The Study of the State

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The Study of the State

Edited by

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Preface

This volume has a rather long history. As early as 1976, when preparing *The Early State*, we considered the possibility of bringing together a group of scholars to discuss a number of problems related to our subject. Different factors prevented pursuing the idea at the time, but when the Xth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences was announced for New Delhi, we seized the opportunity of realizing our plan.

We invited a number of scholars from various disciplines — anthropologists, historians, archeologists, political scientists — to participate in a special conference on The Study of the State. Nineteen were able to attend. We were most fortunate in finding an excellent conference room in the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and the Department of History of that university acted as host. We owe Professor Romila Thapar a great debt of gratitude for arranging all this. The only thing we could offer in return was a meeting worthy of the university's high standards. Dr. Sudharshan Seneviratne willingly undertook the many tasks required to make everything run smoothly.

We greatly regret that not all the colleagues who accepted the invitation actually attended. For various reasons, Dr. Marc Abélès (Paris, France), Dr. Leonid Andreyev (Moscow, U.S.S.R.), Dr. Lucien Bäck (Kigala, Rwanda), Professor Ronald Cohen (Evanston, U.S.A.), Dr. Susan Drucker-Brown (Cambridge, U.K.), Dr. Anatolii Khazanov (Moscow, U.S.S.R.), and Mr. Frank Perlin (Leiden, The Netherlands) could not join us. Their papers, however, were

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presented in New Delhi by colleagues familiar with the subject matter. With a few exceptions all the papers presented at the conference are included in this volume.

During the sessions on The Study of the State, we profited from the participation of several scholars, who were only able to join the discussions for a day or two. Professors Maurice Godelier (Paris, France), Lawrence Krader (Berlin) and Jérôme Rousseau (Montreal, Canada) attended the first day. Dr. Serghei Arutiunov (Moscow, U.S.S.R.) made many contributions in the two days he was present.

We feel that the Conference on The Study of the State was a fruitful opportunity to exchange ideas. The papers collected in this volume have all been amended and corrected considerably as a result of the meetings. We think that what we learned from each other made the cost of bringing together a group of scholars from all over the world worthwhile. We are proud that more than twenty participants from different countries and a wide variety of scientific and ideological backgrounds were able to share their ideas for several days in an atmosphere of openness and cordiality. Such a spirit helps facilitate progress in knowledge and understanding in a short time.

This same spirit of understanding and cooperation guided us in writing the summary chapter in which we tried to pinpoint the essence of the many contributions. We sent a draft of it to all participants asking them to see whether their views were presented correctly and to comment upon the ideas we put forward. They all reacted in a most positive way and, though the comments were sometimes rather critical, our intentions were never faulted. We have tried to do justice to all comments and suggestions. Where we have failed to do so, it is our responsibility alone. Our colleagues, of course, cannot be held responsible for this last chapter in any way.

In connection with the summary chapter we mention with gratitude the excellent comments of Professor Gregory A. Johnson (New York, U.S.A.), and Professor M. Estellie Smith (Oswego, U.S.A.), who wrote some most stimulating (and critical) letters, and gave us the benefit of her wide knowledge of the literature.

We also want to express our gratitude to the friends and colleagues of the Leiden Institute of Cultural and Social Studies. The Board of the Institute provided us with a grant which enabled

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us to have the greater part of the manuscript edited by Mrs. Vicky Vlek-Baker. Martin van Bakel, in his quiet way, took over the teaching and administrative duties of Henri Claessen several times, thus enabling him to give his full attention to the completion of the last chapter. Renée Hagesteijn and Leo Koolen undertook the unenviable task of typing and retyping parts of the manuscript. Renée Hagesteijn also helped with the correspondence, without which an international volume like this cannot come into existence.

A final word of thanks goes to let Claessen and Dagmar Skalníková, who patiently endured our absent-mindedness during the long periods of preparing the conference and the manuscript.

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1 'Sacred Kingship' and Formation of the State

MARC ABÉLÈS

1. INTRODUCTION

It is still difficult today to define or even to characterize the set of ritualistic or political phenomena which have recurred in a large number of African societies, and which are known by the name of 'sacred kingship' or 'divine kingship'. However, there is no shortage of ethnographic data and shrewd analyses. We should be wary of these denominations as Lange was, who stated that 'the mass of literature dealing with divine kingship is largely characterized by metaphysical flight of fancy' (1973:1). In fact, whatever the future of such expressions as 'sacred kingship' or 'divine kingship' may be, the reality of the coalescence of politics and religion and the conditions of functioning of this original type of state remain to be explained.

Without wishing to explain these 'superstructural' forms exhaustively, we shall try to bring out the essential contradictions which they stage and the manner in which they manipulate them. For this purpose, we shall attempt to situate the problem of sacred kingship in a more general perspective of a materialist and historical questioning of the formation of the state. There are two reasons for this: (1) sacred kingship is synonymous with the process of autonomy of politics which places the state *in* and *above* the society; (2) this process being contradictory itself, it is the ethnological investigation of this contradiction which will allow us to make more progress in the characterization of the principal

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and especially ideological aspects of the process of autonomy, and thus of the formation of the state. (This approach will prove more satisfactory than adding to the innumerable comments upon Marxist texts.)

In several African societies dominated by a centralized authority which is inherited in one social segment (clan, lineage, patri- or matrilineal), we can observe the extreme importance delegated to the royal function, though many authors have also stressed the brittleness of the royal person. This is a curious paradox: the king is the incarnation of divinity; he appears as the guarantor of the natural order, the only one who can restore the world after a catastrophy, and the one whose weaknesses are sufficient to provoke tragedy. But the man-king, the person who holds the title is never protected against death. At the slightest sexual, intellectual or physical weakness he must be executed.

The erudite revelations of Frazer on the 'men-gods' scandalized anthropologists for a long time. It is true that the reconstructions, the poetical evocations which appear in *The Golden Bough*, had something which left field-workers skeptical. How could one admit that the ruler of the universe was also a living man in danger of dying? Other questions also arose: was the king really put to death ritually as was indicated by the first studies on divine kingship among Shilluk, Ibo, Yoruba? Did one have to deal with a man-god or simply with a priest-king?

The precariousness of the supreme government and its dependence on the society were confirmed in a central fact. The representation of a king as a scapegoat constitutes an element of a more global logic. The king is in fact always playing a role, not only because he incarnates a legitimacy which transcends his person, but also because in this type of regime the king is represented as a character in a play, in a 'drama', as so subtly noted by Kuper (1947:197). It is therefore necessary to take seriously the set of practices which fills the gap between the heart that is always vulnerable to power, and its endless source.

In the divine kingship, or rather the political system which this expression connotes, the process of autonomy is quite clear without breaking the primordial and symbolic link. The periodic reiteration of the real or simulated execution of the king, or simply the threat that looms over him, suffices to define the constraints of the royal game. It would be naive to think that death is the

sanction for impotence. On the other hand, to present the murder of the king as a revenge of society against him, for his being a violator of the social order (Makarius 1970) is hardly a satisfactory rationalization. Certainly these two opposite characteristics of the king as a subversive and as a scapegoat denote royal action and royal passion respectively. This most striking association of omnipotence and impotence evokes a contradiction. On the one hand, the king belongs to the whole society, and on the other, he finds himself projected above society; he is a living incarnation of society as a whole, transcending its members.

The first term of the contradiction implies a total control of the population over the royal person, a symbolic mediation: when an unfortunate event takes place (epidemic, war) the king may be used, according to the interpretation of this event, as an actor or as a patient; the sacrificing king is also the sacrificed king, as Girard points out (1972). The omnipotence of the society is manifest in this sense. The divine king is merely a subject. The second term of the contradiction consists in the projection of the king above the society as a living incarnation of it; the king is transferred to a superior level, a transcended position. At the same time it is necessary, whatever may be the destiny of the royal person, that the kingship perpetuates itself. Among the social formations, a clan or a lineage will constitute a differentiated stratum full of claims to the symbolic preeminence and prerogatives of the king. The rites of sacred kingship are centered on the social drama in which all members of the society take part. Here, the institution/societal representation is brought into play in order to reinforce itself, but the power of any one clan is questioned.

The above elucidation of the constitutive contradiction present in this political form has allowed us to explain the recurrence of significant elements, which are also the structural principles of sacred kingship in several societies.

2. KINGS UNDER CONTROL

We shall now attempt to sum up the set of pertinent elementary recurrences. The enthroning of the king is characterized by a veritable taking-into-possession of the elected person. Among the Nyakyusa the king (lwembe) was chosen alternatively from the

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two senior lineages of Mwampondele and Mwakisisya. The priests took the elected man and placed him on a sacred skin: 'and then he cannot run away, it is taboo', relates a Nyakyusa priest. The king is secluded in a hut 'just as a nubile girl'. The Nyakyusa were afraid of the idea of becoming *lwembe*. However, they did not have the right to refuse this function. The priest who held the king in the hut implored him: 'You are the Lion, the Leopard, the Snake, the Banana . . .' (Wilson, 1959:23).

In a very different context, among the Rukuba of Nigeria the chosen king is literally arrested. Those who select the king are called 'those of the rope' because he will thereafter be tied to the kingship. The ritual assistant 'catches this child'; he is sometimes said to 'catch that young girl for us'. The king will then go to his maternal uncle where his head is shaven as a sign of mourning. Once the uncle agrees to release the king the latter is resuscitated. He is dressed as a child at the end of initiation and does not receive his new status until having drunk a special beverage.

It is as if the enthroning, consisting of violence on the part of community and a loss of identity of the elected, was preceded by a process of social regression. This is clear during the enthronement of the Shilluk king (reth): 'you are a Dinka slave; we want to kill you'. The chosen man dies symbolically a first time. He will not be considered as a member of his own clan any more. During seven days the Rukuba king symbolizes a dead person. In the same way the lwembe of the Nyakyusa is isolated, kept at a distance from his sociological ties. The representation erases the royal clan behind the Dinka slave; the two poles of the social scale, the king and the slave, are not recognizable except from their function. Like the initiated child and the nubile girl, the Rukuba kings and the Nyakuysa wait before appearing on stage; Muller (1975:18) rightly speaks of 'les coulisses de l'intronisation'.

The people take care of the divine king during the rest of his life; it means that the society has the power of life and death over the king. There are medicines reserved exclusively for the royal bodies. Some consider this to be a symbol of omnipotence. I prefer to see it as a symbol of the ascendancy of the social group. The two interpretations are in fact complementary. The king lives apart from his subjects and receives medicines which are associated with his special powers. The Swazi king receives at puberty a particular concoction prepared by an expert belonging to a special

lineage. Every year at the time of a large festival, the *incwala*, the king is treated with drugs which should regenerate him. National priests are charged to find medical plants that grow near the sea and certain rivers, to strengthen the king. This big ritual pilgrimage is preliminary to the *incwala*.

Thus, the importance accorded to the prosperity of the royal body shows the people's seizure of the most powerful man, the king himself, always threatening to fall short of the requirements of the representation. Is the sacred king just a poor fetish? In fact, the sovereign is not a passive figure. The anthropologists are prolific on the omnipotence of 'men-gods'. They describe them as the guarantors of the fecundity of herds and of humans, and as the masters of the fertility rites. Among the Nyakyusa the lwembe makes sacrifices in the grove of Lubaga, a hill where his ancestors lived; he needs the cooperation of priests and chiefs. Natural catastrophies are attributed to the incompetence or the failing of the officers, and first of all the lwembe. If the latter violates a taboo, he is admonished by the priests and must give them a bull. The guardian of Lubaga grove is called the 'wife' of the *lwembe*. The lwembe must be an 'instrument of prosperity', like the Rukuba king whose subjects estimate his work on the basis of the size of the harvest. The king is identified with the sacredness of this whole tradition.

The symbolism of territory also closely associates sovereignty with the division of social space among the Swazi. This process begins as soon as the king dies. The young heir and the future queen mother move to a new site where the new capital will be built. The old one is rebuilt in another place. The embryonic capital becomes populated and grows along with the heir. This process is considered complete when the new king marries his first wife. The inauguration of a reign is the occasion of a veritable recentering of space. Each new reign implies a rearrangement of the different territorial units (capital, royal villages, villages of chiefs, villages of commoners). 'The king decides on the alignment of principalities and royal villages' (Kuper 1947:66). The change of capital symbolizes a questioning of the collective spatiality which coincides with the end of a reign.

In less complex territorial systems, this phenomenon is just as visible. Among the Shilluk, where the first phase of the enthronement consists of a mock combat between the southern army and

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the northern one, commanded respectively by the future sovereign and by the effigy of the founder, the kingship is clearly a matter of space; this ritual stages the territorial unity of the social formation. The processes of integration/recentering constitute the royal function in the same way as do the rites of capture, the control of the chosen king's life, and the ritualistic tasks which are assigned to him. The action and passion of a king, who is an instrument of the social entity, are manipulated in an ideological structure which transcends him and his role. We have tried to sketch the efficiency of this system. And yet is it not in reality double-faced?

3. THE OTHER FACE OF SACRED KINGSHIP

The falterings of authors who try to qualify these forms of state organization are extremely significant: 'sacred kingship', 'divine kingship', 'priest-king', 'an-god'. Indeed, the holder of the title is evidently the most powerful man; he is the omnipotent. The ambivalence is clear among the Nyakuysa, where the king acts as the first of the priests during the rites of Lubaga. We have seen that a good cooperation is necessary between the *lwembe* and the other officiants. But kingship not only implies competence. After his enthronement the *lwembe* becomes a terrifying personage; he is too strong and cannot be approached without danger by commoners.

Powerful and omnipotent; maker of space and enclosed in a space apart; social instrument and agent impossible to control; prisoner for life (dead temporarily) and holder of powers of life and death. This series of opposite terms determine the two aspects of kingship. The opposite terms belong to the same symbolic axis, and one may pass from one to the opposite without breaking the continuity. Thus the paradoxical appearance of power is reinforced by the permanent drama which constitutes the system of transformations on these symbolic axes. We find at this level the nodal contradiction of a state where the ritual/integrative aspect is subsumed by the domination/coercion aspect, all contributing to the consolidation of the power of one clan. Indeed, the same processes assure the representation of power (the king as a social operator) and the realisation of this power (the king possessing power of domination).

The projection of kingship above society is made evident by the relation of the king to the taboos. As Makarius (1970) emphasizes, the king transgresses the taboos, but he is also surrounded by taboos. The king is always protected from outside forces by symbolic and sometimes human shields. When the Swazi king reaches puberty, two boys belonging to special clans are chosen to acquire the title of tinsila after a ritualistic exchange of blood with the sovereign. They are supposed to intercept the witchcraft exercised against the inkosi. The latter is also separated from his subjects by other taboos: they are forbidden to approach him, to wear the royal clothes, to use the royal medicines or to commit adultery with the spouses of the king. The constraints of avoidance define a potential danger and isolate not only the royal person, but also the royal function from the rest of society.

Spontaneous deductions are often misleading because they are based on incomplete knowledge. In certain interpretations it is said that approaching the king is taboo because he is too strong. But the association between avoidance and omnipotence cannot be identified as a causal sequence. It is the joining of social belonging and social separation which is primary and constitutive of the representation of power. Differing from Makarius, who searches for the explanation of taboos associated with sovereignty in the common perception of the king as violator of taboos, we are inclined to think that this perception very likely exists, but as an effect derived from the global structure. We cannot underestimate the importance of social transgression, especially that of royal incest.

The existence of a matrimonial relationship, of real or symbolic unions between close parents, is attested in most sacred kingships. We have already pointed out the close association between the *inkosi* and the queen mother among the Swazi. It seems that in interlacustrine Bantu societies incest was a ritual of kingship. According to De Sousberghe (De Heusch 1958), the Lunda king sanctioned his union with his sister in one gesture: raising her clothing, he looked at her sex. The case of the Luba, where the king had sexual relations with his own mother, is no doubt the most extreme.

It is worth noting that the unions between king and sister are condemned to sterility. The pretenders to the throne, according to the dynastic rules, are never the sons of the ruler's sister. The 8 Marc Abélès

alliances between consanguines, therefore, do not have the function of preserving and reinforcing royal heredity. Incest does not constitute the means of assuring the reproduction of a superior stratum of rulers (hyper endogamy), neither is it the nec plus ultra of transgression. We must distinguish two aspects of this phenomenon. The first aspect refers to the powers of fertility and fecundity which the dominated people attribute to this exceptional association between people of the same lineage and of the same blood. The second aspect is the 'sociologically incestuous' nature of these unions, to adopt the expression of De Heusch (1958).

The apparent violation of exogamic constraints imposes a double rule. Under very diverse forms, since kings may marry uterine sisters, half-sisters, or even close relatives, which are prohibited to commoners, we find a similar negation of the usual matrimonial rules. It is worthwhile to note that these common rules apply to the other members of the royal clan. We can conclude that this transgression is in fact an indicator of the autonomy of power. The king appears liberated from all dependence on the collectivity. He is situated outside the exogamic game, 'hors du circuit matrimonial qui fonde la société vulgaire' (De Heusch 1958).

In short-circuiting the exogamic process the sovereign places himself outside his clan. We saw that the king entering in representation loses his noble privileges to become the Dinka slave among the Shilluk, or the initiated among the Rukuba. The Bushong say that the king and the sorcerer do not know shame because they live 'above society'. Vansina, who quotes this conception of royal incest, notes also that in acceding to the supreme power the king becomes an outcast. The Swazi say that 'a king is king by his people' and that 'a king is not followed'. The sovereign no longer belongs to a clan and cannot, strictly speaking, have any relative. 'Il est hors clan par construction', as Adler emphasizes well with respect to the Lere king who marries without bridewealth, outside of matrimonial circuits (1973:122).

One may object to this viewpoint, holding that the king also acts as a reproducer of a dynasty and works in such a way for his own clan. However, it is as if the most highly regarded union had a higher function than giving birth to an heir. Among the Swazi the two first wives of the king are also 'blood sisters' who have no right to give birth to the heir. The couple heir/queen mother is designated by a council of parents after the king's death. We

notice that the first wives and the principal wife have a very distinctive status. The succession remains in the last resort an affair of lineage and population. In the council which selects the heir we only find the representatives of the deceased's patrilineage and of the dead ruler's mother who is said to 'stand for the people'. The distinction between the begetting-wife and the sisterwife is a part of the global logic of sacred kingship: the king symbolically breaks off links of lineage to form together with the first queens, his queen mother and his blood brothers the ritualistic unit which guarantees social and natural order. The begetting of the heir is hidden and is neither a benevolent nor a malevolent influence on the course of things.

It is only at the death of the king that the dominant clan and the society recover the reproductive function invalidating the succession and inaugurating the process of spatial redistribution of the kingdom. Contrary to our European kingship of divine right, where dynastic heredity played an essential role, in these societies the king has a function of cosmic reproducer on behalf of the entire society.

The powers of fecundity and fertility, the first aspect of the phenomenon of royal incest, are not a consequence of transgression according to any metaphysical inversion from evil to good. The rupture with common forms of exogamy liberates the royal power. It escapes the clan's interests as much as the ascendancy of the community. A simple apparatus functions: the association of the couples of king/mother, king/sister(s)-wife(wives) the application of ritualistic procedures is enough for the periodic reiteration of the world, since henceforth the kingship shall have risen above the society and can act directly with cosmic phenomena. The king is no longer a procreator. Inversely, the king is recognized as procreator a posteriori, when he has disappeared as cosmic reproducer.

4. KINGSHIP IN REPRESENTATION AND THE CRISES OF IDEOLOGY

The king is at the summit of his power, but the social determinations of kingship are not at all erased. At the time of the selection of the heir, the stake appears clearly. It is a question of achieving the unity of the social formation under the domination of one 10 Marc Abélès

clan. But with this procedure the power increases in efficiency to the extent that it frees itself from its terrestrial grounds. Exemplary in this regard is the growth of the Swazi sovereign whose maturity is sanctioned by the existence of a new capital.

The cyclic character of the reigns reflects the permanent tension between the clanish and social belonging of the institution on the one hand, and the autonomy necessary for its efficiency on the other hand. The fateful destiny of the king gives his omnipotence its exact limits. The benefit of power always incurs a debt. The surplus of power which creates the omnipotence will be restored to the subjects; this is the meaning of the king's murder, even if the murder is a symbolic one as among the Rukuba. With the execution of the king, it is the omnipotence which comes back to the social circuit where it is soon to be reinvested: the rite serves to 'réparer le monde' (Muller 1975:24). To subvert the royal power is not only to reinforce kingship, but also to recreate the cosmic order. There is a kind of periodic crisis of ideology, which corresponds to its reappropriation by those who are its real subjects.

The kingship is, by definition, unstable insofar as it is derived from consensus and cannot be imposed by coercion. As kingship is constructed with reference to the concept of a natural order, it is logical that the cyclical recovery of the royal omnipotence by the social group implies a more general stir. The world is to be created again among the Swazi. The annual *incwala* ceremony condenses in its successive phases the mourning of the king, the first fruits rites, the regeneration of the royal person, the unification of the whole society around the *inkosi* and the feasts which inaugurate the new year. In the *incwala*, the contradictory effects of the institution of sacred kingship appear on the stage. 'You hate him (the king)' as it is sung: the sacred kingship is intolerable, and this is sung at the very moment that the king is regenerated and will demonstrate his omnipotence as a vertiable 'bull' of the country. The reign has reached its term.

In these sad mourning songs we find the ambivalence of the relation between the people and the sovereign. The enemies (those who 'hate the child king'), in the interpretation of Selby and Msimang (Kuper 1947:207), are 'not necessarily from the outside, but may be members of the royal family or tribesmen'. In fact all the Swazi hate the king at this moment; they will applaud him

after his ritual treatment, after having chased away the real foreigners and the symbolic ones (the dominant clan): it is the first phase of the social reappropriation of power. The second phase, the great day of the *incwala*, also begins with melancholic songs. The king is not dead, the king is naked. Everything starts again.

'The work of a king is indeed heavy', as an old Swazi has said. But as soon as the inkosi joins the nation to which he transmits his power, the royal clan reacts by inviting him to leave the country. They seek to regain possession of the sovereignty by separating their own parent from the people. Kuper suggests two interpretations: the royal clan wants to take out the king and to leave the country; or, on the contrary, the royal clan provokes the king and expresses its hate for him. The songs and the dances are indeed ambiguous. On the one hand, the clan encircles the king; it is omnipresent as it was during the whole life of the sovereign. On the other hand, the king escapes from his clan, and it is the trick of sovereignty that the omnipotent disposseses the dominant members of power. The excluded clan gives way. It is now the turn of the people to control their king. At this point, a last symbolic reversal: in throwing the gourd, the king returns the ball to his people.

The 'rituals of rebellion', as termed by Gluckman (1963) are not a type of catharsis. They do not resolve the social conflict by restoring a spectacular unity. On the contrary, in sacred kingship the constituent contradictions of a state's power function in a system of ritualistic reversals: from the intolerable to the necessary, from the necessary to the intolerable, and again from the intolerable to the necessary, etc. Finally recovered, the king must become what he was: the omnipotent. Separated from his people, however, he belongs to the dominant clan. Yet he emancipates himself from this clan and comes back once again to the society, but only to reescape immediately. There is no term limiting the game of sacred kingship.

'Sacred kingship', 'divine kingship', the words are not essential! We find with this phenomenon a typical transitory form, a non-state/state¹: a state, because the process of autonomy is well realized; but a nonstate, because it does not operate as an instrument of a dominant class. This form manifests the real efficiency of the ideological process. It consists of a symbolic manipulation

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of a double relationship: (a) between the king and the society: the first is in and above the second; and (b) between the society itself and the royal clan (lineage, line) which, on account of the function occupied by one of them (the king), tends to rise above society.

But such is the weight of the ideological process in these societies where power functions first with ideology so that the king becomes the incarnation of the society and rises above it. This can happen only because he ruptures symbolically with his clan in such a way that the royal stratum cannot, by definition, occupy the dominant position. The king does not belong to his clan anymore; the king's clan is no longer the royal clan. In practice this situation has an important consequence: it impedes the development of an exploiting class which would base its dominance on ritual and political preeminence. Such primacy belongs only to the king. Thus, we understand this periodic reiteration of the drama which stages the double contradiction between the king and the society and between the king and its clan: it is indeed a drama, not a revolution. We are not dealing with the society against the state, but the state against the formation of classes, the state as factor of instability.

NOTES

- 1. Using this concept of nonstate/state, I refer to the Marxist question of transition as a contradictory process. We must not forget that this question was dealt with by Marx in a large number of texts, and again by Bukharin ('Towards a theory of the imperialist state', in The Revolution of the Right, Moscow 1925) and Lenin (The Blue Notebook 1916' Editions Complexes, collection Dialectiques 1976, and, of course, The State and Revolution 1918). But Marx, Bukharin, and Lenin consider in these texts the transition to classless society (communist society). They try to define a specific transitory state which may be called: state/nonstate. In my opinion, state/nonstate and nonstate/state are two symmetrical processes. If we compare the early state with the 'ultimate state', and we use the theoretical-political Marxist corpus (we have not to stick to the Marxist texts upon precapitalist societies; see for instance how Marx himself, in the Ethnological Notebooks makes a connection between the ethnological problems and his political reflections). We see that:
 - (1) As there is not one end of the state, there is not one origin of the state; we have to understand two dialectical processes.
 - (2) When they try to understand the transition to the classless society,

Bukharin and Lenin are obliged to distinguish the two components of the ultimate state: a broken state and a disappearing state. In a symmetrical way, the early state is an appearing state which is not yet constructed. The state begins to stand above society, but does not stabilize class domination, as I tried to demonstrate elsewhere (Abélès 1974, 1978). The study of sacred kingship, as a specific form of nonstate/state shows, on the contrary, that the double process of appearance and construction of the state impedes the constitution of class antagonism.

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2 Traditional Rwanda: Deconsecrating a Sacred Kingdom

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1. INTRODUCTION

The first Europeans who set foot on the territory of what is today the Rwandese republic are said to be O. Baumann in 1892 and the Count A. von Goetzen in 1894. For this country as well as for neighboring Burundi this was the prelude to more than twenty years of German administration. In 1919 the territories became a common trusteeship of the League of Nations controlled by Belgium. The same administration continued to exist under the United Nations Organization from 1945 until 1962, when both countries gained formal independence.

In Rwanda the European administrators faced a traditional form of political government with the *umwaami* at its top, which was not to be overthrown until the social revolution of 1959 to 1962 coinciding with the struggle for formal independence. The system has often been described as a 'sacred kingdom' or 'absolute monarchy'. Colonial administration was thus a kind of indirect rule.

By the standards of ethnographic research of the day, a good number of the first administrators and missionaries were well prepared for the task of describing the country and its people. Their work was based partly on direct observation of the present and partly on collection and evaluation of the sources of oral history about the past. Baumann and von Goetzen themselves wrote about their expeditions (Baumann 1894; Von Goetzen 16 Lucien R. Bäck

1895). More detailed accounts were given by R. Kandt (1900, 1901, 1905) and J. Czekanowski (1917). Thereafter, under Belgian rule, an abundant literature was produced on Rwanda (see references).

However, the various ethnographers also brought with them a good deal of prejudice. Being integrated in administrative and mission work, their approaches were characterized by their authors' attempt to gain control over the country in one way or another. Most unfortunately, we do not as yet have a sufficiently thorough account of the background of German and Belgian intervention in this part of Africa. The role of the missions would deserve special attention in such a work (see Linden 1977).

One of the leading Belgian scholars, M. D'Hertefelt, has recently observed that the historiography of Rwanda by no means gives the satisfaction that might be expected from a literature of its size. Based exclusively on oral sources as well as on their interpretation and their reinterpretation, the literature appears as a collection of well-intended beliefs and suppositions rather than a body of factual knowledge (1971:26). The author doubts if any new material from oral traditions will be added in the future. One reason is that even the oldest living persons cannot possibly remember the details of what happened before and during the European intrusion in Rwanda. Another reason is that the society of Rwanda has undergone a period of profound change since the revolution of 1959-1962, which has, among other things, interrupted the oral transmission from one generation to the next (1971:22-23). D'Hertefelt expects new data from archeological research only. So far, however, the little existing evidence does not confirm anything we know about the evolution of the monarchy from the oral sources (1971:76-77).

The constraints of empirical verification certainly hamper Rwandese historiography, but they may have been slightly overestimated. Since 1968 a new generation of scholars, many of whom have been trained in a different tradition of empirical work, have carried out a number of stimulating investigations. Authors like A.L. Des Forges (1972), C.A. Newbury (1976), J.F. Saucier (1974) and C. Vidal (1969, 1971, 1974) have worked with popular and local sources, which had previously not received systematic attention (cf. Vansina 1962:35-38). At least concerning the more recent past, we are confronted with carefully collected data from

different regions of what is now the Rwandese republic shedding new light on some of the assumptions of older scholars.

2. THE POPULATION AND ITS COMPOSITION

Before taking up the problem of the political structure of traditional Rwanda, it may be useful to examine the composition of the population which has often been chosen as a framework of historiographic and ethnographic work.

The population is generally divided into three distinct groups: Hutu (accounting for 82.7 percent of the total population in 1956), Tuutsi (16.6 percent) and Twa (0.7 percent) (D'Hertefelt 1962:18). Their spatial distribution is unequal. In the north and the northwest of the country the overwhelming majority is Hutu. Elsewhere, the Tuutsi and most Twa live interspersed with the Hutu. Despite peculiarities pertaining to the regions and the groups all Rwandese can be said to share a common culture. This is particularly confirmed by the fact that they all speak a common language with minor local variations, *ikinyarwanda*, which is closely related to *ikirundi*, the idiom spoken in neighboring Burundi.

The three groups have been said to differ in their physical traits. The Hutu are generally described as 'Bantu', the Tuutsi as 'Ethiopids' and the Twa as 'Pygmoids' (Maquet 1954:22-23). However, anthropometric data cannot systematically confirm this description (D'Hertefelt 1962:17-18). The division of the population into Hutu, Tuutsi and Twa thus seems to be an essentially social reality.

The general trend in Rwandese historiography has been to assume that Hutu, Tuutsi and Twa are specific ethnic groups which arrived in the region at different times. The Twa are said to be the oldest inhabitants of Rwanda, followed by the Hutu, who are assumed to have penetrated the region sometime during the first millenium of our era. The Tuutsi are said only to have arrived during the thirteenth century. There is no evidence at all as to the Twa's or the Hutu's arrival, and assumptions as to the immigration of the Tuutsi were inferred from local sources only (D'Hertefelt 1962:17) and linked to the belief that certain amooko (see below) were all Tuutsi in the past (D'Hertefelt 1971:23-47). On the other hand, the fact that Hutu and Tuutsi speak one

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language and share a common culture suggests that they must have lived together for much longer than merely a few centuries, if they are not actually of common stock. The factors that may have interfered with the peopling of Africa are so numerous, the time span under consideration so enormous, and the actual evidence for one or another hypothesis so limited that a good deal of the relevant discussion must be considered as highly speculative (cf. A. Southall, in M. Posnansky 1966:60-81).

What makes the belief that Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa are of different biological stock rather awkward is that, apart from this, the Tuutsi are supposed to be naturally superior to the Hutu. We find this bias especially in the writings of A. Kagame, but also in the work of J. Maquet. Kagame's great merit is that he made many sources known and accessible for the first time (1943, 1947, 1951, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1969). But being one of the first national members of the Catholic clergy of Rwanda, and at the same time sharing the obligations and the partly secret knowledge of the traditional court, he represents the Tuutsi as the genuine bearers of the highly complex political and social organization of Rwanda – one which may have been brought to the region by these immigrants or at least developed by them on the spot. He often refers to the Tuutsi as 'Hamites' because of their supposedly 'Ethiopid' origin. In a recent piece of writing D'Hertefelt strongly criticized Kagame for his 'racist' bias (1971:31), making reference to E.R. Sanders' critique of the 'Hamitic' hypothesis which is rather widespread in Africanist literature. This hypothesis claims 'that everything of value found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race' (Sanders 1969: This hypothesis was introduced into research on Central Africa by J.H. Speke (1863). Sanders observes: 'Such a viewpoint had a dual merit for European purposes: it maintained the image of the Negro as an inferior being and it pointed to the alleged fact that development could come to him only by mediation of the white race' (Sanders 1969:529).

Kagame and Maquet as well as D'Hertefelt in an earlier work (1962) based their argument that the Tuutsi accounted for the elite partly on what Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa did economically as functional groups. Especially Hutu and Tuutsi are said to have been distinguished from one another by their economic specializations. The most important activity was agriculture (without the

use of manure, the main instruments of labor being the hoe and the pruning knife) practiced by the Hutu. This activity was supposedly despised by the Tuutsi and many Twa (Maquet 1954; D'Hertefelt 1962:25-26). The Tuutsi are said to have specialized in sedentary cattle breeding, which was practiced with limited economic output. Cattle breeding was claimed to be of great social and political importance (D'Hertefelt 1962:26-27).

If the Tuutsi could not live on what they specialized in, and if they did not participate in production of subsistence crops, it is logical to assume some type of class structure along the line of division into the two main groups. A special feature of the Tuutsi subculture was said to be their disdain for food — they rarely ate anything in public but pretended to nourish themselves by drinks such as milk, banana and sorgho beer, as well as mead made of honey. This peculiarity would then be explained as an attempt to hide their dependence on what the Hutu produced.

However, this approach seems to be a simplification based on the stereotype of the Hutu being the man of the hoe and the Tuutsi the man of the cow. This separation may at any time have been a norm rather than a straightforward fact. At any rate, we know that cattle breeding was de facto practised to an important extent by the Hutu (D'Hertefelt 1971:75), and it cannot be excluded that many Tuutsi also participated in agriculture. Many members of the elite may have been Tuutsi, but the reverse cannot be assumed by itself, i.e., perhaps even a majority of all Tuutsi did not belong to the elite. On the other hand, Hutu may have been members of the elite, especially in regions where Tuutsi were not numerous.

D'Hertefelt has recently made an attempt to tackle the problem of the importance of the Hutu/Tuutsi dichotomy by drawing attention to a social category of traditional Rwanda called ubwooko (plural amooko), rendered by him as 'clans' (1971). It is distinguished from kinship groups by the fact that nowadays all three groups — Hutu, Tuutsi and Twa — are represented in each ubwooko. Membership is determined by agnatic descent, but it is not a corporate group; it has no chief, no internal organization, and no specific procedures to settle matters of common interest. Its members are scattered over the country (1971:3). Although it is difficult to assess whether all or most amooko are of Hutu or Tuutsi origin, the fact that Hutu, Tuutsi and Twa find themselves

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united in each *ubwooko* is explained by D'Hertefelt by a certain social mobility observed by earlier ethnographers like Czekanowski (1917:242) and L. De Lacger (1939-1940, 1961:40). For example, the offspring of a Tuutsi and his client's daughter serving his wife belonged to their father's *ubwooko* but were considered Hutu; any Tuutsi who had become poor could stay in his *ubwooko*, but his children might be Hutu, especially if their mother was Hutu; by contrast, some Hutu holding political offices might have married a Tuutsi woman and thus be considered Tuutsi. Cases of mere adoption were also observed (D'Hertefelt 1971:56-58).

These observations confirm that the Hutu-Tuutsi dichotomy was an essentially social reality which existed at least into the twentieth century. Another question is the content to be given to these social categories. We already discarded the attempt to describe them as ethnic groups, as this would mean distinguishing them by their origin (which is not proven), by their economic specialization (which is difficult to specify) and/or by their language and culture (where no essential differences exist). Whether they were or became social classes at some time (in Marx's sense of the term 'class') remains an open question, but we should be aware that the Hutu were not the producers and the Tuutsi did not account for the exploiting elite.

In the literature we find a rather consistent assumption that the Hutu are somehow inferior and the Tuutsi somehow superior. This may be due rather to the ethnographers' prejudice than to actual reality at the time when the European influence was but marginal. We should remember that the oral sources make no mention of Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa. The Tuutsi's arrival as an ethnic group was rather inferred from the ethnic character of certain amooko, which in turn is doubtful. Early ethnographers may have found it useful to apply an easygoing frame of reference to a highly complex social reality. Being administrators or missionaries at the same time, they may have tended to influence this very social reality directly or indirectly by basing their administrative and educational policies on these categories. This would explain why there has been a growing sense of affiliation with 'ethnic' groups among the Rwandese themselves during colonial rule to the point that a good deal of the social revolution of 1959-1962 was centered on these issues. Later ethnographers (e.g., Newbury, Saucier, Vidal) may indeed have found Hutu, Tuutsi,

and Twa as fairly distinct functional groups in many ways, but their findings in this matter would not be applicable to the precolonial situation.

3. THE 'SACRED KINGDOM'

The assumption that traditional Rwanda was a 'sacred kingdom' or an 'absolute monarchy' centered on the *umwaami* (or king) was made especially by scholars like A. Kagame and J. Maquet. The *umwaami* was thus divine and his legislative and executive power was without appeal. He personified the well-being of the country. His succession was determined by a royal code of conduct (*ubwiiru*), but usually one of the former king's sons acceded to the throne. This event did not always take place peacefully, and often the death of an *umwaami* was followed by a period of competition and disorder. An additional indication of the king's royalty was his possession of a royal drum called Kalinga (*kariinga*).

The king's government was supported by three institutions: the queen mother, who was closely associated with the king and who even lost her power if he died before her; the abiiru representing the most important strata of the country, whose task was to preserve the ubwiiru and to perform the rituals indispensable for the well-being of Rwanda; and last but not least, the great chiefs' council, which was occasionally held on the initiative of the king. One of the chiefs was usually the king's favorite; he had the useful function of being blamed for controversial decisions of the king, as the umwaami was essentially good and could not be attacked (Maquet 1954:146-150).

According to Kagame the most important political institutions of traditional Rwanda were the social armies. Every inhabitant of the country was a member of one of them (1952:21). Each of them comprised a certain number of the smallest kin groups, amazu (singular: inzu), to which were attributed cows or pastures. Each kin group was represented before the next higher authorities and before the king by its head, a title which was hereditary except when decided otherwise by the authorities (1952:17-18). A social army was headed by a chief, whose essential task was to train young people belonging to his group (1952:27-28). An army was divided into two sections: the warriors and the shepherds. The

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latter were entitled to tend the royal cattle and the cattle taken as booty (1952:32). On the other hand, it was customary for each inzu head to present one or more cows to his chief on social occasions (1952:32-37). Regular duties were due to the court from each social army (1952:45-50). In return, each member of an army enjoyed the protection of his army chief in case of dispute (1952:37-43). As a rule, a king could form but a single social army during his reign, which could not be dissolved thereafter, although it might be combined with another by decision of the king (1952:21).

Apart from the organization into social armies, the country was governed by an administrative code with the highest authority being attributed to the king. The interior of the country was divided into civil districts called ibikingi (singular: igikingi). At the head of each of them the king nominated a land chief (umunyabutaka) and a pasture chief (umunyamukenke), the former being usually a Hutu and the latter a Tuutsi. The two chiefs were responsible for the duties, which differed for the Hutu and the Tuutsi (Kagame 1952:116-117): the Hutu had to supply labor as well as beans, peas and sorgho grains, whereas the Tuutsi gave milk only. Anyone who refused to pay what was due ran the risk of losing his land (1952:125-126). The duties passed through the hands of local subchiefs (1952:119), who kept the difference between what they obtained and what they had to present (1952:126) and the land chiefs; the latter retained one third of the produce and passed two thirds on to the representative of the king.

The division into *ibikingi* did not apply to land held by army chiefs and peripheral regions, which were placed under the command of army chiefs by the king. These were thus exempt from administrative duties (1952:119). In each *igikingi* there were several royal residences, one of which bore the title of district capital. They constituted the king's direct property and were thus free from any duty. They might sometimes be given to the queens or other members of the royal family (1952:124-125) or be governed by a Twa nominated by the king (1952:118). Other districts that were free from duties were the enclaves of the *abiiru* and the territories of former kings who had been defeated but who had preserved some of their older rights (1952:121-124).

Apart from the organization by social armies and ibikingi,

traditional Rwanda knew clientship called ubuhake, which was considered important especially by Maquet. A person of inferior status offered his services to a person of higher status, who would then give him one or more head of cattle. The client was called umugaragu and the patron shebuja. The king was shebuja to a certain number of eminent clients, who in turn were patrons of clients on lower levels of the population. The organization which affected everyone was thus strictly hierarchical (Maguet 1954: 163). Ubuhake had essentially two purposes according to Maquet: one was to maintain the status quo based on the privileges of the Tuutsi elite, who disposed of the ultimate rights over highly valued goods such as cattle, as well as over agricultural and other produce; another closely related purpose was to promote social cohesion through the protection offered clients by the patrons (1954:158-164). Maguet has become well known for his theory of the 'premise of inequality', which he relates to the fundamental physical and psychological distinction between the three 'castes': Tuutsi, Hutu, Twa. All rights and privileges as well as all duties were acquired by birth, and social mobility was highly restricted. The author stresses the hereditary character of the various administrative, military, and clientship institutions, which determined the ways of behavior of each individual to a far-reaching extent (1954:184-196).

Maquet is one of the authors who obviously identifies the Hutu-Tuutsi dichotomy with the hierarchical organization and underestimates the degree of social mobility that may have existed in traditional Rwanda. The value of his empirical work is limited, as most of his informants seem to have belonged to the elite (1954: 14-15). D'Hertefelt has recently criticized Maquet's work in a very harsh way: although the period to which he refers, the early twentieth century, was characterized by important changes, his work contains little concrete ethnographic information; the 'premise of inequality' is a schematic equilibrium model in the structuralist-functionalist fashion, which is logical and admirable in itself, but which does not take into account the diversity of arrangements in their historical perspective (D'Hertefelt 1971:16-17). The very same criticism can equally be made of the work of Kagame.

An historical perspective was introduced into the study of traditional Rwanda by J. Vansina (1962). He made reference to 24 Lucien R. Bäck

an anonymous study bearing the title 'Historique et chronologie du Ruanda' (1956), which was based on more popular accounts. In the beginning of the sixteenth century Rwanda was a tiny territory situated around Lake Muhazi, occupying only a fragment of what would later be central Rwanda. The first expansion occurred during the sixteenth century towards the west, and most of the territory of central Rwanda was occupied. The task was completed during the seventeenth century, and by 1720 Rwanda began to have influence farther west. It was only during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the south (Bugesera around 1795), the east (Gisaka 1860) and the north (especially Ndorwa and Kiga end of nineteenth century) were more or less incorporated.

Whereas until 1800 the authority of all kings remained contested, the reign of King Yuhi Gahindiro at the beginning of the nineteenth century brought significant innovations to Rwanda. Most important, he split the office of district chief into two: from then on, there was a land and a cattle or pasture chief for each district. This measure may have been influenced by a shortage of pasture land. The two chiefs were thus to be in constant competition with each other before the king (Vansina 1962:70-71). The considerable increase in royal authority was pursued to even greater extremes by King Kigeri Rwaabugiri at the end of the nineteenth century (1962:71-72).

Vansina's approach has been confirmed by a recent empirical investigation, which is clearly systematic and careful. A.L. Des Forges (1972) mentions that King Rwaabugiri did not hesitate to kill his mother when she and her kin opposed his orders. He also replaced many hereditary chiefs by persons of his own liking. Nevertheless, he did not succeed in imposing his intensive administration throughout the country, as the abiiru and certain powerful lineages continued to be either exempt from any duty or to be tributary to the court without intermediaries (1972:14-15). After his death his legitimate successor Rutarindwa was removed from office by a faction (ubwooko) which had so far only supplied queen mothers. Rutarindwa was replaced by Musinga, a 15-year-old boy who was under the strong influence of his mother and his maternal uncle (1972:21-22).

Some of the opponents of this illegitimate accession were killed, but the reign of Musinga was to be characterized by a desperate

fight for power against factions present at court, against other factions trying to get a stronghold through influencing the king, his mother or their advisers, and against notables in the country and peripheral regions not accepting central government. The installation of Musinga and his reign coincided with a growing influence of European colonization and administration. This influence was received with great suspicion by the court at the beginning, but was later accepted with resignation, partly because of the military superiority of the foreigners, partly because the court needed their support in intrigues and fighting in the country. Des Forges stresses that the peripheral regions in the east and the north of the territory conquered by Rwaabugiri remained in constant overt or covert revolt. The Europeans were sometimes asked to protect the population of these regions from the demands of the central government and managed to put pressure on both sides to increase their own power.

Unfortunately, Des Forges' work remains highly descriptive and characterized by a remarkable abstention from analysis. She concentrates on persons and events, and we do not learn much about economic and social arrangements that set the framework for those actions. Vansina hinted at important changes in control over land and cattle during the nineteenth century, but he did not work out this information. However, the findings of both authors suggest that there have always been limits to royal authority and that important regional differences must have existed in Rwanda until the recent past, a fact which neither Kagame's nor Maquet's abstract pictures took into account. Moreover, the obvious bias in Kagame's and Maquet's works and the questionable empirical evidence in support of their assumptions cast doubt on the adequacy of their models even in central Rwanda. Both questions will now be examined in greater detail.

4. THE SETTING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

There is no other way to overcome the 'centralist' and 'elitist' bias of most of the older literature on Rwanda (D'Hertefelt 1971) and to gain an insight into the setting of the various institutions in their historical perspective than to carry out systematic empirical work in the different regions of the country. We must, however,

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be aware of the generally unfavorable situation described above.

One of the encouraging studies pursued recently is C.A. Newbury's research in Kinyaga (southwestern Rwanda). This region underwent a period of profound change between the end of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth. According to this author, the preeminent social parameters in this peripheral region had been kinship and residential location, kin groups performing corporate political functions. Clientship was introduced in Kinyaga at the end of the nineteenth century, central chiefs and local collaborators using this institution to divide and fragment Kinyagan lineages. This innovation contributed to the emergence of rigid social stratification, characterized by but not totally coincident with the division into Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa. However, political separation and exploitation favored the development of a consciousness of oppression among dominated groups in Kinyaga, which resulted in the emergence of horizontal cohesion for the purpose of combating domination. Newbury confirms the widespread hypothesis that clientship was essentially a relation of This is not quite consistent with the findings of oppression. another author, J.F. Saucier (1974), who studied ubuhake in southern Rwanda.

Most previous authors had believed that this patron-client relationship was a generalized institution in the twentieth century even to the extent of every inhabitant of Rwanda being involved. At least in the region where Saucier carried out his research, this belief seems not to be supported by fact. Only 8.2 percent of his informants' grandfathers had been involved in ubuhake. As far as the informants' fathers' generation was concerned, coinciding roughly with the colonial period, this percentage rose to 16.9. Saucier views this institution as a multi-faceted, complex one based on a solemn and formal agreement in which the inferior party gracefully acknowledges the patron's protection. He stresses the strong personal links which extended as long as the patrons considered the agreement a quasi adoption. Ubuhake seems to have been considered a comparatively clement institution: at the time of Saucier's fieldwork in 1972, twelve years after the social revolution, 34.9 percent of his informants gave a positive judgment on ubuhake (25.6 % of the Hutu informants and 56.1 % of the Tuutsi).

Saucier's findings in southern Rwanda were confirmed by the

research of C. Vidal (1969, 1971, 1974). She bases her work partly on land surveys of a Belgian administrator, J. Reissdorf (1952) and partly on investigations carried out by herself in both central and peripheral regions. By asking a sufficient number of informants about their individual family history, she found out that ubuhake was limited in western and eastern Rwanda to a few Tuutsi who had accepted cattle from their superiors. Hutu clients were not frequent even in central Rwanda. Mostly, a single important member of a lineage depended on a shebuja, and one may infer that the institution constituted a relation between social groups rather than between individuals. Vidal claims that about 85 percent of the patrons were political chiefs who had great influence in a local setting. (Saucier came to similar conclusions in southern Rwanda: cf. 1974:274.) Only a very small number of Tuutsi were directly linked to the *umwaami*. Vidal stresses the fairly independent position of the army chiefs as well as that of the land and cattle chiefs to whom produce and labor were due. These chiefs had to pass on to the court only a limited amount of what they had obtained.

According to Vidal, there were other systems than ubuhake by which the rich could extract surplus produce and labor from the population. Some Hutu had to give beans and sorgho (ipfukire and urutete respectively), whereas those who were residents of a pastoral plot had to work two days out of five for their patrons (ubuletwa) (1969). Further relation was conceded only to those with whom the patron would eventually share a drink, whereas ubuletwa did not imply any personal bond. Another custom consisted of the patron's giving a hoe to a poor man, for which the latter had to work two days out of five on his fields. The informants ascertained that this relation was much more valued than yet another based on mere labor for kind carried out by day laborers called abacancuro. Economically speaking, the abacancuro who worked with their own instruments of labor were better off than those who cultivated with a rich man's hoe. But the general opinion was that those who had nothing else to offer than their own labor and who did not enjoy any special commitment of the patrons were to be despised by society. Those who worked permanently under this scheme belonged to the poorest strata of society, lacking land to provide for their own needs. The abacancuro, whose employment was sometimes occasional but always

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unstable and impersonal, must have been so numerous as to constitute roughly half the labor force. For every day of labor they received a basket full of beans, sorgho, or sweet potatoes, which was just sufficient for an average family to live on (1974).

Thus only a very limited number of people belonged to the elite which held control over land and cattle, enabling them to keep the larger part of the population at their mercy. For the ordinary people the essential aim was to establish personal relationships with the mighty through gifts, which was possible only if they had been granted enough land and cattle to dispose over a certain surplus beyond the subsistence needs of their own families. Ubuhake was one such personal relationship, but the customs of ipfukire and urutete as well as labor in return for a patron's hoe could also be considered situations of relative well-being. However, the larger part of the population did not possess enough land and other means to produce the necessary surplus. They had to sell their labor force either temporarily or permanently as abacancuro, or if they happened to live on a plot claimed by the patron, supply ubuletwa labor. According to Vidal, it should be noted that surplus produce was not only transferred upward to the rich and redistributed to a limited extent downward to their favorites, but also exchanged 'horizontally' among people of similar status (1974).

Vidal noticed during her fieldwork that informants could often remember ubuhake relations as far back as the reign of Yuhi Gahindiro, which is generally associated with the new organization of political offices coinciding with a relative shortage in land. She infers from this that there was a close connection between the new land-tenure system and the growing importance of pastoral bonds. If ubuhake only existed where there had previously been control over land by the chiefs, this institution had the ideological function of masking the relations resulting under real exploitation. She criticizes previous scholars for having failed to distinguish a social relation (ubuhake) from an economic structure. Cow giving was not the essential means by which the ruling elite appropriated surplus labor and produce for themselves, but by making everybody believe it was an institution which could be expanded, the elite succeeded in building up an ideology that masked the economic structure (1969:396-400).

Vidal notes that the colonial administration replaced the old

land-tenure system going back to Yuhi Gahindiro by a system of taxes, thus leaving *ubuhake* as the only system of personal relationships. This institution thereby took on new functions, which she does not examine in greater detail (1969:400).

Unfortunately, Vidal gives little information about where she collected her data, and her tendency to generalize about Rwanda weakens her argument. However, her findings along with those of Saucier may be said to have introduced a completely new framework into the study of traditional Rwanda based on systematic collection of empirical data. It is not clear whether Newbury's findings in Kinyaga stressing the directly oppressive role of client-ship must be considered as counterevidence or as a misinterpretation of the material. They may also represent what was the factual situation in this peripheral region only.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The limitations of the few empirical studies available obviously prevent drawing general substantive conclusions. Since most authors had to concentrate not only on particular periods and regions, but also on certain aspects of traditional society, we merely have fragments of an enormous puzzle in which many gaps remain. The following conclusions might serve as preliminary hypotheses for any further investigation:

(a) Rwanda was represented by most of the earlier authors as a 'sacred kingdom' or as an 'absolute monarchy'. In the light of more recent empirical research it appears that the role of the umwaami and the court directly associated with him may have been more limited even during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the monarchy succeeded in increasing its influence considerably. Several power groups united by kinship or ubwooko organization competed for accession to the position of king, or at least to that of queen mother or influential advisers. The king always had to take into account the power of the others, and only the most ruthless among them succeeded in extending their influence by nominating officials of their own liking. The army chiefs as well as the land and cattle chiefs acted on behalf of the king in name, but their actual dependence on the monarchy may have been less marked than assumed. The chiefs did satisfy the

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court with gifts which were sufficient to permit it a comfortable life-style. However, the economic distance between the important chiefs and the court seems to have been considerably smaller than that between the elite and the common people. The fact that the central kingdom attempted to subjugate peripheral regions may be explained by the court's need for new sources of revenue, as the chiefs of the central region were too powerful to give the king more than a minimum.

- (b) The stratification of traditional society was blurred by local and imported ideologies. In the first place, those who belonged to the elite made themselves and everyone else believe that all inhabitants of the country benefited from the system that was in existence. As most of the European administrators were introduced to traditional Rwanda by members of the elite, they assumed the same credo. Moreover, European observers chose as a framework for their descriptions the division of society into three groups: Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa. Since this division plays a very subordinate role in the oral sources relating the past, we may assume that it is a social reality introduced or accentuated comparatively late, perhaps even under the direct or indirect influence of the foreigners themselves. A number of assumptions, especially on the origin and characteristics of the Tuutsi, are highly speculative and not free from racist elements. As an indication of social stratification, the division into Hutu, Tuutsi, and Twa is imprecise and even misleading, at least as far as the precolonial situation is concerned.
- (c) Between the rich elite and the larger part of the population living on subsistence economy or 'wage' labor (abacancuro), there was a rather limited 'middle class' attached to the elite by various patron-client relationships. Those who belonged to it had at their disposal a certain surplus from production by which they could obtain protection and material favors from the elite. They could also engage in employing day laborers who contributed to their wealth, as their cost was limited to a minimum. Despite the important economic distance that existed between the rich and the poor, there seems to have been a certain social mobility. However, the frequency of common people becoming clients and clients rising to the status of patrons (or the reverse) has not been examined in detail. If this credo was based on a few individual cases, it may also have been part of the ideology generally adhered to.

- (d) An essential question is how the elite could maintain its position. The role of the ideology that everybody benefited from the system has already been pointed out. The elite disposed of judicial and military means to convince everyone that greater advantage was to be expected from good behavior than from resistance. However, an essential feature may have been the lack of alternatives combined with a comparatively unproductive subsistence economy. It is not clear to what extent land shortage was important in nineteenth- and twentieth-century developments. The resistance to centralist power that was reported especially from peripheral regions could be explained to a certain extent by the presence of external alternatives to submission.
- (e) Traditional Rwanda was based on subsistence agriculture. The output was rather limited, and it was difficult for any peasant to produce more than he and his family needed for survival. However, exchange of produce between cultivators as well as appropriation and limited distribution of surplus by the elite did exist. Any future research should take into account the role of these exchanges in the establishment of economic and political stratification.

Despite the generalization which is implicit in all that has been said about 'traditional Rwanda', the regional differences should be examined as closely as possible. This may contribute to overcoming the schematic and historical character of this description.

Moreover, we should be aware that at the time when the analytical tools for a critical approach to the history of Rwanda had become available, the country had already undergone a period of profound change, particularly due to the European intrusion and movements provoked by it. The best empirical work can nowadays only register what is remembered and communicated by local informants who are themselves part of present-day reality. Even if the Hutu-Tuutsi dichotomy, for example, only became important during colonial and postcolonial times, any information given on precolonial Rwanda may be filtered by this distinction and any affiliation related to it. Apart from this, the various social categories need not have held the same content in the past as in the Historiographic and ethnographic work is part of the irreversible dialectic of history. And the population of the present day Rwandese republic is more interested in the future than in things of the past.

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3 Kinship and Politics. The Formation of the State among the Pastoralists of the Sahara and the Sahel

PIERRE BONTE

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the bases of the classical Marxist theory is that the existence of the state can be immediately deduced from the process of constitution of social classes and from the progressive autonomy of politics. This analysis is perhaps sufficient to explain things retrospectively, and it enables us to study on a more general basis the current state. But it is not sufficient to study societies where the state is about to appear. Moreover, much anthropological data cannot be explained by this classical theory. Sometimes the state is a condition of the formation of social classes. Under other circumstances class societies establish themselves without the constitution of a state. Now Marxist analysis must justify its pretension of accounting for historical facts; it must not be a retrospective explanation of these historical facts. Marxist theory is not a definitive and dogmatic schema, but it becomes richer through concrete analysis. This short essay on the pastoralists of the Sahara and the Sahel attempts such an analysis and shows some of its consequences for Marxist theory.

2. STRUCTURES, RELATIONS, AND CLASS CONTRADICTIONS

The Moorish and Tuareg pastoral societies have numerous common aspects, particularly an identical mode of social stratification:

(a) warrior aristocracy - imajeghen (Tuareg), hassani (Moorish);

- (b) religious groups in part assimilable to the warrior aristocracy - inislumen (Tuareg), zawaya (Moorish);
- (c) tributary pastoralists *imghad* (Tuareg), *zenaga* (Moorish);
- (d) emancipated agriculturalists or pastoralists assimilable to the preceding category - ighawelen (Tuareg), haratin (Moorish);
- (e) craftsmen, mainly blacksmiths inaden (Tuareg), metallmin (Moorish);
- (f) slaves iklan (Tuareg), eabid (Moorish).

This social stratification first corresponds to class relations, which are defined by the places of the groups in the production. We can distinguish, from this point of view, between (1) slave class relations (slavery is domestic, the slaves provide a labor force to the domestic units of production of the dominant groups); (2) tributary class relations (an aristocratic group controls particularly the processes of production, through their control of collective means of production, pastures and water; it also appropriates a part of the surplus produce and labor of dependent units of production); and (3) clientship class relations (the real appropriation—and not the property or formal appropriation as in tributary class relations—of means of production; particularly herds permit a social group, in exchange for the use of these goods, to dispose of a part of the labor and produce of clients).

This social stratification also corresponds to a class structure, which cannot be reduced to social categories defined by class relations. Then there are slaves in almost all the social strata. The clientship relations can be established in all social categories, including aristocratic groups. The class structure constitutes a hierarchic set of orders or castes so well-marked that some writers speak of a caste society in the case of the Moors (Hamés 1969). Returning to the question again some years later Hamés (1977) shows, however, that this hierarchic system does not display the general aspects of a caste structure (strong social mobility, partial professional specialization, etc.), and he concludes that the indigenous representation of the society in terms of castes is an ideological product the function of which is to maintain the social status quo. This observation is exact, but it does not explain why the class relations in these societies appear as a hierarchic set of

orders or castes.

To understand the nature of the class structure we must in fact look at another aspect of the organization of these societies: the maintenance of a segmentary lineage system. Every social category is organized as a set of unilinear descent groups related by a genealogical structure, which defines the relations between the descent groups in terms of complementary opposition (the opposition of segments at a genealogical level is balanced by the common affiliation at a superior genealogical level). There is only one exception: the slaves, whose social status is not defined by descent because they are outside the ordinary conditions of social reproduction. However, the segmentary lineage organization of these societies presents some important differences in comparison with the classical model (Middleton et al., 1958). Among these differences are:

- (1) Descent groups are not exogamic. In-group marriages are possible and even preferential ('Arabic' marriage with the FBD in Moorish society). So the descent group is really undifferentiated from the point of view of descent, even if the group has a strict unilinear descent structure: unilinear descent is an ideological reading of the genealogical relations.
- (2) The rules of complementary opposition are transformed as a consequence of these in-group marriages and strong genealogical manipulation. The result is that the more genealogically related groups are competitive and that alliances are made with more distant groups for matrimonial, political, or economical reasons (Peters 1967 studies this situation in the case of the Bedouins of Cyrenaica). These rules are also transformed as a consequence of the existence of political functions which are not exclusively determined by the segmentary structure.
- (3) Finally, inside every social category, the genealogical structures are not in all cases common to the whole category. The genealogies are more unified as the groups have a higher hierarchical status. The Moorish hassani all descend from Hassan, who himself descends from the Bedouin Maqil migrating in the direction of the West. On the other hand, in zenaga and mainly in haratin groups, the genealogies are scattered and the different descent groups are not related.

These last two points are the effects of the class structure upon the segmentary structure. The class structure appears as a set of

hierarchical relations between social categories of common (or equivalent) descent. The differences between these categories are conceptualized as a breaking of the genealogical schemas in ethnical terms (Arabs hassani and Berbers zenaga), in racial terms ('whites' and 'blacks'), in military or political terms (imajeghen and imphad among the Tuaregs, the hassani conquerors of the zawaya during the war of Shurr Bubba at the end of the seventeenth century), etc.

We can immediately remark that the class structure dissimulates, paradoxically, the class relations, that is to say the relations of labor exploitation and the contradictions that determine these relations in society.

On the one hand, the class relations appear as different from their real nature (relations of labor exploitation), namely as ethnical, racial relations, or as 'natural' relations. Identically, the descent relations are also conceptualized as 'natural' (i.e, blood). Hamés notes that the sociopolitical superiority of the Moorish aristocracy is based on this conception of social heredity: 'from there the importance and care invested [by this aristocracy – P.B.] in establishing, conserving and diffusing genealogies which attach them by consanguineal ties to great Arab conquerors (Ogba ibn Nafi for example) or to the family and companions of the Prophet' (1977:18).

On the other hand, the relations between hierarchical social categories are interpreted by these societies in terms of segmentary equilibrium. Every category contributes to the reproduction of the others and to the society as a whole: the aristocracy provides the military or religious protection, the tributaries provide labor and products. Inside the Moorish aristocracy the same idea is found: the hassani have a warrior function, the zawaya a religious function. This ideological interpretation of class relations has sometimes been confused with the real working of society by the anthropologists, as exemplified in the Tuareg case by E. Guignard (1975), and mainly in the analysis of the Moorish society by Summing up the functionalist approach by Stewart (1973a). Gellner of the segmentary lineage organization (1969), Stewart analyzes the social stratification in Moorish society as the sum of relations of complementary opposition between social categories of status: 'the segmentary principles of opposition and complementarity balanced the numerically superior zawaya against the

militant hassani, the pastoral against raiding economies and spiritual against physical protection' (1973b:383). It is the same balanced opposition between the protection of aristocracy and the labor of tributary groups.

I have criticized this analysis at length elsewhere (Bonte 1979). particularly the consequences of the functionalist theory of segmentarity and equilibrium used by numerous anthropologists studying the Maghreb and Saharan 'tribal' societies. purpose is different. Since the class structure dissimulates the real nature of class relations and of the consequent contradictions, the analysis of the development of these contradictions, as they determine the constitution of the state, is essential for understanding, the conditions of working and transformation of these societies beyond the appearances. Stewart's position induces him to negate the existence of the state in the precolonial Moorish society. The following two examples, the Kel Gress Tuaregs and the emirate of Adrar, are illustrations of the diversity of the possible forms of historical transformations. I attempt to analyze here the structures and class contradictions in these pastoral societies and to draw some more general conclusions on the formation of the state.

3. THE FORMATION OF THE STATE AMONG THE KEL GRESS TUAREGS¹

The Kel Gress Tuaregs constitute one of the principal Tuareg confederations. They are also the southernmost group, localized on the border of Niger and Nigeria in a Sahelo-Sudanese climatic zone (from 450 to 650mm rainfall per annum). The confederation was formed in the Ayr Mountains, from which the members migrated during the eighteenth century with almost the same political and tribal organization as now. On the other hand, the relations of production were deeply transformed during the nineteenth century as a consequence of the development of agriculture in Kel Gress society. There was a great development of tributary Kel Gress society was henceforth organized in two relations. principal social categories. The imajeghen remained pastoralists and nomads (the sedentarization began only after 1940) and constitute now a warrior aristocracy representing only 10 percent of the population. They receive the tribute of cereals (about

10 percent of the harvest) given by the seminomadic agropastoralist ighawelen, who also give much unpaid labor. The ighawelen comprise about 75 percent of Kel Gress society, and they are growing in number as a result of numerous emancipation acts: the emancipated slaves become tributary agriculturalists, settled on the fields by their ancient masters and paying a tribute of cereals. The slaves are almost exclusively owned by the imajeghen and form a necessary condition for the existence of pastoral and caravan labor. Besides controlling pastoralism, the *imajeghen* also control the transport and trade of the salt of the Saharan oases of Fachi and Bilma, made possible by their camel husbandry. With cereals (tributes) and transport camels, they can develop their capacity to Thus, trade reinforces hierarchical accumulation. accumulate. Accumulation takes the form of craftsmen's products, manufactured products, arms, and especially livestock; the Kel Gress aristocracy owns important herds of camels, more numerous than the herds of the exclusively pastoral and nomadic Tuareg. Pastoral production necessitated an increasing number of slaves, iklan, in this social category. This wealth, along with the trading and warriors' functions of the Kel Gress aristocracy, permitted their regional supremacy during the second part of the nineteenth century. They demanded tributes from numerous Hausa villages which were often settled under the protection of the imajeghen.

We can characterize the evolution of Kel Gress society during the nineteenth century as a considerable development of class relations, which was a consequence of the growth of agriculture, of trade, and the conquest of neighboring societies. What were the effects of this development on social structure? I shall summarize here analyses developed elsewhere (Bonte, 1972a, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1976).

The first consequence naturally is the polarization of the society into two groups: pastoral aristocrats *imajeghen* and agricultural tributary *ighawelen*. These two groups constitute 90 percent of the Kel Gress population.

There is yet another difference between the social organization of the Kel Gress Tuaregs and that of the exclusively pastoralist Tuaregs. The matrilineal descent group tawšit is not a group whose members have a common descent, since beyond the aristocratic imajeghen (who have a common descent and give their name to the tawšit) it also includes dependent ighawelen, who give a cereal

tribute to the 'chief' of the tawšit ('elder' of the lineage). The chief redistributes these goods between the imajeghen of the tawšit. The tawšit is also defined by a territory with very precise limits, corresponding to the soil exploited by the groups of ighawelen, who are dependents of this tawšit.

Is this an application of the classical Marxist scheme (since Engels and Morgan) of the transition from consanguinity to territoriality? In fact, although there is indeed a territorial dimension of the descent group, the following must be remarked: As a consequence of the opposition between the patrilocal characteristics of residence and the matrilateral transmission of social and political statuses – particularly rights to tributaries – the territorial dimension of the tawšit is not contradictory with the perpetuation of a consanguineal organization of the aristocratic imajeghen. The opposition between patrilocality and matrilinearity is in fact an aspect of an opposition between two modes of unilineal descent. As livestock and many other accumulated goods are transmitted preferentially in patrilineal line (but following the Islamic rules a part is given to the women), the heir is thus related to the residence. On the other hand, status and political titles are transmitted in matrilineal line. That is to say that the means of accumulation (tributes/matrilinearity) and their results (livestock, slaves/patrilinearity) cannot be mixed during one generation. At the level of residential organization, the difficulty is resolved by a change of residence at the moment of access to the chieftainship of a tawšit: the new chief leaves his patrilocal group to settle on the territory of the tawšit to which he belongs. The pastoral vocation of the dominant aristocracy makes that mobility easy. A more important result of the working of this type of social organization is that in spite of the development of class relations, a constant redistribution of title and wealth occurs, which thus cannot be accumulated in the same descent lines of the aristocracy. Another consequence is the development of secondary contradictions in the kinship system, particularly the contradictory relations between sons and uterine nephews.

The social organization of the *ighawelen* is also profoundly transformed. Among the pastoral Tuareg, the tributary *imghad* or *ihlan n'tawšit*, who are also pastoralists, are divided into groups filiated to the *tawšit*. The latter are politically dependent but have their own organization, a common origin and genealogical

structure. These tawšit are strongly endogamous (Bernus 1976). The ighawelen of Kel Gress, however, are attached to the tawšit of the imajeghen to whom they pay tribute. The ighawelen of one tawšit, thus, do not have a common genealogy. Constant introduction of liberated slaves, iderfan, into these groups contributes to a greater heterogeneity of this category from the point of view of filiation. Social relations are organized ever more exclusively as a function of residence, thus as a function of utilization of cultivated land, and in the last analysis as a function of the dominant relations of production. The tributary relation is defined by the political control of access to land by the imajeghen.

The class structure can be seen as an ensemble of political relationships between hierarchical orders. This corresponds to the fact that the dominant class relationships, the tributary ones, are political relationships (political control exercised by the *imajeghen*. including a hierarchy of rights over the territory). However, the development of class relations includes reorganization of these orders. There occurs an increasing exclusiveness (of the place of the social groups thus defined) in production, and particularly in the access to cultivated lands. This means that these orders 'function' ever more as classes. The constitution of a class structure (in the form of this structure of orders) is thus the condition of the formation of class relations, but it also transforms itself according to the development of these class relations. Failure to grasp all the forms of these processes of formation of social classes prevents the understanding of conditions which may constitute the state. In the case of Kel Gress, we now have to explain the permanence (in the nineteenth century and partly until today) of an identical mode of political organization which they developed when they were in the Ayr, living exclusively as pastoralists.

It is a confederation of four ettebel (drum groups), each of them commanded by an agholla. One of these is preeminent and chief of the confederation. The symbol of power is a war drum kept by the tawšit and from which the agholla is chosen. Every agholla is at the same time the chief of this tawšit. The agholla is elected and revocable. His power (preeminent control of the territory of the ettebel, arbitration in juridical matters, command in war, etc.) is real but is performed in the name of the imajeghen.

Thus, in spite of the transformation of class relations and the organization of society into two groups (imajeghen/ighawelen),

some of the structural aspects (particularly descent) of the reproduction of the dominant class determine the perpetuation of the collective power of the aristocracy; they also stabilize the forms of political organization corresponding to the former segmentary lineage system of Kel Gress society. The stabilization, however, is not definitive. The development of class relations and trade and the progressive domination over the Hausa villages involve problems of increasing accumulation. The development of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century is an aspect of this crisis of domestic accumulation inside the aristocracy. Slave production also has limits which are related to the form of the pastoral process of production. In the second part of the nineteenth century two solutions appeared for the aristocracy. The first was exclusively pastoral and based upon slave production. The second was a development of agricultural production among the *imajeghen*: this production was done by slaves, but these slaves had an intermediary status between slavery and tributary (they autonomously cultivated the fields given them by their masters, but they provided beyond the title a specific prestation, the tiuse, the symbol of their servile status). The development of agricultural production in the dominant class also involved in the end a transformation of the land system.

The crisis of the domestic economy among the *imajeghen* was a part of a more general political crisis, the first cause of which is the same problem of accumulation. The manifestations of the crisis were first a series of conflicts inside Kel Gress society. between agholla and tawšit, over the domination of the Hausa villages. Secondly, we notice an attempt to constitute a new political organization, a state organization. Budal Insilkim, whose personality dominated Kel Gress political life during the second half of the nineteenth century, was a near relative (uterine nephew perhaps) of the agholla of Ighayawan. The drum group became more important through a policy of incorporation of foreign groups, and also the agricultural groups developed. Budal came from a poor family without many opportunities for gaining power. He collected a warrior clientship partly outside Kel Gress society. He defeated the imajeghen and after many fights became the leader of all Kel Gress. He then created a new political organization, taking the title of amenokal, previously unknown in Kel Gress. He was invested by Sarki N'Musulmi, caliph of Sokoto,

leader of the Fulani *jihad*, which has modified the political organization of the whole country. He attempted without great success to collect tribute from all Kel Gress, including the *imajeghen*.

Here we can speak of an attempt to create a state, partly inspired by external models (Sokoto), partly determined by internal processes. This attempt failed. When Budal died he designated his uterine nephew, Kaosen, as his successor. Kaosen came in conflict with the son of Budal, Waray. This was the beginning of a long civil war that only ended with the French colonial conquest. The continuation of the political crisis was also marked by some important structural transformations.

- Kel Gress scholars place in this period the beginning of the possibility of a patrilineal succession to chieftainship (tawšit and drum group). It is not a transition from a matri- to a patrilineal structure, since the two choices are open; it is rather an undifferentiated structure of descent groups, whose composition is more and more determined by political considerations (competition for chieftainship). This also has as a result the possibility of centralizing the means of accumulation (tributes) and the accumulation proper on the same patrilineal line.
- At the same time, we can identify a series of splits of the tawšit related to the political and military conflicts for the domination of the Hausa villages, and even of the ighawelen. More generally, two factions formed among Budal's successors. These factions grouped the imajeghen not only on the basis of political competition but also in connection with different economic options which opened the transformation of class relations. Some were more directed towards pastoral and slave production (Kaosen and his brothers, Edigni and Fakendo) and others towards agricultural production (Waray and his son Mullul). The struggle between these two factions continued during the colonial period at the political level only.
- Lastly, as a consequence of the importance of matrimonial obligations and of the localization of political power in some descent lines, a growing internal stratification of the *imajeghen* developed in which we can identify endogamic strata with differentiated political functions.

The colonial conquest in fact stopped an evolution (not a linear one, but with partial developments and ruptures) whose term was the formation of a state organization among the Kel Gress. The causes of the failure in this case are as important as the analyses of the constitution of the state in other cases.

4. THE FORMATION OF THE STATE IN THE MOORISH SOCIETY ADRAR²

There is in the western Sahara a long tradition of state organization which begins with the constitution of the Almoravide emirate during the eleventh century. In Mauritania, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a series of small states was formed, the emirates of Trarza, Brakna, Adrar, Tagant (in order of constitution). The Adrar, where I worked, is the northernmost, located in a very arid region. It is mountainous country, where underground water permits the development of a dates and cereal culture in oases. Around the massif the great sand plains (erg) are good places for camel husbandry.

The local historiography dates the constitution of these states from the defeat of Berber tribes (from the Almoravides) by Arabic conquerors during the war of Shurr Bubba. In fact, one of these states — the last formed — the emirate of Tagant, was founded by a Berber group, the Idawiš. It is also surprising to learn that these states were first constituted in southwest Mauretania, the Gebla, the most distant region of the zone of penetration of Arabic tribes; this was several centuries after the entrance of these tribes in the western Sahara. The history of this region, such as we can reconstitute it through oral tradition (the written texts are closer to official history), shows a more complex ethnical situation. Thus in Adrar the tribe (qabila) of Ideyešelli, dominating the country at the beginning of the eighteenth century, allied with some hassani groups against the assaults of other hassani groups related to the prominent hassani qabila who already dominated in Brakna.

We can therefore consider that the conquest of these Berbers by the Arabs and the war of Shurr Bubba were a kind of foundation charter for the Moorish emirates. Even the course of the war such as it is recorded in Moorish historiography, was partly a myth, making use of the models provided by the Islamic historiography (Norris 1972 speaks of 'myths' and 'saga' to define this local historiography).

By cross-checking sources, however, we identified a period of

important political and military conflicts in the region of the mouth of the Senegal at the end of the seventeenth century, not only in the Moorish country but also in the Walo country of the The work of B. Barry (1972), used by Hamés for the Moorish aspects (1979), offers new hypotheses which replace the traditional interpretation in terms of conquest. The disorders at the end of the seventeenth century are, according to their analyses, a generalized conflict between locally dominant groups controlling the trans-Saharan trade since the time of the Almoravides. This trade, linking the Maghreb and the gold-production zone of the Niger's sources, was converted after the fall of African gold to the commerce of slaves and Sudanese products; there were also other groups in close relation with the European merchants implanted on the shore of the western Sahara (Arguin, Portendik) and at the mouth of the Senegal (Saint Louis) since the sixteenth century. These merchants attempted to divert this trans-Saharan trade. The conflicts ended with the triumph of the supporters of the 'Atlantic trade', and from the formation of emirates we can see (Hamés, 1979) that the 'customs' paid by the French merchants to the Moorish chiefs (arms, cotton fabrics, manufactured products, etc.) strongly reinforced the powers of the emirs. These customs duties enabled the French merchants of Saint Louis to get a monopoly on the gum trade (Arabic gum is an important product in the European textile industry). We cannot reduce the constitution of these Moorish states to the development of this trade only. Other internal factors have played an important role, too. I shall attempt to demonstrate this role in the case of the Adrar emirate.

The hassani, a group related to the Awlâd Abdallah, founders of the emirate of Brakna in the south of Mauretania, triumphed in the beginning of the eighteenth century over the Ideyešelli, who until then dominated the oases and grazing grounds of Adrar. These groups of hassani represented in that period a unity of tribes with segmentary lineages. They were camel husbandmen, more specialized than the Berber pastoralists whom they vanquished and who practiced simultaneously cattle and camel husbandry on a small scale, commercial activities, and the cultivation of dates and cereals. The first emirs bore the title of šeyh, i.e., 'the first among equals' in the segmentary system of hassani warriors and aristocrats. Their position was determined by their place in the genealogy. The šeyh were chosen at that time out of the lineage

of Ahel Etman of Awlad Amonni. The formation of the emirate is a result of a process which unfolded in the course of a halfcentury. I shall summarize only the principal aspects.

- (1) The hassani groups imposed on groups they conquered militarily or subjugated politically a set of tributary relations (hurma) based upon the extortion of part of the surplus produced by each domestic unit of production in exchange for military protection and the control of pastures. Other groups had to pay the ghaver collectively, particularly the great zawaya or foreign tribes which had to cross the country for trade and pastures. These tributes freed the warrior aristocrats from productive work: every year they received dairy camels and small livestock for regular consumption; they also received slaughtered animals, dates, and agricultural products. Their need for craftsmen's products was also satisfied by tribute. Each hassan family thus had at its disposition the tribute of many tributary families. family (but also the richer ones) increased its income by military expeditions, ghazw, and plundering, justifying the military protection of other hassani. In this way tributary relations and accumulation of wealth developed among hassani domestic groups contrary to the situation of the units of production of the dominant class in Kel Gress society or in the zawaya groups without the development of slave production. This is an important factor in the autonomy of political and military functions in the hassani aristocracy, which is partially freed from productive work.
- (2) The tributary relation is a political relation; it is due to the monopoly (disputed only by some religious chiefs) of political power that the *hassani* aristocracy exercised a preeminent right to the means of production, to the territory covered by the herds, and even to the herds (this right is conceptualized in terms of protection and the possibility of plunder and seizure of tributary or foreign camps in the territory). The political power and the capacity for hierarchical accumulation determine an extension of the dominant groups, thanks to the formation of political clientship relations resulting from gifts and loans (*meniha*) from tributaries. It is the basis of the formation of the Ahel Yahia ben Etman, that is to say a group of warrior tribes from various origins. Some *šeyh*, who had many tributaries, formed the *qabila* of Awlad Ghaylani, which elaborated a genealogical structure with a distant relation to the *hassani* (Bonte 1972b). This *qabila* reinforced

the dominant group demographically and politically without challenging the monopoly of power; only some chiefly lineages of this tribe participated directly in political power. The *qabila* of Awlad Ghaylani played an important part in the formation of the emirate of Adrar.

(3) The *šeyh* of Ahel, Etman, at first played a limited role in the sharing of tributaries by inheritance (excluding women contrary to Islamic rule), and in the competition between collateral lineages. However, when a conflict of succession arose between the brother of Etman, L'graea, and the son of Etman, Sidi Ahmed, the principal chiefs of Awlad Ghaylani intervened in favor of Sidi Ahmed and imposed a transformation of the transmission of the emiral title. This title was always transmitted in one lineage — but without precise rules of selection and with many conflicts of succession. Many goods – slaves, date-palm trees, houses, arms, etc. - and especially a set of tributary relations were connected to the title. The emir, however, had only the usufruct of this estate. It was the beyt-el-mal or public treasure. Oral traditions call this the 'reform of the three Muhameds' - from the name of the Awlad Ghaylani chiefs who imposed this political transformation. The working of political power was radically modified. Before this it was determined by the segmentary character of the kinship system; now it became politically autonomous and actually the constitution of the state. The Awlad Ghaylani tribe was based on a tribal and segmentary political model but the chiefs played a determinant role in the process of subordination of kinship to politics because they were outside the rules of the segmentary functioning of the dominant tribe. Their participation in political power was limited to the chieftainship directly related to the emirate, having hurma and ghaver. They had an interest in the constitution of the state: they could stabilize their power and strength more heavily on centralized political power than when this power was determined The history of Adrar is dominated by by segmentary rules. conflicts between these groups and the qabila Awlad Amonni and Awlad Akšar (the Jaeavriya) composed of the collateral lineages of Ahel Etman (Bonte 1979).

The Moorish emiral state can be characterized by the following features.

(1) It is organized around the emiral lineage of Ahel Etman. Inside the lineage the emirs are chosen by a *jemaea*, a council

including the Jaeavriya and the Awlad Ghaylani. This lineage also has some distinctive moral and physical features: the baraka (mystical power) and a specific temperament. (2) A great part (one half) of hurma and ghaver prestations are connected to the emiral function and constitute the beyt-el-mal.³ The emirate also obtains tributes from caravans crossing the Adrar. (3) The emirate is identified with the territory of Adrar, which has precise boundaries. The emiral camp, the hella, moves regularly in this territory because of transhumance. (4) A kind of emiral administration is created. As in the case of the Awlad Ghaylani, the political function of this group is organized according to a segmentary system. It was the origin of the qabila of the Eabid Ahel Etman which furnished counselors, messengers etc. for the emir.

We can speak in this case of the constitution of a state. The autonomization of political power modifies considerably the conditions of functioning of a segmentary lineage system. A few examples will be sufficient to demonstrate the nature of these transformations and their effects on the political dynamics.

In the ruling group (Awlad Amonni, Awlad Akšar), which holds the essential political power and tribute, the segmentary rulers are strongly perturbed by the existence of the central power which contributes to stabilizing the positions of the different lineages and political fractions (fa had). The wars prevent the demographic growth of the group. Collateral lineages are constantly rejected by the tribe and become tyab, 'repentants'; they lose the warrior's customary rights to tribute, political autonomy, the honor of being without external protection, and the carrying of arms. They lose their social and political status. The tyab lineages from Awlad Amonni, and especially from the Awlad Aksar tribes, are more numerous than the original tribes. They are connected to other tribes, for example to the Awlad Ghaylani or more often to the zawaya groups.

The example of Awlad Ghaylani illustrates the formation of a qabila on a segmentary model — including the ideological production of a common genealogy — from the exercise of its political function. The composition, the segmentation, and the successive reconstruction of this group cannot be understood without reference to the political function of the Awlad Ghaylani chiefs surrounding the emirs. An elaboration of this analysis is presented elsewhere (Bonte 1972b, 1979).

In the tributary tribes, the political dependency — the link with different hassani groups and sometimes with several of them at the same time — has as a consequence the dispersal of genealogical structures and the political and territorial dispersion of the descent groups. A clear case is that of zenaga groups in Adrar, such as Mešduv, Basin, Ladem, etc. which have an autonomous and non-dependent political existence in other regions of Mauretania (the Mešduv even have a dominant position in eastern Mauretania).

All these analyses must be developed further. I shall expound on only one of their consequences. The main effect of political centralization on the segmentary lineage system is to break the genealogical affiliation of numerous individuals and lineages: tyab of dominant aristocratic lineages join the Awlad Ghaylani or Eabid Ahel Etman chiefs; lineages of tributaries are connected more and more individually to the hassani. This is an essential aspect of the 'bicephalism' of the Moorish aristocracy (Hamés 1977). This expression accounts for the power exercised by some great religious šeyh, who collect those fleeting populations around them (for example the Ahel Sidi Mahmud, the Awlad Ebieri, the Ahel Šeyhma el Eaynin, etc.), on the basis of religious affiliation. These groups constituted strong forces of political contestation, but they never triumphed over the emiral power.

The power of the *šeyh* corresponds also to the duality of the Moorish system of production. The tributary relations of production – the basis of the founding of the state – are dominant, and moreover, the organization of these religious groups partly reproduces this model (products and labor given for religious motives to the *šeyh*, etc.). However, for the *zawaya* groups, the importance of trade and of slave production shows another orientation on the basis of the same pastoral production. Since the development of the Kunta movement during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these religious confraternities are responsible for the organization of pastures and wells and the opening of transhumance and trade routes in the western Sahara. The analysis by Stewart of the growth of the Ahel Sevh Siddiya in the Trarza (1973a) is a good illustration of this influence of confraternities. In the Adrar, as a consequence of the later constitution of the state, these religious movements only developed during the second part of the nineteenth century. The ephemeral attempts of Seyh Sidi Muhamed el Kunti el Sghavr to organize the northwestern part of the country, and the new attempts of the Ahel Šeyh Muhamed Fadel and the Ahel Šeyhma el eaynin in the same region to control the trade between Adrar and Morocco, correspond to the same political dynamics.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The example of pastoral and nomadic societies of the Sahara provides evidence on the conditions enhancing the formation of social classes and the state in these societies. These conditions are not immediately applicable to other historical situations which resulted in the rise of the state. The nature of the dominant class relations, the tributary relations, the role of exchange, the form of class structure, all correspond to historical circumstances specific to these societies during a specific period of time (the sixteenth to nineteenth century). With these reservations in mind one may try to formulate some general conclusions from these analyses.

(1) The first of these conclusions concerns the established distinction between class structure and class relations. already distinguished between the formation of a class structure which takes the form of a hierarchical organization of orders, each order presenting a segmentary lineage structure - and the forma-This distinction is not only a tool for tion of class relations. analysis, it takes into account the general form of the process of development of social classes and the state. The formation of a class structure is the condition for the formation of class relations insofar as it determines the differentiated places of groups and individuals in production, as well as in the reorganization of the labor process on the basis of extortion of the surplus product by some of these groups. This distinction, in the special case of the constitution of social classes, seems to me an application of the more general distinction established by Marx, namely between formal and real submission. The passage to real submission, i.e., the constitution of class relations and their development, corresponds to this progressive reorganization of the processes of labor in the sense of extortion of a surplus, and to new contradictions which include development of exploitation. Also the introduction of agriculture among the Kel Gress Tuaregs had more consequences

because of the reorganization of labor processes (the reorganization of the relations of labor among the *ighawelen* on a residential basis, favoring increased exploitation of agricultural laborers by the *imajeghen*, who control the access to land) than because of the new possibilities of accumulation it offered.

This first theoretical conclusion calls for two remarks. First of all, if the constitution of the class structure is the condition for the formation and development of class relations, new contradictions introduced by the development of these class relations cause a further transformation, which may lead to the formation of the state. The two examples developed in the preceding pages permit the assertion that there is no immediate correspondence or linear development of stages in this whole process leading to the formation of the state.

In fact — and this is my second remark — such a correspondence is not possible, because the form which the transformation of class structure takes (whether there is formation of the state or not) continues to be that which leads to its constitution. It refers to contradictions which in classless society lead to the constitution of class structure.

(2) In these Saharan societies kinship relations play a dominant role, even though a class structure constitutes itself in the form of an internal hierarchy. And, in spite of several negative characteristics (no common genealogical relations, endogamy), the relations between the hierarchical orders are relations of kinship. The Moorish state remains to be organized partly on the basis of these kinship relations. It is the function of the kinship relations in nonhierarchical and politically noncentralized segmentary lineage societies which contributes to explaining the specific evolution of these societies of the Sahara. Here I summarize briefly the conclusions of my articles published recently (Bonte 1977a, 1977b, 1979). In these we have the chance to study simultaneously, in the same historical and geographical context, segmentary lineage societies without differentiation, which is the case with the Rgeybat, the Awlad Dlem and others in the western They illustrate the form of social organization of the Sahara. hassani groups which dominated the Moorish emirates in former times. The genealogical ties between the different groups of the hassani (descendants of the Arabic Magil) are not yet cut:

Segmentary genealogical relation		i
Awlād Dlem	hassani zawaya	Hierarchical relations of orders in the emirate
	zenaga	
	haratin	

The dominant, even exclusive role of kinship in the segmentary lineage societies is related to the fact that the kinship relations regulate the quasi totality of social relationships, in particular the social relations of production. Among these are the communal relations of production in the form of exploitation by cattle herds of the collectively held resources (pastures, wells). In fact, as the whole of kinship relations has these functions, the relations of unilinear filiation have a supplementary and particular function: they determine the distribution of individuals in the descent groups and of groups in the whole community. Thus, to take the example of these Saharan and Sahelian societies we can distinguish two levels of functioning of kinship relations. First, there is a residential and cooperative organization (camps) determined by several types of kinship relations constituting the level of real appropriation of the collectively exploited resources. Second, a territorial distribution defined by unilinear descent only can be found, corresponding to the formal (juridical) appropriation of these resources. We can show that the principal function of descent was to dissimulate the other functions of kinship relations. These functions appear as consequences of the 'natural' rule of descent, of social heredity. This specific character of kinship (descent), the possibility to dissimulate its own functioning, I have called 'kinship fetishism' (Bonte 1977a).

The constitution of class structure occurs in the framework of this social structure. In Tuareg as well as in Moorish society, the class differences are conceptualized as differences of descent and appear thus in the order of 'natural', ethnical, or racial differences. It is because of the fact that the dominant group has a genealogy, relating the group to the Prophet or to old Arabic tribes, that it exercises a monopoly of political power. The class structure, defining the position of social groups in the production process is thus constructed as a function of descent, dissimulating the reality of class relations and the extortion of surplus labor. The factors determining the formation of this class structure are in the last analysis based upon the economic order: the conditions

of unequal accumulation between segments of the social structure, especially between the domestic groups and the unit of pastoral production. The segmentation of the genealogy made the reproduction of the egalitarian structure ever more difficult (Bonte 1977b). However, these contradictions did develop in the framework of the dominant kinship relations. The diverse aspects of this class structure can be specified as: (a) the transformation of lineage 'endogamy' (actually the choice between marriage inside the lineage and marriage outside) into strata endogamy; this excludes marriage with some hierarchical groups by one group, which alone has the possibility of defending the physical integrity of its members (of which sexual control and the virginity of the women of the group is an important aspect), and which protects other social groups; and (b) the nonequivalence of the different categories of filiation.

When this class structure is constituted, kinship relations continue to fulfill partially those functions in production on the level of domestic organization, as well as those for defining the forms of collective appropriation of the extorted surplus. It is only in the sense of the reorganization of the labor process in the function of class relations (real submission) that kinship relations — as relations of production — come to be totally subordinated to class relations. The rupture of the lineage structure and the residential organization of the Kel Gress *ighawelen*, the crisis of the domestic economy, and the formation of the state in the dominant aristocracy are the aspects of this process of development of social classes.

In this way kinship relations — here the relations of filiation unilinearity — can continue to simulate the relations of production during the whole stage of this process, including new class relations. In certain circumstances (Kel Gress Tuaregs), which partly correspond in form to the relations of unilinear filiation, kinship may thus continue to organize politically the dominant class. In other circumstances (Moorish emirates) the dominant class must, for its reproduction, (which means to reproduce simultaneously the organization of classes, the hierarchical structure of orders, and the appropriation of the extorted surplus) be organized in another political framework, that of the state. Thus, the constitution (or not) of the state in segmentary lineage societies is connected with the conditions of the constitution of the class

structure and the conditions of reproduction of the dominant class (in the form of order) as the class relations develop.

(3) I shall be more brief in sketching the last conclusion that can be drawn from these analyses. If in the Saharan societies the formation of the state did not seem to be an immediate consequence of the development of a class structure, not even of the development of class relations, in other circumstances the class structure constituted itself directly in the form of the state.

The preceding theoretical discussion seems to me to have the capacity to formulate these hypotheses in understanding how in certain societies the state can arise — not as a consequence, but as a condition of the emergence of class relations. This is the case in the 'sacred kingships' of East Africa, which I have started to study elsewhere (Bonte 1974, 1975d, 1977b). These contradictions, contained in the classless society, are the conditions for the constitution of a class structure, which then justifies the emergence of the state at the initial stage of the processes of formation and development of social classes. Thus, by refusing to succumb to dogmatic schemes, the Marxist theory can hope to refer to data which were utilized to refute it. But it should be recognized that Marxist theory of the state has yet to be extensively developed.

NOTES

- The data have been collected during several periods of fieldwork in the Republic of Niger: 1965-1966 (Cooperation) January-August 1968, June-September 1970, December 1972-January 1973 (CNRS).
- The data have been collected during several periods of fieldwork in the Islamic Republic of Mauretania: 1969-1971 (CEDIMOM), March-May 1975, March-July 1976, May-August 1977 (CNRS). A program of research is currently being developed in this country in the framework of the RCP 477.
- 3. To appreciate the importance of these tributes at the moment of the colonial conquest, we have at our disposal the notebooks of registration of hurma and ghaver opened just after the conquest (1909), which are complete up to the moment of the repurchase of these tributes (1952 in the Adrar). With these books we can assess the quantitative importance of the hierarchical circulation of goods.

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4 Specific Features of the African Early State*

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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether African early states south of the Sahara show organizational features that can be labeled typically or specifically African. To reach this goal the concept early state will first have to be discussed briefly, and then the question of the specificity of features must be dealt with. After having defined our terms in this way, ethnographic data on a number of African states will be presented and compared.

1. THE EARLY STATE

The early state is a concept used to denote the state in the precapitalistic era of the evolution of political society. It is the first stage of statehood, and can be defined as:

the centralized socio-political organization for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent social classes — viz. the rulers and the ruled —, whose relations are characterized by political dominance of the former and tributary obligation of the latter, legitimized by a common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 640).

This definition is based upon a comparative analysis of 21 case studies of precapitalistic state formations, a sample which included African and Polynesian, as well as Asian, European and American cases. The analysis of the cases made possible the construction of a structural model of the early state, based upon the characteristics which scored high in the comparisons (Claessen and Skalník 1978, ch. 25: 637 ff.). Some of the characteristics of this model may be presented here.

The position of the ruler – the head of the early state – is based upon a mythical charter and a genealogy which connects him with supernatural forces. He is also considered a benevolent figure, a source of gifts, remunerations, and offerings. He is surrounded by a court as well as a bodyguard.

The aristocracy comprises members of the ruler's family, clan or lineage heads, and the incumbents of high offices. Private ownership of land is a rare phenomenon, and does not seem to be of importance for the attainment of high social status in the early state.

The ideology of the early state appears to be based upon the concept of reciprocity: all categories of subjects provide the ruler with goods and services (tribute and tax), while the ruler for his part is responsible for his subjects' protection, law and order, and the bestowal of benevolence. The priesthood supports the state ideology.

The actual production of food is limited to certain social groups, and access to material resources is unequal. The upper stratum generally has tribute as its main source of income. Tax, however, is paid by all social categories, though varying from one category to another in quantity and quality. Social inequality seems to be based first and foremost upon birth, with the relative distance from the ruler's lineage constituting the defining principle.

For the government of the early state a system of delegation of tasks and powers evolves. There are numerous functionaries fulfilling tasks in the governmental apparatus. 'General functionaries' are found especially on the regional and local level, while 'specialists' are more on the national level. Though, ideally, only the ruler has the right to issue laws and decrees, many other people exercise a formal or informal influence upon affairs and developments.

A possible explanation for the amazing degree of uniformity in the structure of early states can be found in the consideration that the problems posed by the necessity of organizing groups of people with different access to the means of production, the requirements of communication and organizing defense, and the need to find ideological justifications for the given situation are in all cases very much alike. Apparently only a limited set of solutions to these problems was functional, or, at least, appeared to be better, or more efficient than others. Where these 'solutions' did not develop the early state did not develop at all, or collapsed very soon. Where they did — either by borrowing, or by local development — the early states were remarkably stable structures.

This is not to say that the early state is a kind of static monolith. The analysis of the twenty-one cases also demonstrated the existence of internal dynamics (Claessen and Skalník 1978, ch. 26, and 638 ff. Cf. Claessen 1979: 184 ff.). To describe the differences in organizational complexity caused by these internal dynamics, three types of early states were distinguished: the inchoate, the typical, and the transitional (ibid.: 589 ff., 640 ff.). This typology reflects the degree of development of such aspects as: trade and markets, mode of succession to important functions (hereditary versus appointment), the occurrence of private ownership of land, the judicial system, the taxation system, and the manner of remuneration of functionaries.

The African states in the early state sample (Ankole, Axum, Egypt, Jimma, Kuba, Volta, and Zande), as well as the African states in an earlier comparative volume (Claessen 1970) — Dahomey and Buganda — were found to be comparable in nearly all respects to the cases from the other continents.

2. AFRICAN FEATURES?

The results of these studies make the existence of 'typical African' aspects rather questionable. Do they exist at all? The works of several well-known political anthropologists – for this study limits itself to political aspects – give the implicit or explicit impression that traditional African states were something special. However, the fact must not be overlooked that these scholars (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940; Schapera 1956; De Heusch 1958; Vansina 1962; Murdock 1959; Mair 1962, 1977; Balandier 1969) were Africanists, having but limited interest in developments outside the region of their specialization. The results of the Early State Project, and the more limited analysis of Van vorsten en volken (Claessen 1970) demonstrate that in the general structural and

dynamic aspects there is no reason to expect something really different or exceptional for Africa.

There are, however, parts of the structure of early states in which a certain degree of variation is possible, without affecting the more general structure and the working of the organization as a whole, or the essential character of the sacral ruler. include variation in the aspects of sacrality, variation in the mode of succession to high office, variation in the position of royal women, and variation in the tasks of the functionaries in the early state (Claessen 1970: 308 ff.; cf. 1973: 75). In fact several analyses emphasizing these features have been made in the recent past. Westermann (1952: 34 ff.), as well as Murdock (1959: 37 ff.) presented long lists of traits and aspects, which, in their opinion, were specific to traditional African states. However, in Van vorsten en volken (Claessen 1970: 315 ff.) it was found that these lists of so-called specific characteristics could not stand the test of comparison with other regions. Westermann presented 18 traits, of which six were not found in at least a number of African states, while 11 were found also in Polynesia or in the realm of The only remaining feature was the possibility of a ritual killing of the ruler. The Murdock list showed the same weaknesses. No less than seventeen out of eighteen aspects were also found outside of Africa. Only one remained as a possibly specifically African aspect, viz. the security provisions around the ruler (which in fact is rather vaguely defined).² These results hardly seem encouraging. It still seems possible, however, to find aspects of the traditional African early states that are characteristic for this region only. Africa will be taken here in the sense of Africa south of the Sahara in the precolonial situation. I exclude those early states where the dominating ideology is definitely non-African, such as, for instance, Islamic or Koptic early states.³

In the following section a number of possible specific features will be analyzed. This will be done on the basis of an extensive survey of the literature on eight early states, with a traditional African culture: Ankole, Rwanda, Buganda, Yoruba (Oyo), Dahomey, Kuba (Bushoong), Tio (Bateke), and Swazi. The choice of this sample is based partly on the consideration that the important regions should be represented, partly on available literature, and partly on the results of earlier research. To this must be added the possibility that the data of the sample are valid only for

peoples reached by the 'Bantu Expansion' (cf. Miller 1976; Kuper and Van Leynseele 1978). There can thus be no pretension of analyzing a balanced, representative sample. The results of the investigation will be compared for each case with the findings in a control group made up of the Polynesian early states of Tahiti and Tonga, and the American Incas: polities so distant from Africa, that no connection whatever exists. In this way it will be possible to formulate — at least with some degree of probability—a list of specific African aspects (cf. the methodological remarks in Claessen and Skalník 1978: 533 ff.).

3. THE ETHNOGRAPHICAL DATA

The findings of the comparative study suggest that specific aspects will probably be found in only a number of fields such as the sacrality of the ruler, the succession to high office, the position of the royal women and the position of certain functionaries.

3.1. The Sacrality of the Ruler

One of the most debated aspects in this respect is the relationship between the ruler and the fertility of his country. Since Frazer coined the term 'divine king' to describe this relationship several anthropologists have considered their findings against this background (for instance Seligman 1934; Mair 1962: 180 ff.; 214 ff.; Richards 1964: 278 ff.; Wilson 1959; Krige 1975). The survey of the literature on the sample of early states led to the following results: a direct relationship between the well-being of the ruler and the fertility of the country was found in the ideology of Ankole, Rwanda, Kuba, Tio, and Swazi. The data for Buganda were not clear: several indications could be detected, but a direct relationship could not convincingly be established. Yoruba (Oyo) and Dahomey scored negatively on this aspect. Here, however, as in Buganda, an indirect relationship was found to exist: the ruler, being a near relative of the supernatural beings, was supposed to have the power to influence these positively to further well-being in the country. In all cases the ruler performed rituals to promote the fertility of land and people.

In connection with these rituals it is interesting to note that in Ankole, Buganda, and Rwanda it was explicitly stated that the ruler was not a rainmaker, and that in Kuba, Tio, and Swazi it was equally emphasized that the ruler was the most important one. Dahomey and Yoruba provided no data in this respect. Most probably differences in climate — and as a result, differences in the annual rainfall — are responsible for this situation.

In only three cases (Buganda, Dahomey, and Swazi) were rituals to restore the physical force of the ruler mentioned, in Buganda and Dahomey even accompanied by human sacrifices. Also in three cases it was stated explicitly that the ruler should avoid any contact with dead or ill people (Kuba, Tio, Swazi), and for Buganda this 'taboo' seems probable. For the four other states no data were found in this respect and it seems probable that, at least in Dahomey, no prescriptions existed.

The data mentioned can be presented conveniently in a table. A positive case is marked with a cross, a negative one with a dash, and where no data were supplied the zero-sign is used. Where the data are unclear or contradictory a question mark is inserted. In the table the data for the control group are also included.

Table 1. Ruler and fertility

Case	Direct	Indirect	Rituals	Rain	Rest. of force	Avoid death
Ankole	x		x		0	0
Rwanda	x	-	x		0	0
Buganda	?	x	x	-	x	?
Yoruba		x	x	o	0	0
Dahomey		x	x	o	x	-
Kuba	x		x	x	0	x
Tio	x	-	x	x	0	x
Swazi	x	-	x	x	x	x
Tahiti		x	x			
Tonga	-	x	x			
Inca	-	x	x	0	?	-

The results of Table 1 show that the direct relationship with fertility is found in Africa only — though this aspect is by no

means a general characteristic there. Some corroboration for the idea that this is a typical aspect can be found in the distribution of additional aspects such as restoration of the physical force of the ruler and the prescription to avoid death and sickness, which appear to be restricted to Africa too.

Directly connected with the relationship between ruler and fertility is the 'ritual killing of the king' to quote Westermann's phrase (1952: 34ff.). It is interesting to note that all the works we consulted vehemently deny that a king was ever really killed for ritual reasons. The killing existed only in the ideology, in ritual or in theory. If a ruler was ever killed, it was for political reasons, not for the sake of ritual (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1948). There seems no reason to doubt this information. However, the existence of an ideology in which the ruler could - or should be killed cannot be denied. This phenomenon was found in Ankole, Rwanda, Yoruba, and Kuba. In Dahomey and Buganda a substitute for the ruler was killed. At least it seems possible to interpret the following phenomena as such: in Dahomey, according to Bertho (1946: 62 ff.), the ruler took a ritual bath yearly. Then a boy clad in the clothes of the ruler was buried alive (no bloodshed), together with the royal hair and nailclippings. This ritual was held at the beginning of the harvest season. In Buganda the ruler visited the nankere priest once during his reign for the purpose of prolonging his life. The nankere then selected one of his own sons, who was then fed and clothed and treated in all respects as a prince. During the ritual the nankere presented the boy to the ruler, who passed him on to his bodyguard who killed him by beating him with their closed fists, so that no blood was spilled (Roscoe 1911: 210; Claessen 1970: 107). It seems possible to interpret the killing of the bull during the Swazi incwala ceremony as the killing of a substitute of the ruler (cf. Girard 1972:150 ff.).

Only for Tio were no indications found that killing of the ruler played a role. However, in this polity ceremonies existed for a ritual rebirth of the ruler. It seems not unreasonable to expect some connection between this ritual and a more drastic 'king-killing ideology'. Moreover, the idea of a rebirth is also found in Ankole and Yoruba, while the killing of the substitute in Buganda, Dahomey and Swazi is also accompanied by a ritual rebirth of the ruler (cf. Seligman 1934: 51 ff., 61). The control group offers

not the slightest indication of king killing or ritual rebirth.

Table 2. The killing of the king

Case	Actual killing	Ideological killing	Rebirth	
Ankole		x	x	
Rwanda		x	0	
Buganda	-	S (= substitute)	x	
Yoruba		x	x	
Dahomey	-	S	x	
Kuba		x	o	
Tio			x	
Swazi	-	S	x	
Tahiti	-	-		
Tonga		-		
Incas			-	

Some other aspects that seem to be connected with the ritual position of African rulers are the existence of (ritual) *incest*, the relationship with a perpetual *fire*, and the fact that the ruler *travels* seldom, or only within certain limits.

One of the problems connected with incest is that of definition. A definition of incest as the prohibition of sexual intercourse with near kin seems generally acceptable. The question here is whether the ruler is allowed or even obliged to trespass this prohibition while his fellowmen are not (cf. the contribution of Muller in this volume). Another question is whether the incestuous relation is only incidental, or leads to a relationship of long duration - even a marriage. In view of this the data of the sample give but one clear example of (ritual) incest: Kuba. Here the ruler has sexual intercourse with a full sister, to demonstrate that he, being the ruler, no longer is a member of his family. The Swazi ruler can marry women, classified as sisters. Royal incest is not found, and often vehemently denied, in Ankole, Rwanda, Yoruba and Tio. In Dahomey marriages within the royal clan were permitted, but there is a clear preference for the ruler to marry women outside of the clan. Marriages with sisters are not mentioned at all here. Buganda is not clear. The ruler spends a short period with his sister when passing the complex inauguration ritual. This in fact is the custom for all men, who have to pass some ritual. The *lubuga*, the royal (half?) sister leaves her brother after this short period and from then on they live separately. There are no indications that this relationship includes sexual intercourse, but also none that it does not. Some sources speak of a 'marriage', others do not (cf. Kagwa 1934, who does not include the *lubuga* in his list of royal spouses).

It is interesting that several authors seem to make royal incest a cornerstone of African kingship, though the ethnographical data are rather sparse (De Heusch 1958; Mair 1977: 40, 52. cf. Beattie 1971). On the other hand, outside Africa some very clear examples of this custom can be found. Especially the Incas are well-known for marrying full sisters, and the same holds for the highly sacral rulers of the Hawaiian kingdoms. For Tahiti the data are less explicit, but there were no rules against an eventual marriage between close relatives by the rulers. The ruler of the Tonga Islands married a cross-cousin.

Table 3. Royal incest, the perpetual fire, and limited travels

Case	(Ritual) incest	Marriage of sister	Marriage in clan	Perpet. fire	Limited travel
Ankole	-	-	-	x	x
Rwanda	-	-	-	x	x
Buganda	?	?	x	x	x
Yoruba				o	x
Dahomey		-	?	o	x
Kuba	x	?	x	0	x
Tio	-	-	-	x	x
Swazi	-	x	x	o	x
Tahiti			x	-	-
Tonga		<u>.</u> .	x	-	
Incas	-	x	x	-	-

A ritual fire that is extinguished when the ruler dies is mentioned for Ankole, Rwanda, Buganda, and Tio, generally accompanied by the killing of the keeper of the fire. There were no indications of the existence of such a fire in Yoruba, Dahomey, Kuba, and Swazi. A perpetual fire was not mentioned for Polynesia or for the Incas. There are no reasons to make this fire a general African characteristic. At best it is typical of the interlacustrine states.

A better case can be made from the limited freedom for the ruler to travel. For Ankole, Rwanda, and Buganda it is stated that the ruler travels only within limited distances, and the same holds for Dahomey. The Yoruba ruler is not even supposed to leave his palace at all, while for Kuba and Tio it is stated that the ruler seldom travels. The Swazi ruler does travel, but especially at night, which can possibly be interpreted as a limitation of the freedom to travel. This custom contrasts sharply with the position of rulers in other parts of the world. Most of them were hardy and frequent travelers.⁵

3.2. Succession to High Office

Is it possible to discern special characteristics for Africa south of the Sahara in the 'succession to high office' (Goody 1966) or in the 'passage of power' (Burling 1974)? The general impression is that at the death of the ruler it is not known exactly which of the sons of the deceased will become the successor (for instance: Mair 1977: 50, 74, 106, 111 and chapter 9). The successor is somehow selected from among the sons – usually with the help of a council of high functionaries. This happens in Buganda, Yoruba, Tio, and Swazi. In Ankole and Rwanda the ruler suggests a successor, but this is not necessarily the next ruler. In Ankole this position usually falls to the prince who succeeds in surviving the fierce wars of succession, and in Rwanda the council of highranking functionaries rejects the selection, or the brothers of the proposed heir contest his position. In the case of Kuba there seem to be rules, according to which one of the near kin of the ruler the Bweemy - succeeds. But in practice this seldom happens. A council of high functionaries influences the actual choice of the successor (cf. Vansina 1964: 113, 119; 1978: 366. Cf. Torday and Joyce 1910: 25, 32, 62, 63). Only in Dahomey is the future ruler known with at least some certainty, well before the death of the ruler. Also here, however, a selection is made from among the sons of the ruler. The general conclusion therefore is that the successor is chosen from among the sons of the ruler by some mechanism (cf. also Richards 1961; and Goody 1966; 12 ff., 142 ff).

The question remains whether this is a typical African feature. It seems necessary to scrutinize this aspect more closely (cf. also Burling 1974: 25 ff.) in view of Goody's remarks (1966: 13) that

even in those systems we speak of as hereditary, some element of choice is always present, the extent of option varies greatly from next-in-line succession to 'dynastic election'. And despite the western idea that the automatic next-of-kin procedure is the normal type, dynastic election is in fact far more wide-spread.

In Tuden and Marshall's Cross Cultural Codes (1972: 436 ff.), forty-one states are mentioned. Of these forty-one cases twelve are found with a succession in the ruling family (or group of families), the choice among potential heirs being made by the family, the predecessor, a council etc. Seven out of twelve were found in Africa. Haiti, with an African cultural heritage, has the same principle of succession. Cases outside of Africa are, according to Tuden and Marshall, the Khmer, the Armenians about 1843, the Romans of A.D. 110, and the Incas. As African cases with a different mode of succession are mentioned: the Bemba, the Fur, the Amhars (1953), Egypt (1950), and Azande. How can we square these findings with the rule of dynastic election in Africa? In the first place it must be pointed out that the procedures for selection among the Bemba or the Azande are hardly different from the procedure known as 'dynastic election' (see for the Bemba: Burling 1974: 28 ff; Zande: Kandert 1978: 523, 527). They in fact conform to the more general rule. The Islamic Fur and Eygptians, or the Koptic Amhars have a different mode of succession which is connected with the different ideology dominating these polities, an ideology imported at some moment in their history (cf. also Lewis 1978 on Jimma). The discussion so far seems to confirm the idea that dynastic election is predominantly African. But, how about the non-African examples mentioned by Tuden and Marshall?

It appears that the Khmer are placed correctly under this heading (cf. Sedov 1978), and the same holds for the Inca. It is not clear, however, why the Romans of A.D. 110 are mentioned in this connection, for this was the very period when the emperor

adopted as son a capable man, to guarantee a qualified successor (Alföldi 1956: 194). Since the Armenians were incorporated into the Russian empire in 1823, it is not clear how they could select successors to their throne in 1843. (In *former* times the Armenians had a dynastic election. Dr. Khazanov, pers. comm.)

Though the case studies of the *Early State* volume confirm the impression that dynastic selection was a predominantly African phenomenon (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 116, 173, 302), there are too many exceptions to make it a *typical* African feature.

Table 4. Succession to high office:

Case	Dynastic selection	Influence council	Death kept secret	No phys. defects	Sacral after inaug.
Ankole	x		?	x	x
Rwanda	x	x	?	?	x
Buganda	x	x	x	x	x
Yoruba	x	x	?	x	x
Dahomey	x	0	?	x	x
Kuba	x	x	x	0	x
Tio	x	x	x	0	x
Swazi	x	x	x	0	x
Tahiti					x
Tonga	-	-	-		x
Incas	x	x	x	?	x

In view of the foregoing it is not surprising that there is a tendency to keep the death of the ruler a secret for at least some time. This custom was found in Buganda, Kuba, Tio, and Swazi, while for Rwanda and Ankole the data are not clear. It seems improbable, however, that in Yoruba or in Dahomey the death of the ruler was kept a secret. Though in principle several near kin are eligible, there are some peculiar specifications. In some cases the eldest son of the ruler is excluded from succession: Buganda, Yoruba, Kuba, and Swazi. In the other cases he had no special position at all (cf. also Richards 1961). There also existed the requirement that the successor should be without physical defects. This is mentioned explicitly for Ankole, Buganda, Yoruba, and Dahomey, while it seems highly probable for Rwanda where the ruler is

expected to be a 'strong' man. However, no mention was made of this custom in Kuba, Tio, and Swazi, though it is not incompatible with the ideology of these states. It is interesting to note that in Tahiti and Tonga, where a different mode of succession was found (viz. primogeniture), none of the accompanying features were found either. However, in the realm of the Incas, where dynastic election prevailed, the other features played a role.

Once the successor is found, a complex ritual is needed to change him from an ordinary mortal to a highly sacral ruler. These rituals were found in all African cases. There is no reason, however, to consider this typically African. In nearly all cases where a sacral ruler is found to exist — and that means in nearly all early states — the same kind of sacralization of the successor is needed. Even in Polynesia, where the crown prince is already sacral from birth, complex inauguration ceremonies are found, in the course of which he becomes transformed into the sacral ruler.

3.3. Royal Women

The first person, or rather institution, that comes into view when discussing African royal women, is the mother of the ruler. With the exception of Tio and Kuba she is said to play a most important role in all the early states of the sample. However, this in itself is not a peculiar phenomenon. In numerous polities all over the world the mother of the ruler has a high status and often influences the politics of the state. It seems, however, that the royal mother in Africa displays some distinct features, the most important of which is probably the institutionalized and official character of her position: not only her status is formally recognized, but if she dies during the reign of her son, a successor is appointed, who in her turn functions as the mother of the ruler.

In Dahomey and Yoruba even 'mothers' of long deceased rulers are found. In Yoruba, moreover, the real mother of the ruler has to take poison when her son ascends the throne. She is immediately replaced by an official mother.

The Tio form a clear exception. Neither the mother, nor the sister(s) of the ruler have a special position there (Vansina 1973: 393). For Kuba the data are insufficient. The royal mother is mentioned as important by Torday and Joyce (1910: 11, 17),

while Vansina (1964: 113) mentions her only once. Neither give details of her position. In the cases where the mother of the ruler was mentioned as having an important position, it appeared that this position was ritual rather than political. In a recent article Cohen (1977) suggests that the position of the mother of the ruler is a kind of compensation given to the faction of the royal lineage which lost the competition for high office. Though the data of our sample do not seem to support the hypothesis in this form, it seems that her position is connected with some security provision: in the patrilineal early states it is her clan that gives the most trustworthy support to the ruler. It also must be pointed out that in these cases it was either the real mother of the ruler, or a near relative of her's who succeeded as the 'official mother'. In the matrilineal states (Kuba, Tio) no clear institutionalized and official position of the royal mother could be demonstrated, however. Incidentally, depending upon her capacities, the mother of the ruler played also a political role. This, however, is hardly limited to Africa. The phenomenon of a politically active royal mother seems to occur in all times and places.

Table 5. Royal women

Case	Royal mother					Royal sister			
	Instit.	Pol.	Rit.	Own mo.	Offi- cial	Pol.	Rit. act.	Offi- cial	Inst.
Ankole	х	х	x	х	x	х	x	х	x
Rwanda	x	x	x	x	x	-	-	-	-
Buganda	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Yoruba	x	x	x		x	_			
Dahomey	x	?	x	x	x	-	-	-	-
Kuba	o	ο .	o	x	o	o	x	0	x
Tio	-	-			-	-	-	-	-
Swazi	x	x	x	x	x	x	?	x	x
Tahiti		x		x		-	-	-	-
Tonga	-	x		x		-	?	-	x
Incas	-	x		x	-	-	-	-	-

The second 'royal woman' who is mentioned, though less frequently, is the (eldest) sister of the ruler. She is only important in Ankole, Buganda, Kuba, and Swazi. The four other states of the sample are clearly negative. The royal sister is supposed to fulfill mainly ritual tasks, though this is not clear for Swazi. Her position is official in so far that in Ankole, Buganda, and Swazi a successor is appointed when she dies. It seems that the royal sister as an institution is only found in states where the royal mother also has an institutionalized position. Only in the Tonga Islands did the sister of the ruler have some sort of status. However, her position was not official, for a successor was not appointed, nor did she have clear ritual or political tasks (cf. Claessen 1970: 41).

3.4. Special Functionaries

In the sample of African states functionaries were generally found who acted in specific situations as ritual substitutes for the ruler. The most important of these were connected with the army during war. The interesting - and typically African - aspect here is not that the ruler is only nominally commander of the army, but stays at home, or at least at a safe distance, when actual combat starts. This is a situation quite common, according to the findings of the Early State volume (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 562), though nineteenth-century Dahomey seems to form an exception in this respect (cf. Claessen 1970: 94). The interesting point is that in all cases a person is found who substitutes for the ruler ritually. It is his ritual bloodbrother in the case of the Swazi. It is someone who is considered a king, and who wears the bow-string which is kept by the royal sister in Kuba. The Rwanda substitute is considered ritually responsible for the outcome of the battle. He therefore has to sit down without moving during the fight, while the ruler does the same - at home. In Ankole the royal fetish and the royal drum are given to the substitute. The osiwefa in Yoruba wears the royal garments, and exercises royal privileges. The ritual commander of Tio is the one who eventually could be king, and in Dahomey the ritual commander is allowed to sit on a throne, identical to the royal seat, while he smokes a royal pipe. He is considered explicitly

responsible for the outcome of the war — in the place of the ruler. The ritual commander of Buganda is regarded as 'king'. He therefore is not allowed to sleep in the royal residence (no two kings on one hill), gets the ashes of the royal fire on his face, and wears royal paraphernalia. There is not the slightest indication that a comparable functionary is found outside Africa.

Table 6. Special functionaries

Case	Ritual commander	Other substitutes	Ritual obligations regional administr.
Ankole	x	x	-
Rwanda	x	x	
Buganda	x	x	-
Yoruba	x	x	
Dahomey	x	x	
Kuba	x	x	
Tio	x	x	
Swazi	x	o	0
—————— Tahiti			x
Tonga			X
Incas			X

Ritual substitutes are not only found in military affairs. In Kuba the Bangwaam incyaam perform rituals in connection with the moon, when the ruler is surrounded by strong taboos. Their position as a substitute for the ruler can be inferred from the fact that they have the same burial rites. In Rwanda there are 'ritual kings', with their own capitals and drums. They guard over the most important rituals which are meant to assure the well-being of the ruler and the country. In Ankole some ritualists make rain in the place of the ruler, and in Yoruba the osiwefa fulfils several ritual tasks in his place. There are also people who take part in religious or social rituals for him.

The ruler of Tio has to undergo the long and complex inauguration ritual in the company of a child, who has to sit on the royal seat several times in his place. In Dahomey a priest is tattooed in the face with the cicatrices of the royal panther (the ruler's blood is not allowed to be spilled). In Buganda functionaries such as the *kauzumu* and the *kago* fulfill mourning taboos in the place of the ruler. For Swazi there are no clear data with the exception of the bloodbrothers of the ruler, who will be discussed in the next section. Again, there are no indications that this type of functionary was found outside Africa.

The most interesting substitute is perhaps the royal 'twin' or, rather, 'double'. This is sometimes an object, and sometimes a person. In some cases the double exists for a short time only, and in others it may survive the ruler. In short, there is much variation, but the underlying idea seems to be the same everywhere: to have a ritual substitute for the ruler. In fact, the ritual commander discussed above also belongs to this category.

A well-known example is the royal drum in Ankole. This drum symbolizes more the principle of royalty than the ruler himself. There are even human sacrifices in honor of this drum. Besides this, there is also a person who acts during the interregnum as a mock-king, and who is killed as soon as the new ruler makes his entry. Rwanda also has a royal drum with the same symbolic value as that of Ankole (cf. Muller 1976). In Buganda the position of the drum is of lesser importance. Here the royal 'double' is the carefully preserved umbilical cord of the ruler. In the person of the *kauta* the ruler has, moreover, a bloodbrother, who is killed when the ruler dies.

The Yoruba are less clear in this respect, though there the aremo, the eldest son of the ruler, reigns together with his father, but has to die with his father as well. Another possible double is the osiwefa, who we already mentioned as ritual commander. The ruler of Dahomey finds a ritual double in the 'bush-king', as this object is usually called by the ethnographers. All rituals are done twice there: once for the ruler, and once for the bush-king. The ruler of Kuba has a carved image, the ndop, which was supposed to be his double. When the ruler died, the carver of the ndop was killed. It is not clear if the 'great fetish' of Tio can be considered a double. In the case of the Swazi the two tinsila, the bloodbrothers of the ruler must be mentioned here. They have a close ritual connection with the ruler, and act as his substitutes on several occasions. In former times it seems that they were not allowed to survive the ruler.

When discussing functionaries with ritual responsibilities, it is interesting to note that Africa seems to be an exception in that regional administrative functionaries had no ritual obligations as such (Swazi is not clear in this respect). Ritual obligations, however, were found to be a normal part of the tasks performed by the regional functionaries in Tahiti and Tonga, as well as in the realm of the Incas (see Table 6).

Table 7. Royal doubles

Case	Object	Blood- brother	Other person	Killing of double	Ritual commander
Ankole	drum		mock-king	x	х
Rwanda	drum		-	-	x
Buganda	umb, cord	kauta	-	x	x
Yoruba	-	-	osiwefa aremo	x	x
Dahomey	bush-king	-			x
Kuba	ndop			x	x
Tio	fetish	?	child at inaugur.	-	x
Swazi	-	tinsila	-	x	x
Tahiti		-		-	
Tonga	-		-	-	-
Incas	-	-	-	- "	-

4. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

It should be made clear at the outset that the data presented are not based upon an exhaustive review of all possible literature. In some cases only some general works were consulted, and in other cases relevant literature was not available. It is very well possible that more thorough research would have provided more and better data. The following discussion therefore must of necessity posit hypotheses and possibilities, and not unshakable conclusions and truths.

The tables make clear that not all characteristics discussed were found in precolonial Africa south of the Sahara only. Others, though restricted to Africa, were not found to be general here. It may be helpful therefore to take into consideration also those that can be considered as functional equivalents, and those that —

though not having a general distribution – seem to corroborate the more central ones.

The direct relation between the health of the ruler and the wellbeing of the country (the traditional concept of 'divine king') according to the data presented seems to be found in Africa only, though not everywhere (Table 1). Dahomey and Yoruba do not exhibit this relationship, while the case of Buganda is not clear. It appears, however, that both in Buganda and Dahomey rituals exist which aim at the physical strengthening of the ruler, while in Buganda the ruler is not allowed to come into contact with death or sickness.

This phenomenon must not be separated from Table 2, however. The ritual killing of the ruler was found to be characteristic for Africa. It is also connected with the relation between ruler and fertility. The killing, or rather the *ritual* killing of the ruler, was not found to be generally practized. Dahomey and Buganda featured only the killing of a substitute, while Tio and Swazi had no killing at all, but rather a ritual rebirth of the ruler. In view of these data it seems probable that the ideology of the relationship between the ruler and fertility, as well as the 'killing of the king' are typical African features, even though not all components of this complex were found to exist everywhere.

As Table 3 shows, there is no reason to think of royal incest as a general characteristic of African early states. Neither the relations between the ruler and his mother, nor those with his sister can be considered as such. Only in Kuba did a ritual incest between the ruler and his sister occur, but apparently for the purpose of demonstrating that he was no longer a member of his family. The data for Buganda were not clear. Moreover, royal incest was found to exist outside Africa as well.

An interesting feature is the limited freedom of the ruler to travel. This was found to be characteristic for Africa only. If this aspect is brought into connection with the ruler's influence upon fertility, it may be interpreted as a means of keeping him in the very heart of his country, or of preventing him from spreading his benign powers elsewhere. On the ritual fire the data are too meager to make any generalization possible.

The succession to high office in Africa was found to be generally by means of dynastic election. However, it also appeared that this method of finding a successor to a deceased ruler was

used in some states outside of Africa too (Khmer, Incas, Aztecs). The method of dynastic election has some inevitable consequences, such as the influence of councils, a period of interregnum, sometimes leading even to civil war, the necessity of extended rituals to make the successor a sacral ruler, the effort to keep the death of the ruler a secret, etc. This complex of consequences was found to exist outside of Africa too. It is perhaps not unimportant that dynastic election was found in Africa generally, but outside Africa only exceptionally. It seems possible therefore, to call this method typically African.

The prescription that a successor to high office must be without physical defects is quite in line with the assumed relationship between the ruler's health and the fertility of the country. This requirement was found only in Africa — as far as the literature available showed. Interesting in this respect is that Yoruba, Dahomey, and Buganda know this prescription explicitly, although the relationship between ruler and fertility is more indirect, than direct. This seems to corroborate the idea that the direct relationship is a general African phenomenon.

The position of the royal women, the mother and the sister of the ruler, is a rather complex one. Their position is not accidental, but institutionalized. With the exception of Kuba and Tio (where spouses of the ruler fulfilled these tasks) it is stated everywhere that the ruler cannot rule without a mother: his own mother to start with, and an 'official' mother when she dies. The reasons for such a double monarchy are not clear, nor are the actual activities of the mother. She is said to have political influence, or to fulfill ritual tasks, but none of these seem to justify such a lofty position. Perhaps a hard core of 'realpolitik' is hidden behind the mythical and ritual statements that are often given to explain her status: the support of mother's patriclan. This support is not without importance for a new ruler, not specially educated to be king, starting his new career while a number of potential usurpers are eagerly awaiting their chance to supplant him. without meaning that often the mother of the ruler liquidates dangerous brothers of the ruler (as has been well attested for Buganda, for instance). Even when the competing princes have been eliminated in a fierce war of succession, the support of a powerful faction is not to be despised by the ruler (cf. also Cohen 1977). The position of the royal mother seems to give this support a formal status. In view of the 'balance of power' policy, which is found to exist in all early states (cf. Claessen 1979), this explanation does not seem improbable. A corroboration of this view may be found in the fact that the successor of the royal mother generally is recruited from her near kin.

The same considerations may play a role in the explanation of the position of the royal sister. She is less frequently found in an institutionalized position than the royal mother, but when this position is recognized her position is quite comparable: she has some political and ritual tasks, and when she dies a successor is appointed. In the light of the 'balance of power' policy she may be a kind of counterweight against the royal harem. The phenomenon of the institutionalized position of a royal mother, as well as a royal sister, seems to be specifically African.

The ritual commander, who was found in Africa only, can easily be related to the ruler's influence upon fertility. The ruler should avoid not only the risks of the battlefield, but also the ritual responsibility for war and bloodshed. Therefore a substitute is chosen, who, dressed in royal garments, and with royal paraphernalia in hand, accompanies the army. He, and not the ruler, carries ritual responsibility (cf. Claessen 1970: 264). This seems to be found in Africa only. The same holds for the other ritual They, however, seem not to be connected with a substitutes. dangerous responsibility, but rather with the simple fact that physically the ruler cannot meet all the demands made upon his time by both ritual and administrative responsibilities. ritual obligations often lay a heavy claim on time and attention, he has to find a solution for this problem. The burden of these obligations is felt in early states outside of Africa too. Here solutions are often sought in other directions: the sacral ruler of Tahiti, for instance, abdicates as soon as a son is born to him. This infant son then becomes king, burdened with all sacral obligations, while the father continues his reign, without ritual problems, as the regent for his son. The ruler in the Tonga Islands followed another policy. He appointed a hereditary political 'substitute' and kept for himself the ritual position. Elsewhere (Incas) a high priest, a near relative of the ruler, took over nearly all ritual obligations (cf. Claessen 1970: 222 ff.). Interesting in this respect is that the regional administrative functionaries in Africa had no ritual obligations at all (apart from private obligations as lineage head, etc.).

The last aspect to be considered is that of the royal 'doubles'. It seems that this custom is found in Africa only. There is wide variation in this aspect: from drum to bloodbrother. The meaning of the custom is not clear. Perhaps it should be interpreted as a way of symbolizing the royal omnipresence. Perhaps a kind of ritual selfprotection lies at the bottom of the custom. In some cases the 'double' lives on after the death of the ruler, and in other cases people like the bloodbrothers, or the carver of the ndop have to die when the ruler dies.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Summarizing the results of the discussion it can be said that there are a number of features that seem to be typical for precolonial Africa south of the Sahara with the limitations indicated in Section 2. These features were *not* found in the control group, nor in the data of the *Early State* sample:

- A direct relationship between the health of the ruler and the well-being, or fertility, of the country.
- (2) A ritual 'killing' of the ruler when his virility diminishes.
- (3) A limited freedom to travel for the ruler.
- (4) The existence of a royal 'double'.
- (5) The demand that an heir-successor should be without physical defects.
- (6) The institution of a coruling, official royal mother.
- (7) A 'ritual commander', who carries the ritual responsibility for military activities.
- (8) Some high-ranking functionaries who fulfill, as substitutes, certain ritual obligations for the ruler.
- (9) No ritual responsibilities for regional administrative functionaries. With some hesitation may be added to this list:
- (10) The institution of an official royal sister.

It is possible to interpret the features mentioned above as the specific expressions of a few underlying principles: the alleged direct relationship between the ruler's health and the fertility of the country is connected with the 'killing' of the ruler, his limited

freedom to travel, the physical fitness of the successor, and the avoidance of military activities, coming to the fore in the position of the ritual commander.

The often hard-won position of the ruler — via royal election — seems to call forth the position of the royal mother and the royal sister, expressing the support of mother's patriclan. It seems to be connected also with the nonritual position of the regional administrators. It is also possible to interpret the position of the ruler in terms of a kinship system, being a clan- or lineage chief, rather than a warrior king, or a priest-king. In this respect the great influence of the (official) royal relatives, mother and sister, the position of the (eldest) son, and the competition with his brothers can be mentioned. (cf. Miller 1976, and Drucker-Brown, this volume). The combination of administrative and ritual obligations may have led to the development of the royal doubles, the ritual functionaries, and the ritual commander, as well as, perhaps, to a number of ritual tasks, fulfilled by the royal mother and sister.

In view of these conclusions it seems apparent that in the African early states the complex relationship between power, power base and ideology found specific forms of expression: a clan-oriented type of kingship, and fertility as the dominant characteristic of the ideology. In this way these findings may indicate the existence of an underlying pattern: the features not being just a collection of unconnected traits (cf. Kuper and Van Leynseele 1978: 350; Muller in this volume).

The data of the control group suggest that these characteristics were either not found at all outside of Africa, or developed in a rather different way. The origin and development of these specific African features cannot be discussed in this paper, however.

NOTES

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- This point of view is similar in some respects to Steward's. For this
 author says on the basis of what he discovered in a comparative study of
 the rise of the state in Mesopotamia and Meso-America that by isolating

the important institutions from their specific appearances and by abstracting them into types one is then able to use the terms 'basic' and 'constant'. The phenomena giving these institutions their specific form can be qualified as 'secondary', or 'variable' (Steward 1955: 184. Cf. Claessen 1973: 75 ff.).

- 2. This conclusion in Van vorsten en volken must be corrected, however, in the light of later research. The security provisions, as suggested by Murdock, are only a consequence of the system of 'dynastic elections', which are as this article will demonstrate not an exclusive African custom. The position of the royal mother, also mentioned in his list, is in fact the only typically African characteristic though in a more limited formulation. The broad formulation Murdock used led to the incorrect conclusion in Van vorsten en volken. The same holds for Westermann, who defined mother's position also far too broadly (1952: 39).
- This is not to say, of course, that in these states typically African features should not exist at all. However, as most sources on these states are Arabic or Coptic, the typically African features seem to have been more or less obscured (cf. Tymowski 1974).
- 4. The following sources have been consulted for the case studies:

Ankole: Oberg 1940; Roscoe 1923; Karugire 1971; Doornbos 1973, 1975; Steinhart 1978.

Maquet 1954, 1961; d'Hertefelt 1962, 1965, 1971; d'Hertefelt

and Coupez 1964.

Buganda: Based on chapter IV of Claessen 1970, which covers most of

the relevant ethnographical literature.

Yoruba: Johnson 1921; Lloyd 1960, 1967, 1968; Smith 1969; Kocha-

kova 1978.

Dahomey: Based upon chapter III of Claessen 1970.

Kuba: Torday and Joyce 1910; Vansina 1964, 1978.

Tio: Guiral 1889; Brunschwig 1965; Obenga 1969; Vansina 1973. Swazi: Marwick 1940; (H.) Kuper 1947, 1952, 1964; (A.) Kuper

Marwick 1940; (H.) Kuper 1947, 1952, 1964; (A.) Kuper 1978.

For the controlgroup:

Rwanda:

Tahiti: Claessen 1970, 1978; Oliver 1974. Tonga: Claessen 1970; Rutherford 1977.

Incas: Claessen 1970; Schaedel 1978.

5. The Early State sample shows the following:

No traveling at all: Yoruba.

Limited traveling only: Ankole, Aztecs, Jimma, Kuba.

Extensive traveling: Angkor, Axum, China, Egypt, France, Hawaii, Incas, Maurya, Mongolia, Norway, Scythia, Tahiti.

Volta appeared to have changed from extensive traveling to limited in the course of its history (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 585).

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5 Evolution, Fission, and the Early State

RONALD COHEN

1. INTRODUCTION

Theoretical and empirical work on the emergence of the early state is bedeviled by normative outlooks. To some the state solves problems and provides benefits to its citizenry (Service 1975). To others it is the expression of exploitative domination of the rulers over the ruled. In my previous work (Cohen 1978a) I tried to show that both of these positions are (partially) correct and that a more neutral systems approach depicts the empirical data and process more accurately. From my field data I have suggested (Cohen 1978b, 1978c) that the state emerges from a number of differing sources and relations between groups and that once the process is set into motion the political sector becomes more and more a major determinant of the structure of society and its correlated culture. In my view, the universal and core processual feature of state formation is the development of institutions counteracting the normal fissioning of the polity. This latter process is an ubiquitous quality among all previous forms of social and political organization. Comparative research on a larger sample of societies by Claessen and Skalník (1978:21, 639, 645) has provided support for the proposition and these authors have accordingly included fission/antifission as one of the important differences between state and nonstate systems. Although states certainly do split or break up, unlike other systems they have evolved organizational and cultural features specifically devoted

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to constraining or stopping fission.1

A number of problems remain. As stated above, institutionalizing antifission capacity is a necessary feature of state formation. But is it sufficient? Are there other qualities just as necessary? And how are they all related? Contrarily are there instances in which antifission circumstances and/or institutions evolve but the state remains undeveloped? And is there such a thing as centralization without the state?

More concretely can these notions of state emergence and formation deal with the differences between what are often referred to as chieftaincies and states? Service (1975) notes that for his own comparative work the distinction is difficult, often arbitrary, and still unresolved. Claessen and Skalník (1978) meet the issue head-on by inventing three types of early states. These cut across societies I classify as being some on one side, some on the other side of the state/nonstate dichotomy. This replaces my own dichotomy with a gradation of institutional arrangements ranging from kinship and local community dominated (the 'inchoate' state) to ones in which territorial ties balance kinship, (the typical early state) to states in which administrative officers are primarily appointed nonkin persons (the 'transitional' state). This is an improvement. The variance is described as 'ideal type' model building so that each 'type' is posited with a number of possible correlates which may or may not be reflected in the real world.² For Claessen and Skalník (1978:21-22) the central criterion that divides chieftaincies from states is that of the power of the central government to legitimately enforce its decisions. Chieftaincies, although centrally organized, lack this capacity; states have developed it. It is also important to note that extensive empirical research by these same authors tends to support their theoretical position.

In my own work so far it has proven useful to keep the dichotomy state/nonstate. In applying this division to chieftaincies and states I argue with illustrative material (Cohen 1978b) that chieftaincies fission, states do not. In this view the state is an emergent form of human polity, one with relatively enormous potential for growth, expansion, and power. In this sense I am in agreement with Claessen and Skalník (1978), but where they place the emphasis on the capability of central government to enforce legitimately, I would emphasize an organizational capacity

to maintain and coordinate without continuous splitting into separate polities. Clearly we all agree that all of these qualities are essential and the difference is more a matter of choosing a criterion we each find useful, rather than a basic disagreement.

One other point requires discussion. Political systems do not generally develop by leaps and discontinuous bumps and bounds. Even a revolution is definably part of the social evolution of human society. Before going on, therefore, let me clarify how I conceive of sociopolitical evolution. The term has come to mean so many different things by now that it requires careful delineation.

2. THE STATE AS A 'LEVEL' OF EVOLUTION

Elsewhere I have described and explained the evolutionary approach to achieving some understanding of political and sociocultural systems (Cohen 1979). Although the entire matter is rather complex the major concepts are easily summarized. Evolutionary knowing comes from two and in some instances three intellectual operations: taxonomy, process, and directionality. Taxonomy involves the classification of the evolving phenomenon into subtypes or taxa which are assumed to be developmentally related. Evolutionary processes involve the production of constant variance within the phenomenon through time. The variance interacts with selective factors to produce both stability and changes which can be retained and perpetuated within the evolving phenomenon. Directionality is indicated by a traceable set of changes from one form to another. And for a variety of reasons such predictability is apparent only after and not before it occurs (Cohen 1979; Monod 1972).

This logic applies to all phenomena. However in the case of human forms there is an added emergent Lamarckian feature in which collectivities of actors can decide to choose a direction and then develop the means to achieve these preconceived goals. This makes evolution even more unpredictable; it also locates major selective factors inside the phenomenon itself.³ Although I intend to discuss this central issue in future publications, it is important to notice here that the Lamarckian quality of human social evolution makes social theory normative by definition. In this sense social

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science is qualitatively distinct from natural science. Positivistic methods and approaches are included in social science but the latter includes policy creation and analysis. Thus social theory must ask about the use and misuse of natural science findings and create prescriptions (i.e., theories) or sets of them to deal with such issues. It is thus like natural science in some ways but includes emergent qualities and problems not present in the 'hard' sciences. Not to accept this view means disregarding the Lamarckian nature of social evolution and its profound import for social theory.

Evolutionary theory gives rise to taxonomies of evolving phenomena in which groups of taxa are lumped as 'branches' within successive levels. And this in turn produces two separate sets of criteria; one distinguishing between successive levels and the other between the branches within any particular level. Applied to political evolution the taxa take on levels shown in Figure 1. Arrows in the paradigm illustrate only one possible set of known theoretical changes. Actual rather than theoretical change occurs among branches. Cases within any one branch may assimilate to or be incorporated by later stages, remain the same, change to other branches within the level, devolve towards branches in previous levels, or become extinct.




Figure 1. Paradigm for the study of political evolution

The number of branchings per level is, again, a matter of definition and empirical research, and today all polities are subparts of modern, industrial or industrializing states. What comes next is unclear—candidates sometimes offered are world government, rule by multinational corporations, communism, anarchy, or extinc-

tion. No clear prediction is possible. Be that as it may, the central place of definition in evolutionary theory now becomes clear. For example, a theory of the state depends to a large extent on how Section 5 of the paradigm is separated off from previous sections, and this depends on what criterion (or set of them) is used to classify $(a_5,...,n_5)$ branches together under the overall category 'early state'. And this in turn depends on what we use for criteria, which need not always be the same. In the paradigm, specifically human culture and human brain capabilities separate levels 1 and 2;5 storable, renewable, food resources separate levels 2 and 3; and supralocal authority structures separate levels 3 and 4. Each criterion is a constant for the level and differentiates all cases in a particular level from previous ones. Levels are defined by a quality whose emergent nature determines that all cases and each branch within the level have a distinctly different form of political organization from those in previous levels. Thus a criterion is, theoretically, a major determinant of the political life within the level that reflects fundamental causal forces associated with emerging levels of evolutionary change. That is to say, it must be correlated with and demonstrably deterministic of all branches within the level. It must also be emergent. This means it must be a quality whose widespread importance has not appeared in previous levels. Many nonstate polities have some capacity for multiethnicity, but the small size of each polity creates strong tendencies towards rapid homogenization. Early states on the other hand can tolerate multiethnicity as long as the governmental system is not threatened by cultural differences. These logical properties for creating theoretical and taxonomic criteria lead to two forms of assessment to be used in judging evolutionary classification:

- A criterion for statehood should be a universal feature of all cases classified as states which is not present among or poorly developed among nonstates.
- (2) A criterion should be associated with or indicative of factors that have caused or produced early statehood.

From this point of view let's look at some of the candidates for differentiating states from nonstates and ask whether some are arguably more useful than others.

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3. CONVENTIONAL CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD

The criteria most often used as a rough and ready feature to distinguish state from nonstate is that of the centralized governmental structure, operating usually at a level above local authorities. This central authority has a monopoly over legitimated coercive power, and it serves as a central point for tribute and revenue collection and redistribution. A monarch or chief of one or more dynastic lineages represents in his sacred person the 'body-politic', i.e., the corporate nature of the political entity over which he and his advisers rule. Claessen and Skalník (1978: 23) provide a number of other correlates in the trait list attached to the typical early state. Their primary criterion is still the power to legitimately enforce central governmental decisions. Others are in some sense derivative of these and correlated to local conditions and history (Claessen and Skalník: personal communication).

As already noted, it is my belief that the use of differing criteria produces a different list of societies included under the rubrics 'states' and 'chieftaincies'. For me, if a society fissions as a normal or expectable part of its political process, then even if its central government can enforce decisions, it is not a state. Ankole was included in Claessen and Skalník's (1978) work as a state which does normally fission; therefore, I see it as a chieftaincy. As I shall try to show below, this is not a mere taxonomic quibble. It is my theoretical assumption, open to testing, that even though a society may be centralized and simple with very few statelike features, whether or not it can enforce legitimated decisions from the center, if it has evolved antifission institutions, it has crossed the threshold to statehood and will evolve more statelike features. Without such a quality, no matter what else has evolved, then development towards more statelike features is inhibited. Theoretically, therefore, the fission/antifission criterion predicts which society will evolve greater degrees of statehood and which will not.

The notion of class stratification or 'class' society is also widely used as a criterion. Fried (1967, 1978), Khazanov (1978), Krader (1978) and others identify the state as an organization that develops in order to protect a particular set of 'relations of production'. In effect this means the interests of an upper class

having systematically greater than normal chance access to, and power over, scarce resources. Recent research on the Tuareg has shown, however, that classes may exist with no tendency towards centralization of authority, i.e., organized means for the dominant group to express or wield its power (Bonte 1975). Conversely classes may develop after the state not to protect previously held superior power but rather in revolt against previous 'exploitation' or access to scarce resources. The revolutionary groups then set themselves up as rulers and the state emerges (Cohen 1978a, 1978b). In the face of such contrary evidence, the most recent and advanced Marxist thinking has accepted the non-Marxist position on lack of clear evidence for the class origins of the state and repudiated earlier theories (see Godelier 1978:767-768). Caught in such disconfirming cross fire, Godelier (1978:768) asks 'ought we [Marxists] really to be using words such as class and state when referring to hierarchized precapitalist ancient or exotic societies?'

Clearly the stratification criterion and its accompanying theory is in the process of being jettisoned by some of its heretofore most avid supporters. Class structure involving rulers and ruled is an ubiquitous feature of early states. It is also present among some nonstates; in other cases it may come into existence only after the state has formed. Thus like centralization class society is nonexclusive. It is a necessary but not sufficient aspect of early states and it satisfies neither of our definitional criteria, being neither an exclusive trait of states nor a factor associated with causes of the state.

Another candidate for the position defining characteristic of states is a specifically structural one. Wright and Johnson (1975) have found that significant differences are associated with shifts from a two-step to a three-step hierarchy. Much greater differentiation of settlements, a more urbanized center, monumental architecture, and (so they infer) much more complex managerial functions, are of necessity associated with three levels of hierarchy rather than two. They see these distinctions reflected in durable remains that express interrelations of social, political, and cultural activities associated with chieftaincy (two levels of hierarchy), and the state (three levels). The data presented by these authors on Mesopotamia is supportive of their position.

If it were universally applicable this would be an excellent

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criterion. Based as it is on a simple count of the levels of hierarchy the criterion is numerically objective, parsimonious, and simple. However, on closer inspection the same problems emerge as with centralization and class. Many three-level hierarchies are clearly Anyone familiar with small to medium-sized West African agricultural communities whose precolonial background was nonstate understands the negative evidence. Such villages (ranging in population size from a few dozen to several hundred) generally have three levels of hierarchy, sometimes more. Judicial proceedings, land registry and distribution, and a host of village affairs occur at compound and multicompound lineage levels under formal leaders. These are in turn under ward heads (dispersed wards are common in middle belt Nigeria) who are in turn under village heads. Several villages may in a few cases acknowledge one powerful village leader as their 'chief' (Harris 1965: Netting 1972). Little if any bureaucracy exists except the hierarchy itself, and the ruling 'class' is simply the founding lineage. Generally, it supplies incumbents to leading villagewide offices as its special prerogative. Others seeking such prerogatives must leave to found their own settlements or remain 'under' others in the original village as late comers.

Such a village organization is hardly a state, but it has a three-tiered hierarchy. Possibly Wright and Johnson (1975) wish to restrict their criteria to territorial units occupying a region in which there are three differentiated types of settlements. Then high degrees of communication interchange, cultural, social, and political integration may, indeed, signal a state especially if the centroid position in the network is a large, architecturally prominent center-cum-citadel. Does this apply equally well to a city-state? And when can we differentiate the three levels of hierarchy in a small village from that of a well-developed city-state? Three-tiered hierarchy therefore applies to some but not all entities that are states, if it is restricted solely to a region; and to all states and some nonstates if it refers to any hierarchy. So it too has difficulty meeting our criteria.

4. THE FISSION/ANTIFISSION CRITERION

States differ from nonstates in their capacity to withstand normal

fissionable processes and tendencies associated with political In developing out of their nonstate background early states for one reason or another evolve institutions that combat fission by progressively removing political integration from other functional settings. Thus as long as groups remain together and recognize the dominance of a central authority they may differ in location, in local cultural traditions, economy and ecology, religion and so on. And the mobilization capability of such centralized systems far exceeds anything ever before encountered. Thus states once formed are highly adaptive. All other previous systems tend to breakup or send off budding and politically autonomous segments through time because one normal way of resolving conflicts or resource shortages is for groups within a polity to opt out and establish their own political entity elsewhere. The evolution of institutions that contain such fissioning is the basic criterion separating states from nonstates.

In earlier work (Cohen 1978a, 1978b) I have explained these ideas more fully and have illustrated how the emergence of antifission forces creates statelike forms where none previously existed. I did this by comparing two differing trajectories of change, one involving a sedentary society, the other nomad/sedentary relations. In the nomad/sedentary situation nomads pressed increasingly onto sedentary owned pasturage and the 'price' exacted for access to needed resources rose to punishing heights. Nomads eventually united under a leader and conquered the sedentary people and their lands. The nomad leader then set up a citadel capital city and a hierarchical administration which included quelling revolts from nomad clans seeking autonomy outside the new state. The sedentary case, that of Pabir-Biu is recapitulated below. In both, however, it is clear that the major effort and the clearest distinction between having a state, and not having one, is the institutional means for maintaining the polity within one organizational structure.

Two criticisms can be leveled at this formulation. It is, possibly, tautological, and it may be in different words an exact replica of Carneiro's (1970) well-known circumscription theory. Let me deal briefly with each of these.

The antifission theory is not only tautological, it is clearly meant to be since it is first and foremost a means of identifying and classifying early states. Thus the creation of antifission

institutions is a defining feature, i.e., another way of saying the same thing and, therefore, tautological. However, as we have seen, many other qualities could be used, and have been, to define this phenomenon. I have chosen this one (a) because it comes directly out of my own field research and my comparative reading, and (b) in my view it points to the most determinative set of changes whose selection and retention creates the early state. In other words the criticism is correct, the antifission nature of early statehood is tautological; it is also heuristic and points towards a more adequate theory of state formation than many now available in the literature. So much for the first criticism.

Is an antifission model simply a restatement of the Carneiro (1970) 'circumscription' theory. This theory, supported by a number of studies done before and after its publication (Harris 1965; Netting 1972; Cohen 1976), argues that populations constricted from expanding spatially in areas capable of supporting larger, denser populations, tend over time to become states. Since Carneiro's notion of circumscription implies that any group so constrained cannot break up, on logical grounds my approach and his seem very close if not identical.

The test of such congruence is independent variation. This can be stated by the null hypothesis which predicts that since 'antifission' and circumscription' are arguably identical theories, no instance of one occurring without the other can be found. Any exception is thus an instance in which the two conditions occur separately and we can then conclude that they are not in fact the same set of notions empirically or theoretically.

In a previous publication I compared three societies in the Chad-Upper Benue basins of Nigeria all lying on a north-south line. My purpose, noted above, was to show multiple developmental trends in which different societies, differentially related to social and physical environmental forces were stimulated to evolve towards a common convergent and emergent form of the early state. The north-south line positioning was not an accident—it reflected the north-south annual trekking for water and pasture, and raids by emirate societies to the north amongst non-Muslim nonstate people at the south end of savannah country.

To see fission/antifission and to test our null hypothesis more clearly we can set the controls differently. The most obvious case of antifission development occurs when societies like PabirBiu develop walled towns. In general this occurred along an eastwest line at the southern edge of the Muslim emirates of northern Nigeria. Although few exact and detailed reports have been published, it is my impression that state-building reactions occurred widely along this entire southern perimeter, regardless of ethnic differences, among the people concerned.

In what is to follow I wish to document again how normal fission processes once stopped can lead to statehood. However, the form of antifission institutions may vary in detail; and whether or not circumscription leads to statehood is both testable and problematic.

5. THE TYPE CASE: PABIR-BIU

At the southern edge of western (the ancient) Borno state of Nigeria (Cohen 1967) lies the Biu plateau which separates the Lake Chad and Benue valley water sheds. On this upland live Pabir and Bura peoples who have interacted with the great Borno state over the centuries. Like all of the peoples in this region many were eventually incorporated into Borno, others ran southwards to forested hills and valleys for refuge, while still others set up walled towns as a defense against predatory raids from the north.

Pabir and Bura peoples share a great deal of their culture, social organization, and speak a common language—Bura. Pabir are, however, centralized and stratified while Bura are not. The latter live in locally autonomous villages separated into lineage-based and dispersed wards. Early-ripening grains are planted closely around each compound so that as lineages proliferate down the generations, virilocal settlement expands topographically. Political organization is an aspect of descent and residential settlement patterning.

Founding lineages provide headmen both for wards and for the village as a whole. The village headman-descendant-of-the-founder adjudicates disputes, keeps the village shrine, announces village events, plants his crops first, organizes community work projects, and intercedes with his founding-lineage ancestors for the welfare of the village. Independent villages and semiautonomous wards proliferate; fission occurs because of land shortages and internal

disputes, especially disagreements over succession to village and ward headships.

The Pabir have religious beliefs similar to the Bura's with admixtures of Islam, especially at the top of the society. These beliefs center around the *haptu* or lineage shrines in each household. Worship at the shrines connects the living to the dead through the mediation of household heads and senior lineage members. Both Pabir and Bura also make offerings at village shrines to honor and request favors from the spirits of the place whose permission is needed in order for a village to be founded. On special occasions Pabir and Bura visit shrines at their own and in each other's villages. There are as well complex beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery that are virtually identical across both groups.

The Pabir, however, live in larger, more compact settlements, traditionally with high moated walls, and they have a monarch-chief who traces his ancestry back through twenty-seven predecessors to a folk hero who is said to have come from the capital of Borno. The monarch's compound in Biu is traditionally much larger than other peoples', and he has a court in which sit titled nobles in special patterns, as well as members of the royal family.

As I have noted elsewhere (Cohen 1976), Pabir is a variant of Bura society that has differentiated from the original in response to its need to defend itself in reaction to early Borno raiding for slaves and booty. In the process, the people were forced to develop and build walls, gates, and moats around their settlements and live within them. Although overall density in the area quite possibly remained the same, the population of major settlements increased from a range of 50-200 to a range of 1000-3000. The practice of surrounding compounds with early-ripening grains was abandoned in favor of using nearby land just outside or inside the The population then increased in size per settlement, in compactness, and decreased in its capacity to proliferate and expand across the landscape. In effect this meant that land use was intensified, and at the same time fission became a less attractive solution to intracommunity shortages and conflicts. adjudicative functions of the leaders were used more often, as were their coordinating and managerial skills. The supernatural powers and priestly role of the headman of the settlement were now used for the welfare of a much larger group. His installation and burial became enormously elaborate ceremonies, and the royal burial grounds became the shrine for promulgating the national welfare. Heads of leading lineages of the town of Biu became, instead of a council of elders, a royal council or court in which former elders of segments were now titled nobles of the realm along with the *maina*, or princes, whose fathers had been kings.

Ultimately the nobles and their close kin formed a group of upper-class officials who carried out the governmental activities of the realm in Biu. To enhance their own solidarity, they abrogated or simply ignored traditional rules of Bura exogamy in order to marry one another's daughters. Preferential cross-cousin marriage evolved rapidly as a consequence, and the Pabir upper class borrowed the Kanuri kin terms for their cross cousins and the parents of these relatives (switching from generation-merging lineage terms to generational distinctions).

The Pabir also developed (or borrowed) the widespread West African idea of the queen mother who is generally not the monarch's own mother but a father's sister or other close relative. She lived in a separate town, helped install the new monarch, and had as her close advisers and courtiers a group of royal relatives, her agnates, who had lost out in a royal succession struggle (Cohen 1977). Pabir say that the queen mother made a king: she had the sacred objects that an heir had to sit on to absorb kingliness, and only she could handle the objects with impunity. If a man had been in charge of such things, then (they say) he would have made himself a king. With a woman they were safe. Femaleness, queenship, in a separate unwalled town represented loyal opposition of a royal lineage segment that in prestate times would have Queenship then symbolized continuity and subordination of the subgroups to the central government (Cohen 1977).

The king organized defense and public works on the walls, adjudicated cases, and carried out rituals at the nearby tombs of his ancestors (and elsewhere) for the welfare of the people. Although there was no regular revenue collection, he was always given some form of tribute at harvest time and from trading expeditions. The monarch received half of all goods taken in raids against other towns and villages. He sent trading expeditions headed by his own clients to Kanem for salt and natron (hydrated sodium carbonate) in return for cotton rolls, slaves, and primary

products given to him as tributes. In his turn the king gave out local products and trade goods, especially the much prized salt and natron, to his nobles, clients, and through them (and in person as well) to the common people as gifts in return for their continued support of his authority. He also exchanged gifts with surrounding chiefs (e.g., the Jukun) on an annual basis. As noted elsewhere in Africa (Feierman 1974: 121), the proportion of productivity and tributes were often inversely related. shortages were severe, people brought gifts to help the monarch offer sacrifices for the welfare of the land. The king sacrificed more bulls and performed more ceremonies during poorer, less productive times than when things went well. The meat and other foods were then distributed. In other words, 'surpluses' were 'created' when shortages were greatest, so that ceremonies could be performed and so that, as a by-product, the hungry could be fed. The authority system was supported by helping the society over economic hardship.

In the later stages of the kingdom, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Pabir of Biu united other Pabir towns to drive out Fulani who had fought their way in from Gombe (to the west of Biu) and tried to settle in the region. This produced the rough beginnings of a hierarchy of walled towns with Biu as the center and with the leaders of other towns, like Thlerima, subordinate chiefs under the chief-of-chiefs at Biu (Cohen 1976). Unfortunately this emergent multitown system was in its infancy (or atrophying?) when the British arrived, and I have only the barest outline of its workings. Basically, a series of towns came to look to Biu for leadership in massing fighting power for defensive operations against common enemies who intruded into the area. As far as I know, this enlarged militia was never used for aggression or expansion, but it is tantalizing to speculate whether the Pabir would have entered such an expansionist phase had history given them the chance.

During this entire period the Bura remained in independent small villages to the south of the Pabir. Although similar in culture, language, and ecology, they were able to maintain autonomous small village polities while their Pabir cousins developed high-walled towns, social stratification, and interpolity alliances bordering on a complex state system. In the southern area the terrain breaks up into hills, promontories, rivers, and thick forest groves. Raiding cavalry-led incursions from Borno or the western Fulani-held regions were spotted by scouts from hilltop outposts and the people fled to other hilltops or into the forests. In contrast the Pabir area is on the southern edges of the Borno plains. There are hills and a few promontories but the vegetation is savanna and raiding by large forces is possible. As a result compacting into large settlements has never taken place among the Bura until very recent times when modern primary schools and markets on the main highway introduced a new stimulus.

6. GULANI

About fifty miles west of Pabir-Biu lies Gulani, a town of two to three thousand. For reasons similar to Biu it was the center of another nexus of state building at the southern and eastern edge of powerful Muslim emirates. Its people were also subject to raids from these expansionist state neighbors and they in turn raided and conquered people to the south and southeast.

The town is said to have been founded by the third or fourth name on the list of twenty of the local dynasty putting its origin well back into the early nineteenth or late eighteenth centuries. Before the founding of Gulani two ethnically distinct peoples. the Konom who migrated from Mirnga 15 miles north of Biu, and the Maga-speaking or Geshi people who came from Fika in the north, settled in the general area in separate but mutually friendly villages. The area is hilly and dry in many areas but there are small rivers in the valley bottoms that stem from natural springs in the porous volcanic rocks. 'Konom' means a dry hilltop and 'Geshi' is a dry grassy plain atop the flat plateau area close to present day Gulani town. Legend has it that Konom and Geshi people joined forces to establish Gutani in a small valley flanked on nearly all sides by relatively high (200 to 300 foot) hills. There is a good spring fed river that outcrops in the valley and the hills are an excellent set of defensive outposts. From the first the town was surrounded by high walls and deep double ditches. It was rebuilt and expanded once according to local accounts to allow for expansion.

Evidence from oral accounts and early travelers suggests that Gulani was much larger than surrounding settlements. Estimates

vary from 2000 to 4000 divided into five wards (gala a gara). The town had friendly relations with Bara people to the north (one major town plus a number of nearby hamlets) and several of the closeby settlements whose people came into Gulani for protection during raids. These were also referred to as gala (wards) although they were located beyond the original boundary of the main town. They had moved out from town to be closer to their farms, but remained part of its administrative organization and communal life.

To the south were villages that were (a) hostile and were raided for slaves and booty, and (b) were defeated by either conquest or threat of conquest. The subject villages were not raided and were instead defended by Gulani against raids from other groups. In return they delivered annual tributes to Gulani of slaves and cloth rolls (used widely in this region as currency). Recalcitrants were subdued by force, and a son or daughter of the local chief was taken back to Gulani as a hostage.

In the early days of the town the Konom group still attended royal funerals and installations in Biu, bringing gifts whenever they came. However, once the town itself became the center of an expanding power in its own region west of Biu such obligations ceased and subordinate status or 'paying respect' to Biu ended. By the end of the nineteenth century, Gulani people all spoke Mage whether they were Konom from Bura-speaking Pabir-Biu or from Fika (where Bolewa which is dialectically related to Maga is the dominant tongue). By this time, the rising kingdom of Gulani was independent of other powers in the region, and was recognized as a possible center of administration by the colonial administration. However continual rebelliousness and overzealous taxation practices by Gulani led in 1920 to its fragmentation under Gombe, Fika, and Biu. The final blow came at about the same time when the Shehu of Borno, acting under orders from the British marched on Gulani and destroyed its famous walls.7

The internal administration of Gulani reflects its own historical experience as well as general features of state building. The original Maga-speaking group from the north seem to have been in the area before the Konom from Pabir-Biu. Evidence for this point comes from the fact that as an identity group they are the ones who relate to local spirits of the place. In this region as a whole the first founders of a settlement make a covenant with

the spirits of the local land. The subsequent relation between the human and nonhuman inhabitants forms a basis for village-wide religious activity. The founders then 'own' the village priesthood and supply incumbents to the office from their patrilineage. Konom people, on the other hand, always supply the ruler of Gulani. From these data I infer that the Maga group came earlier, Konom later and that they quite possibly were incursive and dominant militarily. Each of the five original named wards, although much mixed today, are identified or known to be originally Konom or Maga at the start, and ward headship (zanna gala) is still restricted to whichever group founded the ward.

The ruler of Gulani is always recruited from one of two original leading Konom lineages said to go back to Mirnga (north of Biu). The explanation goes back to the beginning of the Konom dynastic list. The legend describes a conflict between two brothers, Some and Karafa, over the throne. Each of the claimants and their supporters fought a bloody battle outside the village. Over time this takum, or succession fight, became customary between the leading candidates from Some's and Karafa's patrilineal segments. Sometimes the fight was settled by force sometimes by taking turns. In the latter case the takum simply became a set of negotiations between Some people and Karafa people outside the village to settle the succession and usually to bargain for the next turn to go to the other group.

The local governmental structure was made up of the chief-ruler and his titled nobles, the titled ward heads, and princes, i.e., male members of the royal patrilineage whose male parent or grand-parent had been ruler. The royal ward head zanna chiroma is said to have descended from a senior male agnate of the ruler. He was head of the electors who decided on the Konom candidates and on any final choices that had to be made after the takum. He also had the power to depose a ruler, and he acted as ruler when the monarch was away from the capital.

The Maga leader was entitled the *kargania*. He led the major Maga ward, and was installed in a seven-day ceremony with all the pomp and ritual of a ruler himself. The one exception being that the Konom ruler had to undergo an immersion bath in the river almost identical to that of Pabir-Biu.⁸

Besides the centralized government and the ward organization below it there was a female organization led by magira, wife of

one of the titled men of the town. She was chosen by popular support at a meeting of the wives of titled men. She organized the women for festivals, dances, food preparation, and for their part in defensive operations. The young adult men had an organization under an elected head as did some of the occupations, such as the butchers, diviners and hunters. Heads of these organizations represented their groups to the ruler and his court.

For a time before the colonial regime a regional secret society. angiramta was present in the town. It was open to all adult men and concentrated its attentions on social control, and magical activities to bring rain, crops, and personal success to its adherents. In Gulani, however, there were two separate angiramta societies, one for Konom, one for Maga. Each vied and competed for control over annual festivals. Maga claimed they had traditional priority in the religious sphere and their kuru (priest) should therefore head the annual ceremonies; Konom countered by arguing that they had political priority and festivals were a town function involving organization and administration, therefore their kuru should lead the proceedings. The ruler and council finally met to adjudicate the matter and decided that the annual ceremony would not be held anymore because it was dividing the town into conflicting factions. Although some angiramta activities continue quietly its public ceremonies were subsequently not practiced.9

The resulting picture is one of two distinct ethnic groups each from several small villages joining forces for defense and common access to scarce resources. Local organization still remains the same, but a commonly legitimated leader emerges over both groups. The older leadership forms a titled nobility over the newly compacted walled town with one ethnic group taking over secular governmental offices, the other taking sacred, priestly functions linking the society to the spiritual guardians of the town's resources, especially its water supply.

The duties and policies of rulers, of priests, of the royal court, the wards, and the crosscutting organizations are avowedly and clearly formulated to stop any possible breakup of the towns constituent elements. Even the small hamlets outside the walls are seen as constituent wards of the town. Their headmen are titled zanna and sit in the royal court just like ward heads from older sections of town. The nineteenth-century legislative deci-

sions by the royal court to abolish secret society ceremonies because they were divisive of polity unity is another clear indication of the value placed on avoiding any fissile tendencies that might creep into local religious organizations.

On the other hand, no queen mother institution like that of Biu fifty miles away ever developed. The same title magira was used for the head woman of the town, elected to the post by a meeting of all wives of titled men. The losers of the takum did not split off but returned to town, knowing full well that their own lineage could not be deroyalized. By constitutional fiat they must get a crack at the kingship at every succession. Takum came to mean not only succession fight or struggle, but also the notion that the original split was resolved by giving access to royal office to contesting lineage segments in perpetuity thereby avoiding deroyalization and possible fission.

7. CHIBUK: THE NULL CASE

Fifty miles east of Biu lies the stateless society of Chibuk. In geopolitical terms it has experienced selective state-building pressures almost identical to those of Gulani and Biu. It lies to the south of Borno, at almost the same distance from the large emirates as Biu and Gulani—and if anything it is closer to them. It may also have experienced pressures from Fombina-Yola a nine-teenth-century Fulani emirate to the south. Many of its people are from Buraland and the local language, Chibuk, is closely related to that of the Biu area. Crops, technology, mode of production, settlement patterns, marriage customs, and religious beliefs are similar to those of prestate Pabir/Buraland.

Yet the result has been dramatically different. Where Buraland and Gulani produced walled towns, a local aristocracy, and clearly identifiable beginnings of centralized government, Chibuk developed as a series of small independent and locally autonomous communities. Indeed so fiercely independent are they that they successfully resisted colonial conquest for over four years (1902-1906), well after the rest of the area had capitulated.

Among other things, Chibuk refers to a group of what were originally twenty-two separated clan settlements (ngura)¹⁰ situated around a chain of low hills several miles in length broken by the

Chibuk mountain which gives its name to the locality as a whole. The local language is also referred to as Chibuk as is the contemporary town where over half the people now live. Chibuk is thus a people, their place around a line of hills, their language, and an emergent and differentiating way of life that was busily developing before being radically deflected by the colonial intrusion.

The precolonial settlement pattern involved the small clan settlements for 'wards', each hidden on the forested and rocky hillsides with farmlands down below on the savanna. Borders between ward lands were marked with tall lines of local cacti hedges (whide), and water resources were ample in the hills in the form of springs and small rivers that flow down to the plain, then north towards Lake Chad. Each settlement ranges anywhere from thirty to forty compounds on the small side to over one hundred for the largest, i.e., 150-200 for small wards and 500-700 for larger ones (assuming an average of five persons per compound). This makes for an overall population of some 7000 to 8000 for Chibuk as a Today it is a circular area around the hills containing approximately 78.5 square miles (five miles in diameter) or about 100 persons per square mile. It is safe to assume that nineteenthcentury population was much more constricted in the hills since earlier colonial reports clearly indicated forcing Chibuk settlements down onto the plain. On this basis the precolonial population was over its present 100 per square mile, possibly as high as 200. 11 I conclude that the population density was therefore relatively high, well over the usual 40 to 60 per square mile of this part of Nigeria and the Sahel. Furthermore it was restricted to a particular place, the Chibuk hills, above the Borno plains.

There are no founder-owners in the usual sense known in Gulani and Biu. The twenty-two named clan groups arrived in seventeen remembered immigrations whose order of arrival is known. The first group settled highest on the side of Chibuk mountain and its headman always serves as priest of the mountain's spirit—the most powerful supernatural force in the area. This historically-based prestige and its hereditary office do not support any special political authority whatsoever. The origin story reflects the heterogeneous arrivals and their reasons for coming to Chibuk. These are summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: The origins of Chibuk clans

Place of Origin		Reasons for Coming		Occupation	
Biu	7	Seeking new farmland	6	Farmers	17
Borno	5	Feuding and inter- group hostilities	6	Hunters	2
Hona/Kilbo	4	Hunting, looking for game	2	Leavers	1
Marghi/Figi	6	Robbers chased into hiding	1	Thieves	1
Do not know	w 0	Don't know or some hint of being chased	7 i	Do not know	1
Totals	22		22		22

Each clan-settlement head, along with patrilineage elders conducts the affairs of the settlement, represents it to other Chibuk settlements, protects the people against supernatural harm, performs annual clan ceremonies at a place-oriented shrine (milim), calls out people for defense, and performs a covenant ceremony agreed to by the founder who first contacted the local spirits. The covenant ceremony is also used as a means of choosing new leaders. Some signal is given by the spirit when recruitment decisions are required e.g., after a sacrifice the man who comes out of a sacred cave without cobwebs has been 'chosen' by the spirits as the new leader.

Clan-settlement leaders (bulama or katsalla) could all meet to unify the entire Chibuk area against an incoming aggressor. However, no record of any unified offense was available and several said it did not occur. There is some record, not fully corroborated, that one or two of the southern settlements paid tributes to Fulani at Yola, but this could be after 1900 (the dating is unclear). One clan leader visited Biu annually and brought gifts to the Kuthli of Biu because he was from that town. Reports emphasize that no clan-settlement ward leader was 'under' any other. Each was independent.

The extreme autonomy and mistrust of strangers in each ward was emphasized over and over again by the local oral historians.

The most basic law of Chibuk was that of trespass. Any adult from one ward caught on the lands of another ward could be punished, even killed, with impunity and no compensation should be claimed or given. Any child doing the same could be taken as a slave. In practice the extreme position was rarely taken, but the law was available should the need arise. Visiting in another ward had to be done carefully. Compounds had multiple exits in order to go out or send out to check on the size and force of a visiting group well before they arrived, or while they were kept waiting outside the compound. People never used the same routes to go and return from visiting or trading; alternate routes were the rule to avoid being waylaid from ambush. Social organization of the ward and the area as a whole was closely related to a lack of order and to the predatory activities of strangers or as one person from the area noted, 'There were no rules to make you safe'. Locally, ridicule, gossip, and the threat of violence and expulsion kept everyday life peaceful but anxiety-laden because of the constant fear that uncontrolled elements, raiders, thieves, and vengeance seekers might appear at any minute.

One way to get around this was to create alliances and many did so. Groups of two and three villages formed close alliances in which they intermarried and came quickly to each other's aid. They also treated each other as 'brothers' trusting one another to visit without extreme caution and mistrust.

The reason for such intense local autonomy and mistrust are complex and not fully known, but some things are clear. Although raids from the Borno state, and details of raids during Rabi's (the Sudanese conqueror) overlordship (1893-1900) of Borno are easily come by, the general outcome seems to have been victory for Chibuk through its capability to withstand sieges of up to a month or more in their hilltop cave retreats and their access to secret water supplies. These are unlike reports of such raids from other nonstate groups, all of which describe defeats, loss of lives, and burned villages. Thus the Chibuk area was one of natural defensibility against attack by superior arms and manpower.

This natural refuge was also on or near a major trade route from Kano to Maiduguri and Yola. Raiding the carvanas and surrounding villages came to be a major part of Chibuk economic life. As one informant put it, 'It was like robbery today, but in those times it was the manly and good thing to do'. The methods varied with the goals. The most common was to ambush a party, kill the men and take women and children as slaves plus all the property of the people. People could become wealthy this way and were admired for it. Chibuk raiding parties moved in a thirty-mile radius from the home hills to carry out such activities.

Another method was to attack an entire village—almost invariably stateless people like Bura, or Kilba, or Hona. They would attack, feign retreat, and once people gave them chase they would lead them to ambush, then return and plunder the village.

There was interclan feuding and clans unified to fight defensive operations. But violence and warfare were oriented primarily outwards for raiding. Chibuk was a den of refugees and migrants whose way of life was the plunder of those less powerful than themselves. In effect the mountain fastness was a Sahelian pirates cove.

But each clan group or related group of two or three clans sent out raiding parties on its own. No coordinated organized activity came of their piracy. Possibly it might have later on, but for the period prior to colonial rule they had developed a robber settlement that was a place of refuge for those running away from feuds and home problems elsewhere. Their culture differed from others in the region in reflecting the mistrust they had of one another, and predatory relations with trading parties and other groups. Control of trespass and mistrust were the leitmotif of their intergroup relations. They needed privacy and no overall authority, not the state.

8. DISCUSSION

The three cases of Biu, Gulani, and Chibuk are in the form of a quasi experiment. Centralized governmental institutions are present in two (Biu and Gulani), absent in one (Chibuk). All three societies are previously uncentralized polities that have experienced similar, if not identical external pressures from large strongly organized predatory-state systems in their sociopolitical environment. All three societies had exogamous patrilineal descent groups in their nonstate form, with ancestor cults, and local spirit shrines. Technology, mode of production, compound organization

and settlement patterns are roughly similar except that Chibuk is a series of dispersed clan settlements referred to locally as 'wards'. Inputs are extraordinarily similar, outputs are strikingly different; even the two statelike developments are quite distinctively different. Why?

First let's look at Biu and Gulani. Both formed into statelike systems; both developed compacted walled towns and centralized governments. In Biu the particularities of local history develop out of its local homogeneity of culture and a possible historical accident that then developed into an antifission institution. Because local prestate people were all Bura, or assimilated to Bura culture, the governing group was clearly to be the prior leadership now raised into a titled or ruling elite because new conditions (more people, more disputes, more coordinating problems to be resolved) turned them into full-time specialists. Even if the ruling dynasty (Wolviri) is an incursive group from Borno as suggested in legends, it still became highly assimilated and thus the Pabir/Bura state is built on local roots. Local history has it that an early Biu monarch appointed a royal woman to head the town of Koghu. What is clear is that through some accident of local history (it could have been an attempt to copy the queen mother office in pre-nineteenth-century Borno where it was highly developed, including a similar separate residence about one mile from the capital) the queen mother office and village evolved. Once it did, it became a means of offsetting the usual fission of a polity associated with conflicts over succession in monarchy.

In Gulani the integration problems were more severe. Here there were clearly two major ethnic groups (Maga and Konom) and succession conflicts can still split up the polity even if the ethnic problem is resolved. Again local historical experience gave the 'totemic' religious functions to the Maga and the political realm to the Konom. This probably indicates prior or older status as originals in the area for Maga and incursive and superior military capability for the Konom from the Biu area. The official banning of two ethnically based secret societies by the Gulani central government is another clear policy decision to maintain unity in the face of possible fissionable activity. The constitutionally endorsed struggle between two Konom royal segments (takum) ensured a place and a hope for royal office among the otherwise deroyalized losers, the Konom claimants. Thus losing a succession

struggle did not mean losing forever.

This notion of keeping the losers in the polity is the basic antifission and emergent constitutional development separating state from nonstate. In the state-building area of Africa the importance of this innovation is repeated over and over again in the data, and by informants themselves. South of this area is the three-town kingdom of Shani. The original capital town houses the ruler and each of the other offshoot towns Kombo and Buma supplies a king for seven years each. Kingship years are called 'fat' years, nonkingship years are 'lean' or 'hungry' years for each town. The reasons are clear, and are given by local people. In order to keep the polity from breaking up each of two segments of the royal house must take turns coming from their own separate village. The system is now extinct but is reminiscent of that in Gulani, except that it involves separate towns for each dynastic segment.

Both Biu and Gulani had to deal with political opposition that created losers and winners. Biu worked out a compensatory mechanism around the office of queen mother, Gulani kept losers in the running by saying in effect, 'Better luck next time'.

Chibuk is the surprising case. The data indicate that statebuilding stimuli may have few or no effects. Given no interstate imperial order, long-distance trade, slavery and no legal-moral community outside the local polity, then one reaction to state building is to find a node of refuge and prey upon neighboring peoples, upon trading caravans and remain in a raiding piratical community whose way of life involves predatory rewards and very little centralized control.

Whether Chibuk would have eventually developed more hierarchy as did the Barbary Coast is unknown. That such communities, living on such predation, lack of mutual trust and weaker neighbors must have flourished throughout history seems obvious, once the case is examined.

And Chibuk is a case that instructs generalizations. It was a larger and more dense population than usual for nonstate systems. It was circumscribed because it had to remain close to its small mountain chain refuge area. Circumscription need not necessarily lead to statehood—at least not immediately.

9. CONCLUSION

The comparison of Biu, Gulani, and Chibuk leads to a number of conclusions of importance to theories of the early state.

- (1) Circumscription as laid out in Carneiro's theory (1970) often leads toward statehood, but not always. Circumscription theory is not the same as fission/antifission and therefore the null hypothesis predicting that there are no cases of one without the other is not supported. Chibuk developed no antifission institutions; Biu and Gulani did. All three were circumscribed, only the statelike ones developed antifission institutions. Antifission is one among a set of possible results of increased density in circumscribed populations, and antifission, not circumscription, is invariably related to statehood.
- (2) Antifission as a criterion for statehood is primarily the locally developed means by which groups in a polity competing for scarce rewards especially high political office are made to believe that they can still receive more rewards by remaining in the polity than by leaving it or starting a civil war.
- (3) The exact nature of antifission institutions in any particular early state is a function of the details of the local ethnic history and competition among its groups for high office.
- (4) Even with local cultural variations, once statelike forms emerge they tend to converge in their structural form. Given the quite diverse cultural backgrounds of Biu and Gulani populations, the structure of their central governments and the evolving similarities of their center-periphery relations are quite striking.
- (5) Biu and Gulani do not normally fission, yet their statelike features are not very fully developed. Central bureaucracy, revenue collection, military organization and levies were all quite significantly underdeveloped compared with those of more highly developed states in the region. Center-periphery relations were hardly developed at all—but clearly developing (Cohen 1976, 1978b). Claessen and Skalnik (1978) are therefore correct in referring to several 'types' of early state. Fission/antifission institutions provide an heuristic watershed criterion. Within this rubric there is a range of polities—some more, some less fully evolved as states. Centralized polities that normally fission however, such as Ngoni or Azande are chieftaincies.

In terms of our original question, I believe this paper demon-

strates the utility of the fission/antifission criterion. It points to means by which a society develops the coordinating capacity to organize itself as a state. Fission is the major hurdle to be overcome. In this sense it separates state and nonstate and points to the causes. Societies may find themselves circumscribed into a particular refuge but not develop antifissionable institutions. Chibuk people can leave whenever they wish with nothing to stop them except the profits to be made from predation. Finally, and by deduction, fissioning societies that have some centralization are not states and so we can use the criterion to sort chiefships from early states knowing that some early (nonfissioning) states were only weakly developed. Thus the fission/antifission criterion predicts which ones among a set of early centralized societies will go on to become more highly organized states and which will not. In this sense, it is not only a means of classifying states but of explaining the dynamics of evolution towards statehood and the inhibition of this process in those cases in which states did not develop. All very early states are hard to classify as either states or nonstates. Some become more complex; others do not. The antifission criterion tells us which is which.

NOTES

- This does not mean that states are any less statelike when they split
 up. This could only occur if they also gave up their institutionalized
 opposition to fission. Clearly states do break. But as a type of society,
 they are significantly less likely to do so within comparable time spans
 than all other types of polities.
- Claessen and Skalník do examine 21 real world cases in their studies and use the concluding sections of the book to examine the fit between their types and the real world. Generally speaking, and so far, the fit is quite good.
- Any factor significantly related to the retention of genetic variances is selective, its locus may be either inside or outside the phenomenon itself (Donald Sade: personal communication).
- The distinction is arbitrary and analytic but has obvious empirical significance, e.g., all states are more like each other than like band polities.
- Brain size alone is not sufficient. Neanderthal has a similar brain size to homo sapiens but very probably a different capability. Klein (1979) describes how human cultures elaborated and proliferated in technological variance and symbolic expression once sapiens forms replaced

Neanderthals. He argues that this increased creative capacity is a function of changes in human brain organization not just size.

- There are as follows: kinship ties counterbalanced by territorial ones; heredity counterbalanced by appointment in recruitment and succession to office; nonkin officials take up important offices; and redistribution and reciprocity are important for social, political, and economic integration.
- The symbolic value of the walls was indicated dramatically when one Gulani oral historian broke down in tears during the recounting of this event
- 8. The ceremony is held at the end of a seven-day retreat and symbolic rebirth. It involves (in both Biu and Gulani) a controlled rise and fall of the river level that makes a special rock emerge from the water. Konom people clearly brought the ceremony from Biu to Gulani.
- The exact date of this event is unknown. On inconclusive evidence, I would hypothesize either just prior to, or very soon after, the inception of colonial rule.
- Ngura is derived from the Kanuri word nguro meaning ward within a town. Thus clan settlements, although separated, are viewed as parts of a larger whole.
- 11. I reach this upper figure by halving the number of square miles available, which seems valid, and a similar average population of around 7500 for the area. Colonial reports mention no population estimates but state the Chibuk was 'populous'.

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6 The Structure of the Mamprusi Kingdom and the Cult of Naam

SUSAN DRUCKER-BROWN

The kings of the Voltaic states of northern Ghana and Upper Volta trace a common descent in their myths of origin to the founder of the Mamprusi kingdom. The Mamprusi royals themselves claim origin from an unnamed king of Fada N'Gruma, to the east.

A study of the ritual processes associated with Mamprusi king-ship (Drucker-Brown 1975) suggests that the structure of this state can be described as a system of courts, each of which is a congregation of the cult of 'naam'. A court consists of a single 'sovereign' (reference naba; address na), and at least two titled 'advisors' or 'elders' (kpaamba). Naam is coeval with kingship. It is an element brought into the region by the first king, Na Gbewa. Through the courts of the kingdom, naam is continuously allocated, 'returned' and reallocated to be embodied in successive kings and chiefs (cf. Fortes 1969).

The work of Meyer Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) has given us a paradigm for understanding the organization of segmentary lineages. The overall structure which produces the unification of lineage segments depends on the fact that specific norms enjoin the cooperation of units, which are opposed to one another at lower orders of segmentation in the performance of certain tasks. Increasingly larger groups are defined by tracing further back in time from living lineage members, the common lineal ancestors connecting the smaller subunits. Fortes (1945) in particular has documented the manner in which groups which occupy contiguous

territory are incorporated over time into a common genealogy.

Although the manner in which a court's constitution changes depending on the context is reminiscent of the varying constitution of descent-group segments of differing orders, there are basic differences between a system of courts which link discrete local communities, and descent-group organization. The most important distinction between the Mamprusi polity and the acephalous lineage organization of the Nuer or the Tallensi is that the basic unit of Mamprusi political organization is not a descent-group segment but a 'court'.

The uses and patterns of genealogical reckoning among Mamprusi are quite different from such calculi in acephalous polities. The correct genealogical pedigree is essential for succession to royal office. But genealogical pedigree depends on patrifiliation within the royal descent group; not on membership by birth in the corporate group.

One source of confusion is the fact that the idiom of kinship is used by Mamprusi to refer to the political relationship between courts or between court officials and aspirants to naam. This idiomatic use of kinship terms is not by any means a description of genealogical relationship. The use of kinship terms refers in this context to the seniority of a court with respect to any chief which it has installed in office.

The overall political system is unified by the derivation of naam and its periodic return to a single point of origin. It is axiomatic in this system; as Mamprusi say, that 'two chiefs cannot reside in a single place. If they do, one must be stronger'. Thus, the king who embodies naam directly received from Na Gbewa is strongest. But if he is to bring forth other chiefs, these must exercise naam at a distance. In order for naam to be effective it must be spatially distributed.

The king, in his position as the closest of all royal chiefs to the deceased founder Na Gbewa, is 'father' to them. Similarly the chief of any court which gives naam to another chief, is 'father' of that chief. The senior chief and court 'create' a new chief, as parents create a son. An avoidance relationship between father and son, or between eldest and younger brothers characterizes kinship relations at a domestic level. This is paralleled in the mutual avoidance of chiefs which must obtain if each is to form a separate court.

The term 'sovereign' in English may be translated as 'naba' in Mamprusi. All chiefs and the king himself are addressed as 'na' and referred to as 'naba'. Only one individual can be thus addressed in any given group. This is one of the many corollaries of the Mamprusi dictum that 'two chiefs cannot reside in the same place'.

Court organization, viewed internally, can be described as a series of complementary roles divided among members of the two segments which encompass the total Mamprusi population i.e., 'royals' (na-biisi, literally 'Na's children') and 'commoners' (tarima). It is generally true that chiefly office is held by royals, and eldership, or advisory office, is held by commoners.

Chiefly office, by contrast with other types of *naam*, is spoken of as the 'skin' of a particular place. Normally the place names of the 'skins' of chiefly office are also the names of the local community where the chief resides. However, the previous locations of Mamprusi courts may be commemorated in the names of chiefly office. Thus, where the name of a local community in which a chief resides does not correspond to the chief's title, the explanation given is always that a prior incumbent of that chiefly office came to 'this place' (i.e., the local community in question) from elsewhere. Often the site commemorated in the chief's title exists as a shrine to which the chief in question owes sacrifice, or as a community with a nonroyal chief.

Chiefships are ranked by Mamprusi into 'sons' and 'grandsons' skins. However, this ranking system depends on divisions within the royal clan described below.

In the context of court organization, it means that certain courts will receive either 'son' or 'grandson' royals as chiefs. Other courts will receive only 'grandson chiefs'. In different sets of linked courts there will be a single chiefship, awarded only to the true sons of those who can trace a pedigree through father/son ties to the first chief of that particular court. This tripartite division of royal chiefship is highly flexible, but the contrast between 'royal naam' and the office awarded to commoners is quite clear. Nonroyals normally trace descent from foreigners or autochthons. Members of these groups perform specialized tasks as members of courts presided over by royal chiefs. Such chiefs are not members of the royal clan; they are senior members of specialized groups; warriors, earth priests, or Muslims. Each has

its own distinctive installation ritual and constraints on the chiefly role distinguishing them from one another and from royal chiefs.

All such chiefs may be regarded as nonresident 'elders' of the royal courts which agree to the award of *naam*. Royals, by contrast, are always 'children', once installed to chiefship, of the chief whose court installed them. This is an important element in the construction of royal genealogies.

With investiture and installation, naam becomes part of the physical body of the incumbent of office. Mamprusi say it 'covers his name'. One might say that naam covers his social personality prior to his accession. At a royal chief's death, symbols of the deceased chief's person and his chiefly office are 'returned' to the court at which he was installed. These objects are accompanied by a live animal and a fixed sum of money which represent the fecundity of chiefly office.

Chiefly naam, unlike the offices held by titled commoners, is creative. Chiefs alone can reallocate naam and, in effect, can 'create' new subchiefs or new titles for commoner elders. Naam can be reallocated, but it cannot be revoked. Thus, no chief can depose the elders of chiefs installed by his predecessor. This security in tenure of all incumbent chiefs and titled elders means that any new chief, even the king himself, joins a court which is received from a predecessor. This court changes through time as a chief replaces the incumbent elders and subchiefs who die, or are installed to other offices. A chief or king establishes his own court with time. The followers he brings with him are important, but, at least in the contemporary situation, they do not oust the existing community. On the contrary, a sovereign makes every effort to keep the community resident there.

I have said that subchiefs can be created. This can only be done with the approval of the court from which a royal chief received naam. Each new official must be seen to have ancestral claim to office. Although an observer may consider an office to be newly created, the Mamprusi view is that offices which existed in the past should be filled. Offices filled in the contemporary situation are always said to have had previous incumbents. The deceased incumbents of vacant office are believed to threaten their descendants, and to cause death or major misfortune if they have no successors. On the other hand they may kill a successor who does not please them. Thus, a court may postpone the award of

a particular office on the grounds that the deceased incumbent has no eligible successor. Obviously this dogma can be manipulated to the material advantage of the court which performs the rituals.

A court is located; 'it sits' at the house of a particular chief. Each court has a territorial domain whose boundaries are never completely demarcated. Usage defines some of the territorial boundaries in terms of the contrasting membership of resident senior men in separate courts. In case of conflict between members of different courts, or territorial disputes between different local communities, the conflict must be arbitrated by a senior court which is regarded as 'owning' both territorial segments, as it installs the chiefs of different courts in office. Arbitration is possible because of the fact that the patronage of the senior court is essential in the award of naam to royals. The unification of the courts depends on the periodic return of naam to a court which may then reallocate it. In this 'gathering up' of naam which occurs at the death of each incumbent chief and titled elder, the resident elders of a senior court are the first to receive the symbols of vacant office.

Court elders also perform important sections of the installation ceremony, but this ritual responsibility signifies the importance of their routine functions. Elders 'represent' the chief or king in all those situations where 'father' and 'son' must avoid one another. Elders thus have a wider range of knowledge about, and social intimacy with, royals than royals have among themselves.

The capacity for holding naam is inborn in each royal. But individual royals must 'wrestle' for naam among themselves. Participation in the competition is the primary means by which each royal affirms his individual royal status. In the competition for vacant office each royal candidate must choose a particular elder as his sponsor. Elders may encourage some candidates and are said to have the right to eliminate others. Elders thus act as judges of the character and fitness of individual royals to succeed their 'fathers' in office.

The elders, both as a group and individually, acquire valuable information about all candidates and about local communities in the course of these competitions. They also acquire material advantage in gifts. Though major gifts must be delivered by an elder to the chief or king who will then redistribute it among the

court, a specific portion ('takubsi'), consisting of roughly one quarter of a gift, is returned to the elder who initially received it.

Once installed, royals are attached to specific court elders through whom they should approach a senior chief. This attachment is made in a special portion of the installation ritual and applies not only to the new chief, but any messenger or court member whom he sends to the senior court.

When the kingship is vacant the constitution of the resident court in the capital changes. An effigy of the king will be made and during the interregnum the most powerful commoner chiefs occupy the palace. Simultaneously the royal candidates arrive to solicit the kingship from the now resident elders, and from all those ineligible but powerful groups which reside outside of the capital. The court which installs the king includes members of courts dispersed throughout the kingdom. In this context, however, the unique feature of the kingship is that no single living individual can ever be said to choose the king. Royals are chosen by their seniors, both chiefs and elders, to hold naam. The kings or royal chiefs are responsible for these decisions. The king is chosen by God, and is the strongest of the candidates.

This Mamprusi conceptualization reflects the situation in which, as they say, the king can have no patrons. He must owe his office to no living person.

When a new chief is taken to the place where he will establish his own court and join that of his predecessor, he is led by representatives of the king's elders, or by elders of the senior court. These elders present him to the people of the local community who greet him with hostility. The hostility is part of a ritual reception in which the chief is greeted as a stranger, and threatened. He is interrogated as to his intentions and must promise to behave properly. However, the hostility may be more than symbolic, and chiefs have been known to call upon the king for support in order to enter and remain in the community.

The people of a local community who receive the chief will also provide part of his court. The senior men of that community will be his 'elders', and if there are rival royals in the community, as there often are, they must eventually accept the status either of 'children' or 'elders' in this court, or they must move elsewhere. This situation explains the fact that royals are highly mobile.

Membership in a court may be acquired by installation to office.

However, for most Mamprusi, membership in a court comes about through the regular greeting rituals by which a court is convened. These greeting ceremonies take place at chiefs' houses throughout the kingdom on specified days of the week. Four times a year, at annual festivals, the chiefs greet the king's court and other important courts. At the annual festival of Damba the intercourt greeting rituals should encompass the entire kingdom. New chiefs undertake, as part of their oath of office, to greet regularly the chief of the court at which they are installed. The routine weekly or biweekly greetings of a chief are the meetings at which court membership is established by the senior men of a local community. The heads of local households greet the chief verbally in a highly reverential manner. They make small gifts to the titled elders and particularly to the chief at specified times of the year, and if they wish to request the chief's services. Senior women greet the chief's senior wife and may take portions of their domestic produce to her.

The chief in turn distributes kola to those who greet him on these occasions. Chiefs and elders chew kola together and exchange 'court conversation'. This conversation appears to be casual in content, though it is carried on with formality. It is an essential means of collecting important information. Men comment on the events of the week, strangers are questioned about their travels, the weather, the crops, and the conditions in the places they have seen. Information, stored in a court, is essential for chiefs, kings and elders to reach decisions for which the chief or king will be held responsible.

At the king's court the distribution of kola has special significance. In itself the kola given by a king is considered to be a blessing. But anyone who eats it may die if he bears the king illwill. When kola is distributed, the location of people in the king's presence is rather like 'a map' of the various types of office allocated by the king. Chiefs and their followers who form a court in their own community will separate upon entering the king's house. President elders in the king's court (i.e., those resident in the village of Nalerigu) represent different types of commoner naam. Their places in the group which they form around the king are fixed by custom. Thus, all royals sit together with strangers farthest removed from the king. Other commoners sit to the right or the left of the king according to the types of naam they

hold. Chiefs and their followers arrange themselves as part of these groupings and receive kola with the resident Nalerigu elders or royals.

Esther Goody (1977) has described greeting ritual among the neighboring Gonja. Much of her analysis holds true for greeting among the Mamprusi. However, her analysis is focused on the rituals as a means of affirming rank between subordinates and their superiors. She sees the giving of gifts as the 'equivalent of greeting' in that 'it establishes a claim by the subordinate on the person of higher rank'. In the Mamprusi case, however, it is important to see the greeting ritual, and its reciprocal, the distribution of the sovereign's kola to those present, as more than an interaction between individuals.

The exchange occurs before an assembled group, and all those who chew the kola together are witnesses to the exchange. The public announcement of the names of each recipient of kola is a most important part of the ceremony. Each senior individual present is announced, comes forward to receive kola, and may then redistribute portions of kola to those junior persons sitting with him. The acceptance of kola by an individual in this context signifies an acceptance of membership in the group and with this, recognition not only of the chief but of other individuals as having 'precedence'. The hierarchical relationship between the chief who receives reverence, and the recipient of kola is a precondition of membership. But the announcement and communal consumption of the gift of kola serves as a means of formally convening each meeting of the court, and stating its constitution to all those present.

For most Mamprusi, membership in a local court as untitled elders is the basic expression of citizenship. Among royals, however, there is another source of citizenship and position within the political system. As we have seen, this consists of membership by birth into a particular royal patrilineage. All legitimate sons and daughters of Mamprusi royal men are themselves royal. The groups of agnates which trace common patrilineal descent from a named royal ancestor through named agnatic descendants constitute exogamous units. They are linked to one another by the genealogy which also provides the basis for the allocation of royal office, and this fact must influence the preservation of genealogical knowledge considerably.

The exogamous lineages of the Mamprusi royal clan are all regarded as descended from the founder, Na Gbewa. The Nayiiri, (to use the king's title), is the son of a king. However, the lineages which constitute the royal clan consist not only of descendants of kings, but also of the agnates of royals who did not acquire kingship. Such royals, though they themselves may have been 'king's sons' (nabiisi) are regarded as producing descendants who are 'king's grandsons' (na ya'ansi). The distinction between sons and grandsons is applied both to individuals and to lineage segments. Moreover, as noted above, chiefly office is also categorized as 'son' or 'grandson' naam. This occurs because the genealogy of the royal clan combines the history of specific courts with the succession histories of specific lineage segments.

Jack Goody (1966) writes of 'dynastic descent groups' in dealing with different types of hereditary succession. He does not clearly define the term. In the Mamprusi case a dynastic segment may be taken to mean a royal lineage segment made up of a group of agnates which share the same portion of naam. The units combined in a dynastic descent group are what Mamprusi call 'gates' of a specific chiefly office. The founder of the court which allocates a set of chieftaincies may be regarded as having embodied a portion of naam which is now shared by all the chiefs installed at that particular court. The subunits of the relevant patrilineage are called 'gates' because from within the gate individuals will go forth to 'build' or 'rebuild' their 'father's' house. Here again the symbol of the chief's house as both central to a court and essential to the transmission of royal status can be seen.

The patrilineage which provides the Mamprusi king traces descent from Na Gbewa through an unbroken line of successive kings. It is localized in the geographically central region of the kingdom which surrounds the incumbent king's village at Nalerigu.

In 1965 there were also three other courts, located from northwest to southwest of Nalerigu which received *naam* from Nalerigu and reallocated it to members of similarly constituted and localized royal lineages. The founders of these capital courts, are regarded as having forfeited their claims to kingship because they preferred to remain in the courts they themselves had established. As a result their descendants cannot be candidates for kingship. They are 'grandsons' of the king, by contrast to members of the Nalerigu lineage who are the king's sons.

All royal lineages possess segments which contain the living sons of incumbents of these 'capital chieftaincies' or the kingship itself in the case of the Nalerigu lineage. When members of these gates are contrasted with other members of the same lineage, they are called 'sons' by contrast with members of other lineage segments who are 'grandsons'. Finally, within the paramount gates themselves, individuals are distinguished by patrifiliation as sons or grandsons of kings or incumbents of the capital chieftaincies.




Figure 1. Ranking within the royal clan and the Nalerigu lineage of 'sons' and 'grandsons'

In theory the kingship should rotate among the lineage segments, i.e., the gates, containing a king's true sons. To this end sons are forbidden to succeed their fathers immediately in the vacant kingship which should be awarded to the son(s) of a previous king. A gate is said to 'die' when it no longer contains any surviving sons of a particular king. However, each gate normally contains the sons of at least two kings who were close agnates. This same unit will persist when all the sons of one of these kings have died, but the name of the king who has no surviving sons will be eliminated from the name of the gate. The surviving grandsons of kings may succeed to local chieftaincies and their descendants be assimilated to grandson lineage segments. The

elimination of a king's name from the name of the gate may be the first step in its elimination from the total royal genealogy.

Reliable and complete genealogical information about royals is extremely difficult to obtain. It is forbidden for the names of kings to be spoken and prohibitions on the use of the personal and title names of royals are complex. Royals themselves know the names of only their close agnates; and the successive links of patrifiliation which bind them to the incumbents of royal office.

Royal drummers are the custodians of the publicly sung royal genealogies. These genealogies, sung on frequent ceremonial occasions, contain the names of the incumbents of royal office and of the entitled sons of kings. In addition drummers claim to know all the names of successive incumbents of all royal offices from the first incumbent of the office through all his successors to the present incumbent. This information is dispersed among drummers attached to royal chiefs in different courts of the kingdom. Note that drummers must be paid to perform the royal names. This can only be done by the living survivors of deceased royals. Hence the probability that even king's names are eliminated in the course of time.

The fact that royal drummers can describe the incumbent of any office as the *child* (son) of his predecessor in office, regardless of the exact genealogical connection between the two, is highly significant. It means that any piece of royal genealogy can be fitted to any other piece of royal genealogy through the common 'descent' (i.e., ritual patrifiliation) of any two officeholders from a king or chief at whose court their *naam* was allocated.

Thus, the contemporary connection between courts which install and those which receive chiefs can be translated into a genealogical connection.

Jack Goody's picture of how collaterals are eliminated from succession within the dynastic segments corresponds to what Mamprusi call 'the death' of a gate. There is no doubt that royals are constantly 'shed' from these segments. However, Goody suggests that in the 'split dynasty' (Goody 1966: 26) the division (between eligibles and ineligibles) is very abrupt and 'linked to the minor part played by the wider group in the political system'. It is not clear which 'wider group' he is referring to. He does say that the dynastic descent-group organization in Gonja, Lozi, Hausa, Nupe and some of the Mossi states occurs where the dynasty

constitutes the only significant descent group in the society.

The royal Mamprusi clan is certainly the only descent group whose members are domiciled throughout the kingdom. However, most of the people with whom the Mamprusi share the territory of their kingdom are organized into unilineal descent groups. The court organization which I have described is one means by which peoples organized into acephalous lineages can be drawn into Mamprusi political life. Members of such groups receive office in Mamprusi courts as elders. They and their descendants thus 'become' Mamprusi (see Drucker Brown 1975, ch. 1).

At the same time, the award of naam is viewed by the Mamprusi as a means of extending their polity. The naam which Tallensi Mamoos carry off to Tongo and use there in their own way to make chiefs whose 'courts' consist of lineage elders may be claimed by Mamprusi as proof of their previous dominance among the Tallensi. Fortes has documented the fact that Tallensi lineages function independently of the Mamprusi kingship on which only the Namoo rely for the renovation of naam. This is correlated with the fact that Mamprusi do not regard the Tallensi as people who 'know how to honor a chief'. That a Tallensi chief's court consists of his kinsmen is only one of the cultural differences between themselves and the Tallensi to which Mamprusi might point. However, in the consideration of court organization it is a crucial distinction.

The organization of Mamprusi courts enables members of other descent groups to be assimilated into the Mamprusi polity. In part this is because of the emphasis which Mamprusi place on individual accession to office. This is a conception which does not enter into the Tallensi view of *naam*. The manner in which Mamprusi genealogies are preserved reflects the fact that *naam* is awarded to, and embodied in, an individual. Patrifiliation is the source of Mamprusi royal status; not birth into a corporate lineage.

Naam has here been translated as 'office', but the English translation does not carry with it the notion of supernatural power inherent in naam. Mamprusi political structure is 'churchlike'. Titled commoners, as well as chiefs, are believed to wield both natural and supernatural power. Citizenship in the Mamprusi polity, like membership in a church, rests on manifest adherence to faith in these powers. It does not depend solely on criteria

of birth or residence.

Like many churches, the Mamprusi court system is not far removed from violence and the use of physical force. The explanation Mamprusi make of their characteristic facial scar is that it meant they could not be taken as slaves. The Mamprusi king, in whose presence death may not be mentioned, nor the voice raised in anger, is said to have had the power to order the most gruesome public executions. However, the regulation of conditions under which naam may, and may not, be granted makes it possible now, as it must have in the past, for individuals to acquire chiefly office through intelligence and moral qualities which are independent of physical force.

To summarize then. The myriad dyadic links between courts which grant and those which receive naam constitute a territorial organization centered on a king. The ideology of Mamprusi kingship implies that dispersed local communities which manifest allegiance to the king through their participation in courts are a transient representation of the allocation of naam at a particular moment in time. Since chiefs cannot coexist in a single community, courts must function at a distance from one another. Chiefly sovereignty is not a matter of permanent rank in a fixed hierarchy, but partially depends in practice on the constitution and location of a particular court.

Centralized political organization is often conceived as a hierarchy of nesting segments which fit together in a single territorial unit, represented by the king who is the apex of a pyramid of chiefs and subchiefs. At the same time, many authors have emphasized that centralization does not depend in many African systems on royal control of land. They have quoted people throughout the continent as saying in one form or another 'a chief is chief by his people' (Schapera 1937; Abrahams 1970; Goody 1971).

The usefulness of viewing a court, rather than a descent group or a territorial segment, as the basic component of centralized political authority in the Mamprusi kingdom is that with it one can see how the territorial basis of the system is a relationship between spatially discrete groups which does not necessitate systematic control from the center of land or people at the periphery. Unification may be accomplished by rituals which connect local communities to one another and ultimately lead to a single source of 'power' at the center.

It is possible here to imagine how the entire system might have moved over the ground in the past. It would seem that so long as the capital survives, the Mamprusi polity might be viable, providing that a senior and two or more junior courts could be segregated from one another within its territory. At the other extreme, the court system could be extended indefinitely. Courts could continue to reallocate naam, thus creating further spatial extensions of the kingdom. Local communities may remove themselves from a chief or refuse to form a court. Naam, in such cases, would be lost. Finally, the centers which reallocate naam may easily become politically and ritually autonomous. This is what Mamprusi say happened in the neighboring states of Mossi and Dagomba. The courts failed to return naam to its source in the Mamprusi capital, thereby creating new kingdoms with naam originating in Mamprugu.

The dispersal of royals and their regrouping in 'gates' to specific chieftaincies is the mechanism which centralized the Mamprusi system. What draws royals to court is the hope of securing office, and the appreciation of 'courtly life' which they share with other Mamprusi.

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7 Social Function and Political Power: A Case Study of State Formation in Irrigation Society

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The social function of constructing and maintaining irrigation works was crucial for the survival of the civilization which flourished for more than fifteen centuries in the 'Dry Zone' of Sri This Asian island provides a noteworthy example of Lanka. massive investment of labor resources for the construction of some of the most complex networks of reservoirs and canals in the premodern world. Evidently, by about the middle of the third century B.C. when the earliest inscriptions make their appearance an agrarian economy based on small-scale irrigation works had already come into being. It is possible to suggest on the basis of archeological and literary evidence that the village settlements in the 'Dry Zone' practiced wet rice cultivation in the land area irrigated by village reservoirs or channels, and also raised several swidden crops including sorghum (Sorghum vulgare), cotton, green gram (Phaseolus aureus), undu (Phaseolus mungo) and two or three other varieties of pulses. Over the years the agricultural practices in these early settlements would have revealed a pattern of oscillation between irrigated and swidden forms in response to variations in rainfall. Space devoted to wet rice cultivation would vary from season to season according to the availability of water; and, in proportion, the forest land taken over for swidden cultivation would vary in extent. Such conditions were not conducive to the development of a sense of sharply demarcated space or territory.

The forest land around the village settlement constituted the

reserve for swidden cultivation which was essential for the survival of the community. In addition to being an alternative or supplementary source of grain, swidden cultivation provided the protein-rich leguminous products. The forest land also supplied pasture for the livestock. On the other hand, cultivation in the irrigated area represented a much more efficient method of energy conversion than swidden cultivation and supplied the predominantly greater proportion of the energy requirements of the village. The village reservoir was also a source of fish protein. Further, when its waterline receded in the dry season the exposed bed of the reservoir with its rich soil was used for cultivation.

In certain areas of the island the 'one reservoir - one village' economy persisted up to recent times. Perhaps the observations of modern ethnographers about the responses of the village settlement dependent on a single small irrigation reservoir to population pressure may be applicable to ancient times. One response was to push the capacity of the economy to sustain people to the very limits either by constructing smaller supplementary reservoirs or by extending the area under swidden cultivation. But the more usual, and in any case the ultimate, response was fission, the creation of a new village settlement around a new reservoir (Ievers 1899, ch. 7; Codrington 1938; 63-65). With the passage of time, finding suitable sites for reservoirs of adequate capacity which could be constructed with available technology would have become more and more difficult. Such conditions of 'circumscription' (see Carneiro 1970) would not only cause friction but also affect this process of replication by bringing about the appearance of villages totally dependent on swidden cultivation as well as villages clustering around reservoirs situated below, and dependent upon, the surplus water from older reservoirs. Thus it would be incorrect to assume that the invariant response to population pressure was the replication of a basic settlement of uniform type. Population pressure would have led to the appearance of several different types of village settlements with varying degrees of access to irrigation water, varying patterns of food production and varying densities of population.

The work of Ievers (1899, ch. 12), Leach (1961: 157) and Yalman (1967: 250, 253) points to two main traditional systems prevalent in Sri Lanka which sought to ensure the rights of all 'shareholders' within the village to irrigation water. One was the

system of dividing the irrigable land into sections on the basis of the degree of accessibility to irrigation water. Each 'share' in the village included a tract of land from the section closest to the reservoir as well as tracts from other less irrigable sections of the fields. According to the second system, known as betma, the 'shareholders' estimated the total irrigable area at the beginning of each season of cultivation and allocated to each domestic unit a plot within this area, in proportion to the size of its 'share'. Both these systems were evidently handed down from antiquity. While the betma ensured the right of each domestic unit to its share of irrigation water, the plots of land allocated to domestic units would vary from year to year, depending on the amount of water in the reservoir. Thus, in fact, betma appears to discourage claims to particular tracts of land. Of the two systems it appears the older.

Leach (1961: p. 157) has emphasized the 'egalitarian' aspects of these arrangements. The community of rights and labor arrangements was perhaps a dominant characteristic in the earliest stage of irrigation society in Sri Lanka. No references to individual ownership of reservoirs are found till about the beginning of the Christian era and it is most likely that the irrigation works of this period were of the communally owned (sabbasādhārana) type mentioned in literary works, a type in which both the water and the fish belonged to the entire village community (Samantapāsādikā II: 343-346; III: 680). Cooperation was necessary not only in the construction and maintenance of irrigation works but also in the production process of rice cultivation since for certain operations the labor of the domestic unit would be inadequate. But it is important to note that the strict enforcement of the shareholders' rights did not necessarily lead to equality of access to irrigation water. Shares are subject to fragmentation and differential patterns of reproduction would lead to differences in the sizes of shares held by domestic units. Disparities between domestic units could also appear in the ownership of livestock. But the level of production technology attained by this time and the consequent limitation on the size of the population in each settlement restricted the extent to which these inequalities within village communities could develop. Hence it was between village communities rather than between domestic units that significant differences arose during this period in the degree of access to

strategic agricultural resources.

Evidently, ranking had long been well known to the society reflected in the earliest Brāhmi inscriptions of Sri Lanka. There was, on the one hand, a system of ranking on the basis of ritual status or varna and it clearly indicates the influence of Vedic ideology. There was also a parallel system of ranking on the basis of sociopolitical status. The most common among the titles of the latter type were parumaka (literally 'leader'), 1 gamika (head of a village community), gahapati (head of a household), and gamani (Skt. grāmanī, a type of leadership associated at an earlier time with a mobile, probably tribal, group). Almost all the early Brāhmī inscriptions published so far, amounting to more than 1100, record donations, mostly of cave dwellings, to the Buddhist clerical community. These records point to a very wide distribution of Buddhist religious within the island. The prominent presence in many different parts of the country of such groups of religious, who totally abstained from productive physical labor in adherence to the codes of conduct prescribed in the Buddhist canon, is an indication of the productive capacity of the economy. For it could generate a surplus which maintained such groups of nonproducers. It may also be argued that the absorption of a good part of the surplus products by Buddhist clerics, who during this period lived in close proximity to but outside village settlements, hampered the process of internal differentiation within the village settlements. In an economy producing agricultural crops capable of being stored over long periods, there was comparatively little economic compulsion to indulge in potlatch on a massive scale. Donation to the Buddhist clerical community was the closest approximation to potlatch in Sri Lanka. It is significant that the donors were careful to set up inscriptions and in the majority of cases to give their lineages, affinal connections and titles. These records reflect a state of intense competition for status conducted through acts of conspicuous generosity. People of diverse social position took part in this competition, but the parumaka were clearly at an advantage, for they appear to have possessed the resources to make donations on an impressive scale. Twenty-eight percent of all recorded donations were made by this group. A likely interpretation of the term parumaka would be that it denoted heads of clan groups.2

The statements in the early chronicles of Sri Lanka that kings

held sway over the whole island even from the time of the mythical Vijaya have influenced modern historical writings on the early stages of the island's history and have blurred the understanding of its early political developments. The present writer has pointed out elsewhere that the island was divided into a number of small political units up to about the middle of the second century B.C. (Gunawardana 1971a). At the head of these polities were individuals bearing the title raja, gamani, or aya. In the middle of the third century B.C., Tissa of Anuradhapura, the leader of one such polity, held a 'proper' consecration with the requisites provided by Asoka Maurya and assumed the titles devanapiya maharaja. In assuming the title devanapiya, which meant 'friend of the gods' or more accurately 'one who is pleasing to the gods', Tissa was following Asoka. And in taking over the title maharaja, he was probably attempting to elevate himself to a position above the leaders of the other polities. The consecration of Tissa was certainly an important event in the development of the ideology of political leadership in the island. Tissa was probably the first aspirant to overlordship over the whole island, but there is no evidence to show that he succeeded in having his authority accepted by the leaders of other polities spread over different parts of the island. The term raja, like its Sanskrit equivalent rāja, has been translated as 'king'. Though the leaders of some of these local polities assumed this title, it is clear that these polities were at a very elementary level of organizational develop-It is remarkable that with one exception there is no reference to administrative functionaries serving under any of the political leaders mentioned in inscriptions at fourteen different regional sites. The only reference is to an ayaka, probably a steward. Evidently, a governmental apparatus or a differentiation of governmental functions had not yet evolved. It does not seem meaningful, therefore, to describe these polities as kingdoms. In the absence of a better term, the term chiefdom will be used in the present paper to designate this stage of political evolution. It has to be emphasized, however, that this term is not being used in strict accordance with the definition given by Service (1975: 16), since certain traits more akin to a Big Man system could also be detected in these polities.

Extracts from some of the earliest literary works from the island, preserved in the Vamsatthappakāsinī (306-307), reveal that

elevation to the position of chief was not marked by any elaborate ceremonial: a staff (yatthi) was the symbol of office. The chief was a military leader who ensured the security (abhaya) of the population within his political unit from whom he received bali. The term bali carried strong religious connotations. The chronicles use the term to denote what the ruler received from his subjects as well as propitiatory offerings made to maleficent spirits (Mahāvamsa, ch. 34, v 40; ch. 36, v 89). Buddhist texts from Sri Lanka speak of five types of bali and list the receipts of the ruler together with entertainment offered to guests and donations to kinsmen as well as sacrifices to gods and ritual offerings to the dead (Aṅguttara Nikāya II: 68; Manorathapūranī III: 99-100). It may be suggested that bali was initially a voluntary offering, an 'oblation', comparable to the gifts of honor which, according to Tacitus, the German tribesmen made voluntarily and by individual contribution (ultro ac viritim) to their leaders (Germania 1935: 292).3 Later on these oblations may have become regular and obligatory. but it is important that they represented a personal relationship between the ruler and the ruled. It is likely that the chiefs sometimes directed the construction of irrigation works. However, their participation was not essential for the construction of unsophisticated and small village reservoirs. Their enterprise, even if they could mobilize the labor of more than a few village settlements, did not lead to the appearance of large-scale irrigation works. The technological problems involved in the construction of large reservoirs had not yet been solved, and there are no references at this stage to the construction of long canals cutting across political boundaries.

The chiefdom brought together several village settlements within a system of political coordination. Diversity in the productive capacity of villages would encourage the development of a special type of integration based on the intervillage exchange of rice from the affluent villages practicing intensive irrigated agriculture for services from the less well-off village communities. The privileged access to irrigation that the affluent communities enjoyed was the pivot on which this system of exchange revolved. An element of power may have been necessary for the preservation of such a privileged position. Thus this type of chiefdom may be described as a political arrangement by which the affluent and densely populated village communities perpetuated the subordination of

an economically dependent minority. But the chiefdom represented a stage of political evolution in which the mechanisms of domination were not well developed and in which, despite varṇa ideology, a constant competition for status was taking place.

Even at this stage when there were several chiefdoms it is possible to detect certain factors which were conducive to the development of a higher sense of identity. Inscriptions provide instances of individuals categorizing themselves on the basis of ritual status and ethnic criteria. Language and religion were perhaps the most important elements in this society with an integrative potentiality. Fried's assumption (1967: 253) that literacy appears only with the emergence of states is not applicable to Sri Lanka where a common language and a common script were in use all over the island long before the appearance of the The rapid expansion of Buddhism over the island was another factor favorable to the development of a higher sense of People of varied rank patronized Buddhism and a considerable number described themselves as followers of the faith (upasaka/upasika).

Affinal exchange was a significant factor in the long process of the development of coordination among chiefdoms. The Dhātuvamsa (30-39) refers to matrimonial links between the chiefdoms of Mahāgāma and those of Kalyāni and Girinuvara. Sometimes members of one ruling family became heads of other chiefdoms and it was by this method that links had been established between Anurādhapura and the chiefdoms at Yatahalena and Mahāgāma. Certainly the most important mechanism of coordination was Gothābhaya of Mahāgāma subjugated the neighboring warfare. chiefdom of Kataragama. His successor Kākavanna Tissa concentrated on amassing weaponry and resorted to a curious blend of religion and military force to impose his sway over the chiefdoms of Seru, Soma, and Lona in the eastern regions of Sri He announced his intention to build a Buddhist shrine within the chiefdom of Seru, marched there with his army and ordered the chiefs of Seru, Soma and Long to help him in this task. Evidently, these chiefs considered it prudent to submit to this intimidation, thereby accepting subordinate status, rather than resist him with military force. It is clear that in the early struggles among chiefdoms, the house of Mahagama achieved a greater measure of success than any other and hence was at an advantage

in the struggle for overlordship over the whole island.

The campaigns of Dutthagāmanī (161-137 B.C.) constituted an impressive military tour de force which marked the culmination of the long-drawn struggle for power among chiefdoms. With the elevation of this scion of the house of Mahāgāma to the position of the supreme political leader in the island begins a dialectical process of state formation which lasted several centuries and brought into being a political system representing the exercise of coercive power in the interests of economically dominant groups. This process may be compared with what Khazanov (1972) has described as 'the epoch of class formation' and led to what Claessen and Skalník (1978) have termed 'the early state'.

During the early phase of the period of state formation in Sri Lanka there was no administrative apparatus to help the rulers in the exercise of their authority. It is not stated whether all the chiefs defeated by Duṭṭhagāmanī were killed. But even if they had been so eliminated, in the absence of an administrative apparatus, others had to be appointed to execute the very functions which had been exercised earlier by the chiefs. Thus, particularly during this initial phase of the period of state formation, there seems to have been a remarkable continuity of some of the political features of the previous epoch.

Soon after his campaigns, Dutthagamani shifted his capital to Anuradhapura. The major task undertaken by him after this event was the construction of three Buddhist shrines at his new political center. Of these, the Mahathupa begun by him and completed by his successor was for a long time the largest $st\bar{u}pa$ in the Buddhist world. Here we find Dutthagamani making a deliberate attempt to turn his political center into a place of pilgrimage for the Buddhists in the island. Evidently, circumvallation appeared much later, and it was Kūtakanna Tissa (44-22 B.C.) who built a wall, seven cubits in height, and a moat around the city. At this stage, the mechanisms of administrative control of the peripheral areas had not yet been developed. And also the economy was not conducive to integration on an islandwide scale. Hence the acceptance of the Anuradhapura shrines as the foremost shrines in the island and the participation of individuals from the peripheral areas in religious ceremonial at these shrines would have played a significant role in emphasizing the sense of unity.

Thus at the beginning of the period of state formation Anurad-

hapura was the place where the foremost political leader lived and where some of the most important Buddhist shrines and monasteries were located. Its gradual evolution into a place where administrative decisions affecting the peripheral areas were taken covered several centuries. It is possible to detect the evolution of a rudimentary administrative apparatus during the first two centuries which followed the campaigns of Dutthagamani. The terms senapati (general), badakarika (treasurer), kotagarika (storekeeper), adeka (functionary managing an establishment), and ameta (general purpose functionary) reflect the type of differentiation of functions taking place at the time and point to the importance of Indian political ideas in this development. However, it is noteworthy that, apart from a few exceptions, records of these functionaries are found around the capital (roughly in the present Anuradhapura District) and not far away from it. Thus it does not seem likely that at this stage the governmental apparatus was an important element which contributed to the political integration of the island.

On the other hand, cultural elements were of prime importance for political unity during this phase. Myths datable to this time speak of the Buddha visiting the island to drive away the yakkhas and to sacralize by his presence Anuradhapura and such other places situated in different parts of the island as Nagadipa, Kalyani, Sumanakūta, Mahiyangana and Dighayapi. They also present the rulers of the dynasty at Anuradhapura as scions of the Buddha's lineage. These myths emphasized the unity of the island and the right of the dynasty at Anuradhapura to rule over the whole island (Gunawardana 1976). There also seems to have been a further elaboration of the rituals associated with kingship, particularly those performed at accession, bringing about a growing emphasis of the social distance between the ruler and the ruled. The development of a Sinhalese identity, as evident from the references to the kingdom as Ilaraceya or Simhalarajya, was another factor conducive to political unity. Further, the patronage that the ruling house at Anuradhapura extended to Buddhist shrines in the peripheral areas helped them to win and maintain influence in those areas. Our emphasis on cultural factors behind political unity, in particular the role of the capital city as a center of ceremonial, does not imply that Sri Lanka presented a variant of the 'theatre state' (Geertz 1968: 38; 1973: 335). As emphasized

earlier, these developments constitute only an initial phase in the process of state formation.

The dominant position occupied by the ruler of Anuradhapura placed at his disposal the power to mobilize an extensive supply of labor which could be used for public works. Religious buildings and irrigation works were the two main types of public works. But, until the bisokotuva or the 'cistern sluice' came into use some time before the second century A.D., the reservoirs sponsored by rulers were not large undertakings (Gunawardana 1978). Rulers donated some of these irrigation works to monasteries, and it is possible to detect here the beginning of a trend leading to the alienation of the village communities from a strategic resource basic to their agricultural production. The 'cistern sluice' facilitated the regulation of the outflow of water from reservoirs without endangering their weirs and thereby paved the way to the construction of large-scale reservoirs and interrelated irrigation systems. With its appearance began a stage of decisive intervention of the ruler in irrigation enterprise. Vasabha (A.D. 65-109) is credited with the construction of twelve reservoirs and the Alisara canal which was the first attempt at diversion of water to a distant locality. An inscription of Kanittha Tissa (A.D. 164-192) mentions village reservoirs (gamikavavi) as well as two new types of reservoirs: 'large reservoirs' (mahavavi) and 'service reservoirs' (danavavi) (Epigraphia Zeylanica I: 252-259). The first of these two new types was evidently a storage reservoir and its water was distributed to the fields through the medium of service Here we see the beginnings of interlinked irrigation systems. By the reign of Mahasena in the next century, irrigation technology had developed to such an extent that it was possible to construct a gigantic reservoir like the Minneri, which was about 15 miles in circumference. Now that the technological problems of heavy construction had been overcome, the power of the ruler to mobilize labor could be put to effective use in the execution of a crucial social function: the irrigation enterprise of rulers during the five centuries which followed the reign of Mahasena produced, in addition to a host of other works, twelve reservoirs of gigantic proportions, some of which formed part of the two interlinked irrigation systems based on the rivers Kala, Malvatu and Mahaväli. The evidence cited above runs counter to Wittfogel's assumption (1963: 17-19) that the organizational requirements of irrigation provided the main stimulus for the evolution of political organization in irrigation society. The construction of small, unsophisticated village reservoirs was well within the capacity of village communities. Royal intervention in irrigation enterprise only became decisive when rulers began to construct reservoirs and canals of supralocal significance; and this happened long after the ancient chiefdoms had been incorporated within a political system under the domination of the rulers of Anurādhapura.

An important development in the latter phase of state formation was the emergence of a new social group which finds mention in inscriptional records from about the beginning of the Christian era. These were the owners of irrigation reservoirs (vavihamika) some of whom came from the ranks of the parumukas. While certain reservoirs were the property of individuals there were also some reservoirs which were the property of clans and others which had been donated to monasteries. It may be suggested that conditions of inequality within village communities enabled the better-off elements, in particular those like heads of clans who had the capacity to mobilize labor, to emerge as entrepreneurs in irrigation activity. The consequent evolution of new types of property perhaps reflects the process of the dissolution of the village communities. It was a significant development in another sense since in societies where the prime strategic resource was water, the ownership of irrigation property would give the entrepreneur a far-reaching control over agricultural production. These owners extracted a share of the produce called 'water-share' (dakabaka) from the fields which used their water. It is also evident that the fish in these irrigation works was a subsidiary source of income. The use of sluices enabled the owners to regulate effectively the issue of water as well as to deny irrigation facilities to those who tried to avoid payment. The Samantapāsādikā, a Pāli commentary written in the fifth century A.D. but based on Sinhalese commentarial works written several centuries earlier, discusses problems faced by monasteries which owned irrigation property and recommends the withdrawal of irrigation facilities from those cultivators who failed to pay the irrigation dues (III: 679). Thus irrigation enterprise provided the entrepreneurs with an effective mechanism for the appropriation of a share of the agricultural produce even in situations where the direct producer was not alienated from the land. The fact that

irrigation enterprise was not the monopoly of the ruler meant that in this society individuals, clans, and monasteries who owned irrigation works were loci for the accumulation of the agricultural surplus. Sometimes, as owners of small reservoirs and canals in interlinked systems, such groups participated in and benefited from the distribution of water from large irrigation works built by rulers. Further, even some of the major irrigation works built through royal initiative had been donated by rulers to monasteries. Thus, unlike in Southeast Asian societies described by Geertz (1960: 231), we see in Sri Lanka the development of a process of stratification which led to the rise of property-owning monasteries and a 'peasant gentry' enjoying positions of power and influence through their ownership of irrigation works, animal wealth and, later on, land.

On the other hand, the initiative of rulers in irrigation enterprise brought about a remarkable change in patterns of production, with significant social and political repercussions. reservoirs which harnessed an enormous supply of water reduced the seasonal fluctuations of the area under rice cultivation and in fact made it possible in extensive tracts of land to raise regularly two or three crops per year (Epigraphia Zeylanica III: 177-178). To that extent, they contributed significantly to the development of productive forces and reduced the dependence of agriculturists in these areas on swidden forms of cultivation. The large reservoir also performed an integrative function in bringing together village settlements that were dependent on it for a supplementary source of water for their village reservoirs. This link had brought about a marked increase in the efficiency of the system of energy conversion and as such was of fundamental importance to the village economy. The change from a pattern of seasonal fluctuation in the area under irrigated cultivation to a more stable pattern of production paved the way for the emergence of concepts of rights to clearly demarcated space or territory. From about the second century A.D. there are references to the sale of tracts of land and to instances of monasteries and the ruler himself purchasing property in land. This period witnessed the development of private property rights in irrigation works as well as irrigated land and housing sites. There is at least one reference to private property rights over pasture land (tanabumi. Paranavitana 1970: 91). It may be suggested that such developments reflecting the dissolution of communal rights should be associated more with nuclear regions irrigated by the larger hydraulic works. It would appear that these nuclear regions differed from other areas in the intensity of the methods of agricultural production, the density of population, and perhaps also in relations of production. In effect these nuclear regions seem to present a new mode of production. Another result of the intervention of the ruler in irrigation enterprise was that it placed at his disposal resources which could be used to intensify his political power. In sponsoring the construction of large-scale irrigation works the rulers were making investments which brought them returns in the form of an additional share of the produce, and this constituted one of their most important sources of income. Further, these irrigation works were nuclei for the aggregation of dependent populations and therefore their construction amounted to the creation of new power bases. The control over the nuclear regions where the major irrigation works were located provided the ruler with the resources to maintain his sway over the whole island.

The growth of commerce was an important development in the latter phase of the period of state formation. The vaniiha or the trader is mentioned in inscriptions from pre-Christian times. The number of such records is small, but they are scattered over a wide region covered by the modern Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Ampare, Hambantota, and Kurunägala districts (Paranavitana 1970: 28, 37, 40, 45, 49, 70). Some of these traders describe themselves as Dravidians (Dameda) and may have been South Indians. But there were traders who were certainly local inhabitants. One trader bore the title parumaka while another described himself as a 'trading householder' (vanijha gahapati). Though commercial contacts with foreign lands, particularly South India, may be traceable back to very early times, it was the growth of trade between the Roman Empire and the East from about the beginning of the Christian era which had a significant impact on long-distance trade. Royal interest in fostering this trade is evident from the embassy which, according to Pliny (402-405), was sent from Sri Lanka to the court of Claudius (A.D. 41-54). The first contacts between Sri Lanka and the Han Empire were also probably made in the first century A.D. (Werake 1979). It appears from literary sources, including the Greek and Latin writings on the island, that

Sri Lanka was known for products like precious stones, pearls, elephants, muslins, and turtle shells. It is most likely that rulers tried to participate in, if not control, this lucrative trade. There were lapidaries (manikara) in royal service and Fa-Hien noted in the fifth century that the ruler had placed guards over the area which produced pearls and that a share of three-tenths of all pearls harvested had to be paid to him. But long-distance trade does not appear to have been a royal monopoly since the ruler exacted customs duties (suka) at the ports. The fact that these duties were collected even at distant southern ports like Godavava (Paranavitana 1933: 197) illustrates how long-distance trade induced the extension of the administrative apparatus of the rulers of Anuradhapura. Further, the expansion of trade in the early centuries of the Christian era stimulated increased use of coins which we find mentioned in the inscriptions of this period as a medium of exchange even for transactions involving irrigation property, land, and labor.

Concomitantly there evolved trends conducive to centralization and strengthening of royal power which constituted essential aspects in the formation of the state. Inscriptions indicate that a regular system of taxation (kara) had appeared by about the second century A.D. When compared with what we have termed oblations, these new exactions which were levied on irrigation works, land, and perhaps other means of production represent a depersonalization or formalization of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. A similar trend is evident from the new offices like dorakani (dovārika) and mahadoratana mentioned in inscriptions from about the first century A.D. These functionaries controlled access to the court and only those who obtained their permission could see the ruler. Even presents brought for the ruler had to be channeled through them and the person who brought the presents was not normally presented to the ruler (Hettiarachchy 1972: 106-107). The increase in social distance between the ruler and the ruled that these conditions reflect was further enhanced by ritual. The physical act of paying homage to the ruler became a regular part of court proceedings and on occasions of special ritual significance courtiers and other prominent subjects had to demonstrate their allegiance by joining the ruler's retinue and following him in procession. In the reigns of Ilanaga (A.D. 35-44) and Jetthatissa (266-276) humiliating as well as brutal punishments were meted out to noble clansmen and courtiers who attempted to deviate from these norms of conduct.

This phase also witnessed gradual accretions to the administrative apparatus enabling it to replace or limit the functions of traditional power groups at regional centers. From about the reign of Vasabha (A.D. 65-509) functionaries were being appointed as provincial administrators and evidently they were transferable. By the second century A.D. the administrative apparatus had expanded to an extent which enabled the regular collection of taxes and customs duties even at the southernmost extremity of the island (Paranavitana 1933: 197; Nicholas 1956: 64). The codification of the law, undertaken when Tissa the Lawyer (A.D. 214-236) was ruler, helped this process of integration. Though these codes of law have not been preserved, it is possible to suggest that they included provisions safeguarding the rights of property. Such a hypothesis finds support in the Samantapāsādikā. work contains passages (II: 330-331, 344-345), evidently quoted from legal writings, which list theft of water and fish from irrigation works and damage to weirs among offenses and lay down the procedure for determining responsibility and compensation for property lost or damaged. A system of centrally controlled courts was operative even by the time of Gajabahu I (A.D. 112-134) and, evidently, there was provision for appeals through a hierarchy of courts right up to the court of the ruler (Hettiarachchy 1972: 164-166). It is possible to detect here the formalization of the mechanisms of social control to maintain a stratified social order. Further, such systematization of judicial procedure and the employment of state functionaries in arbitration would have helped to legitimize the power of the ruler and to open up independent channels of communication between him and the ruled population in the peripheral areas. The provision of amenities of social welfare introduced another link between the center and the Buddhadasa (A.D. 340-368), began the practice of providing facilities for the treatment of the sick and is said to have appointed physicians, one for each group of ten villages, in different parts of the island (*Cūlavamsa* I, ch. 37: vv. 145-148).

The opening up of several channels of communication between the ruler and the ruled population no doubt undermined the position of regional centers of power; however, we should refrain from overemphasizing the independence of the ruler from traditional power groups since the expansion of the administrative apparatus tended, paradoxically, to strengthen the position of some of these groups. Initially a considerable number of officials came from among the ranks of the parumukas. noticeable tendency for political office to be associated, generation after generation, with families who also happen to be affinally related. Evidence in commentarial works like the Sammohavinodani (443) indicates that there were lineages which traditionally held high government office. Further, men who held office were not only distinguished by rank but also had independent means, as is evident from instances of conspicuous and generous patronage of religious institutions.⁴ This is not to imply that the official hierarchy strictly corresponded to the rank order and to the order But it is noteworthy that there were several instances of concentration of social rank, wealth, and official position within the same families. This type of social group was an important source of military support for the ruler. Such a situation was not conducive to the total concentration of political power in the ruler which Wittfogel (1963: 4) held to be characteristic of irrigation society.

The preceding delineation of state formation in Sri Lanka raises certain points of general interest when examined in the light of the theoretical work of Wittfogel, Southall, Fried, Carneiro, Robert McC. Adams, and R.N. Adams. In what we have termed chiefdom we see not a pattern of centralization but one of coordination among village communities. The elevation of the rulers of Anuradhapura to the supreme political position in the island after the campaigns of Dutthagamani represents a higher stage of coordination, and centralization is a gradual and long process detectable only after this stage. The emergence of a political system which brought the petty regional polities under the sway of Anuradhapura was not the response to the organizational demands of irrigation society. The vital social functions of constructing and maintaining small-scale irrigation works continued to be performed by village communities after the formation of the state, as they had been in prestate polities, with little intervention by the ruler. 5 In Sri Lanka, rulers began to construct large-scale irrigation works of supralocal significance several centuries after the campaigns of Dutthagamani had undermined the independence of petty chiefdoms. In this respect our findings agree with the conclusions that Robert McC. Adams (1960: 27) has drawn in his study of ancient Mesopotamian polity.

It will have been evident from the material presented in the preceding paragraphs that political evolution in ancient Sri Lanka proceeded beyond the level of segmentary polity which Southall (1953: 254) believed to be typical of Asia, Africa, and many other parts of the world except in times of imperial rule. The concept of the 'segmentary state' may be a most useful analytical tool for the study of conditions of reversion to decentralized types of polity in certain periods of Sri Lankan history. But, by about the second to third centuries of the Christian era, it is possible to detect the emergence of a state in Sri Lanka which conforms to the concept of a unitary rather than a segmentary state.

State formation in Sri Lanka was a complex process which does not lend itself either to such a simple explanation as a response to the stimuli of Mauryan influences or to easy generalizations of the Wittfogelian type. Indian influences are certainly discernible in such elements as consecration ceremonial. But the ancient Sri Lankan state was not a mere imposition from outside: it was the result of a long process of indigenous development. We have outlined several distinct but interrelated developments leading to the emergence of institutions which together constituted the It seems particularly necessary here to emphasize the importance of the development of technology in this transition since its relevance in state formation has been questioned by several scholars (Carneiro 1969; R.N. Adams 1975; Cohen 1978). Of the technological innovations which can be detected, the invention of the sluice was of far-reaching economic and social significance and may be compared with such innovations as the heavy, wheeled plough and the stirrup in European history. On the one hand, the invention of the sluice brought about a significant development of the productive forces by making the construction of large-scale irrigation reservoirs possible and by paving the way to the decisive intervention of rulers in irrigation enterprise. On the other hand, by facilitating stricter control over the issue of irrigation water, it promoted the accumulation of the agricultural surplus in the hands of the owners of irrigation works.

Our description of the evolution of the state in Sri Lanka bears a certain similarity to Fried's analysis of the stages of political evolution. However, in our analysis, the period of state formation

represents an intermediate stage between the chiefdom and the mature state. Certain features of kingship are evident in what we have termed the second phase of the period of state formation. But this was essentially a period in which kingship was in the making and, even though the term 'king' has been used in the absence of a more suitable term, the institution was more a form of protokingship. Fried defined stratified society, which precedes state society in his scheme, as one in which the members did not enjoy equal access to strategic resources, and the state as 'a collection of specialized institutions ... that maintain an order of stratification' (1967: 186, 235). For Fried, as for Carneiro (1970), population pressure was the primary factor in political evolution. While suggesting that the period of state formation in Sri Lanka was preceded by a stage of societal evolution in which population pressure had brought about inequality in access to resources, we agree with the observations made by Kottak with reference to East African states (1972) in pointing out that a complex process involving several other factors was operative in the formation of the state in Sri Lanka. The period of state formation witnessed further intensification of inequality, and irrigation activity was a major factor behind this development. Irrigation enterprise of private individuals, chiefs, and later on kings brought about the separation of the direct producers from the sources of irrigation water. The state in ancient Sri Lanka was primarily a response to the needs of a society in which the process of the separation of the direct producers from one or more elements essential for their production had led to the growth of what may be termed exploitative relationships. It is also evident that by building large-scale irrigation works the rulers not only created nuclear regions with an impressively high pattern of energy conversion but also acquired new, independent power bases, and this constitutes another link between irrigation activity and the evolution of the state. Thus it appears that though the evolution of the state in Sri Lanka does not approximate to Wittfogel's hypothetical pattern of the acceptance by the ruled population of the authority of a despot who performed the vital social function of providing irrigation facilities (1963: 17-19), there was nevertheless a close relationship between this development and irrigation activity. However, it is important to emphasize that irrigation activity only intensified the development of trends which were equally common

to societies not dependent on irrigation: the relationship between irrigation and state formation was not one which gave a totally different and specific form to the state in irrigation society.

The state in Sri Lanka was a system of power wielded by the ruler and officials recruited primarily from among high ranking and wealthy families. To some extent it also represented the domination of an area under older methods of production by nuclear regions with a more efficient method of production. Another equally valid definition of the state would be that it was a system of clan power. Two 'aristocratic' clans dominated the political scene, and the ruler had to win the support of these clansmen to maintain his power. Coups and revolts organized by clansmen, rebellions organized by state functionaries and uprisings in the peripheral areas, which are not infrequent during the period from the third to the eighth century, are indications of the forces and problems that rulers had to contend with. The performance of the important social function of providing and controlling irrigation facilities proved to be a source of power for the king, but it was a source of wealth and power for other groups as well. Thus while irrigation activity was conducive to the evolution of the state in Sri Lanka it generated forces which worked in opposition to the total concentration of power in the ruler.⁶

NOTES

- The term parumaka may be compared with Sanskrit pramukha and Tamil perumakan (Pattupāṭṭu 1962: 110) both of which carry the meaning 'leader'.
- For discussions on the significance of this term see Ellawala (1969: 37-40), Paranavitana (1970: lxxii-lxxxvi) and Hettiarachchy (1972: 68-75).
- The similarity between bali in Vedic texts and contributions of tribesmen mentioned by Tacitus was pointed out by Heinrich Zimmer in 1879 (166-167).
- See for instance Epigraphia Zeylanica (V, 1965: 410-413) and Ancient Ceylon (I, 1971: 127-140).
- As Claessen has pointed out (1975: 55-56), Hawaii too provides instances
 of minor irrigation works being constructed without the intervention of
 the king.
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8 The Early State among the Eurasian Nomads

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The Eurasian steppes, half-deserts and deserts (the so-called Dry Belt), when seen on a map are a continuous strip extending across two continents from the Danube area to northern China. Notwith-standing a relative diversity of local conditions and consequent variability of economy, the nomads and seminomads who inhabited this region for nearly three thousand years can be regarded as representatives of a specific variety of pastoral nomadism.

The specificity of this variety, however, should not be exaggerated. It is connected by several intermediary links with other varieties of pastoral nomadism, such as the Middle Eastern variety, both geographically, culturally, and economically. But it should not be underestimated either. The peculiar features in the Eurasian variety of pastoral nomadism and seminomadism, taken as a whole and compared with other varieties, can be sufficiently well traced, not only in the economic, but also in their cultural and historical aspects.

For the purposes of the present paper it will suffice to handle just one of these particular features. The nomads of the Eurasian steppes and their sedentary neighbors occupied different ecological zones, while in the Middle East they were in a closer symbiotic relation and very often shared, completely or partially, the same ecological area. From the time of Avesta to Shahname, 'Iran' (i.e., the sedentary world) was in a confrontation with 'Turan' (i.e., the nomadic world) not only economically but also territorially. In the course of time the ethnic implications of these

terms might have changed, but the confrontation itself persisted.

This difference is indeed also relative. In Maveran-Nahr, the historical region between the Amudarya and Syrdarya Rivers, the nomads and seminomads sometimes utilized the same ecological area with agriculturalists. But the routes of pastoral roaming of the main mass of Eurasian nomads in times of relative political stability really did not cross the agricultural areas. Even in marginal zones the nomads most often just contacted agriculturalists, but utilized different ecological areas. This fact has influenced the specificity of many states created by the nomads, as will be demonstrated below.

Disregarding the problem of the variety of pastoral nomadism we deal with, its economy never was completely autarkic. Pastoral nomadism and in part even seminomadism are a result of passive adaptation of food-producing societies in ecological areas favoring this adaptation. The reverse side of a nomadic specialization was on the one hand its limited perspective for an economic selfregulation with permanent instability as a consequence, and on the other hand an equally permanent need for agricultural products and handicrafts. In this regard the nomads of the Eurasian steppes were considerably different from their southern urban-agricultural neighbors. The latter possessed a much more complex economy combining agriculture with various kinds of sedentary livestock breeding supplemented by handicrafts, and harmoniously balancing urban and rural ways of life. Therefore, commercial and other contacts with nomads were by no means vital for them. The really interested and active party were the nomads who had but two alternatives to overcome their economic onesidedness.

(1) The first alternative was sedentarization, which implied a drastic structural break in the nomadic society and many problems of both social, psychological, and purely ecological order. Since nomadism in the Eurasian steppes was developed as an effective alternative to agriculture in climatic conditions unfavorable for it, agriculture in the zone of widespread nomadism and seminomadism was possible only in limited enclaves or in equally limited marginal areas. For this reason any considerable sedentarization required migration to a territory with a different environment. Examples of this are well-known in history, but as a rule they resulted from relations of nomads with sedentary societies in a given historical situation. The sedentarization in these cases was often not a goal

but a consequence, and was caused by the necessity for adapting to a new ecological and social environment.

(2) The second alternative was acquisition of necessary agricultural products and handicrafts from sedentary neighbors. This aim was achieved by various means, the most typical being the following: (a) mediation or participation in trade between various sedentary societies, as well as various services and other contacts of an exchange type; (b) trade with neighboring sedentary agricultural and urban societies; (c) subordination to the latter and various forms of dependence on them; (d) periodical raids on the areas of sedentary societies and irregular looting of them, as well as forcing on them relations of alliance or patronage, etc.; (e) conquest of sedentary societies.

The first two ways were for Eurasian nomads the least reliable, profitable, and stable. Notwithstanding the fact that the transcontinental trade routes, including the silk-trade route, had passed through their territories since ancient times, and the nomads had never failed to extract some profit from this fact (cf. e.g. Strabo, XI, 5, 8 about the Aorsians enriched by long-distance caravan trade), the trading mediation never was as important for Eurasian nomads as it was for the nomads of Afghanistan or the Tuaregs of the Sahara. The routes and uninterrupted functioning of lines of commerce were largely determined by political factors: a stable situation in the steppe, including the presence of a state authority to control the territory of the trading routes. For instance, transcontinental trade gained particular significance in the times of the empire of the ancient Turks or the Mongolian empire under the first successors of Genghis Khan, and the Volgo-Caspian trading route in the time of Khazaria.

Direct trade with agricultural and urban populations faced many obstacles too. First of all, as I have already noted, the sedentary societies with their more complex and at the same time more natural economy typical of ancient and medieval times were more autarkic and less interested in trade with nomads than vice versa, though sometimes it might be profitable for both sides. Secondly, trade with nomads was used as a means of putting political pressure on them, and therefore was often regulated by the state, especially in China. Quite often the nomads had to confirm their trading rights by means of arms. Thirdly, the instability of the nomadic economy could not provide for the

production of a stable surplus for regular marketing which would serve the needs of the entire society. Lastly, separate habitats caused additional problems for trade between nomads and agriculturalists.

Various forms of subordination and dependence on settled agricultural societies afforded the nomads some possibility of acquiring necessary goods and products, but on unfavorable conditions. Loss of political independence, danger for traditional social structures, direct or indirect exploitation from outside rendered this alternative undesirable, only acceptable for nomads under external pressure. Not accidentally this alternative was only really characteristic for modern times.

Irregular looting of sedentary societies was essentially unstable and completely dependent on the balance of power at any given historical moment. Nomadic and sedentary societies each kept their political independence. Therefore, the exploitation of the sedentary population was not institutionalized, and hence not guaranteed. From the point of view of nomads, a stable subordination or conquest of sedentary societies was the best alternative. Only this could guarantee the most complete and regular flow of necessary foods and goods on the most profitable basis of a noneconomic coercion.

However, the struggle to conquer sedentary areas by nomads was connected not only with their economic one-sidedness but also with the specificity of their social and political development. Among Soviet anthropologists the problem of an utmost level of social organization achieved by Eurasian nomads in their independent development stands as one of the most disputable problems of the study of nomadism. A number of opinions have been published on this issue and I shall limit myself here to quoting only those which seem to be more correct from my own point of view (Khazanov 1975).

Seen internally and purely economically, the functioning of a nomadic society was already guaranteed at the lowest levels of socioeconomic organization. Therefore, the presence of higher levels was connected with factors such as: need for rational distribution of pastures and wells; coordination of roaming routes; struggle for sufficient livestock and pastures; an unstable social and political situation in the steppe, partly resulting from economic instability, wars, migrations; striving of some groups of nomads

to subordinate others; and the need for relations with the outside world. Being charged with these functions the nomadic aristocracy enjoyed certain privileges and sometimes more or less fixed tribute and obligations on the rank and file nomads, although the amount of these obligations was usually not very significant. Besides, their high social and economic status enabled the aristocracy to exploit the labor of impoverished and dependent nomads in their households, and to lend them some livestock for herding with a considerable profit for themselves. Most often the nomadic aristocracy did not form a closed estate, but a certain tendency toward this was present in some societies.

The degree of such stratification, however, should not be over-estimated. The integrative tendencies in the societies of nomads of the Eurasian steppes were not constant. A certain reversibility of social processes made social stratification unstable to a degree. The nomadic economy could not provide a sufficient base for its own stabilization. An outside factor was needed as a stabilizer, and an outside source of a surplus product was indispensable as a base for stable social stratification. Only under these conditions could the integrative tendencies in nomadic societies be long-lived, and centripetal forces could prevail over centrifugal ones. A successful expansion, though favoring further stratification among nomads, nevertheless tended to smooth internal conflicts, somehow placing them outside the society and thus promoting its consolidation.

One of the peculiar features in the process of expansion of nomads in the Eurasian steppes consisted of the fact that in this region the nomads often faced large states and even empires of sedentary populations. There were of course some petty state formations which could be easily subordinated by the initiative of leaders of relatively small nomadic groups. Not too much force, for example, was necessary to conquer some isolated oases with a relatively small population in eastern Turkistan, provided that China was not able to react. But much more often, in order to subordinate sedentary societies it was necessary to consolidate a whole nomadic society or even several societies (as, for instance, was the case with Genghis Khan in the beginning of his career). This consequently resulted in further stratification within nomadic societies themselves. In such cases, a state, or rather a prestate formation, could even emerge among nomads on the eve of the

conquest, although their further destiny was determined by the success or failure of the conquest itself.

The records on ancient and medieval nomads are mostly compiled by authors who themselves came from sedentary peoples. The latter naturally paid special attention to the nomads only when they were becoming a part and parcel of their own history. It is not surprising therefore, that we know much less about the prehistory of the states created by nomads, than about their subsequent fate. Properly speaking, the situation with regard to the history of the states created by sedentary peoples is much the same.

Against this general background the Mongols can be singled out because the origin of their state is more or less adequately reflected in historical sources, although these of course are also far from complete. Up to the early thirteenth century Mongolia knew only separate tribes and tribal units of an unstable and fluctuating composition, mostly created for occasional wars. Consequently 'khans of this time were ephemeral chieftains of loose groups with their loose and always ever disputable power' (Vladimirtsov 1934: 80). The twelfth century was a time of fierce struggle, not only between separate tribal units but also within them, and between separate tribes and subtribes. 'The Secret History' of the Mongols and Rashid el-Din both tell this story in mutual accord and with many details. It is not surprising that it took Temuchin more time and effort to unite the Mongols than to complete all further conquests.

The struggle was as always for pastures, livestock, loot, and for subordination of some groups of nomads by others. Certainly, comparison and evaluation are not very reliable when the sources are incomplete. But still there is indication that the internal struggle in the Mongolian society of the twelfth century exceeded the usual frame of nomadic rivalries. There are some hints that the balance between the productivity of available pastures, the number of livestock, and the population was at that time highly distorted among the Mongols. At the same time, the additional sources of subsistence outside the nomadic economy proper were very limited. Transcontinental trade in this period was in decay; relations with China were far from friendly and on the whole not in favor of the Mongols. Mongolian society was obviously under stress.

Meanwhile, the existing stratification became more complex. Besides the rank and file commoners and an aristocratic stratum dependent groups were found, consisting of poor people who lived and worked in the households of their well-to-do kinsmen, and 'otegu-bogol', after Pelliott, literally 'esclaves ancestraux', or in his translation 'serfs héréditaires'. Their origin was connected with wars, in which some nomadic groups were defeated by others. In Pelliot's opinion these 'slaves' were rather vassals keeping their freedom of movement and even their lineage organization, and many of these vassals could later attain a very high social ranking (Pelliot and Hambis 1955:85-86).

The Mongolian nobility was strong and influential enough to attract and keep bodyguards — nukers. Nukers were not dependent but personally free people who volunteered their service. Their main function was to participate in the war affairs of the leader, but in times of peace they helped him to manage his household. The number and personal qualities of nukers largely determined the power and influence of a certain person among the aristocracy. And to keep them, continuous successful wars were necessary, because rank and file free commoners had no considerable and fixed obligations toward the aristocracy.

The aristocracy among the Mongols of the twelfth century was already tending to become a hereditary estate. Temuchin was a great-grandson of Khabul Khan, one of the most noble and famous chiefs of the first half of the twelfth century. But the position of this aristocracy was not yet stabilized. Evidence of this we find again in the history of Genghis Khan and his ancestors. Genghis Khan's great-grandfather headed a unit in which most Mongolian subdivisions were incorporated. But Genghis Khan's father was not a khan and could subordinate apart from his own subdivision only a part of another, namely the Taychiuts. Temuchin himself, in spite of his noble origin, started his career as a poor man without influence, without dependent people and nukers.

This used to happen often among the Mongols. But not everybody could master one's own fate like Temuchin. He managed to do this only because his activity coincided with the objective tendency in the development of Mongolian society. That society was badly in need of unification. If there had not been Temuchin, the same aim might have been achieved by somebody

else. The merit of Temuchin is that he could do it himself.

The year 1206, when Temuchin became Genghis Khan, can be regarded as the birthday of the Mongolian state. Its further destiny depended completely on successful expansion in order to overcome internal difficulties and conflicts. Without conquests this state would have been doomed to failure and disintegration. It was no accident that Genghis Khan started his first robbery campaigns against the Tanguts before and immediately after the kurultay of 1206.

Thus, the conquest of sedentary societies was one of the variants in contacts between nomads and the outside world. At the same time it was a manifestation of the external factor, which together with the internal one was determining the social and political structures of nomadic societies and the general level of their development. Nomadism being not only passive ecological adaptation to the natural environment, but also an active adaptation to the social and political environment in the larger world, the conquest was a means of active adaptation in extreme form.

Numerous causes of conquest of sedentary societies by nomads of the Eurasian steppes are recorded with many details in written sources, special studies and works on general history. Much less attention has been paid to the problem of how they were reflected in the society of the nomads themselves. Meanwhile, the conquests never failed to bring about rapid and often substantial changes in the social and political structures of nomads. In many cases the change was much more drastic than among the conquered rural and urban population.

The possibilities of the emergence of any stable state and longlived statehood among purely nomadic and even among seminomadic societies of the Eurasian steppes seem to have been very limited. In order for a state to emerge among nomads, it needed not only internal but also some external prerequisites, and among the latter successful expansion was the most important.

This thesis does not imply a support of the conquest theory of the origin of the state in the form initially formulated by its adherents (cf. e.g. Ratzel 1898; Gumplowicz 1899; Oppenheimer 1926; Thurnwald 1935; Eberhard 1952; Westermann 1952), although they were fond of quoting the fact of conquest of agriculturalists by pastoralists and pastoral nomads to confirm the validity of their views. Firstly, conquest was one among many ways of establishing a state, but not the only nor universal one. Secondly, it was proved long ago that a conquest resulted in the emergence of a state only if the societies of both conquerors and conquered were already stratified, i.e., if they met some internal preconditions for the emergence of the state. Only these conditions provided a superstratification in Fried's coinage, which resulted in the emergence of a state. With regard to the nomads of the Eurasian steppes one more limitation can be introduced. As a rule, their state resulted from a conquest not only of sedentary areas, but also mostly of areas which previously had been incorporated into other states.

There are exceptions to this rule, but they are rare and due to some additional factors. Thus, the Second Scythian kingdom in the sixth to third centuries B.C. and Khazaria in the eighth to ninth centuries A.D. were based on subordination of sedentary tribes of eastern Europe which were already stratified, but had not yet reached the level of statehood. For the Scythians, however, the decisive importance lay in the possibility of selling in Greek markets the grain received as a tribute from these tribes. For the Khazars the same importance lay in the control of the international trade routes which crossed their territory.

The domination of nomads over the rural and urban population which was established as a result of conquest was manifested in many ways: (a) in direct looting; (b) in tribute relations; (c) in fixed taxation; (d) in the creation within the nomadic society itself of agricultural and handicraft segments from among the resettled groups and integrating these into the dependent population of the conquered societies (the method long used in Central Asia by the Hsiungnu, the ancient Turks, the Mongols, and others); (e) expropriation of landed property in sedentary societies and exploitation of peasants, etc. The concrete forms of dependence were mostly connected with the character of conquest, having the peculiar features of conquered societies and the relations established between the conquered and the conquerors. In the Eurasian region two variants are typical, although there are many intermediary forms.

(1) The nomads and the agriculturalists continued to live mainly apart, each in their own traditional ecological zone, and preserving their different socioeconomic structures. Their integration was primarily of a political character. (2) The nomads and the agriculturalists shared, at least partly, the same ecological zone after the conquest. Their social, political, and even economic structures underwent a process of integration.

To some extent these variations were correlated with geography and ecology. For instance, in southern Russia the nomads could be engaged in their traditional economy only in the steppe zone and thus were naturally separated from the agriculturalists inhabiting forest and forest-steppe zones. On the other hand, nomads migrating to Maveran-Nahr or Iran could go on leading their nomadic way of life, living side-by-side with agriculturalists in the same ecological zone. In Dzhungaria, apart from separate oases, there were pastures suitable for the nomads, while the oases of Kashgaria were separated from each other by barren land. Consequently, in Dzhungaria the nomads could control oases without abandoning their traditional way of life, but in Kashgaria the need for such control demanded sedentarization. Under any circumstances, however, these two variations directly determined the character of the state that emerged among the nomads as the result of their conquest of sedentary areas.

For the first variant it was typical that nomads exploited the subordinate rural and urban population on the basis of tribute relations. Sometimes nomads, agriculturalists and urban dwellers were incorporated into one state. Sometimes the sedentary society kept its own state, but in a vassal dependence on the nomads (e.g., China with reference to the Hsiungnu in the second century B.C., or the Turks in the sixth century A.D., or Russian princedoms with regard to the Golden Horde). In any variation, however, the nomads and the agriculturalists might live side-by-side but not together. Their interaction took place mostly in the political sphere. The exploitation, though sometimes very severe, did not affect the foundations of the socioeconomic structure of rural and urban populations, and never integrated them in one single society with the nomads.

In such states the nomads, although politically dominant, were as a rule socially and economically the most backward. Their state may be labeled an early one.² Their highest stratum could acquire some features of a ruling class, determined by the extent to which it was connected by its position to the subordinate sedentary society.³

It is true that the subordination of the sedentary societies

accelerated to some extent the development of the nomads. The Hsiungnu said that they 'built a state fighting on horseback and therefore are respected and famed among all peoples' (Taskin 1973:34). But Yehlu Ch'uts'ai, the Chinese adviser of the first Mongol Khans, repeated an old bit of wisdom to Ogedei: 'You have conquered the universe sitting on horseback, but you cannot rule it sitting on horseback' (Munkuev 1965:73).

Quite often cities might emerge in the steppe as centers of political power, craftsmanship, and commerce, and a trend towards sedentarization might grow among the nomadic commoners. But such events in the states considered in this report are reversible. They would only serve as preconditions for further development on the basis of the sedentarization of the nomads, or of a change in their relations with the conquered sedentary societies.

Such state formations of nomads might follow different courses. In some cases, a change in the relations of power restricted or eliminated the possibilities of primitive tribute exploitation of sedentary societies. This resulted in disintegration of the state, separation of sedentary areas (which might, however, preserve dynasties of nomadic origin), decrease of the share of agricultural production within nomadic society and decline of urban life, etc.

In other cases the separation of the sedentary areas might accelerate the process of sedentarization among the nomads. As a result their society on the whole tended to become predominantly rural and urban, and proceeded to develop in another direction, though preserving a considerable segment of nomadic economy.

There were other cases in which the very character of relations between nomads and rural and urban dwellers might change. These evolved towards the second pattern of state development among the nomads of the Eurasian steppes. This second pattern can be described in the following way. In the states created by nomads, where they found themselves integrated with the rural and urban population within the framework of a single socioeconomic and political structure, the development of nomadic society followed quite different patterns. The early class relations attained by nomads in the course of conquest began, sometimes painfully and incompletely, to merge with the more developed class relations of the conquered. The process of synthesis might have a negative impact on the development of the sedentary

societies, but accelerated the development of the nomads.

In the course of further development the highest stratum of nomads turned into the ruling class of the sedentary population, sometimes merging with its predecessor, or more often dividing power with them. The rest of the nomads might continue to support the dynasty for a certain period in order to enjoy the privileges given for providing soldiers for the army, but still the degree of their dependence was growing. Accordingly, their social positions and prestige diminished.

Although the states under consideration were created by the efforts of nomads, the pattern of the socioeconomic relations which prevailed was finally determined by the level of development of sedentary areas. Besides, in the course of conquest large masses of nomads might find themselves in another natural environment, which was unfavorable for a nomadic economy, at least in its former shape. That is why the process of sedentarization was most extensive in the states of this type. It is worthwhile to mention that all these tendencies and variations of development are known for both ancient and medieval times. Both the First and the Second Scythian kingdoms were early states based mainly on the conquest and tribute exploitation of agriculturalists by nomads. But the sedentarization of nomads, which began in the period of the Second Scythian Kingdom, led to the later events. After a sharp decrease in possibilities of tribute exploitation of the conquered population, the Third Scythian Kingdom started to develop as a predominantly agricultural and urban society, where internal forms of dependence prevailed over external forms. This course of development was also favored by long contacts with Greek polities, for in their neighborhood profitable grain export was an additional impetus to shift to agriculture (Khazanov 1978a).

The Hsingnu society developed for a long time in the same direction as the Scythian one. Under Mao-tun many agricultural and nomadic tribes were conquered, and China was forced to pay regular tribute. But the state of the Hsiungnu remained an early one and ceased to exist when the Hsiungnu started to face defeats. The strong but loose and unstable formation created by the European Huns also seems to have been an early state based on tribute relations.

It appears that many other nomadic formations of ancient

times, for instance the Siracian in the northern Caucasus and the Iazyg in the Danube area, or the Kangyui and Wusun in central Asia, had also achieved the level of primitive statehood. There are reasons to believe that the prevailing form of dependence there was also tribute relations. The scarcity of sources, however, does not allow us to study upon these polities in detail.

At the same time another variation of nomadic state can be found in antiquity. The central Asiatic nomads, the Parni, who conquered Iran from the Greeks, soon became sedentary. Their aristocracy merged with the old Iranian nobility into one class ruling both the agricultural and nomadic population. The social and economic relations within the country did not undergo any significant changes. The development of events in the Kushan empire was similar. (See Narain in this volume.)

In medieval times a typical state of the first pattern was the empire of the ancient Turks, based on tribute relations resulting from the conquest of a number of agricultural and nomadic tribes and peoples. But both the commoner Turks and the majority of their nobility remained nomadic as before. They only encouraged a resettlement of their lands by large groups of Sogdians and also by Chinese, who were engaged in agriculture, handicrafts, and commerce. As soon as the balance of forces changed, the state of the ancient Turks collapsed.

Khazaria was also based on tribute relations and partly on customs duties which it could collect due to its geographic position and exceptionally profitable commercial situation. But the process of sedentarization there was considerably advanced (Pletneva 1967:181ff). Khazaria was clearly tending toward a sedentary state, but military defeats and intrusions of new masses of nomads into eastern Europe interrupted this development.

The Kara-Khitais, according to Ibn al-Asir, 'oppressed their peoples heavily' after the conquest of eastern Turkistan and Maveran-Nahr, but limited themselves mostly to the tribute forms of exploitation and kept their nomadic way of life outside these countries. 'They appoint a governor in every town who provides them with money and they live in yurts according to their own customs' (Materialy 1973:73).

The Uighur state was initially based on tribute relations, but the defeat of the Uighurs by the Kirghiz and their forced migration to eastern Turkistan finally produced a sedentary state in the early thirteenth century, though it retained a considerable nomadic element. Internal forms of dependence took the leading role in this state.

Another path of development can be seen in the states of the Qarakhanid Turks, the Seljuk, and others. The Qarakhanid conquest did not cause any principal changes in the social structure of central Asian society. But though it was not accompanied by a single mass migration of nomads, and one can only trace a gradual infiltration of separate groups into the Maveran-Nahr, nevertheless, the new state was a state of the second type from the very beginning. From the point of view of sedentary society, it would be more correct to speak not about a new state, but of a change of dynasty, or a change of frontiers, or a change in the composition of the ruling class, which was now supplemented by the Turkish military nomadic aristocracy. Very soon, however, the latter started to approximate the local land-holding nobility closely connected with the government machine. Some Turks of noble origin were eager to obtain land and other holdings, and the Oarakhanid khans took care of the economic properties of cities and took measures to prevent nomads overrunning agriculturalists. The contradictions in the ruling class lost ethnic, economic, and cultural specificity. Nomadic aristocrats, disappointed by the khans' orientation toward urban trade and handicraft strata tried to ally with the clergy, though it too was urban (Belenitskii, Bentovich Bol'shakov 1973: 348-349).

After their migrations and the conquest of Iran and Asia Minor, the Oghuz nomads found themselves in another ecological zone, amidst an agricultural population with a firmly established social and political order as well as a millennia-long tradition of living in a state. The Seljuks did not and could not change the local ways of life, but only slightly modified them. For example, the institution of *ikta* became more widespread than under the Buids, because it enabled the Seljuk nobility to collect taxes from the peasantry without immediately giving up their nomadic way of life.

The Seljuk and later the Turkish sultans and their nobility, kept many traditions of the nomadic way of life for a long time. But they were ruling states whose socioeconomic relations, and to a large degree even political organization, were determined not by nomads, but by the agricultural and urban dwellers. Reposing upon a new social base they increased the exploitation of the nomadic commoners, who were absorbed into the sphere of social relations prevalent in the countries of conquest.

Due to their fear of the disruptive and restive nomadic element in their states, the Seljuk and the Turkish sultans consciously divided, territorially dismembered and scattered nomadic tribes, turning them into common dependent subjects, sending them to the border areas, and favoring their sedentarization. As a result, the nomads in the states conquered by their ancestors became one of the lowest strata of the population. The word 'Turk' in the sense of nomad, once spoken with pride or fear, became almost contemptible, a synonym for a plebeian. Ironically it was often used with scorn by those Turks, who had lost their connections with nomadism (Gordlevskii 1960; Bartol'd 1963b:372; Agadzhanov 1969: 46-48; 1973: 97-99). The dynasty was connected with nomadic strata by its origins, but social development was soon determined, not by nomadic but by sedentary elements, when the latter had recovered from the shock of conquest.

Soviet authors have noted that under Genghis Khan and his successors there were many disputes among various groups of Mongol nobility on the problem of methods of exploitation of the conquered sedentary population, and on the question of which one of the two patterns of nomadic state the conquerors should adopt. The struggle was over the issue of whether this exploitation should maintain its rapacious but in essence contributory and tribute forms, or become more regular and institutionalized. Consciously or unconsciously, the issues at stake were whether the nomadic aristocracy should assimilate to the ruling class of the conquered countries, or remain a hostile conqueror relying only upon military force, and whether it should favor sedentarization and rapprochement with the conquered population, or oppose it.

Until the Mongol empire disintegrated, it basically remained a state of the first type, i.e., an early state. Though the nomads had enlarged their pastures at the expense of certain agricultural areas, nevertheless they did not directly intervene in the life of the conquered. The collection of taxes and administration of sedentary territories were in the hands of the local nobility. External expansion was still going on in this period. The cessation of conquest coincided, and not quite accidentally, with the beginning

of the disintegration of the empire. When it was divided into separate states, development in each of them displayed its own peculiar features. But despite the specificity, one finds one of the two general tendencies everywhere, though marked by different degrees of consistency and success.

The first type of state survived for the longest period and in the purest form in the Golden Horde, with its strict geographical division between nomads and agriculturalists. Only during the first years immediately after the conquest of the Russian princedoms did the Mongols intervene directly in the affairs of government, physically destroying the most powerful and independent princes, organizing population censuses, establishing a system of taxation, and sending to the Russian cities their specially appointed officials, baskaks, with military detachments. But later the rulers of the Golden Horde were interested only in a regular flow of tribute and in the maintenance of their supreme power over the Russian princedoms, or in preventing one of them from growing dangerously strong. In the fourteenth century Russian princes frequented the Horde, delivering their tribute and intriguing against each other. Along with strengthening the Moscow princedom, the princes were eager to become the sole representatives of all other princes before the khans of the Golden Horde, but their personal visits to the Horde at that time became more and more infrequent.

The Mongol state in Iran also emerged initially as a state of the first type. The main mass of nomads did not shift to a sedentary life because the position of a nomad warrior was far better than that of a tiller of the soil. But contrary to the situation in eastern Europe, they roamed directly among the sedentary population, and the state of the 'Ill khans could not do without a functioning government machine, in which most of the officials were Iranians. From the very beginning, therefore, there was a combination of Mongol early state institutions with the highly developed traditions of sedentary Iranian society. The reforms of Ghazan Khan and his minister Rashid el-Din, the latter being another Yehlü Ch'uts'ai, did not result in a considerable sedentarization of the nomads, but signified a definite growth in the political importance of the local nobility and especially of the bureaucracy.

The nomadic nobility and even the rank and file warriors did not give up all the old traditions, but they became holders of ikta and had 'a passionate desire' to possess land and 'to engage in agriculture' (Rashid el-Din 1946: 60). Thus they adapted to the changed situation when conquests ceased and could no longer be the source of profits. It is worth mentioning that after the collapse of the state of the Hulaguds, the Chobanid reaction, which tried to eliminate the local sedentary nobility, was shortlived. They were succeeded by the Jelairids, who tended to govern within the framework of Ghazan Khan's policies (Petrushevskii 1960: 29). The history of the Mongol states in central Asia demonstrates how under corresponding conditions a state created by nomads may shift from the first pattern of development to the second one and vice versa. At the kurultay of 1269 on the Talas River, when the creation of the separate Mongol state in Turkistan was formally recognized, the right of every Gengizid to a share of the profits from the exploitation of sedentary areas was confirmed. At the same time it was decided not to collect taxes single handedly, to live in mountains and steppes, and not to let herds roam in tilled lands. But by the middle of fourteenth century, the Mongol state in Turkistan was divided in two -Maveran-Nahr and Mogulistan.

From the second half of the fourteenth century some khans in Maveran-Nahr started to try to get a foothold in sedentary areas together with many noble nomads, and this nobility became directly engaged in the administration of rural and urban territories. They were followed in Maveran-Nahr by part of the rank and file nomads who constituted the core of the army. But the rest continued to stick to nomadism and regarded the new way of life negatively (Bartol'd 1963a: 153; 1963b: 262-265). Nevertheless, the second pattern in Maveran-Nahr tended to prevail and was finally established under the Timurids.

On the contrary, in Mogulistan where the agricultural base was weak and unreliable from the very start, attempts by several khans to follow the Maveran-Nahr example were doomed to fail. The khans of Mogulistan failed to seize sufficiently large sedentary territories, and even less, to create a significant rural and urban center of attraction inside their own society. In the second half of the fifteenth century when Junus Khan ascended the throne after another round of disturbances, 'the Mogul people and emirs demanded a promise from the khan that he would never again compel them to live in cities and settled civilized places, because

this was the reason for disturbances among the Moguls and their anger against the khan' (Materialy 1969: 200-201). At that time Mogulistan was rapidly moving toward collapse, and it is interesting that at the end of the fifteenth century, the remaining power of the Mogul khans spread not to nomadic, but mainly to a few agricultural areas.

More variations in the development of states created by nomads can be viewed in China. In 1230 some representatives of the Mongol nomadic aristocracy insisted on eliminating the population of northern China and turning the lands into pastures. Ogedei did not agree and Kublai, in the time of the conquest of southern China, preferred to avoid unnecessary casualties. transferring the capital from Karakorum to China and founding the Yüan state, he made a step towards the second pattern of nomadic state. At the same time, however, the unity of Mongol society was disrupted geographically. A split grew between various groups of the Mongol aristocracy, whose interests now differed greatly. Those remaining in the steppes were unhappy to see that the lion's share of profits from conquered China was concentrated in China itself among the successors of Genghis Khan who had betrayed his command and their followers. This explains the rebelliousness of the steppe Mongols.

The Yüan state did not reckon too much with ecological demands, because south of the Great Wall there lay an ancient zone of irrigated agriculture, and the nomads, except those who were taken into the army, went on living mostly separately from the agriculturalists. Nevertheless, instead of traditional forms of tribute dependence the Mongols in China preferred direct rule. The new dynasty, however, could not do without the Chinese state machine which kept its previous structure with minor changes, and without Chinese officials, though the Mongols understood how dangerous it was to rely on them completely and did not want to merge with the old Chinese ruling class.

The population of the Yüan empire was divided into four categories enjoying different rights: the Mongols; migrants from the countries west of China; the aborigines of northern China; and the aborigines of southern China. The Mongol aristocracy grabbed vast landholdings mostly situated in northern China. In southern China the large Chinese landholdings prevailed.

Thus, the policy of the new dynasty was inconsistent and

satisfied almost nobody. Moreover, the rank and file Mongols suffered under a heavy burden of military and garrison services in spite of government attempts to support them materially, and their condition was often poor. The fall of Yüan was inevitable. The subsequent state formations which emerged in the steppes of Mongolia up to modern times were only of an early type.

These examples seem sufficient to outline the main tendencies of the origin and development of the state among the nomads of the Eurasian steppes. To cross the boundary dividing an early state from a more developed one, the nomadic society had to be integrated with the sedentary agricultural and urban society. But in the course of this long and painful process, the state created by nomads was turned into a state with an agricultural and urban base.

For almost three millennia there were two main patterns of nomadic state in the Eurasian steppes and adjacent areas. Naturally, individual states, possessed their own individual traits due to particular conditions of origin, the specificity of structures and historical fates. There never was complete uniformity. But as a whole, the development of the nomadic state oscillated between the two patterns described, though a shift from the first to the second was more frequent than the reverse. Development according to the second pattern, however, often failed to reach its logical end, as well. This, and many other reasons, may explain both the reversibility of social and political processes among nomads, and the reversible and transient nature of their states.

NOTES

- The Middle East is understood here as the territory of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.
- The question 'what is the early state?' may naturally arise. A recently
 published volume of papers, including mine (Khazanov 1978b), specially
 devoted to this problem, enables me to devote particular attention to it
 here (Claessen and Skalník 1978).
- 3. I deliberately avoid a more precise definition of these relations. A discussion on such problems as the Asiatic mode of production, the broad and the narrow concept of feudalism, the character of Chinese or Islamic society would lead me too far from the topic of this chapter. I want only to emphasize that I am strongly opposed to the concept of nomadic feudalism. No matter whether it is thought to have a political or a

socioeconomic meaning, to be a purely European or a universal phenomenon, the fact is that one cannot trace any feudal relations in the nomadic societies of ancient or medieval times.

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9 The Legitimation of Early Inchoate States

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent literature on the origin and social organization of early states by anthropologists (Claessen and Skalník 1978; Fried 1967; Cohen and Service 1978; Service 1975; Carneiro 1970; Cohen 1969; Adams 1966) little attention has been given to the political legitimacy of early states. As I have suggested elsewhere (Kurtz 1978), the legitimacy of the authority and political structures of early states was essential for their survival and their legitimation is an exorable and integral part of the process of early state development. The basic premise of this paper is that states have to attain legitimacy if they are to rule by means other than naked force and long survive the tests of history.

In this paper I attempt to explain the process of legitimation by demonstrating how three early states attempted to attain it: the Aztecs of Mexico, the Incas of Peru, and early nineteenth-century Buganda in Africa. Among the many similarities they share, two features that are important for this analysis render them especially comparable: formation of the state based upon a process of incorporation and an inchoate state organization that is a consequence of early state formation. A necessary first step is to introduce the concepts that are critical to this paper.

2. CONCEPTS

While a state functionally is inseparable from its nation, analytically they are separate entities. This distinction is important for understanding the legitimation process. The state can be perceived as both an abstraction and concrete reality. For example, Krader argues that 'the state is, in its abstract meaning, the principle of organization . . . of society; concretely it is the organization itself' (1978:94). In order to avoid reifying the state as abstraction, I conceive of that concrete form of the state not as the organization of society, but as a systematic organization of roles nested in permanent political offices, the actors of which represent a ruling class that makes decisions, establishes policy, and implements strategies on behalf of a subordinate population and to gain political ends. More formally, the state refers to a set of centralized bureaucracies that is staffed by political and administrative functionaries over which presides a single office that is rarely occupied by more than one individual. The person who occupies that office is the central authority over the nation and the major actor in national and state affairs and rituals. The political offices of the state differ from political roles and offices in stateless societies by the centralization in the office of head of state of three sociopolitical functions: management of the revenue, execution of the laws, and command of the military forces (Gibbon 1906; Polanyi 1966; Cohen 1969). These functions reflect the centralization of authority, power, and decision making that fundamentally distinguish the state from stateless political structures.

The concept of nation, on the other hand, approximates Krader's (1978:94) organization of society. A nation refers to a class-structured society that occupies many communities of different sizes which are marked by varying degrees of institutional and structural complexity within a more or less clearly demarcated territory (cf. Cohen 1969). One class clearly is economically and politically dominant and members of that class fill state offices. The subordinate population is that over which state functionaries attempt to exert control and from which they attempt to derive support and allegiance, the foundations of legitimacy.

Legitimacy rests upon the direct and indirect support that a nation's population provides its leadership and political structures (Swartz, Turner, and Tuden 1966). State functionaries perceive legitimacy as desirable because it is synonymous with social and political stability (Parsons 1969; Eckstein 1964; Lipset 1963). Stability ultimately is based upon the mutual compliance of both state functionaries and the nation's population to a reciprocal exchange of real and symbolic values, obligations, and services. However, legitimacy may accrue to other organizations and levels in the nation rather than to the state (Easton 1965). In early states the support and allegiance which the nation's population renders to diverse internal structures is due to a common pattern in their formation.

The formation of most early states involved the incorporation by a dominant society of adjacent societies into a single socio-political entity (Cohen 1969). Although the concept and process of incorporation presumes a reduction in the boundaries which separate social categories and the emergence of a unified nation (Cohen and Middleton 1970), the formation of early states was marked by the existence of categories of the population which continue to provide allegiance and support to regional and local social, political, religious, and other structures rather than to the state. Legitimacy is difficult for a state to attain because of national heterogeneity (Bendix 1964); state inchoateness is, in large measure, a product of national heterogeneity.

Claessen and Skalník (1978) recently have established a taxonomy which categorizes early states as inchoate, typical, and transitional in terms of their degree of development toward a full-blown, mature state. They perceive maturity as the reduction of the role of kinship in the political field and the integration of increasingly specialized social institutions into the state sphere of activity. Although they categorize the Inca as typical and the Aztecs as transitional (Buganda is not in their sample, but clearly fits their model of the typical early state), I conceive of these three states as similarly inchoate. The different interpretation of inchoateness between myself and Claessen and Skalník is slightly more than semantic.

I conceive of inchoateness in a legal sense, as a condition in which state functionaries are not vested with sufficient authority and power to make binding decisions concerning the affairs of the population and enforce them (see Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged,

1963: 1142). Inchoateness, based upon a lack of legally vested authority, triggers the codification of law by heads of early states, a critical aspect of the legitimation process. But it is one thing to codify laws; it is quite another to possess the power to enforce them. In early states, despite the existence of codified laws, a variety of local-level structures, political and otherwise, may well be more fully vested with authority than state offices because of the allegiance and support their followers accord them.

Without necessarily contradicting the point of view presented by Claessen and Skalník (1978), it may be argued that the differentiation and specialization of institutions that accompanied the development of early states resulted on the one hand in a reduction of archaic institutions but, on the other hand, gave rise to alternative social categories, such as slaves, personal interest groups, merchants, secret societies, and other socially bounded groups which adhered to nonstate ideologies and gave primary allegiance to local-level structures instead of the state. Such groups may be either in fact or perceived by state functionaries as antagonistic to state authority and power and a threat to the right of the state to rule. In this sense it is permissible to conceive of early states as paranoid organizations, all of which were to some extent inchoate. The degree of inchoateness varies due to historical circumstances. Clearly, the states in this sample are marked by varying degrees of institutional specialization and kinship But the behavior of the actors who occupy the prominence. offices of state suggests a degree of real or imagined antagonism at the local level sufficient to render remarkably isomorphic the process by which they attempt to legitimate state authority and structures.

3. LEGITIMACY: WORKING HYPOTHESIS

In beginning to explain the process of legitimation I refer to an hypothesis suggested by others. It argues that the centralization of political authority depends upon control and allocation of economic resources by political leaders and that the social and cultural change which accompanies legitimacy is in large measure the result of political leaders pursuing public and private goals (Fried 1967; Cohen 1969; Adams 1966; Orans 1966; Bailey 1969).

Elsewhere I have pointed out (Kurtz 1979) that the implication of this hypothesis for the legitimacy of political authority has not received the attention it deserves, for legitimation is a process that involves the intrusion of state personnel and values into the economic and social affairs of the nation in order to effect changes that create support for its authority structure. Critical to the process is the creation of a new socioeconomic order.

State functionaries must acquire the means to carry out policy and secure the offices they hold. In early states this entails reducing local level antagonisms to state authority, controlling the leadership of critical social institutions, and establishing policy to motivate production in order to ensure a supply of goods above per capita levels of necessity. The surpluses then are mobilized in structures coordinated by state bureaucracies and deployed to accomplish state political ends. Control and deployment of gross surpluses subsidizes state influence over other national institutions; state functionaries may either provide or withhold support from In effect state bureaucracies extend control over the maintenance of social order within the nation and enforcement of conformity to the authoritarian values which state functionaries are allocating among the population, the focus of which is the virtue of work, sacrifice, and increased productivity. Strategic deployment of critical resources by state officials permits them to acquire control of additional human, material, informational, and ideological resources, each a basis of power, to subsidize further their activities (Fried 1967; Claessen and Skalník 1978; Adams 1966).

Policies in support of these activities are not accomplished easily. The early state is an amalgam of structural oppositions. On the one hand exists the state, its functionaries, bureaucratic apparatus, central authority, and embryonic economic, religious, military, legal, educational, and other support structures. On the other hand there is a subordinate population that is embedded in traditional structures and adhers to traditional values. On the peripheries of state power the population continues to engage in activities which contradict state goals: self-help in resolving disputes, participation in kin-based military units, support of local political officials, propitiation of local deities, and so forth. Once the initial threshhold of statehood is attained, state functionaries, confronted with national heterogeneity, seek to subvert local

sources of authority and shift the allegiance and support of the population to the structure and values they are attempting to establish. Since social institutions provide the fulcrum at which the state and local levels articulate, state functionaries attempt to acquire control of these institutions and mobilize them in the service of their legitimacy. State officials extend their control over such matters as tax collection, maintenance of order, production of strategic commodities, expansion and development of more efficient energy sources, military service, education of the young, and the like. At the same time they attempt to convince the population that their control over the nation and its economy is on its behalf. The actions of state officials in such matters as road construction, redistribution, reward for state service, and securing national boundaries against external threats expands their power and influence and, by extension, engages the population in reciprocal duties and obligations.

The support of the population is critical for the state. Without it state functionaries are reduced to managing affairs through barter and all that implies. Legitimation, most simply, is the process by which the office of head of state and the state bureaucracy acquires support, either directly or indirectly through acquiescence. The success of state structures and authority in obtaining the allegiance of the population and reducing antagonisms to them is a gauge of their legitimacy.

4. LEGITIMATION: A MODEL


The attainment of legitimacy by state functionaries sufficient to survive without the blatant use or threat of force, insufficient explanations for state legitimacy, is a protracted process. It entails generally the creation by state officials of a new ideology and value system and the mobilization of national institutions and the population in the service of their survival. The following model demonstrates the activities in which the functionaries of early states engage upon assuming authority in order to establish their right to rule. The model entails five overlapping state goals: the establishment of social distance between rulers and ruled, the validation of state authority, the consolidation of state power, the socialization of the population regarding the new order the rulers

are creating, and the restructuring of the nation's economy. Each goal is comprised of a set of nominal categories which depict the activities in which the rulers engage in pursuit of that goal (see Figures 1 to 5). It is an insidious process. The state must be at once both feared and loved. Its long term survival depends in large measure upon the skill by which its central authorities use the power at hand to mollify the population sufficiently to reduce its antagonism to their rule.

The process is not linear; that is the goal sets which comprise the model are merely the approximations of the reality of a complicated process that cannot be presented in more detail here due to space restrictions. Suffice it to say that state functionaries do not fulfill one goal set before embarking on another. They move when and where they can, ideally triggering a positive feedback that continually generates support. In early states the time period covered by the process is an intangible. Not all states proceed toward legitimacy at the same rate. Not all are equally successful. This depends upon the degree and kind of heterogeneity the nation manifests. Ideally, rulers prefer to attain legitimacy quickly. Despite the multipronged efforts they make toward this goal the process is slow, often plodding, and few states are ever completely legitimate. ¹

Expand social distance

- A. Establish patterns of deference-demeanor
- B. Impose sumptuary laws
- C. Claim divinity-infallibility



X = item exists; NI = no information, item may exist; blank = item does not exist.

Figure 1. Goal set one: Imperatives at the emergence of statehood

Once the independent state is established its functionaries attempt to distinguish themselves from the population by expanding the social distance between it and themselves. A sharp, symbolic line is drawn regarding behavior and function which separates the high-ranking functionaries of the state, including nobility, from the population at large (Cohen 1969; Lenski 1966;

Kuper 1972).

The establishment of social distance between rulers and ruled serves different functions. It firms up the class structure of the society. It establishes an aura and mystique for the authority, respect, and obedience which state functionaries demand (Cohen 1969; Lenski 1966). It symbolizes the right of a few to rule many. And, finally, expanded social distance reduces conflict between rulers and ruled which familiarity is likely to breed (Bendix 1964).

This is a delicate process. Movement too far from the population creates a credibility crisis for the state, for the population may lose identity with it. Moving too close reduces the ability of the rulers to govern since they are unlikely to be able to meet all expectations that such familiarity is likely to breed. Social distance is a calculated risk by which state functionaries attempt to endow their existence with the right to exercise authority in order to gain the compliance of the population.

Several techniques are used by the rulers to expand social distance. Patterns of deference and demeanor are established which regulate how the polity may relate to the rulers. These are extreme in early states and entail such behavior as groveling on the ground before the king of Buganda (Speke 1969; Stanley 1969; Richards 1964), or averting one's eyes so as not to look upon the person of the Aztec or Inca emperor (Duran 1964; Rowe 1963).

Sumptuary laws enforce distinctions between rulers and ruled. In an early state, such as Buganda, where material wealth was not abundant, sumptuary laws may reflect symbolic rights; only the king could sit on a stool (Speke 1969; Roscoe 1966). It might be that the extreme patterns of deference and demeanor that were demanded in Buganda compensated for the lack of material goods upon which sumptuary distinctions are most commonly based (Showman 1977). In wealthier nations, sumptuary laws commonly proscribe the use of various goods, clothing, emoluments of prestige, titles and the like by commoners. On occasion they may restrict affective behavior; only Inca nobility could engage in polygyny, and the Inca himself was permitted and required to engage in full-sister marriage, a practice prohibited to everyone else (Rowe 1963; Brundage 1963, 1967; Moore 1958).

In addition to these activities, which are usually enacted early in the career of a state, others gradually develop as state power and institutional development permits which serve to enhance social distance. Political leaders symbolize state authority by creating divine, sacred, or some other numinous quality for the head of state. The Inca, Aztec, and Buganda kings were deified, either in life or after death (Sahagun 1969; Caso 1958, 1963; Rowe 1963; Brundage 1963, 1967; Roscoe 1966; Kiwanuka 1971). The rulers also enforce class privileges differently before the law, and different educational systems and curricula for elites and commoners are established. These represent long-term legitimating strategies by state functionaries, and their impact is perhaps best understood in the context of the consolidation of state power.

Validate Central Authority Structure	Aztec	Inca	Buganda
A. Establish state religion	х	x	x
a. State deities	x	x	x
1. Obligatory veneration	x	x	x
b. State priesthood	x	x	x
c. State values-ideology	х	x	NI
d. State myth and legend	x_	x	x
e. State ritual and ceremony for:			
1. Investiture in office	х	x	x
2. Veneration of state	x	x	NI
3. Sacrifice (human, etc.)	х	х	х
B. Propaganda	x	NI	NI
C. Establish celibacy	x	х	x

X = item exists; NI = no information, item may exist; blank = item does not exist.

Figure 2. Goal set two: Imperatives at emergence of statehood

It may be hypothesized that the degree of social integration of a society is reflected in the organization of its pantheon and religious institutions (Durkheim 1954). Inchoate states are likely

to be marked by religious heterogeneity; the Aztecs, Inca, and Buganda were polytheistic, and local sects may be antagonistic to state authority. Rulers of inchoate states take steps to reduce or neutralize antagonistic religions. It is difficult to assess the efficacy of their moves. But religious heterogeneity is a powerful basis for national heterogeneity, since religion is a major fountainhead for the validating ideologies of political structures. Rulers of inchoate states have to reduce religious heterogeneity and procure their own validating ideologies for the values which they are trying to inculcate in the polity. In early states this is accomplished through religion. State religions validate the authority and power of the ruling class and its right to act.

State leaders embark upon a variety of dramatic activities designed to transform the societies which comprise the nation into a functioning whole. They attempt to develop a normative set of values that provide a guide and direction for state activities and an ideology that justifies these activities. They attempt to convey these to the population in order to acquire their support or acquiescence to the changes they set into motion.

The primary source of the values and validating ideology for an inchoate state is its religious institutions. In early states a validating ideology is pursued through the establishment of a state religion. The innovation of a state religion is one of the more dramatic changes which the early state undertakes. It involves the creation of a state priesthood, pantheon, rituals and ceremonies, the elucidation of state values and ideologies out of religious dogma, and the innovation of myth and legend. Each serves to validate the existence of the state and extoll its virtues.

The development of a state religion is a crystalization of the religious activities which transpire within stateless societies. Compared to relatively centralized stateless societies, religious structures in early states are differentiated and specialized more clearly. One trait which continues in the transition from stateless societies that are immediately preadaptive to the state is the deification of the head of state and his importance as central actor in state religion and ritual.

The state religion generates a sacred quality which imbues the state structure with sanctity. Heroes are created, legendary and real, who embody state values. Myths and legends are disseminated which extoll their virtues in support of state values and ideology.

State priests engage in worship of state deities and ritual, ceremony, and sacrifice on behalf of the state. The heads of state are provided with divine direction. God—or the gods—is on the side of the state and nation against their enemies, and public activities—war, peace, trade, education, marriage, and the like—are executed in the name of the gods.

Values and ideology propounded by state functionaries are disseminated through propaganda and a variety of media—education, state ritual and ceremony, markets, and so forth. Celibacy, secular and/or religious, serves a real and symbolic function in validating the state. Celibacy is a symbolic expression by a few persons of their willingness to disenfranchise themselves from mundane society. In many instances it is sponsored by the state; it is an expression of an individual's total commitment to the state and its religion, a symbol of the ultimate sacrifice an individual can make for God and country (cf. Cohen 1969).

One major problem that leaders of early states confront is that many of the societies which are welded into the nation also venerate their own deities. In early states the deities of other societies are incorporated into the state pantheon. The positive impact of such incorporation is to force these societies through their gods to identify with the state. The negative value is that it augments state religious polytheism. Aztec priests, for example, were attempting to reduce state polytheism and elevate the war god, Huitzilopochtli, to a preeminent place in the state religion (Caso 1937; Nicholson 1971; Bray 1968).

As noted, it is difficult to gauge the success of state functionaries in reducing national inchoateness by altering the degree of national religious heterogeneity. While over the long haul perceptible changes in religious traditions may be observed as a state matures, at the period when a state is beginning its career it seems rather to neutralize the influence of nonstate religions on the polity and to develop accords with them that are mutually accommodating. Perhaps the best ally state functionaries have in confrontation with nonstate religious sects is that most religions are not innovators of social change; they are followers of political policy and strategy. Only militant political religions are innovators of change, and they usually are an integral part of an expanding state system. Once the state has matured religion tends to lose its dynamic quality and becomes part of the validating mechanisms for the

existing state. Yet, state functionaries fear and need religion for the same reason. It is a source of mystical power which can have a volatile effect upon political activity through the support it can provide emerging political systems and their values and ideologies.

Consolidate power

A. Legally	Aztec	Inca	Buganda
a. Establish and codify laws	x	X	
 Structures class hierarchy 	x	X	
2. Differential treatment before law	x	X	
b. Establish legal institutions			
1. Courts	<u>x</u>	_ x	x
2. Judges	x	X	NI
3. Special pleaders	NI	NI	NI
4. Jails	x	X	NI
c. Enforce conformity to state values	x	X	x
1. Supersede local laws	x	_x_	
d. Regulate marriage and divorce	\mathbf{x}	X	
B. Politically			
a. Maintain social order	x	x	x
 b. Infiltrate local level – replace leaders 	X	X	x
c. Mix ethnic groups - isolate threats	x	x	x
d. Establish central military	x	X	x
1. Conscription	x	X	x
e. Claim eminent domain	x	X	x
C. Educationally			,
a. Establish schools	x	X	
b. Differential education for classes	X	X]
D. Religiously			
 a. Impose state religious personnel on local level 	x	x	x
b. Obligatory veneration of state deities	x	X	<u>x</u>

X = item exists; NI = no information, item may exist; blank = item does not exist.

Figure 3. Goal set three: Imperatives at emergence of statehood

In order to consolidate and ensure their authority and power, rulers of early states take direct and pragmatic measures to reduce internal heterogeneity. State functionaries spread a web of control over the society through state-directed legal, political, educational, and religious activities. Through institutions which state functionaries develop or elaborate to carry out these activities, they attempt to infuse local-level social structures with state values and ideology and to infiltrate them with state personnel.

The legitimation of the authority of early states is in large measure a legal process. Law provides the fulcrum upon which takes place the shift from tradition as the basis for legitimacy, to support for a regime enforced by prescribed expectations of behavior. Law guarantees that nonconformist, antisocial behavior will be met by sanctions aimed at compelling conformity or punishing disobedience (Weber 1962).

Leaders of early states attempt to establish and codify laws, for this provides a clear mechanism by which they acquire the right to apply force in order to gain conformity to state goals and values. Law also establishes a new set of social norms that serve to direct how people act. Through the codification of laws citizenship is defined and the social class hierarchy is formally structured, for the laws provide for differential treatment of citizens and noncitizens and members of different classes.

Codified laws permit state functionaries to penetrate one area of potential antagonism by regulating marriage and divorce. Such regulations impose restrictions on individual affective behavior and extend control over local kin groups, such as lineages or clans. Control over marriage and divorce serves to stabilize the nuclear family as the fundamental unit of production and to undercut extended consanguineal groups, their persistence, ability to expand, enter into alliances, and so forth.

To support these changes, formal state institutions are established, such as courts and judges. Public law in which individuals or groups are tried for crimes against the state augment the private law of persons. Conformity is expected now to state norms, not to local traditions.

These state institutions are developed and used to penetrate local units. State courts and judicial functionaries infiltrate, even replace, locally based courts. Conformity to state values now is enforced by legal rules which are divinely sanctioned. With the

legally and religiously sanctioned right to act, state functionaries now enforce measures to maintain social order better. State personnel infiltrate local-level social and political organizations. Untrustworthy or suspect local headmen are replaced with state personnel who are charged with collecting taxes, maintaining order, reporting rebellions, and the like.

Moves are made against broad segments of the population. Ethnic groups may be mixed or dispersed in order to reduce their cohesiveness and any real or perceived threats they may present to the state. Some populations may be relocated forcibly. Groups which have significant power, such as international traders, and which state authorities either may need or not have sufficient power to control may be socially isolated, restricted to living or conducting business in certain prescribed areas, such as urban ghettoes or international ports of trade.

The state claims the right of eminent domain. It holds exclusive title to other lands and, perhaps, industries. The production from these estates is directly in the service of the state and its power. To enforce compliance with political goals, internal and external to the nation, the head of state establishes a centralized army based on conscription. The army can and does serve as an internal peacekeeping mechanism and enforcer of state goals. Conscription creates an impersonal military organization with allegiance to the state exclusively; it also serves to reduce local heterogeneity by socializing recruits and shifting their allegiance from local associations, such as lineages and age sets.

The primary goal of a state educational system is the creation of a citizen, not the inculcation of knowledge. State educational personnel, institutions, and curricula penetrate the local level and attempt to influence children at an impressionable age. The goal of a state educational system is to deflect the influence of family, kin and other groups in socializing the child and instead instill in the child state values and ideology. State directed education also provides for different education of children of elites and commoners. Children of elites receive an education that in addition to inculcating state values, trains them to participate in and manage the institutions that are critical to the state. Children of commoners are educated in such a way as to render them obedient citizens of the state.

The underpinnings of the consolidation of state authority and

power is the state religion. In addition to sanctifying state authority and structure, the state religion validates the activities which serve to consolidate state authority and power. Religious precepts infuse the state legal code and threaten divine retribution on nonconformists; they justify political activities, such as war, and actions designed to maintain internal order. The state religion may be an integral part of the state educational curricula, at least pointing the way to state values and ideology. In accomplishing these ends state religious personnel also penetrate the local level and oblige veneration of state deities, either exclusive of or in addition to veneration of local deities.

Political socialization is concerned with inculcating in the nation's citizens the values, ideology, and behavior which state leaders desire. It is the foundation of a state's legitimate authority and power. If socialization of the population were accomplished easily, other tactics to achieve legitimacy would not be necessary. The fact that socialization is not accomplished easily calls for a complex process that is broader in its manifestations than previously considered.

Different authors at different times have touched on various criteria by which political socialization is accomplished. Among topics discussed have been fear of punishment and war (Freud 1961; Ferrero 1945), complex social processes regarding how learning is accomplished (Nieburg 1969; Greenstein 1965), the social nature of human beings (Weber 1954; MacIver 1947), and a complex systemic process involving ideological, structural, and personal relations (Easton 1965). Socialization is indeed a complex process. As interpreted here it entails the complementary and contradictory practices of benevolence, information control, and terror.

Socialization directs the reciprocal exchange of goods, duties, and obligations between the state and population. It is the way state functionaries demonstrate what they can and will do for the citizen (benevolence), what the citizen should do for the state (information), and consequences for citizens who engage in non-conformist behavior (terror).

Benevolence. Wittfogel (1957) suggests that in despotic states, which approximate in form and function to inchoate states, any benevolence by state functionaries is designed explicitly to maintain the power and prosperity of the ruling class. Thus, he

Socialization

A. Benevolence	Aztec	Inca	Buganda
a. Welfare - redistribution	x	X	
b. Reward for state service	x	X	X
B. Information control			
a. Mandatory school attendance	x	x	
b. Rote learning in schools	x	NI	
c. Media for public announcements	x	NI	NI
d. National language - lingua franca	X	x	
C. Terror			
a. Legally-religiously enforced	x	x	x
b. Severe punishments for			
1. Sexual activities	x	x	_x_
2. Drunkenness	x	NI_	NI
3. Petty offenses	L X	X	x
c. Humiliation through			
 Capital punishment – public 	x	x	NI
2. Mass incarcerations	NI	_NI_	NI_
3. Mass slaughter	X	X	X
4. Torture	X	X	NI
5. Genocide	x	_ x	x
6. Human sacrifice	x	X	x
7. Joint liability	_ x	X	x
8. Hostages at court	x	X	x

X = item exists; NI = no information, item may exist; blank = item does not exist.

Figure 4. Goal set four: Imperatives at emergence of statehood

argues, state policies which outwardly appear to benefit the people actually cannot be considered benevolent.

Considerable evidence still suggests that leaders of inchoate states do engage in benevolent activities on behalf of the people. However, it is clear also that the motivation for benevolence by state leaders is not always altruistic. Benevolence functionally entails mutual obligations between rulers and citizens, and this reciprocity is a subtle aspect of the socialization process by which the allegiance of the citizen is shifted to the state.

'Welfare' programs represent one type of benevolence. In early inchoate states the term welfare may be a misnomer, for activities by state functionaries designed to benefit materially the population are not marked by the elaborate bureaucracy and funding policies of welfare programs in contemporary industrial nations. State benefits, such as food distribution during crises, serve to demonstrate the power of the state and implant in the citizen a sense of dependence upon it. Rewards to commoners for service to the state may be considered another form of welfare. Aztec emperors, for example, rewarded brave warriors with honorific titles and parcels of land. Such actions also served to remove persons from local centers of authority and allegiance and affiliate them with the state. In this context benevolence provides a subtle tactic by which the commitment of citizens to local level organizations is coopted.

Information. The control and dissemination of information is a critical political power resource. Control of information regarding such matters as state security, obligations of citizens to the state, tax policies, and so forth accrues to higher levels of administration in bureaucracies. Functionaries of inchoate states selectively disseminate information among the citizenry. It is aimed at inculcating in the citizen the new ideology and the authoritarian values the state authority is trying to develop in order to supplant those of local organizations. Leaders of inchoate states maintain firm control of information, and it is disseminated in diverse ways.

Communication was an important function of markets in Aztec society, for only in markets could so many people be contacted at any one time. Announcements and edicts regarding state matters were presented to the population in marketplaces. State and local courts convened there, and criminals were tried publicly.

Punishments were also public and most frequently administered in the marketplaces. Citizens often participated in dispensing justice to the condemned (Sahagun 1951; Kurtz 1974).

Schools are another institution by which information is conveyed. Mandatory public education is decreed and state officials prescribe the curriculum. The information that is disseminated serves to educate the youth regarding state values. Intellectual curiosity is not stimulated; rote learning is the norm, especially for commoners. Conformity to state values is the goal.

In some inchoate states a national language and, perhaps, a lingua franca are established. Certainly the diffusion of a national language among the population facilitates dissemination of information and is a powerful way of creating unity. Schools serve as vehicles to convey the national language to succeeding generations.

Communication of authoritarian values in the service of state legitimacy also may come through other channels, such as public trials and executions. These phenomena are discussed best in the context of the final mode of socialization by which legitimacy may be pursued—state terror.

Terror. State directed terror conveys a message to the citizenry regarding what may happen to the citizen who does not conform to authoritarian values and norms. Usually it is enforced legally and religiously, and, in the extreme, simply eliminates antagonists to the state. Although terror may be an aspect of the politics of any state, it is likely to exist either when the legitimacy of an established state is threatened or when a state is in a condition of extreme inchoateness. In these situations state functionaries demonstrate great concern with the behavior of the citizenry. Control and regulation of some areas of social activity which in stateless societies are the exclusive prerogative of kin groups, such as sexual activity and drunkenness, become of great concern, especially to the inchoate state.

One characteristic of state terror is a severity of punishment exceeding what would seem to be reasonable retribution in more legitimate states. The severity of punishment demonstrates to the people the power that the state has over the individual and local groups. Executions are likely to be public, often carried out in the marketplaces. Death is a common penalty for petty crimes, such as theft and drunkenness. Fornication and adultery also

are punishable by death (Cohen 1969).

Although theft is a serious offense in most societies and severe punishment, especially for recidivists, may be understandable, the concern the functionaries of inchoate states demonstrate over drunkenness and sexual activity is more difficult to explain. One possible explanation is that if state functionaries can control fundamental areas of the citizenry's affective behavior, they have made a giant stride toward control of other, less affective areas of its life.

Human sacrifices, mass slaughter, mass incarceration, and other extremes of institutionalized human debasement are part of an inchoate state's terrorism. However, citizens in good standing are offered only rarely as victims. Certainly a message is conveyed regarding the ultimate power of the state over the life and death of its citizens.

Leaders of inchoate states also may enforce a form of joint liability (Weber 1962; Cohen 1964) upon individuals whose behavior is sufficiently heinous to nullify their right to citizenship. Punishment for treason, aiding a traitor, drunkenness, and a few other offenses are not confined to the treacherous individual. The offender's kin also are subject to punishment.

Detaining at the royal court persons who might threaten the state is another means of ensuring loyalty and conformity. High ranking individuals or their kinsmen may be required to reside in the court part of the year. While the purpose of such service is not always clear one explanation is that the presence of nobility at court ensures the conformity, allegiance, and obedience of their kin and followers. The courtiers are, in a sense, hostages.

It should be noted that many aspects of state-directed terror often are more symbolic than real. Although the right to use terror by the leaders of inchoate states often is established in the legal code, to what extent the more coercive aspects of the law are enforced is not always clear, or even necessarily important. For example, there is little evidence in the chronicles of Aztec society that suggest that either the death penalty for adultery or joint liability was imposed frequently. It does seem to be important that the laws by which state functionaries attempt to regulate antisocial behavior are codified; they can be applied as the functionaries deem necessary.

Establish state economic policy Inca Buganda Aztec х A. Control energy х B. Regulate modes of production Х Х a. Claim eminent domain Х Х Х b. Regulate population movements Х Х Х х х C. Impose state corvee х х Х х D. Impose taxes, tributes E. Construction-maintenance of public works a. Taxation Х Х Х Х Х Х b. Corvee

X = item exists; NI = no information, item may exist; blank = item does not exist.

Х

Х

х

Figure 5. Goal set five: Imperatives at emergence of statehood

F. Regulate markets

Without a sound economic base the survival of early states is jeopardized. The process of legitimation serves covertly and overtly the establishment of an economic foundation upon which a state may build (Lipset 1963). One principal state goal is the control of labor, production, and energy (Adams 1966; Cohen 1969; Orans 1966). The creation of social distance, the validation of state authority, and the consolidation of power, and the socialization of the population are, I suggest, aimed ultimately at ensuring control of the ruling class over the economic sphere of the nation. The strategies by which state functionaries implement these sets of action will ensure, if reasonably successful, the survival of the state and its eventual legitimation.

State leaders quickly move to establish control over the economic sphere of the nation. Populations may be moved to promote production in new areas, or their movements may be restricted in order not to disrupt current levels of production. New potential sources of wealth may fall under centralized political control. The right of eminent domain is claimed by the state and extends control over potential production in the nation. Markets are regulated in terms of goods, prices, participation, supply, demand, and the like. Corvee labor is drafted for state projects, and taxes are imposed which subsidize these projects, as well as the life-style of the ruling class.

The king of Buganda controlled trade with outsiders and reserved certain resources for nobility. The Inca controlled mining, herding, agriculture, and craft activities. Both the Aztec and Inca emperors regulated markets and production and undertook technological innovations. Wars may be waged to expand and acquire additional wealth and tribute in order to sustain the economic foundation of the state.

Leaders of inchoate states not only need to establish this economic foundation, they need to justify it and their actions in creating it. Toward this end the religion provides an ideology and values regarding behavior in such matters.

As noted, the values leaders of early states attempt to instill stress production, sobriety, austerity, hard work, and the like. In contemporary capitalistic societies these values have been referred to as the Protestant ethic (Weber 1958). Recently it has been suggested that the values and beliefs of this ethic are not restricted to capitalistic society. Rather, they represent a more general principle, 'affective austerity' (Cohen 1969), a characteristic of states, especially in their early stages, and one that is established by state functionaries. Validation for the work ethic derives from the state religion and the values and ideology that its functionaries develop in support of the emerging political-economic system. The ultimate goal of this system is to generate gross deployable surpluses, some of which by necessity must be funneled to the population in the form of goods and services. The remainder, the bulk possibly, will be used to further state political and economic ends, nationally and internationally.

So long as state leaders serve reasonably well the needs and expectations of the majority of the population, the state will be reasonably legitimate. Economic wealth and its flow through the society is the primary means by which the population may adjudge the success of the state and whether or not it deserves support. Leaders of inchoate states must convince the population that the state is indispensable. Since not everyone in the nation will be

equally secure economically, the process described here is the hedge against rejection of the state by the population or powerful vested interests in the nation.

In sum, the process described here attempts to clarify how early inchoate states assure their survival by acquiring support of the population. Manicas was not far wrong in his assessment of legitimacy when he said, 'Today, as in times past, 'legitimacy' is a mystifying excuse for the domination of some by others' (1974: 81). In part the purpose of this paper is to render legitimacy less mystifying.²

NOTES

- Many of the nominal categories within each goal set were suggested by Y. A. Cohen. Others have been added by the author. Organization of the goal sets and interpretations of the data are the author's alone.
- 2. Neil Tappen, Edward Wellin, Henry Orenstein, Margaret Showman, Hubert King, Tom Cope, Jim Schuh and Elizabeth Wright commented on various aspects of this paper. The paper also benefited from criticism by participants in the conference on The Study of the State in New Delhi, India, December, 1978. Margaret Showman collected the data on the Inca and Buganda. Linda Dobrushken typed the manuscript. Thanks to all.

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Warfare and the Origin of the State: Another Formulation¹

HERBERT S. LEWIS

1. INTRODUCTION

The problem of the origins of the state has once again risen to prominence in world anthropology. It was long a topic of concern, of course, but the current efflorescence of works on the subject, certainly in American anthropology, is quite remarkable and testifies to a return of interest in evolution and history, as well as to communication among ethnologists, archeologists, and his-But the great flood of new works also threatens to overwhelm us with masses of data about states from all over the world and through the past five thousand years, with material on population, trade, war, classes, production systems, governmental types, on primary and secondary states, and so on. Nor is there any lack of approaches, of schools, national traditions, paradigms, or points of view distinguishing the archeologists, the ethnologists. the Marx-inspired. In the face of this profusion of approaches and data where is one to begin? How can something new and different be said on the subject, or how can one hope to compose the differences and produce a synthesis?

An assumption underlying this paper is that a single synthesis can neither encompass all the possible variations in state formation nor, more immediately, begin to satisfy anthropologists and others who approach the problem from the perspectives of many different schools/paradigms. The arguments which follow, therefore, are directed toward the recognition of a new paradigm for the study

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of state origins. While a few specific arguments are new, many others are old and make use of ideas and data already found elsewhere in the literature. What is wholly new, I believe, is the explicit recognition of a difference in approach to the material. I realize that this will probably not persuade those working within different paradigms, but it may at least clarify some differences of emphasis and straighten out the ranks of the contending approaches.²

2. ESSENTIALIST/STRUCTURAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL EVOLU-TION

The problem of the origins of states rose to prominence under the impetus of evolutionary thought in the nineteenth century. There were many contributors to the evolutionary paradigm (see Nisbet 1969 for the depth and implications of this tradition) and their joint heritage has left the subject of social and cultural evolution with numerous tacit and some explicit assumptions. These have often been tied to the assumptions of structural-functionalism, and together they form much of the background to the study of political evolution.

In general this paradigm implicitly assumes the unfolding of an evolutionary plan which is directional, purposeful, sequential, irreversible, and cumulative. It is also tied to a view of societies as organisms, with their own patterns of growth and development, analogous to the growth of biological organisms. Indeed, both the essentialist evolutionary model, based on the metaphor of growth, and the structural-functionalist one, based on the organic analogy, focus on total systems, and the manner in which they are perceived to grow from stage to stage, or, in some formulations, from type to type. As Randall Collins noted, '...the functionalist [essentialist] model has always been implicitly concerned with change as an analogue to growth. The appropriate category for describing such change is differentiation, the process of increasing the division of labor within the system' (or the division of classes; the increase of system hierarchy, or capacity, etc.) (Collins 1968: 45).

The essentialist/structuralist view not only gives primacy to the total system, it also tends to reify it, to make it the locus of

teleology, and to see the 'system' acting and institutions arising because of the needs of the system. (See Cohen 1978b: 70 for a recent example.) It focuses upon the society, the system, as the appropriate unit in evolutionary development, sometimes explicitly seeing it as the analogue to species on those occasions when a biological analogy is explicitly made. (For a fuller discussion of this see Greenfield and Strickon, forthcoming.)

This view of evolution and of society is very much with us, at least implicitly, and underlies much thinking about political evolution. In addition to the Marxian tradition, which makes great use of typologies and sequences and the metaphor of growth (need one mention Hegel here?), there are also the newer American archeological approaches which, despite the use of the concept of 'system', are still working in the framework of total systems, their differentiation, and the organic analogy. Other aspects of this nineteenth-century inheritance will be discussed below.

3. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION

In the past decade a new element has been introduced into anthropological analysis and discourse with the development of the approaches called actor-oriented, decision-making or transactional, and with their specific application to phenomena considered political, economic, and reflective of change. (Without going into bibliographical detail it is enough, perhaps, to cite the writings of Bailey, Barth, Cancian, Keesing, Howard, among many.) In the field of political anthropology this approach is exemplified by Bailey's Stratagems and Spoils (1969) and my own Leaders and Followers (1974). It is an approach which has been applied in political sociology, to some extent, in the writings of Reinhard Bendix and Randall Collins, and while it deals with conflict arising from the opposition of individuals and groups, it is closer to Weber than to Marx in stressing both ideal and material interests. It specifically denies any assumed, directional, immanent, evolutionary pattern.

As applied to the understanding of political phenomena, with implications for the study of the problem of the origins of states, this perspective is based on several underlying conceptions:

(1) The focus of interest is *not* upon total systems, societies,

but upon relevant political actors, the leaders, followings, groups or factions, which in fact act and compete in the political arena. While institutions and structures are not irrelevant, and culture forms part of the vital background to action, emphasis is put upon individuals and groups, and not upon abstract 'systems' and 'structures'.

- (2) Consonant with this emphasis is a consideration of actions, of the decisions of human beings who are presumed to be furthering their self-interests by these actions. They lead, organize, follow, compete, dominate, plan, and calculate in order to advance their interests, as they see them. We are assuming maximizing behavior here, although not claiming that we can predict in advance what values are being maximized (cf. Bendix and Lipset 1957: 82).
- (3) When new political patterns, new organizations, new political realities arise, these are the result of the interplay of human forces and actions, of competition, or battles won and lost, of new ideas which are put into practice and adopted. Evolution is manifest in history, and in the outcomes of struggles and inventions. The assumption that there is a 'general evolution' beyond specific evolution is rejected both for its sterility, and because it is naive in terms of modern evolutionary theory. The view I am advocating makes no assumption of immanence and denies the teleological implications of the essentialist/structuralist view of society.³

Finally, we recognize that there are parallel and repeated processes in political evolution, and that similar organizations, activities, conflicts, etc. develop repeatedly. I suggest, however, that cultural and environmental contexts are so variable, and the combinations of forces and circumstances and outcomes of struggles and changes so multifarious and uncertain as to render the search for typologies not only futile but unnecessarily constraining to our understanding. It leads us once again to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, for it is hard to keep typological thinking from slipping into essentialist/structuralist modes of analysis.

The remainder of this paper deals with several aspects of the ongoing discussion of the origins of states. Both the criticisms of ideas in the literature, and the more positive suggestions, have been formulated from this perspective on evolution and politics.

My aim is to discuss once again the significance of warfare in the foundation of states. But first it is necessary to take a critical look at several elements which are deeply rooted in the literature, and taken for granted, which seem to me to be both questionable and a constant hindrance to an appreciation of political evolution.

4. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

4.1. The Role of Kinship in Nonstate Societies

In 1861 Sir Henry Maine wrote,

The history of political ideas begins, in fact, with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions; nor is there any of those subversions of feeling, which we term emphatically revolutions, so startling and so complete as the change which is accomplished when some other principle—such as that, for instance of *local contiguity*—establishes itself for the first time as the basis of common political action. (Maine 1870: 124)

This inheritance of nineteenth-century evolutionary thought is still with us. Derived from Maine, Morgan and Fustel, reinforced by Engels and enshrined in the social anthropology of the 1930s and 1940s by Radcliffe-Brown and Fortes, these concepts are deeply engrained in discussions of political evolution and the state. Having failed to liberate itself from this ethnographic overstatement, the study of state origins is still saddled with the need to explain the 'liberation' of societies from the bonds of kin-based organization.

Over the past two decades it has become increasingly clear that political organization and action is very frequently based upon community, propinquity, and free association founded on self-interest. This is true even in societies with important descent groups, and it is certainly the case in those very numerous societies, known to us ethnographically, where unilineally-based kinship does not play much of a role in public affairs. Unfortunately an almost exclusive focus upon kinship, a concern for stability, and the search for abstract 'structures' led a generation of ethnologists to miss not only political action, dynamics, and processes, but also to undervalue the richness of organizational variety found

throughout the world in nonstate societies.

The literature on 'band level society' (to use this phrase for the sake of argument only) seems fairly clear: insofar as the Nambi-kwara, Inuit, !Kung, e.g., have leaders and engage in political action, these are based not on a reckoning of descent and kinship but on the acts of motivated individuals who create political careers for themselves by convincing their fellow self-interested humans that is is worthwhile for them to work together with, and even follow, their lead (Lévi-Strauss 1944; Pospisil 1964; Lewis 1974b).

When we consider societies of larger scale and greater complexity we find far more possibilities for the organization of action and This is contrary to Fried's assertion (1967: 121) that 'rank society...is dominated by the ideology of kinship...'. Certainly descent frequently plays vital roles in many different societies, but we also find many other cases where this is not so. J.A. Barnes (1962) explicitly argued the inappropriateness of the African 'segmentary system' model in the context of the New Guinea Highlands (incidentally, in some African cases as well). Oliver's account of Siuai leadership (1955) and other works on 'big-man' systems present an important variant (cf., for example, Barth 1959). But there are others as well, such as those nonstate systems which operate with a sort of 'republican' approach to political organization, through which neighbors, community members, elect leaders to fill particular offices for limited terms. (For more on this see Lewis 1974a, 1974b.)

When we cease looking for descent structures and instead observe how people organize to accomplish various aims, and concern ourselves with leaders, competition, and domination, we find a far more interesting and varied picture than we were led to believe existed.

4.2. Chiefdoms

Another product of the typological/evolutionary thought traceable from Morgan through Elman Service is the notion that certain fixed types of systems succeed each other in turn, and set the stage for the forms which will succeed them. Fried, for theoretical reasons of his own, has devastated the idea of the 'tribal' level of political evolution (1975), but little attention has been paid to the equally false notion of 'chiefdom' promulgated with such vigor by Service and accepted so widely by others. Rather like L.H. Morgan seizing upon Hawaiian kin terminology and basing a universal stage in the evolution of marriage and the family upon it, Service has taken the special Hawaiian and Polynesian chiefly organization, focused upon redistribution, and blown it up into a universal stage of political evolution with apparent unconcern for its rarity and particularity.

The chiefdom, redistributive or otherwise, as a state in political evolution is a misleading sort of a myth. Those who accept the myth are bound to try to give it form and substance, and argue over its characteristics as if 'it' had needs and existed. They ask such questions as, 'What is the nature of the ranking system of chiefdoms? What is the real function of chiefly redistribution?' Webster writes of the '...structural constraints on evolutionary potential inherent in well-developed ranked societies...' (1975: 465. Cf. the approach of Wright 1977: 381 ff.).

As cultural and political evolution have proceeded to date they seem to have increased possibilities and variations (much as biological evolution has). As we get to more complex systems we find that we are dealing with more people, more activities, more kinds of institutions, more occupations, and thus also more possible permutations and combinations (cf. Naroll 1956; Carneiro We also find greater scope for competition, domination, leadership, and rule. By labeling complex systems 'chiefdoms' we are confusing and concealing far more than we are revealing or organizing. To my knowledge there is no work which really tries to gather together material for a thorough empirically based study of complex nonstate polities. I am certain that a worldwide comparison of such systems would reveal great complexity and variety, probably more than among states and certainly more than among simpler societies. The possible combinations of descent organization, economic activity, exchange systems, leadership recruitment bases, environmental circumstances, and areal traditions (to name just a few possible areas of variation) are enormous. We gain nothing by ignoring all the possibilities and the actual wealth of difference and pretending that it all boils down to variations upon the Hawaiian theme.

4.3. The Causes of War⁵

In part under the influence of the Marxian notion that warfare is a product of class society and class contradictions rather than its cause, some writers have been constrained in their writings to search for a truly weighty reason for warfare, and population pressure has usually been seen as this serious cause of war (e.g., Carneiro 1970a; Fried 1967). While population pressure may be highly significant, the historical and ethnographic literature indicates that it takes little but the availability of useful plunder, wounded pride, desire for revenge, etc., to induce human beings to use force against their fellows. Perhaps warfare was rare among the hunters/foragers known to us historically (although Carol Ember's recent accounting suggests it was not [1978]), but this is certainly not the case when we look at middle range societies. whether in North America, South America, Polynesia, Melanesia, Micronesia, Africa, Europe, or Asia-and that takes in quite a range of societies. The mechanical stage-reckoning of some neoevolutionists has misled us into thinking that men fight seriously and for profit only at the point at which they are about to fall from grace and build class societies and the state (e.g., Fried 1961). But the record shows us something quite different. While most skirmishes do not lead to the development of states. neither should we ignore the fact that the records are full of the accounts of peoples going to war for fun and profit: for livestock and land, for glory and freedom, for honors and plunder. 6

Historical and ethnographic experience indicates that warfare of varying intensity and regularity increases with the growth of socio-economic complexity, above all when there are things to fight about! Certainly population growth and pressure may create conditions which lead to need, frustration, competition, anger, and war. But it also seems clear that men may be moved to fight by hopes of gain of all sorts. We have come to expect that pastoralists will raid and counterraid in order to replenish their herds and flocks, to protect or obtain new pasturage or water sources. But we also see evidence of groups organizing to control trade routes and markets, to take over the land of others, to extract tribute, to capture slaves, or on the other hand, to rebel against their oppressors. And it is clear that such encounters occur without

benefit of the state, despite Fried's suggestions to the contrary (Fried 1961, 1967).

5. WARFARE AND THE ORIGINS OF STATES

I am neither wise nor foolish enough to add my own attempt at a definition of 'state' to the hundreds currently to be found in the literature. I must, however, articulate what I believe is the heart of the search for 'state formation'. In my estimation, what is interesting and problematical about this topic is still contained in Rousseau's epigram: 'Man was born free, and everywhere he is in chains', or, in more prosaic terms closer to the mainstream of the current search for state origins, 'How did it happen that there arose, again and again, political systems through which some men, with their administrative staffs (henchmen) could control others, throughout a territory, on a regular basis?' We may argue about the characteristics of states, about such matters as the firmness of territorial control, or the problem of succession and fission, or whether the ruler may have the power of life and death and rule with the ultimate sanctions of force, or about the extent of class differentiation, but it seems to me that the essence of the debate, its heart, should be: how do some people get regular ruling control over others? The core problem is not merely whether there are rich and poor (for differences in wealth are to be found in many nonstate systems as well) but whether there are those, at the head of government who make rules, execute judgements, 'govern', raise armies and collect taxes, decide policies, and make their orders stick, at least among most of their subjects, if not always among their own immediate entourage or among the nobility. We should be concerned with a political phenomenon, and not in this case with a socioeconomic one;8 hence we should not be searching for 'classes' or 'urbanism' or (still less) for levels of decision making and information processing or energy utilization as some have seen fit to do recently (Flannery 1972; Wright 1977, 1978), but for the presence and/or absence of regularized rule. 9 (See Webb 1975: 157 ff. for similar emphasis.) With this in mind, the discussion which follows will be directed to the question of the origins of rulers and regularized rule.

Robert Carneiro states that 'only a coercive theory can account for the rise of the state' (1970a: 734). It would seem to require

some form of military action, or the threat of it, to bring about the rule of many by a few. Individuals and groups do not willingly 'relinguish their sovereignty in the absence of overriding external constraints' (Carneiro 1970a: 734). It might be foolish to insist dogmatically that every single case must involve force or military action (Cohen 1978a and Southall 1956 both claim cases where force was not involved) but the available record and a sense of process suggest that most cases do call for coercion.

When we speak of the origins of states we are dealing with the question of how some people get to be rulers: kings, viziers, sultans, ministers, lords, generals, governors—and how others become subjects, the ruled ones. These changes occur as the result of events, not just 'processes'. To discover how there came to be kings in Sumeria or among the Galla (Oromo) of southwestern Ethiopia we must look at the actors and the events which propelled these societies from nonstate to state circumstances. Who did what to whom, and under what circumstances? We must focus, wherever possible, upon leaders and their followers, groups and factions, and the competition among them. When we do, I believe we will (almost) always find warfare or armed force playing a significant role.

Carneiro (1970a: 734) continues:

Yet, though warfare is surely a prime mover in the origin of the state, it cannot be the only factor. After all, wars have been fought in many parts of the world where the state never emerged. Thus, while warfare may be a necessary condition of the rise of the state it is not a sufficient one. Or, to put it another way, while we can identify war as the *mechanism* of state formation we need also to specify the *conditions* under which it gave rise to the state.

Carneiro goes on to introduce one of the most fertile ideas in the recent history of thought about the origins of states: the idea of environmental circumscription. This idea has two distinctive and separable aspects. On the one hand it focuses on the matter of physical control over conquered populations. The idea is that in a situation of abundant environmental facilities for subsistence, where there is no apparent geographical limitation on necessary resources, a people under attack from a stronger force can simply move away. Such a move may not be cost-free, but it may be seen by them as preferable to servitude or the loss of their autonomy. On the other hand, if a people is tied to a particular zone, perhaps to the banks of a river, migration would be very costly indeed, perhaps necessitating a total change of subsistence and much else as well. This aspect of circumscription theory seems to be of the utmost importance because successful rule, certainly under preindustrial conditions, must depend upon the physical ability of the rulers to control their subjects. Without subjects there can be no rulers.

Carneiro also stressed another aspect of circumscription. 'With increasing pressure of human population on the land...the major incentive for war changed from a desire for revenge to a need to acquire land' (1970a: 735). Unfortunately some writers have fixed upon this aspect of the concept, and if they fail to find demonstrated population pressure they argue that the concept of circumscription itself is invalid.

It seems clear that Carneiro may be quite correct about population growth in certain cases (see Claessen and Skalník 1978: 625-626). Pressure on resources under conditions of environmental (or social) circumscription may have had just those consequences in Egypt or Peru, for example. On the other hand, we do not need the idea of population pressure to explain why warfare increases in intensity and seriousness and how it can lead to the state. As suggested above, there are many reasons why men fight, and population pressure is not the only one.

We may envision a situation of potential circumscription, where warfare has significant economic or political consequences even without population pressure. Either the threat of potential loss or the promise of possible gain to be won from war may be such that people perceive it as worthwhile or even necessary to organize. fight, and accept the risk of life, limb, and property which is involved. This may mean fighting for agricultural land or for water, pasturage, cattle, control over trade routes, markets, or any other valued resources. We are presupposing, therefore, a certain minimal level of cultural and economic complexity, though not one we can hope to define specifically. We are presuming that war need not be fought only for the maintenance of basic resources to support life itself, but may be motivated by a desire for gain. Control over trade routes and markets per se, for example, need not be vital for the life of a community but the payoffs, which may be considerable, can be a sufficient prize to

motivate some men to organize militarily to compete to control them.

To return to Carneiro's point about the conditions which give rise to the state, although ecological, demographic, economic, and other circumstances are certainly significant, the record of the rise of states is so full and varied in terms of the conditions under which they occur that there is probably no single key or specific combination of circumstances which can regularly be seen as generating forces for statehood. It is clear that there are many different roads to statehood, when we consider in detail the roots of emerging states (cf. Cohen 1978b: 70). But the two elements which are probably indispensable, whether we are considering 'pristine' or 'derived' (secondary) states are circumscription and warfare. 10

War is not merely the mechanism for taking and holding control of the nascent state. In many cases it provides the basis for the growth of strong leadership and the development of the leader-follower units which eventually become rulers and their henchmen (administrative staffs). I have argued elsewhere (1974b: 11 ff.) that political leadership generally grows from and is based upon the coordination of activities. The more significant the payoffs of the activity, and the greater the need for coordination of that activity, the more important the leaders of that activity become. In the context of frequent or endemic warfare that we envisioned above, war leaders rise to prominence, even indispensability (cf. Webster 1975: 467; Webb 1975: 158, 184).

We shall briefly outline a very generalized model of this growth of political leadership and power through warfare. This model is based partly upon general ethnological and historical data, as well as considerations of political anthropological theory, but it also has two specific cases in mind, one is the case of Mesopotamia, as presented by Thorkild Jacobsen (1957). This is clearly a case of 'pristine' development. The other case, that of several Galla (Oromo) states in southwestern Ethiopia, would normally be considered 'secondary' but the processes were basically the same as those in Mesopotamia, despite the differences of scale and in underlying conditions. As there is no room here to detail these histories the reader is directed to Jacobsen's article (1957) and to Lewis (1964, 1965).

We begin with an area in which warfare has become con-

sequential and frequent, if not constant. (Jacobsen documents this in detail for early Mesopotamia; it was certainly the case in southwestern Ethiopia in the sixteenth to nineteenth cen-See also Webb's bibliographical survey of the archeological evidence 1975: 186-189.) It is well documented ethnographically and historically that war leadership is not chosen by the accident of birth order or the casting of lots. Successful war leadership, probably even more than most leadership, requires These talents are always found in complex combinations, as in other leadership, but in any case the leader must be a successful manager of human relations as well as a tactician, a person of at least moderate bravery. He may or may not have a 'drive for power', or a deep sense of responsibility for his fellows, but there is always self-selection involved as the leader presents his qualifications and these are either accepted or rejected by his potential followers. The successful leader gains both followers and the gratitude of those who depend upon him and his men for their own safety or for the rewards from the enterprises he leads.

A successful war leader tends to gain an armed following loyal to himself. His group develops esprit de corps and a sense of itself as a group over and against other such groups. (His rivals build their followings, too.) If they are successful they stand to gain booty (cattle, land, trade goods, women, slaves) as well as esteem and power; they and their leader become a potentially separate force within the larger social group (cf. Webster 1975: 468).

The war leader himself may claim a major portion of the booty and can use this as a 'facility', in Webster's sense, to reward his followers, and his friends and others of his choosing in his society. He uses these resources to set up transactions requiring reciprocal returns, to attract clients, to act as protector of those in need, as well as to increase the mystery of his office or increase the social distance between himself and others.

In contrast to Fried, Webb, and Webster, I do not think it is necessary to hypothesize a preexisting differentiation based upon chiefly hierarchy '...essential (at least in most cases) for the effective consolidation and deployment of that wealth' (Webb 1975: 189). The warfare process itself can produce the necessary differentiation within the system, and this is indicated, to give

just one example, in the case of the Galla states where no chiefly hierarchies existed (cf. observations of Cohen 1978a: 157).

A troop of armed men under the command of a leader can be turned to many purposes other than those for which they were first recruited. A group organized for the defense of the home territory, or to raid for the cattle of others, can also be used for police functions, to build bridges, maintain paths, keep the peace in market places. The leader can also use them to 'right wrongs' which he sees done to others as well, of course, to right those wrongs done to him and his followers (see Jacobsen 1957: 122; Barth 1959). Others may ask him to act as a judge or his forces may come to be relied upon to enforce the judgment of assemblies. An ambitious leader like Oliver's Siuai mumi (1955) will find many ways to use his following.

A war leader may, of course, combine various sorts of leadership functions and titles. He may be the head of a descent group, a chief in a lineage/clan based polity, a diviner or priest, or an elected leader of an assembly. Or he may have rivals for leadership from others who hold these offices. Again, a range of combinations are possible. I am not suggesting any rigid typology of leadership or separations of functions.

If a war leader is chosen for the duration of hostilities, as were the *lugal* of Mesopotamia, but the hostilities never really cease, then he may seem to be quite indispensable. As the scope and intensity of the warfare increases the office tends to become more permanent and independent of the other forces within the society. The impact upon the society of the war leader with his followers increases; his powers and functions expand. The main force which can stand against such developing power is the force of rivals, and these are rarely lacking in the case histories.

If the powers of a leader are checked by kinship or an assembly, there are usually rivals or neighbors who can be legitimately attacked and defeated. It is perhaps through the conquest of these enemies, at least initially, that we often reach a critical point in the great transformation to regularized control and the state. While the inhibitions on ruling one's own kin and neighbors may be quite strong, this may not be the case when it comes to ruling the people who were just defeated. In this case the leader may now in fact be a ruler, with his lieutenants at his side. They are no longer just fellow citizens and countrymen, but constitute a

separate and distinguishable group 'charged' with controlling the conquered enemy.

A frequent end to this scenario, of course, has the hero return to his own people, flushed with triumph, loaded with booty, and perhaps leading some of his newly conquered subjects who are added to his original armed following. In time they may aid him in the final takeover of his own home base. But once again we can conceive of a series of alternative routes to the same end: the establishment of a king and his lieutenants ruling a polity. We can find cases in the literature to exemplify it.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The picture I have presented above is not merely a just-so story but a generalized model of the sorts of developments which have occurred over and over again, in all parts of the world, as the complexity of human life has increased and as human groups developed states. The picture is purposely flexible because there can be no single set of steps or types leading to the state. The state results from the outcome of competition which takes place under diverse conditions. We find the kinds of dynamics that I have alluded to occurring repeatedly as the play of interests works itself out. But the fortunes vary and the interplay of factors is complex and variable. As in biological evolution, we can see repetitive processes. All is not chance and randomness, but the manifestations of change are subject to random factors and the interplay of myriad environmental circumstances and permutations. Perhaps the processes which lead to the state are somewhat simpler than has been generally recognized, while the circumstances and conditions are far more variable.

It has been argued, quite reasonably, that we must give up hope of finding a single-cause explanation for the origins of states. It is obvious that it is not always due to irrigation or the conquest of agriculturalists by herders. But warfare is not a 'single cause' in the same sense. Armed military action is the mechanism or the instrument of state formation itself. More than that however, warfare is the single most effective activity for the production of leadership and differentiation of society into leader-follower units. And competition and conflict which develop over other issues

often resolve themselves eventually into armed conflict. As I have tried to show, leadership in armed conflicts has a variety of potential consequences, some of which are shared with leadership of other activities but which develop more predictably and readily from war leadership.

Leaders and chiefs, kings and states arise through action, through the give and take of events; of battles and constituencies won and lost, and through the control gained over trade routes, markets, land, or the winning of autonomy. Perhaps such a view sounds less 'scientific' than one which visualizes societies as 'systems' with inputs, outputs, and feedback loops, but I suggest that it has far more to do with the realities of state formation. 'Societies' do not produce kings or organizational patterns when some imperative in nature demands them. Leaders and rulers arise when human beings take certain actions in the circumstances in which they find themselves. Again and again the result has been the rise of magnates and kings.

7. AFTERWORD

It is important to make two clarifications or disclaimers regarding the foregoing model. First, it is not a 'Great Man' theory. It does not depend upon farsighted inventors of new institutions or ideologies. Rather, it is a view which sees a lot of ordinary people pursuing their own interests, in the contexts of their cultures and their times, and sometimes purposefully and sometimes accidentally, producing certain results by their actions. Leaders are constantly arising in human relations, in intimate local settings and on a larger scale where cultural and social complexity permits. Groups and factions form, and compete, and the outcomes are often unpredictable. Luck as well as skill play roles. Perhaps some leaders are 'great' and have impacts far beyond their competitors. Most are very ordinary, of course, but may still make events occur by playing their roles. Greatness is not required for this view of change in human affairs.

Secondly, it does *not* envision new institutions arising from the 'needs of systems'. It sees them arising through the innovation (consciously or not) of human actors, and the 'selective retention' of some through their apparent success or failure. (See Campbell

1965 and elsewhere on the concept of selective retention in human affairs.) This view may be seen as Darwinian rather than Lamarckian, with the latter's stress on needs modifying organisms (Stocking 1968: 238-239). In the Darwinian metaphor, humans innovate (introduce variation) and the successful decisions, the winning strategies, may be retained or copied. Needless to say they may also lead to unforeseen consequences which lead, in turn, to new decisions and innovations, and so on...eternally.

NOTES

- I wish to thank the following for reading and commenting on this paper: Robert L. Carneiro, Henri J.M. Claessen, Edward Friedman, Sidney Greenfield, and Arnold Strickon. I appreciate their interest and just regret that I have not been able to meet all of their objections or use all of their suggestions.
- 2. I must disagree with Cohen (1978a: 157) and Fried (1978: 45) who complain of a lack of material necessary to answer these questions. While it is probably true that we do not have enough material about the origins of most of the pristine states, the major reason for disagreement, it seems to me, is because we have so many different perspectives.
- Sidney Greenfield and Arnold Strickon have recently attempted to place the actor-oriented, decision-making approaches into an explicitly evolutionary framework. (Greenfield and Strickon, forthcoming.) They hope to replace the metaphors of organism and growth with one which more productively and accurately mirrors social and historical phenomena. It is their contention that the populational metaphor, which incidentally is the one which reflects the modern view of organic evolution and the Darwinian model of natural selection, can fill this role. This metaphor focuses upon populations, seen as collections of individuals which vary from each other in their characteristics. As the biologist Ernst Mayr points out, 'only the variant individual has reality' in 'population thinking' (1978: 49). It is these individuals which are the locus of purposive behavior, not the species or the total population. The total population is affected, changed, through the selection process which operates upon individuals. It is their behavior which is selected for (cf. Campbell 1965; Richerson 1977). This approach must not, however, be confused with either sociobiology or Social Darwinism.
- 4. According to Radcliffe-Brown, 'I hope that the argument of this paper has shown...that unilineal institutions in some forms, are almost, if not entirely, a necessity in any ordered social system' (1952: 48). Fortes added, 'In theory, membership of a corporate legal or political group need not stem from kinship, as Weber made clear. In primitive society,

however, if it is not based on kinship it seems generally to presume some formal procedure of incorporation with ritual initiation....Why descent rather than locality or some other principle forms the basis of these corporate groups is a question that needs more study' (1953: 30).

- 5. There is, of course, no single accepted definition of war or warfare, as Martin Nettleship's article (1975) and the comments following it attest. In order to lessen the ambiguity, however, I shall define war as: The organized use of, or the threat to use, violent means to attain desired goals in competition between groups.
- 6. An ethically inclined observer might object that regardless of what the warriors think they are doing, we know that the underlying reason they are fighting is the 'need' to readjust man/land ratios. (See, e.g., Vayda 1961; Rappoport 1968.) The populational view of evolution rejects the underlying teleology of this assumption and is content to regard the actors' reasons as likely explanations of why they fight. It is, after all, the warriors who must decide why and when to fight, and when to stay at home. Their leaders must know the appropriate appeals to make.
- 7. This was true in an area such as Kenya in the nineteenth century, for example, at a time when there was no suspicion of the impact of prior states upon such peoples as the Masai, Kikuyu, Barabaik, and others (see Berntsen n.d.).
- 8. I am very well aware that this will seem hopelessly naive from the Marxian perspective since the state is considered to be at least 'the organization of society for the regulation of the relations both within and between the social classes' (Krader 1978: 92) if not, indeed, the very instrument by which one class dominates others. I have no wish to deny the significance of socioeconomic stratification within states; I merely want to stress another aspect in undertaking to explain the origins of rule and rulers. I may be wrong in my view, but I am not unaware of the alternative formulations.
- It should be made clear that I am talking here about monarchies, 'early states', and not about modern states.
- 10. No distinction was made between pristine/primary states and derived/ secondary ones in this discussion. I realize that there are many more possible variations and options for the production of secondary states (see, e.g., Lewis 1966) but I also believe that circumscription and warfare remain basic elements for both kinds of states.

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West African Kingdoms and the Early State: A Review of Some Recent Analyses¹

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The origin and development of the state has for long been one of the focal points in man's attempts to understand his history. How did small kin-based communities grow into much larger polities, with their complex organs of government? How did social inequality become such a dominant feature of human society and in what manner did those processes evolve which maintain and perpetuate inequality? The rise of the very first state was an event in the long distant past. Perhaps it was a unique occurrence, all successive states being formed by conquest. Yet one feels that a process which could occur once could certainly be replicated elsewhere.

The question 'how did the state develop?' may be answered in a number of different ways. One may search for the stages in the development, presenting a series of static pictures in an evolutionary sequence; the temptation is to supply gaps in the sequence with examples drawn from other times and places in order to present a coherent linear development. Or one may specify the factors which seem to be correlated with state development; what other things were happening at the same time? Or, finally, one may attempt to discover the social processes which resulted in the rise of the state, processes of conflict and competition between individuals and groups which led to the aggrandizement of some, the impoverishment of others. Historians studying the states of antiquity must, perforce, explain in terms of stages and factors; the records available can tell us little about process. The social

anthropologist, however, in observing the 'ethnographic present' in simple states can provide us with descriptions of processes which may well be relevant in our attempts to understand the more distant past.

The transition from kin-based community to state was, in all probability, neither simple nor sudden. Yet for more than a century we have been blinded by the dichotomy between kin-based community and state, from the distinction made by Maine between status and contract to the well-known division created by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard in African Political Systems (1940). For many social anthropologists who explored this distinction between stateless societies and states, as for Marxists pursuing the nineteenth-century evolutionary themes, kin group and state became contradictory principles of organization — the latter must supersede the former.

A close examination of kingdoms in Africa and elsewhere quickly demonstrated, however, that in many of them kin groupings and the state organs seemed to coexist – often apparently in harmony; the instability alleged by some writers seems often to derive more from their presuppositions about the impossible coexistence of these two principles of social organization than from empirically observed struggles. These early- or protostates seem to have taken a number of forms. In one type, exemplified by the Yoruba or Ashanti of West Africa, the descent group is the basis of political action, the elected chiefs of these groups providing the governing councils of kingdoms of complex organization and with considerable social inequalities. In another type, the kin-based village community is but an administrative unit of the state; its integrity is preserved by the rulers for their own purposes, but it exercises no power in the decision making of the larger polity. In such states the dominant group is often ethnically distinct from the subordinate indigenous masses - further distinguishing them from the usually ethnically homogeneous kingdoms of the first type. Yet indigenous peoples may enjoy such independence that we do not view them as part of the state, though they pay tribute to this polity. A state thus dominating its neighbors may in fact be of our first type - the Yoruba kingdoms certainly derived tribute and booty from their neighbors. As Andreyev remarks (1978) the early state may develop either through the initial exploitation of neighboring peoples or of

its own people.

For Marxists, discussion of the early state involves the use of some key concepts – class, state, and mode of production. These are powerful analytic tools; but all too often they become the substitute for, rather than an aid to, empirical investigation. Their definitions, furthermore, may vary or be ambiguously expressed. Thus for some, elders in a kin-based society are seen as a class, in opposition to the youths; the former enjoy more leisure and are maintained by the production of the youths beyond their subsistence needs; they maintain their superiority through their manipulation of rituals and symbols of authority (e.g., Terray 1975). Yet others would see here a simple division of labor between farming and administration; the exploitation of the elders is countered by reciprocity - they provide the youths' bridewealth (e.g., Hindess and Hirst 1975). And, of course, the youths in turn become elders. In more developed societies where land continues to be held by corporate descent groups, individuals may rise to positions of great political power or immense wealth; yet these positions are open to all and those attaining them often have humble beginnings. They use their wealth to acquire wives, thus ensuring a large number of sons (whose surplus maintains them); but their estate is fragmented at their death, no single son receiving a material legacy which sets him above his peers. Do the chiefs and wealthy men here constitute a class? Finally there are the truly stratified societies where the dominant individuals, through their control of land and political office can ensure a similar status for their own sons, denying it to the offspring of the subordinate Here we indeed have classes. But when one meets a reference to the development of classes, it is often unclear in which sense the term is used.

The term 'state' is used at two levels of abstraction. It refers to the complex organs of government, the king and his council, the administrative officials (this is the sense in African Political Systems). It is also used in a much more abstract and structural sense, denoting a relationship between and within classes (cf. Krader cited by Skalník in this volume). Here it is logically connected with classes — and so the development of classes occasions the rise of the state; but classes in which sense? Do the Yoruba kingdoms which have complex organs of government and classes of my second type above qualify for the designation 'state'?

Finally 'mode of production', a concept specifying the nature of the relationship between exploited and exploiter. For long we have been accustomed to see a simple mode of production in each historical stage of development, though vestiges of modes of a previous stage may be slowly disappearing. Recent studies both of the economies of developing countries of the Third World, and of early states, have, however, disclosed a plurality of modes of production closely interdependent or articulated, existing within a 'social formation', as it is called. (Though some would see this formation as a single mode of production.) With multiple modes of production one generates a pattern of classes far more complex than the simple classic Marxist dichotomy.

In this short paper I shall examine some recent attempts to understand the early state, exemplified in particular by West African kingdoms in the light of my own studies of the 1950s and 1960s and of two Marxist schools: I term them for convenience the evolutionary Marxists and the structural Marxists. These two schools seem to owe little to each other. The evolutionary Marxists' approaches to the study of the early state have been largely confined to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; their development derives from Engels's Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State; the focus is largely upon stages of state formation with attempts to define the point of emergence of classes and the state. Most of their studies relate to states of the distant past — they tend to be historical ethnographies. A growing interest in this approach is exemplified by The Early State (Claessen and Skalník 1978) and by this postconference session.

The school of structural Marxism (in its anthropological sense) developed in France in the late 1960s. Its leading figures — Meillassoux, Godelier, Rey, Terray — owe their inspiration to the discussion of modes of production contained in Marxist texts such as *Grundrisse* only recently available in the West. All have done extensive fieldwork. Their debates have both influenced and been influenced by the neo-Marxist structuralism of Althusser and others. For once the social anthropologists are in the forefront, rather than on the margins, of such an intellectual ferment. Their concern is much more with the processes of development than with its stages, though their attention is focused upon the structural aspects of process and not upon the individual actor. Significantly, in their published works, authors of neither school

quote from the works of the other.

My own interest in the Yoruba was concerned initially with their traditional political structure. Before setting out for Nigeria I had presumed that the government of their kingdoms was similar to that of the Nupe, their near neighbors already described at length by Nadel. I was thus prepared to find classes and a state (Lloyd 1978). Instead I discovered lineage-based kingdoms now well documented by myself and many others. In an early thesis I described these as 'tribal kingdoms' - tribal denoting the lineage structure, kingdoms the possession of kingship and a complex form of government (Lloyd 1952). I saw these as intermediary between the 'stateless' and 'state' societies of African Political Systems, and probably constituting a link in an evolutionary chain. In an early article (Lloyd 1954), I compared four Yoruba political systems: one lacking kingship altogether; one in which political office was achieved through progression through a series of title grades; and two in which chiefs were elected by their descent group. But it was impossible for me to say how these kingdoms had evolved or whether my few examples were stages in an evolutionary sequence. Historical evidence relating to the genesis of these kingdoms - for many of them supposedly in the thirteenth century or thereabouts - was, both then and now, extremely sparse. Furthermore, there was a problem which still continues to be puzzling; the origin legends of the ruling dynasties seemed to imply conquest, yet the royal lineage is now politically weak and the population homogeneous; why did the conquering group not retain its ethnic identity and dominance, as it did in so many of the kingdoms of the West African savanna (see Lloyd 1968b)?

My interest in origins and evolutionary development then lapsed and I became interested in other topics — in the role of the Yoruba Oba in modern political processes, in customary land law. When I returned to the examination of traditional kingdoms in the early 1960s my own focus had changed. Rather than pursuing a Marxist line of thought I was reacting specifically against the structural-functional approach dominant in British social anthropology in the 1950s and clearly evident in contemporary studies of African kingdoms. In particular I felt myself opposed to notions that conflict contributes to consensus, that the important

ongoing social processes were those that produced equilibrium and that in a society in a state of equilibrium, change is introduced from without, not generated from within. I was reacting too, against the uniformity seen in African kingdoms — formulated explicitly, for instance, by Murdock, with his 'African despotism' and implicitly by many others who failed to distinguish between different types of kingdom. My own experience, both within Yoruba country and within Nigeria (with such examples as the many Yoruba and Hausa Fulani states, the kingdoms of Benin, etc.) indicated a considerable diversity.

In a paper written in 1962 (Lloyd 1965) I attempted to provide both a simple typology of African kingdoms and a model of the political process. For both these purposes the key element was the mode of recruitment of the king and more especially his council of chiefs (for the kingship is invariably hereditary). Earlier monographs had given considerable descriptions of political rituals, of the organization of the kingdom; almost always they failed to tell one how the titleholders achieved their office and what power they exercised. The modes by which this political elite accumulated and consumed wealth produced by the humble farmers were by these earlier writers and by myself assumed rather than explored.

I distinguished between those kingdoms where titled office (save the kingship) was open to all citizens, either through election to a lineage chieftaincy (as in most Yoruba kingdoms) or by progression through a hierarchy of title associations (as in Ijebu-Yoruba and Benin), and those where titled office was restricted to a small minority, perhaps defined in ethnic terms; in the latter kingdoms titles might be allocated either openly to any member of the minority group or in a more restricted manner, e.g., to members of the royal lineage, the king's affines, etc.)

Secondly, the mode of recruitment of the political elite determined the location of conflict, of competition for power, within the ruling group. This conflict, an endogenous and inevitable process, generated the changes which produced the diversity of kingdoms. I added four other variables — the power of the royal lineage, rights to land, the control of the army, and the responsibility of titleholders to their electors/subjects — which could be used to elaborate both my typology and the process of conflict and change.

Later in the same decade I tried to develop these admittedly crude ideas with respect to Yoruba kingdoms (Lloyd 1968a). I sought to use in a more restricted manner such concepts as 'competition', 'conflict' and 'contradiction'. In the context of Yoruba kingdoms I saw two forms of struggle as dominant — not that between rulers and ruled, but that between the constituent descent groups (for land and wives) and that between the king (with his palace entourage) and his council of chiefs. In the latter struggle, any long term changes in the balance of power tended to be masked by a cyclical change as the new king was first subservient to his chiefs (who had selected him for office), then learned to dominate them but finally in senility relinquished power to them.

Subsequently I developed the notion of a struggle for power between king and chiefs in the context of selected Yoruba kingdoms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lloyd 1971). I used Eisenstadt's (1963) concept of 'free floating resources' new resources which were not clearly attributed by custom to one or other party but which were sought by both, with varying success. (This perspective is similar to that advocated by Lewis in this volume.) As it happened, in none of my examples was I able to show a progression towards a more centralized form of government - towards class formation and the state. In fact, in Oyo, a very large and powerful kingdom, the conflict between the king and his palace organization and the lineage-elected chiefs, led to civil war and the collapse of the kingdom; in Ibadan, the mighty nineteenth-century successor, the lineage was even more dominant in the political structure. The evolution of the state probably follows several paths; even more numerous have been the paths taken by polities which never achieved statehood.

This focus upon the process of change was, I believe, echoed by Balandier when in 1967 he wrote 'The urgent task now [for political anthropology] is the search for different processes by which inequality is established and by which contradictions appear within society and necessitate the formation of a differentiated organism whose function is to contain them' (1972: 157). But neither British nor French social anthropologists, following the emergent themes of the 1960s, have undertaken this task. In fact the study of African kingdoms has declined, partly because these structures have decayed to such an extent that their examination

seems to be both of little contemporary consequence and insufficient to provide an image of their precolonial working. Recent works such as the symposium edited by Forde and Kaberry (1967), Mair's (1977) overview of African kingdoms or Lewis's (1976) general introduction to social anthropology all demonstrate the absence of new approaches in the past fifteen years.

As Firth has remarked, British social anthropologists have been concerned with conflict and change, but have ignored Marxist interpretations; Marx's ideas have been avoided by social anthropologists (1975: 30). Class has not been a concept used in their analyses. Both Firth and Meillassoux (1972) note too that social anthropologists have failed to study production; their discussions have related the political sphere to kinship or ritual — but not to economic relationships. These strictures do not, however, apply to the two Marxist schools described above.

The school of evolutionary Marxism, largely confined until recent years to the Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe, has made pioneering studies of the development of kingdoms and empires, particularly in Asia; they have done little original work on Africa. These studies have frequently disclosed early forms of the state, manifesting the coexistence of state and kin-based groupings. Yet the distance in time from the period examined and the paucity of historical data prevents them from describing the process by which the state evolved, or the process by which a dominant group accumulated wealth and power at the expense of others. Only too often the dominant group is defined as a class, the form of government which they established as a state. It is argued that class formation precedes state formation - though we are not told how this class is defined. Given the definition of state as the regulator of class relationships, then class must precede state; such statements however tell us little about the relationships actually existing at the time, in other words about the mode of production.

Other studies from this school focus upon the factors involved in state development. Thus Sellnow (in this volume) relates state formation to technological advances, Skalnik (in this volume) to exchange. Clearly the appropriation of a surplus implies that production must have reached a level which enabled the subordinate groups to survive and reproduce themselves; but when a surplus over subsistence needs does exist, we need to know why

and how it was appropriated by a minority and not distributed equally.

Holý and his Czech colleagues (1968) have provided a rather simplistic Marxist analysis of African societies into those who produce the 'over product' or surplus and those who consume it. The former are usually an undifferentiated mass, the latter are hierarchically ranked. They distinguish between privileged strata and economic classes; but this presentation is static. They give no indication of the perceptions of these strata classes held by the people themselves nor do they indicate the conflicts which are presumably generated.

Some of the scholars in this school have differentiated between the tribute and booty exacted by a kingdom from its weaker neighbor and the various forms of tax levied on its own subjects. This reflects the debate about the priority of accumulation of wealth from within or without the polity, and the nature of class relationships within the exploiting kingdom. Skalník (in this volume) advances this debate in suggesting that both these forms of exaction are payments for political protection — and as such the integrity of the kin-based groupings' administrative units is preserved. This exaction is to be distinguished from rent deriving from the development of private property — and the concurrent decline of kin grouping.

The contribution of the French school of structural Marxism lies in its exploration of the concept of 'mode of production'. Its members have not been concerned to trace grand evolutionary sequences nor to chronicle stages in class or state development; but their work ought to illuminate the ongoing processes of social change. The description given by Terray (1974, 1975, 1977) of the Abron kingdom (now in the Ivory Coast) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries illustrates the contribution made to the study of African kingdoms. So too does that of Dahomey, given by Katz and Kemnitzer (1979), two American social anthropologists using the same methodology but critical of some of its rigidities.

The kingdom of the Abron seems typical of savanna polities: immigrant Abron (an Akan people) dominated the indigenous and ethnically different peoples at the end of the seventeenth century; the Abron numbered 10 to 15 percent of the total population. Yam cultivation supplied a small agricultural surplus; gold was

mined and exported.

Terray identifies two modes of production and demonstrates the articulation between them. In the lineage mode, elders exploit youths — this is a class relationship. But the contradiction cannot lead to revolution for this is a stagnant mode: inasmuch as youths will succeed elders, tensions are resolved and deflected through witchcraft accusations, and conflicts are neutralized. He sees social development as possible only if there is a development of productive forces - an increase in slavery for example - or if the gap between noble and common lineages increases, but he does not say how this might occur. In the slave mode of production, the slaves worked on agricultural estates to feed their Abron masters. and they both mined the gold and served as porters in its trade. The wealth of the Abron came much more from their slaves than from their indigenous subjects. But the passivity of the slaves depended upon their absorption into the kin-based society as free men; an army, drawn from indigenous subjects, was needed to replenish the supply of slaves; to ensure its compliance the exactions imposed upon the subordinate indigenes was minimal. Thus the two modes of production were articulated and Terray neatly shows how the Abron state perpetuated the lineage mode and preserved the kin organization of the indigenous peoples.

Terray holds that this pattern is widespread throughout West Africa (1975) and that slavery is the key element; other scholars such as Coquery-Vidrovitch hold that trade was more important; Katz and Kemnitzer propose a 'predation-tribute' mode to amalgamate accumulation derived from slave production, war booty, and tribute. All, however, specify two modes of production; Coquery-Vidrovitch and others have termed the overall social formation, an 'African mode of production'. She, however, continues to see village and state as contradictory forms, generating disequilibrium and conflict.

These structural approaches tend to present a static picture of the kingdoms described; indeed, in a historical sense, change has perhaps been minimal. Katz and Kemnitzer argue that Terray's approach restricted discussion to the Abron kingdom and ignores its relationships with neighboring peoples and consequent factors of development — their own description of Dahomey includes this wider perspective. They argue, too, that the lineage mode of production is capable of development, through the rise, for

instance, of 'big men' or the development of elite or 'royal lines'. They see the stagnation of the lineages in the Abron kingdom as described by Terray as the consequence of conquest and hence stultified development. But like other writers they do not give precise details of how this development might be achieved. (Strangely, none of these writers mention Leach (1954); his analysis of the Kachin posits, in idealized terms, a cyclical progression as powerful authority figures emerge but cannot maintain their position: gumlao and gumsa alternate; what, one wonders, would have been necessary for a dominant leader to break out of this cycle?)

Katz and Kemnitzer demonstrate in some detail, the growing power of the kings of Dahomey, mainly as a consequence of conquests and the slave trade. Somewhat tantalizingly they refer to conflicts between king and leading families as the trade in palm oil replaced that in slaves (the king excercising a much greater control of the latter); but they do not describe the nature of these struggles. Though they can chronicle Dahomean expansion, the ethnographic data available apparently does not enable them to present a clear picture of the internal structure of the kingdom. The kingdom was founded by conquest; but it is difficult to ascertain how far the political elite or ruling class was recruited widely from the mass of the population, or the degree to which the mass of the population was taxed. They do describe ceremonies which symbolically enhanced national cohesion; but the poorer Dahomean was probably better off, both objectively and in his own estimation, than his counterpart in neighboring subject peoples.

Terray is equally vague about the structure of Abron society and he makes no attempt to differentiate between those Abron who were political officeholders and those who were humbler members of the ethnic group. Thus he fails to distinguish, as Bloch (1977) does not in his description of the Malagasy kingdom, between power and rank.

Each of these specifically Marxist approaches has made its contribution. In the search for stages of development so many intermediate forms of early or protostate have been found that no simple linear progression seems likely — and certainly, given our present knowledge, it is impossible to define it. One of the most interesting questions to be raised, concerns the mode by which

accumulation, which permits the formation of a nonproductive political elite, took place; was it primarily through the exploitation of the new rulers' own subjects or from neighboring peoples subjected in war? The exploitation of youths by elders is probably as old as man himself; but when and why did neighboring groups begin to fight each other; and how far can we attribute these wars to tensions and conflicts generated within the kin-based community?

The search for factors correlated with state development has tended to focus upon elements external to the community rather than upon processes going on within it. To say that increased production facilitates state growth does not tell us much; does this increase come from a climatic change or from new tools? How did the community respond to these changes and opportunities in such a manner as to increase social inequality.

The emphasis upon modes of production brings into much sharper focus the relationships between men, showing where conflict lies. But, as with all structural approaches, it tends to be static. Terray explicitly describes a society in a state of equilibrium (reminiscent of the structural-functionalist approaches of the 1950s). He, and other Marxists too, do state that this equilibrium can be broken by increased exploitation; but they do not state how this is to come about. Terray cogently explains the nature of and the reasons for the conflict between elders and youths and shows how this is muted by witchcraft, the expectation of youths to succeed elders and so on. But he gives no corresponding analysis of the much more complex pattern of conflicts within the political elite or between them and their subject masses; there is no discussion of class conflict.

These weaknesses, as I see them, in these Marxist approaches are not peculiar to studies of state formation; I believe that they pervade much of Marxist thinking — in its more generalized and orthodox forms, for I do not wish to deny the specific contributions made by many individual Marxists. Firstly, there has been a difficulty in transposing economic categories, defined in terms of relationships within modes of production, into social classes; a direct relationship is usually assumed — in practice it so rarely exists. Secondly, in their concern with the relationship between the two dichotomous groups in society — exploiters and exploited — Marxists have failed to examine relationships within each of

these groups; they have ignored the competition for power within the dominant group and the jockeying for positions of relative advantage within the subordinate group. In oversimplifying the processes going on within a society, terms such as conflict and contradiction are used without precision - and by some with wild abandon; they are not, unless more rigorously defined, the tools that we need for the kind of analysis demanded. Thirdly, in equating economic categories with social classes, and in accepting the relative persistence of these divisions within society, Marxists have ignored the degree to which men may move from one group to another; permanence within the category/class is assumed and studies of social mobility are thus seen as 'bourgeois' concerns. Finally, in assuming that a man's consciousness of his social position will derive from his economic role in the production process, Marxists have ignored the degree to which such consciousness can be derived both from experiences of social mobility and from social life outside the workplace - in the residential community for instance. To accommodate these criticisms does not threaten the fundamental assumptions of Marxism - though it does challenge many of its outworn and crude clichés.

What is needed therefore is an actor-oriented Marxist approach to complement that of the structural Marxists. This would incorporate many of the themes which I raised, albeit not within the context of Marxism, in the 1960s — the social origins of the members of political elite (from a restricted group or not), the competition for office between them, the reflection of this in the struggles to gain control of newly available resources. But the role of the actor in the production process too, ignored so lamentably in the British social anthropological studies of the 1950s and 1960s, must be given its due predominance.

Yet this is perhaps a counsel of perfection. For the data sought may be gathered in the firsthand study of contemporary societies; it is not available in such historical records as exist for most societies beyond the most recent past. In such societies we can perhaps but speculate, posing questions about the possible nature of class conflict but being unable to provide very definitive answers. Nevertheless the task should be attempted, for it is by asking questions in a certain manner that the evidence necessary to confirm our supposition is so often discovered.

NOTES

 This paper is a condensed and modified version of a paper 'The Study of African kingdoms in the light of recent Marxist writing' presented at the Xth ICAES at both the Conference Symposium on 'Models of the African State' and the postconference session on 'The Study of the State'. The original paper appears in the proceedings of the former symposium. In this paper I have referred to a number of issues raised in both of these meetings.

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12 'Divine Kingship' in Chiefdoms and States. A Single Ideological Model

JEAN-CLAUDE MULLER

The expression 'divine kingship' is closely associated with the ghost of Sir James George Frazer escorted by his cohort of 'dying Gods'. These godly kings sometimes died by the sword but more often by suffocation, strangulation, poisoning, forced suicide, either after having reigned a given time, after having shown signs of aging (feebleness or impotency), or after various catastrophic events that the king's mystical powers had been unable to avert. Frazer's theory (1911) establishes a close identification of the king with his kingdom. If crops fare badly, if disasters occur, the king must be changed; should the king grow feeble through old age, be unable to fulfill his conjugal duties or fall gravely sick, the whole kingdom runs the risk of being adversely affected and the king must be killed as a remedy. Some kingdoms do not wait until signs of old age could endanger their well-being: the king's reign is fixed – three years, seven years, etc. – after which the king has to die and give way to a more vigorous successor.

Many comments made by Frazer on this institution still remain valid; what is more questionable in many cases is the qualifier 'divine' stuck to the king, Frazer having too hastily concluded that all these kings were assimilated to gods on earth. Many authors have subsequently called such kingship, together with other forms which did not ask for the king's death, sacred kingship. However, we shall keep the expression 'divine kingship' to distinguish these kingdoms from 'sacred kingship' which does not require the king's cultural death. It may, of course, be argued that the term 'divine

kingship' should apply only to those kings who are explicitly seen and taken as living gods and keep the term 'sacred kingship' for others. This is a valid objection but we feel that since the expression 'divine kingship' has long been used in connection with kings who had to be killed, whether gods or not, it is worth retaining this term to qualify this particular form of kingship even if the 'divine' characteristics of the king are not present. A more extensive definition, listing several characteristics for a king's being 'divine', has been given by Seligman (1934) but we shall disregard it because it excludes a number of kings who are killed but who do not share all the other characteristics; the most important feature, for us, is the killing of the king. The best solution would be to coin a new name for this institution but this task will be left to others.

Early travelers, of course, related the practice of king killing with great flourish but without being able to give any proof of such ritual killings. Conversely, anthropologists – especially the British school led in this by Evans-Pritchard (1948) – reduced the ritual killing of the king to a mere epiphenomenon, a fancy which did not in fact exist. The characteristic of divine kingship which was the nonnatural death of the king was evacuated and interpreted as a folktale elaborated from very simple and matter-of-fact sociological inferences. The 'divine kings' were seen as coping with several problems and difficulties like wars and palace revolutions which de facto prevented them from reigning for a long These short reigns gave birth to the belief that the king had to disappear after a given time to avoid his aging, thus emphasizing here the virile and physically powerful figure of the king. The obligation of the ritual and philosophical death of the king that stipulated that he died 'culturally' rather than naturally was relegated to the attic and, satisfied with this explanation, the file was closed and interest concentrated upon more concrete social intrigues.

But there is a well known phenomenon in social anthropology, called the identity of alternate generations, which may well explain why, today, some credit is again given to Frazer's observations, and this, from the very British school which formerly rejected them. For instance, the reinterpretation of M. Young (1966), supported by belated reports from two prestigious anthropologists, Audrey Richards (1969) and Monica Wilson (1959), has shown

that regicide for purely ritual motives really was the norm among, respectively, the Jukun, the Bemba, and the Nyakyusa.

This custom requires explanation and many have been given, most of them directly taken from the local exegesis of the institution. But, whatever kind of explanation might be given for regicide in one society or another, such interpretations, as presented by anthropologists, never place regicide in the forefront. It is rather always seen as a later elaboration stemming from the type of society in which it is found. 'Divine kingship' is considered an ideology pertaining to kingdoms, as its name plainly indicates; such an ideology is not supposed to be a characteristic of small societies and this has led to the supposition that the kingdom is anterior to the idea of 'divine kingship' which is seen as a later development. However, it can be easily demonstrated that this idea is false, for 'divine kingship' is also associated with small societies, as we shall see.

Another prominent feature of 'divine kingship' - as well as 'sacred kingship' at times – is that of transgression. 'Divine kingship' entails the breaking of strong taboos by the king at his installation ceremonies. One such breach of taboo is frequently 'royal incest', i.e., incest with the mother or the sister, but other kinds of transgressions are mentioned in the literature. impressive catalogue of such breaches of taboo is given by Laura Makarius (1970:670); these breaches range from incest to cannibalism, from eating forbidden foods to committing heinous violence. Almost everything that is forbidden can be used; the king is the transgressor par excellence (Girard 1972: 161). To confine myself to the area I know best, Nigeria, we find, for instance, the eating of part of the remains of the previous ruler as it is - or was - done among the Jukun (Meek 1925, II:60), the Mbum (Meek 1931, II:293), the Yoruba of Oyo (Morton-Williams 1967:53-54), the Ekoi (Jeffreys 1939:101-102), and the Yoruba of Ife (Parrinder 1956: 15); in these societies, the king had to eat the heart of his predecessor reduced to powder and sometimes other remains. Such transgressions were seen as a way to elevate, to keep apart and to single out the king; their purpose was to separate him from his subjects. By transgressing such taboos, it was thought that the king showed his impunity, his absolute What was expressed there was the fearsome aspect of power; only the king was authorized to be above all others. L. de

Heusch has argued even further (1962) that such transgressions are made to instill awe and fear of the king in his subjects and he goes so far as to say that there is an homology between the size of kingdoms and the weight of the transgression, the most horrible ones being found in the greatest kingdoms, more grist for the mills of those who see 'divine kingship' as a later elaboration since the might of transgressions varies in direct relation to the size of kingdoms. But we shall see that this assumption is completely wrong.

So far, we have seen that two characteristics of 'divine kingship' have separately interested the writers on this subject, the killing of the king and the transgressions he is asked to act out. However, these two characteristics are very often found together and one might wonder whether there is a connecting link between them. That is in fact the case; the most radical interpretation of 'divine kingship', that of René Girard (1972), makes an explicit connection between these two aspects and shows that their pairing is necessary for a full understanding of the problem. Girard (1972: 150 ff. and passim) discusses examples of 'divine kingship' found in Africa which he sees as being 'certainly among the most difficult systems on earth to decipher'. His thesis can be summed up as follows: in order to purge themselves and eschew their own intrinsic violence which at times could bring about the disintegration of society itself if unchecked, the members of that society achieve unanimity by sacrificing one of their number as a This subdues the members of society, all united scapegoat. again against a common enemy; this reconciliation brings back order and prosperity. The violence of all against all which had run amock is canalized and unified against a single object. But society does not see its internal violence as being the cause of the averted disaster; by a sort of displacement or transfer, the cause is assigned to the very object of society's violence and the sacrificed scapegoat is seen simultaneously as being the culprit responsible for the disunity of society, the originator of the troubles; at the same time he is, by his death, the restorer of order. Paradoxically, it is from uncontrolled violence that order, peace, and prosperity emerge. In order to avoid falling back into chaos, society will simply repeat the sacrifice of the scapegoat by institutionalizing it. Society fabricates a scapegoat so as to have a sort of victim at hand who can be sacrificed in a more supervised and ordered way

than originally, either when circumstances demand it or at given intervals. In order to do this, in African 'divine kingship', the king, who is the sacrificial victim, is under the obligation to transgress normality, thus giving the society a justification for killing him in order to restore, or maintain, prosperity. Such transgressions are not only made to single out the king from his subjects, as some anthropologists argue, but to make the king, properly speaking, a criminal. The king is then very ambivalent, good and bad at the same time. This ambiguity needs to be resolved; the king is a criminal, a taboo breaker and, as such, must be punished while at the same time his beneficial aspect must be preserved. In order to keep such a precious person alive, it is possible to sacrifice in his stead one or several 'doubles' or alter egos of the king. But the king is still kept waiting and may really be killed after a given length of time or if everything goes wrong. The sacrifice of substitutes is also performed periodically, sometimes each year, in ceremonies that anthropologists have called 'rejuvenation rites'; from the particular local ideologies explaining such ceremonies, it is obvious that they have this rejuvenating function but a closer examination of such rites shows very clearly that the king is here in fact killed by proxy (Girard 1972: 150 ff.; Muller 1975). The bad side of kingship is periodically expelled and the beneficial aspect remains in effect longer, subject to the final execution of the king or his expulsion when things go awry.

This, of course, does not mean that the same sequence of events had to happen in every society with 'divine kingship'; the institution, once established and functioning, could easily have been borrowed by neighboring peoples, each of them adding their own variation to the basic pattern.

There is no need to dwell at length on such examples since they are well known. But we must here remark that several small populations, best defined as chiefdoms, also share these features. To limit ourselves to current cases in Nigeria, we will take the Rukuba, who number around 12,000 (Muller 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979). They are divided into more than twenty villages, each with a chief who has to transgress a strong taboo and who, consequently, is liable to be deposed anytime if things go wrong in the village. Substitute chief killing is done for the benefit of the whole tribe in two villages at given intervals. The Kanakuru

of Shena area (Meek 1931, II: 312) expelled their king after ten years of reign and Meek suggests that formerly he might have been killed: the Kanakuru are not a very important population, nor are the Mbum (Meek 1931, II: 493) whose chief was killed only when things went wrong. The Jen (Meek 1931, II: 525), also a small group, deposed their chief when drought or bad harvests occurred. According to Robert McNetting (personal communication), the chief of the Chip, a very tiny population of the Lower Nigerian Plateau, had to die after seven years, and A. Adler (1973: 190) reports that the Moundang of neighboring Chad, who number about 25,000 people, killed their chief every seven years or so. The same applied to the Awtun chief (Meek 1925, II: 59) whose reign could not exceed seven years. The transgressions found among these small populations are exactly the same as might be found in bigger kingdoms, showing that there is no relation between the size of the kingdom and the weight of the transgres-There is no need to suppose that these chiefdoms have been influenced by bigger and stronger ones into adopting the ideology of 'divine kingship'; this ideology could very well have appeared independently in small groups. The inner logic of the scapegoat theory as acted out in 'divine kingship' does not imply the anteriority of the kingdom over its ideology, but, on the contrary, the ideology which stipulates that there is one and only one scapegoat, the chief, provides a plausible answer to a question which to me seems crucial: not the question of the origin of the state, properly speaking, but one very often linked to it, namely the emergence of single rulers in one population or another. To have a ruler is, of course, a well-known model which seems to us quite 'natural'. Our own democracies have evolved from such a model and many a crowned head remains in office in our societies. Such a model, together with the Greek democracy and its derivations like Rome before the Caesars or the French Revolution, was long thought by political scientists to contain the only two possibilities for speaking of a proper political system. Any other model was labeled anarchy and was not thought worth investigating with respect to political evolution. It is only relatively recently that the famous 'organized anarchy' of the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940) has seriously been considered as a full political model and even more recently that Pygmies and Bushmen, not to speak of the Eskimos, were studied in the context of political systems. But the classification into bands, lineage systems, age-grade systems, chiefdoms, and kingdoms, a classification which derives directly from ethnography but which is here arranged in a sequence from the simpler to the most complicated, can lead to the false assumption that this is some sort of evolutionary sequence from the less complicated to the more sophisticated. In such a sequence, chiefdoms appear susceptible to two explanations. The first holds that they are inchoate kingdoms whose ultimate destiny, seen as naturally programmed in their structures, is to reach the stage of the more developed kingdoms; the second is to regard them as being decadent and powerless remains of formerly potent kingdoms. Throughout the literature there has been an unfortunate tendency always to link chiefdoms with kingdoms and to compare them to the most elaborated forms. One goes from chiefdom to kingdom or the reverse according to local historical contingencies but no one asks the crucial question: 'Where do these inchoate chiefdoms come from?' or, put another way: 'Where do these chiefs come from?' What is the use of such chiefs in the first place? Ethnographic reports on chiefdoms show the puzzlement that can strike the Western observer; these chiefs are 'petty chiefs', they often have no power of coercion, they cannot take initiatives, they are weak and sometimes their 'political' power amounts to nought; this lack of real power is contradicted by all the taboos. rules, decorum and stories surrounding chiefs. Looked at from the vantage point of warring kingdoms which have all the appearances of a state (they have an army, levy taxes, have a sort of police force, etc.) which looks similar to our former European states, such chiefs, of course, parade as opera kings.

These conclusions can easily be reached since in many a chiefdom, the political institutions resemble those of a full kingdom with the slight difference that the former is just a miniature of the latter. But if the form is similar, the content may be different and it is precisely the content that must be analyzed. If one confines one's attention to form it is still by implicitly comparing chiefdoms to kingdoms and the form will be judged by what it lacks. The only way to escape from this biased comparison is to analyze chiefdoms for what they do and what they are in their own terms and to see the place of chiefs, neither as some inchoate form which is an anticipation of a more developed king nor as a relic of a more powerful person. In that light it

will be seen that many chiefdoms adhere to the theory of 'divine chieftaincy' in this case. The chief is the scapegoat on which rests the good and evil that can effect society. He is the cause of prosperity and of disaster but at the same time he is also the remedy for such troubles when killed or expelled. The king or chief is the ultimate explanation of good and evil and this stems from his ambivalent status of scapegoat. The model is an intellectual and instrumental one which is sui generis and self sufficient; no need here to torture one's mind into evolving a transition from lineage system to a 'divine chiefdom'; both models can be used independently of each other. We can say this all the more since many of these 'divine chiefdoms', and even some 'divine kingdoms', do not have what is supposed to be a necessary prerequisite of a state, i.e., division into social classes. Their structure, a ruler with many of the characteristics of typical African kingdoms (see the contribution of Claessen in this volume), can accommodate chiefdoms and at least some examples of what are empirically regarded as kingdoms. Abélès (1979, and also in this volume) calls them 'states without classes', an expression which will seem self-contradictory to many. The difference between chiefdom and state would be, then, perhaps handled in two ways. First, the size of the units under consideration would be the dividing line, the small units being chiefdoms and the big ones states. The second would be to exclude from the state category all the units not divided into social classes. However, from the point of view of the inner logic of 'divine kingship' shared by both these systems, chiefdoms without classes and states with classes will nevertheless remain part of the same ideological model. content is the same, the ideology is the same and what remains to be explained is the formation of classes; but here at least, the structure of the polity *precedes* the appearance of social classes.

A plausible transition may be made from 'divine chieftaincy' or 'divine kingship' to 'sacred chieftaincy' or 'sacred kingship' by dropping the cultural injunction to kill the king periodically. It is well known that a number of chiefdoms are — or rather were — at war with one another; this is not a general rule but let us see the implications for the ideology of a chiefdom which engages in warring activities in order either to get slaves, a widespread pattern in West Africa (Meillassoux 1975), or to conquer people in order to levy tributes from them. The chiefdom's people will reap great

benefits from such activities and prosperity will be enhanced even more should such a chiefdom ensure its control over any trade in the area. This was the case for the sub-Saharan fringe of West Africa. If this prosperity is long lasting it will still be attributed to the king as in 'divine kingship' but the ambivalent position of the king as responsible for disasters may well disappear bringing a change in the ideology. The king may no longer be regarded as a scapegoat since things are going well and we may see a shift here to 'sacred kingship'. To restrict myself to Nigeria, such shifts are reported in the literature; Meek (1931, I; 55-60) states that the Hausa kings of Gobir, Katsina, and Daura, as well as the Bornu mai, were formerly killed as in classical 'divine kingship'.

It could be argued that Islam was a factor of change in eliminating these practices in this area. As for the origin of such kingdoms, as evidenced by the mention of former king killing, it could be argued that they sprang from chiefdoms which benefited from trans-Saharan trade and that their original model was similar to those of the 'divine chiefdoms' so common in the area. The prosperity derived from such trade, originally thought to be due directly to the king or chief, is redistributed to the subjects, at least in part (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1969), but surpluses from trade, from slave labor or from tributes allow the king to recruit a permanent guard which can terrorize the people. This permits the emergence of an autocratic rule as Izard (1973) has shown for the Mossi. The king is no longer killed nor deposed, real constraint reigns and the king's power assumes a new meaning. benefits and the help of an army or bodyguards allows the king to eschew the philosophical tenet of king killing. Both king killing and the transgressions may be eliminated but, in some cases, the transgressions are retained with a more restricted purpose, that of elevating the king above his subjects and of making kingship more awesome. One would here have a logical and plausible passage from 'divine kingship' to 'sacred kingship'. But this does not mean that all 'divine kingship' will evolve into 'sacred kingship' given the above conditions; the Jukun (Young 1966), the Bemba (Richards 1969), and the Nyakyusa (Wilson 1959) were big and relatively prosperous kingdoms with 'divine kingship' but retained king killing and the ideology of the scapegoat. Passage from 'divine' to 'sacred kingship' is an alternative which we think has been widely used as evidenced also by the Yoruba (Lloyd 1960)

who remember that they had king killing. Since king killing really occurs elsewhere, there is no objection to thinking that it was present among the people who say so and that it was not a mere myth.

All the foregoing may seem to belittle the place of economy in these societies and underplay the importance of the 'mode of production' in such social formations. A state is normally seen as characterized by the exaction of tribute, tributary gifts, taxes, levies, tolls, labor, etc., from its subjects. If this applies to many states, even some with 'divine kingship', other kingdoms and chiefdoms with 'divine kingship' cannot properly be said to exact such tributes. These are voluntarily given to the chief or king without the possible sanction of force. The term most appropriate to qualify these would be 'prestations of function' (French: 'prestations de fonction', cf. Suret-Canale 1969). These prestations are given freely by the subjects in exchange for the services - be they judicial, mediatorial, or mystical – provided by the chief or king. Such voluntary – although generally normative – contributions are found in small chiefdoms and we have shown in a particular example (Muller 1977) that they may be given under such conditions and so sparsely that the chief himself has to work the land like any other subject. Voluntary contributions are also found in societies that no one hesitates to call kingdoms; the Bemba, who have also 'divine kingship', are a case in point (Richards 1969). Thus, the same basic ideology can cover or rather generate or accommodate all sorts of transitions from freely given prestations to those exacted through the menace of force, especially when the king can count upon a personal police or a mercenary army. What is important to note here is that in some cases (Muller 1977) such prestations of function stem directly from the ideology of 'divine kingship' but the institution is relatively independent from the economic base which is in some ways modeled by it rather than the contrary. Ideology here comes first, it is not a reflection of the economic base or of the relations of production, but the form of the institution (a ruler, a certain centralization, various officers, etc.) seems well-suited to smoothing the passage from a chiefdom or kingdom where the king or chief is tightly controlled by the people (Abélès 1979; Muller 1979) to a proper state where such rulers can use the people or their labor for their own benefit since the form can accommodate both provided the ideology changes.

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13 The Kushāṇa State: A Preliminary Study

A.K. NARAIN

1. INTRODUCTION

Among the Central Asian peoples who made significant contributions to the history and civilization of the ancient world the Kushānas stand out as one of the most important. Recently, particularly during the last two decades, much attention has been paid to them by scholars of history, art, and archeology. Yet, the sources for the study of the Kushana state are most inadequate We hardly have any directly relevant literary and intriguing. sources, and whatever few we have are in Chinese and Tibetan, Greek and Roman, Armenian and Arabic, Sanskrit and Prakrit. Sometimes they may consist of only one line and at other times they may not contain more than a few paragraphs at the most and that too, in later sources for later periods of Kushana history. For our reconstruction we are left mostly at the mercy of epigraphic, numismatic, and archeological materials and literary evidence of circumstantial nature. It must also be noted that the chronology of the Kushanas remains unsettled; here I have used my own version of it.1

2. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND²

The people known as Kushāņa by self-identification, and referred

to as Kuei-shuang in the Chinese histories, were a unit of the great Yüeh-chih tribe. These Yüeh-chih are the same as the Tochari of the Western and the Tushara or Tukhara of the Indian accounts. Variants and derivatives of the name survived much longer in the other sources. It is interesting to note that the Chinese insisted on calling the Kushanas the Great Yüeh-chich and the word Kushana hardly occurs in ancient Indian literature. It is known only through the epigraphs and coins of the Kushana kings and their subjects, and later in the Sasanid, Armenian, and Arabic records. Linguistically, the Yüeh-chih/Kushāna were Indo-Europeans. They lived originally in the Kansu and Ordos regions of China from time immemorial. They were essentially a seminomadic oasis people. In my opinion, they were the eastern-most, and the last, of the Indo-European people to move out of their original homeland.3 In political and military power, the Yüeh-chih held their own in their original habitat for a long time until they were vanquished by the Hsiung-nu around 160 B.C. and the ruling elements and the senior lineages known as the Great Yüeh-chih were forced to leave their homeland for a westward journey in search of new frontiers; those who remained behind became known as the Little Yüeh-chih. But their identity is recognized as late as even the sixth to seventh centuries A.D. in various Chinese and central Asian contexts. By about 128 B.C. the Great Yüeh-chih were established in the areas north of the Oxus, where they were contacted by Chang Ch'ien, the first Chinese emissary to go west. The Great Yüeh-chih, having established their base there, crossed the river in c. 100 B.C. and conquered Bactria proper south of the Oxus. They divided their kingdom into five yabgus or 'chiefdoms', one of which was that of the Kushanas, who emerged as the most powerful among the Yüeh-chih, and who proved their leadership role under Heraus. He was bold enough to issue coins, announcing his identity as 'Koshanos', with his bust and with the title of tyrannoyntos (and related derivatives), perhaps a corrupt form of its Greek equivalent (Túpavvos) originally meaning 'a lord and master' who had seized power by force. But it was more than a hundred years after the occupation of Bactria that the Kushana yabgu, Kujula Kadphises, finally subjugated the other yabgus and, by the beginning of the first century A.D., laid the foundation of the Kushana state in its own right. Since then, for all practical purposes, the

Kushāṇa state became identified with the state of the Great Yüeh-chih.

The life of this Yüeh-chih/Kushana state may be divided into three phases, each consisting of about one hundred years. The first phase covered at least the whole of the first and possibly a few years of the second century A.D. It included the reigns of Kujula Kadphises and Wima Kadphises. In space, starting from the greater Bactrian nucleus it expanded gradually to incorporate territories from Sogdiana to Kashmir and the Punjab. The second phase started in the first quarter of the second century A.D. and ended before the middle of the third. It included the reigns of Kanishka and his successors Vasishka, Huvishka, and Vasudeva. It expanded further and for almost a century the Kushana state extended from Sogdiana to possibly Bihar in the east and from beyond the Pamirs in the north to the Vindhyas in the south. The third phase lasted from before the middle of the third century A.D. to almost the middle of the fourth. It included the reigns of the successors of Vasudeva, the Kushanshahs of Bactria and Peshawar under the Sasanids, as well as the Daivaputra Shāhi Shāhānushāhis, mentioned in the Allahabad inscription of Samudragupta, and probably located in the various enclaves of the northwest. During this phase the Kushana state declined, fragmented, contracted to its original Bactrian nucleus, and finally disappeared.

This story of the Kushāṇa state for almost three hundred years, and preceded by an 'incipient-state' period under Heraus, is one of great importance on account of its relevance to China, India, Iran, and Rome. The Kushāṇa state was indeed one of the four great states of the world of its time. In my opinion, it even held the balance of world power for at least three to five decades. It is significant that about, or soon after, the time of Hadrian in Rome and the decline of the earlier Hans in China, one of the Kushāṇa kings, a Kanishka, mentioned in the Ārā inscription (Konow 1929: 162), calls himself Mahārāja, Rājātirājā, Devaputra, and Kaisar (Caesar), that is, he fancied himself strong enough to appropriate all the great imperial titles used in India, Iran, China, and Rome. Certainly this was a great leap from such titles as tyrannoyntos of Heraus and xopancy zaooy, the Kushāṇa yabgu, used by Kujula.

Recent archeological explorations and excavations by the French

in Afghanistan now indicate the existence of a 'civilization' in eastern Bactria which might be comparable, or connected, to Harappan or late Harappan culture.⁴ It has been suggested that the mountains of Badakshan were probably a source of the lapis lazuli of the ancient world, and if this is true, Bactrians must have been in contact with western Asia and Egypt from very early times, for articles of lapis lazuli are found in Egyptian and Mesopotamian tombs of the second and third millennium B.C. So too, the existence of an independent Bactrian kingdom in the pre-Achaemenid times, and relations between the Medes and the Bactrians, have been mentioned in classical sources. Archeology again would support the suggestion of Ctesias that extensive irrigation canals and towns with citadels in the Bactrian plain were developed under a central organization. Bactria was the central province for the control of eastern Iran in the Achaemenid empire. Already before Alexander, the Greeks from Ionia and other cities were exiled to Bactria by the Achaemenid kings, and coins of Greek origin circulated there along with the Achaemenid currency. Alexander's successful adventure in Bactria is well-known and Seleucid power was represented by a governor there. The local Bactrian Greeks formed an independent state in around 250 B.C. and extended its authority over most of what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan and possibly made incursions even into India. The excavations at Ai-Khanum (Bernard et al. 1973), the easternmost Greek city, and a large number of coins issued by these Bactrian Greeks⁵ stand witness to their prosperous state and its money economy. By the time the Bactrian Greek state was destroyed, 'the thousand cities of Bactria' had already become a proverb. Chang Ch'ien's report of 128 B.C. as incorporated by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (in Shih Chi) informs us that in Ta-hsia everywhere there were 'walled cities and settlements'. New archeological activities in the area do not seem to belie this information. Even some of the numerous military colonies of Alexander, the existence of which is assumed by Tarn, may in the future come to light, though one has also to be prepared to find the beginning of the walled cities and settlements much before Alexander. After all, in Ferghana, Chang Ch'ien noted seventy 'walled towns' and certainly they were neither the 'cities' nor the 'military colonies' established by Alexander or his successors. Evidence is now forthcoming (e.g., Shoturgai) indicating indigenous beginnings.⁶ But we need

not go into this issue further. What is important here is to note that we have reasons to believe that walled settlements, be they cities, villages, or military colonies, were already large in number in Bactria when the Kushanas moved in. Of course, not all the walled settlements need to be taken as 'cities' or 'towns' for administration, or as clearing houses for trade. A large number of them could have been just 'villages' walled for purposes of protecting the peasantry from nomad raids or from other types of military adventurers. The capital of Bactria at the time when the Yüeh-chih/Kushāna moved in was Lan Shih (or Ch'ien Shih) according to the Chinese annals. This could be the same as the Bactra of the Western literature or Balkh of the later sources but there is nothing to prove either one or the other identi-There were also five 'capitals', or administrative headquarters, established by the Yüeh-chih for their five yabgus. The Chinese names of these cities are difficult to identify although suggestions have been made. But the chief administrative headquarters of the Kushāna yabgu was probably in the eastern part of Bactria.7

3. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The population of the Kushāna state of Bactria was already composite and ethnically plural. It included the earlier deposits of Iranian, Greek, and some Scythian, Parthian as well as Indian elements over the original peoples of Bactria. Much water had flown in the Oxus since the beginning of history in the valley. Its notorious fertility and material prosperity had made the country populous. It is not surprising therefore if Chang Ch'ien states that there were 'more than a million' people in Ta-hsia (Bactria) (Shih Chi, 123. 3b) when he visited the area about 128 B.C., i.e., before the Yüeh-chih/Kushanas had moved in there. A new ethnocultural element was thus added with the formation of the Kushāna state in Bactria. Since the inhabitants of the new state already had diverse origins and life-styles subscribing to agricultural, pastoral, and mixed traditions of economy, the new entrants did not face much of a problem in being accepted in the milieu. Bactria, and for that matter the larger Bactriana including the territories north of the Oxus, was not unfamiliar with the broad

dichotomy of the ruler and the ruled. The Kushana state of Bactria, or Bactriana, did not suffer the birth pangs or the experimentations of an early state. Both, the ruler group as well as the ruled, had already had the experiences of an early state. The Yüeh-Chih/Kushānas had also ceased to be nomadic or even seminomadic and had so settled down that they refused to be embroiled in tackling the Hsiung-nu. They did not want to look back but were looking ahead to new roles. Bactria was also a stable society with established norms. But the extension of the Yüeh-chih/Kushāna state into Bactria was a result of conquest. It is significant therefore that by the beginning of the first century A.D., according to the Annals of the Former Hans (Ch'ien Hanshu, 96 A. 14b), the Yüeh-chih numbered about 400,000, a number which may appear exaggerated but may not be so if we remember that they took more than one hundred years to reach this number and that too in an environment which was certainly more congenial to population growth than the one they had left behind. It is true that the Kushanas, per se, must have formed only a segment of the 400,000 but it must be admitted that for all practical purposes all the Yüeh-chih yabgus unified under the Kushāna formed one 'ruler group'; we must not forget that the Chinese historian of the former Hans still preferred to call them the Great Yüeh-chih. Anyway, it would be a fair guess that by the first century A.D. when the Kushana state was established in Bactria or Bactriana the ratio between the ruler and the ruled was that of approximately one to three or four.

According to Chang Ch'ien, the people of Bactria were sedentary; they had no great ruler, but only a number of petty chiefs ruling the various cities. He also reported that the troops in Bactria were weak and there was a market where all kinds of articles were bought and sold (Shih Chi, 123, 5b). In addition to the peasants, there were thus artisans, traders, and soldiers. Much of the peasantry must have been there long before even the Iranians, though they probably received an Iranian admixture. In the Achaemenid period there were certainly Iranian landowners and nobility, the class which had played important roles in Alexander's history. Chang Ch'ien's reference to people wearing beards and to their language confirms the existence of an Iranian or Iranianized population. The Greeks who had been there even before Alexander had also become Iranianized or Bactrianized to

a great extent. Perhaps new classes of military aristocracy, scribes, and bureaucrats were added by the Bactrian Greeks. The existence of slaves must also be admitted. We do not know if all the Iranian peasantry was free or if it consisted of serfs; perhaps there were more serfs than 'freemen' in corveé labor. In the Achaemenid times there were slaves, or more correctly 'menials'. They were divided into two groups, domestic servants and foreign slaves (Frye 1966: 75-76). Whether or not the Greeks exiled into Bactria by the Achaemenids were made slaves, i.e., the foreign slaves, we do not know. But it is interesting to note that the early Buddhist Pali literature of India only knows of two classes among the yavanas: nobles and slaves (Narain, 1962:2). It is not clear whether it was referring only to the internal stratification of the Bactrian Greeks themselves as a social group or to the Bactrian Greek state as a whole, in which case at least some of them formed one class along with the surviving Iranian nobility, perhaps as rulers. In any case, an earlier stratum of the exiled Bactrian Greeks had become free and strengthened by the new Greek elements in the wake of Alexander's invasion had even constituted their own state later. But again, with the coming into existence of the Kushana state their situation must have changed, at least in part, particularly because they were vanquished. Certainly among the Bactrian Greek population there were a considerable number of artisans, some free and some slaves. The name of at least one artisan slave, Agesilos, has survived in the Kushana records (Konow 1929: 135-137). In addition to these various classes of people it is difficult to imagine the absence of a priestly class particularly in a country so traditionally linked with Zoroastrianism, and later with the Greeks. Later in the Sasanid period the ideal society consisted of four classes of people: priests, warriors, scribes and bureaucrats, and finally artisans and peasants. We need not think of the Indian caste or varna system of classification in Bactria. But Bactria before the Kushānas was essentially segmentary in character. The Yüeh-chih/Kushāna, on the other hand, were not internally segmentary but conical. They were organized, as we have noted earlier in yabgus, a form of chiefdom. Theirs was not a class society but a ranked one. Sahlins's description of the structure of a conical tribe (Sahlins 1968) seems to apply well to the Kushanas. For we may note in their structure 'degrees of interest rather than conflicts of interest; of graded familiar

priorities in the control of wealth and force, in claims of others services, in access to divine power and in material styles of life, such that if all the people are kinsmen and members of society, still some are more members than others. For some are of superior descent (Sahlins 1968:24). This is clear from the epithets used in coins and epigraphs of the Kushanas, for the Kushana king was a 'son of god'. Others were inferior. The Yüeh-chih were a patriarchal society and were patrilineal. Chang Ch'ien must have noted a contrast when referring to Ta-hsia (Bactria) he observed that 'they place high value on women, and husbands are guided in their decisions by the advice of their wives' (see Tarn 1951: 298, but I have not been able to locate the original passage in the Ta-hsia section of Shih Chi). It has been suggested that this might be a reference to a pre-Iranian survival in Bactria (Tarn 1951: 299). The Kushāna inscriptions provide examples of men belonging to Yüeh-chih/Kushāna background announcing their patrilineages and of "the sons" originating from some geographical locations. 8 It is significant to note that they all express loyalty to the Kushana king, the son of God, by wishing a transfer of the merit they hoped to acquire by their pious deeds. The internal cohesion within the scions themselves as well as in the conical organization as a whole is quite evident.

Chang Ch'ien reports that the Yüeh-chih 'have some one or two hundred thousand archer warriors' (Shih Chi, 123.3b). Later, in Ch'ien Han-shu we are told that the Great Yüeh-chih had a population of 100,000 households, with 400,000 people and 100,000 excellent soldiers (96A.14b). It is not clear whether the number of 100,000 soldiers is included in 400,000 or is excluded from it. If it is included it means each household, consisting of four members on average, provided one soldier; if it is excluded, it means one out of every five of the Yüeh-chih was a soldier and the average household consisted of five members. But if the earlier report of Chang Ch'ien is taken into consideration one might even say that almost half of their population were 'archer warriors' in which case the number probably included all the men who But surely this seems an unreasonable estimate. could fight. Anyway, this contrasts with the significant statement of Chang Ch'ien about the poor fighters but shrewd traders of Bactria. We have no evidence to indicate other occupational interests of the Great Yüeh-chih than fighting and governing, at least during the first phase of their state. Of course, one cannot deny them such occupational interests as horse rearing, weaponry, etc. related to warfare in addition to some basic ones which one may imagine for a seminomadic pastoral oasis society. But certainly we do not have positive indication that they took to agriculture in their new state immediately on arrival there. I also doubt if they themselves took direct or leading interest in trading initially. It is more likely that they provided new links, and protection and stability to the professional traders of various origins than engaging in trade themselves.

The conical structure of the ruling Yüeh-chih/Kushana and the segmentary structure of the ruled population must have made the interaction between the two complexes a challenging one. But with the expansion of time and space, the Kushana state resolved this conflict by gradually adjusting itself to the prevailing social organization of the ruled and merged into the class society of Bactria, and later even into the Indian varna caste system, which helped them maintain their high rank. The ruling class among the Kushanas became kshatriva of the Indian varna system; and if there were traders among them, of mixed or unmixed origins, they became the vaisvas. Perhaps none of them were suited for the brāhmana and śūdra category. Those among them who had a propensity for religious or literary life found an opening through Buddhism rather than through Brahmanism and they, therefore, preferred to become Buddhist monks: we know of at least sixteen Yüeh-chih monk scholars who translated Buddhist texts into Chinese and thus played a significant role in the transmission of Buddhism to central Asia and China. 9 We do not know of Kushāna artisans and 'slaves' to fill the śūdra varna. However, their existence in the Kushana state as a whole is not ruled out.

A significant matter may also be mentioned here. The Yüehchih spoke a Tocharian language but had no script and therefore no written tradition. When they established themselves in Bactriana, they first adopted Greek language and script without much understanding and we note the corrupt forms of both the language and the script on their coinage. But they soon chose to align themselves with the Bactrian people and not the language of the erstwhile Greek ruling class. They adopted an Iranian language of the so called 'Satem' group, now known as 'Bactrian' in the absence of any better name, and exemplified by the Surkh Kotal

inscription (Maricq 1960; Schlumberger 1959, 1961; Henning 1960). They reformed the Greek script to suit their requirements, for example, by transforming P of the Greek into P for the cerebral The Greeks had never thought of clothing the local Iranian language in this manner perhaps deliberately to maintain their distance from the subject people, or because of a superiority The Yüeh-chih did not, however, kill their own complex. Tocharian language because it not only remained in use as a spoken language, particularly in the central Asian peripheral areas of the Yüeh-chih/Kushāna habitation and influence, but in due course was written in the Indian scripts, Brahmi and Kharoshthi. With the enlargement of the Kushana state and its extension in India, the Kushānas had already adopted these Indian scripts as well as the languages used there, such as Sanskrit, Hybrid Sanskrit, and Prakrit. It appears from coins that the official language of the Kushana state from the time of Kanishka onwards was 'Bactrian' in the Kushanized Greek script. Earlier, the two Kadphises' used both Greek and Prakrit written respectively in corrupt Greek and Kharoshthi scripts. The epigraphs, however, do not indicate the use of only one language and script by the Kushānas but several. 10

4. THE ECONOMIC BASIS

The strength and glory of the Kushana state in history lay in its economic basis. Bactria was well known for the fertility of its soil and mineral wealth. The Oxus and each of its tributaries were utilized to the utmost for cultivation. Probably the Achaemenids had always paid great attention to the maintenance and development of irrigation, a thing inculcated perhaps by Zoroaster himself An innovative system of underground (Frye 1966: 60-62). channels which brought water down from the hills, known now as karezes, supported additional cultivation. The Bactrian Greeks might have continued these Iranian and local hydraulic activities. But recent archeological discoveries (particularly in Soviet Central Asia) have proven that the Kushānas not only maintained the system but improved it both in quality and quantity (Stavisky 1977). They had ceased to be nomads and were not content just to be dependent upon the seasonal tribute from the settled lands.

They were now not only part of the sedentary world as rulers, but also had added a sizeable number to the population in the territory of their state. But as we have noted above, we do not know whether they themselves adopted agriculture. Even if they did, we have no reasons to believe that they did so in large numbers; perhaps they did not need to. But as a ruling class and as the ultimate economic beneficiaries, however, it was in their interest to expand the agricultural base. There is now material evidence from burials that some cattle-breeding communities were gradually becoming agriculturalists in the Kushana period as more lands became available and as more irrigation projects were completed. The pastoral communities which took advantage of the new agricultural opportunities were certainly not all from among the Yüeh-chih; some of them must have belonged to the recently displaced Scythian tribes and others had local Bactrian origins.

But the basis of the 'thousand cities' of Bactria was not only surplus agriculture but also flourishing trade. Chang Ch'ien had observed that people there were poor in the use of arms and were afraid of battle but were clever at commerce. If some of the walled settlements were villages, there were others which were walled cities and towns with markets where all kinds of merchandise was bought and sold. It was in those markets that Chang Ch'ien had even seen Chinese bamboo which had reached Bactria via India. Thus the Bactrian markets were already dealing not only with national but also with international commerce. With their entry into the Bactrian region, the Yüeh-chih had brought a whole new world from the east. Chinese political as well as commercial interests had followed their movement. The Kushanas took full advantage of their relations with China and central Asian regions to their east. New exotic commodities like silk were introduced to Western markets. We do not know whether the Yüeh-chih themselves were clever traders but certainly the Sogdians and Bactrians stepped up their commercial activities thanks to the political stability and peace brought about by the formation of the Kushana state. New roads were opened to establish links with the Roman world.

The Bactrian economy had gotten disrupted toward the end of the first century B.C. because of internal and external violence. It took almost a hundred years before the Yüeh-chih/Kushāṇa

state was able to revitalize it with an innovative and virile leadership. The disruption had become most visible in the money supply. No sooner had the Yüeh-chih taken control of the policy in Bactriana than they took note of it and in spite of the fact that they had no previous experience of a money economy they took steps to remedy the situation by stages. First, they imitated the prevalent local coinage without much understanding just to keep things going. Soon they started making their own experiments with the motifs, metrology, and metallurgy of the coinage. Finally, they were able to standardize their mintings. The commercial enterprise of the Kushana state is evident from their abundant coinage. The favorable balance of its trade with the outside world, particularly with the Romans, is clearly reflected in the large number of gold coins they issued as well as by the existence of hoards of Roman coins found in India (Wheeler 1954: 137. The oft-quoted lament of Pliny about the drainage of 141). Roman gold to India and China in payment of luxury goods¹ only confirms the situation. It has also been suggested that this led indirectly to the devaluation of Roman money in the time of Nero (MacDowall 1968: 137-140).

The Kushāṇas replaced the silver-copper bimetallism of the Indo-Greeks and the Indo-Scythians with a gold-copper one. In metrology they replaced the Attic and related weight system with that of the Roman denarius. It is significant that the Kushāṇas issued the largest number of copper coins and their very wide geographical distribution is noteworthy.

We do not know whether the Kushāna state directly participated in commerce or whether the state had any monopoly. It is possible to argue that in the first phase of their career in Bactriana their control of commerce was more centralized and direct but with their expansion into India it became more decentralized and the role of merchant guilds, an old established institution in India, acquired prominence. This is clear from the epigraphs. The commercial prosperity of the Kushāna state is reflected in the religious gifts and donations made by the artisans and merchants. Archeological discoveries indicate a flourishing urban life and economy.

5. THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

As we have noted above the Great Yüeh-chih were the ruling elements, and the senior lineages, who had moved out of their original habitat. They, no doubt, must have picked up new elements for their camp in the course of their odyssey to the west. But by and large, they seem to have maintained their cohesiveness by keeping to their own original political system, at least for some time. It is difficult to spell out the details of their system but most probably it was a ranked one, headed by the chief under whose leadership they had marched out, and as long as they were north of the Oxus their political organization remained unitary. When Chang Ch'ien, the Chinese emissary, came to negotiate with them, perhaps he talked to the one chief who headed the total community of the Great Yüeh-chih. Chang Ch'ien does not refer to their yabgus or any other ruling components. But not much after Chang Ch'ien had left, and probably already by about 100 B.C., certain senior lineages, which must have played comparatively better leadership roles in the Yüeh-chih movement to the west, became prominent. And, in the process of their movement, through the domains of the various tribes of Inner Asia, the Great Yüeh-chih must have not only picked up more horses and camp followers but also elements from the ruling systems of the The institution of the yabgus people inhabiting their route. (hsi-hu) may be identified as one of them. 12

After having crossed the Oxus, the Yüeh-chih had divided their state, with Bactria as their fundamental 'oblast', into five yabgus. Either before or soon after the beginning of the first century A.D., the most preeminent among them, Kujula Kadphises, the Kushāna vabgu, unified the Yüeh-chih and transformed the state into a multiclan chiefdom. Political organization was thus established above and beyond the community level. As head of this organization he continued to call himself only a yabgu for some time, but with the annexation of new territories he became not only the 'great king' (mahārāja) but also 'king of kings' (rājātirāja) (Chattopadhyaya 1967: 29), and according to some he even adopted the exalted title of devaputra ('son of god') (Cunningham 1892: 66). The various clans and lineage sections of the Yüeh-chih vied with one another in transferring the merits of their own acts of righteousness as an expression of loyalty to

the Kushāṇa kings who had, in addition to their titles indicating royal status, also taken such moralistic and divine epithets as sachadhramathida ('steadfast in the true dharma') and devaputra. Perhaps the leading local lineages supplied from their senior houses the chief state functionaries, military as well as civil. Kingship, and possibly other successions too, probably devolved from father to son, but brother succession is not ruled out. The system of the Kushāṇa state originally worked through the hierarchy of major and minor authorities holding forth over major and minor subdivisions of the tribe, through a chain of command linking the paramount to the intermediate and local-level leaders. When the authority and power of a yabgu developed into that of a ruler with exalted titles the transcendence of the state started yielding to immanence and the tribal sources and organization of authority became distributed in the territories of an enlarged kingdom.

With the growth of the kingdom and the demise of the yabgu system, the Kushāṇas entered into a new phase, marked by new conquests and the subsequent adoption of new ideas and institutions from the people they ruled. A peculiar syncretism arose which is visible in almost everything related to the Kushāṇa times.

The Kushana political organization did not possess that rigid centralization which characterized the Mauryan polity of ancient India. The multitude of state departments and officials as known from Kautilya's Arthāśastra (Kangle 1960-1965) and Aśokan epigraphs (Hultzsch 1969) are absent in the Kushana administration. But it would be wrong to look for elements of decentralization in the variety of grand titles adopted by the Kushana kings as suggested by some scholars (Sharma 1968: 217-218). In my opinion, they indicate only the exaltation of royal authority. In fact, in the Kushana state we discover that a symbiotic relationship was gradually forged between the conical and the segmentary pattern of sociopolitical organization. That is why whatever limited amount of decentralization we find in their system, it did not reduce the quality of the strong source of authority and power at the top of the structure. In addition, one need not look into such titles as mahīśvara and sarvaloga-īśvara adopted by Wima Kadphises for the feudatory character of the Kushāna state (Sharma 1968: 218-219), just as the adoption of the title of kaisara (Ceasar) by Kanishka does not mean a Roman pattern of Kushana administration. It is true that the Kushana kings took

such titles as $z\bar{a}j\bar{a}trir\bar{a}ja$, shaonano shao, or shāhānushāhi, but there are no records which mention the names of lesser $r\bar{a}j\bar{a}s$ and shāhis. The Yüeh-chih viceroy Hsieh^{1,4} was certainly not one of them and the reference to the shāhis in the Kālaka story is not relevant to the Kushāṇas but to the Śakas. I doubt therefore the feudatory character of the Kushāṇa political system in the real sense. The existence of the kshatrapas and mahākshatrapas does not indicate feudatory chiefs but state functionaries in charge of territorial administration such as that of a province, a satrapy. ¹⁵

In certain territorial units of larger sizes there could even be more than one Kshatrapa, as in the case of the eastern-most part of the Kushāna empire (Sircar 1966: 136-137). They need not be taken to indicate the 'dual-kingship' of the Jain sources or as a system in which one would act as a check on the power of the other (as suggested by Sharma 1968: 220). As a conquest state the Kushanas had to be strong militarily, and such checks which were needed on the power of the provincial satraps were provided by the military hierarchy of the mahadandanayaka and the dandanāyaka, who do seem to have occupied important positions in the Kushana polity. It is significant that Lala, a dandanayaka, who served a kshatrapa Veśpasi, was a scion of the ruling Kushāna family (Konow 1929: 145-150). It appears that there were two parallel graded hierarchies of civil and military officers in at least larger or important territorial units, mutually dependent but directly responsible to the king-emperor. The Kushanas perhaps combined the Iranian satrapal system with that of the strategos of the Indo-Greeks. Similarly, while the smaller territorial units of administration remained as they were before Kushana times, they were again administered by two parallel sets of functionaries, one civil and the other military. For the gramika, the head of the smallest unit, the village, was not trusted with the defense of a village or unit of villages and the task was transferred to the gulma or military cantonments stationed by the king in two, three, or five villages in the countryside (Sharma 1968: 224-225). It must also be noted that none of the mahākshatrapas, mahādandanāyakas, kshatrapas, and dandanāyakas, whose names have survived in the records, seems to be of Indian origin.

6. THE SOCIOPOLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The ideology of the Kushāṇa state was syncretic. It derived its inspiration from various traditions. If the titles of mahārāja, rājātirāja, devaputra and kaisara used by Kushāṇa kings symbolize their ideology, they indicate that the traditions involved were Indian, Iranian, Chinese, and central Asian, as well as Greco-Roman.

Its most important prominent feature was the divine element, implied by the title devaputra, the son of god (or heaven). This was not derived from Indian origins; the closest title used in India was that of devanam priva (beloved of the gods) by Aśoka. But the equivalent of the title of devaputra was known in China. In Bactria, the Greeks had adopted such titles as theos and epiphanoys on their coins. The Parthian kings are also known to have taken the titles of epiphanoys and theotropos. It seems that inspired by the Chinese practice, and at the same time not finding it incompatible with the Bactrian and Parthian usage, the Kushana kings claimed this title of devaputra. In India it is difficult to find support for a divine origin of kingship before the Kushānas. Even later when the idea of divinity became associated with Indian polity as a result of the Kushana usage, the emphasis was more on the office of kingship rather than on the person of the king. Moreover, divinity did not imply infallibility in India. It is also interesting to note that the idea of deification was foreign to the early Buddhist sources and yet most of the Kushana kings were probably Buddhists. Naturally this element of legitimation of the power and authority of the Kushana state found provision in the later Mahayanist Buddhist text, Suvarnaprabhashottamasūtra in which to a question, 'why a king born as a man is called deva (god) and why he is styled devaputra (son of god)', the answer given is that 'before being born as a man, he was living among the gods, and that, because each of the thirty-three gods contributed to his substance, therefore, he is called devaputra' (Levi 1934: 1-21). References in Manu Smrti and Mahābhārata to the idea of divinity are post-Kushāna. In any case, the royal title devaputra did not find favor with other kings in India, either contemporary to, or later than, the Kushanas. But the title was used in central Asia and is found in the Khotanese documents (Konow 1929: LXXIV).

In keeping with the idea of devaputra, the Kushāṇas erected devakula (deity-houses) in which the statues of the deceased kings, the devaputras, were housed. These 'deity-houses' were not only erected but were duly maintained by regular repairs (Sharma 1968: 231), and the act of repairing them was considered an act of religious merit. Perhaps a class of priests was also attached to these 'deity-houses'. It has been suggested that the practice of setting up devakula was probably taken over from the Roman example of the ruler cult (Raychaudhury 1963) but this needs further examination.

The divine content of the legitimation is further strengthened by the use of nimbus round the heads of the kings on their coins as well as by such depictions as that of Wima Kadphises' bust emerging from the clouds like gods or the emissions of fire from his shoulders.

The deification of the Kushana kings legitimized in theory the source of their authority and power and secured the absolute allegiance of the officers and individuals which is reflected in the transfer of their merit accrued from the religious gifts, repairs of devakula, and other acts of righteousness for the well-being of the The Kushana subscription to this new ideology was necessary. The Vedic source was not available to them. The Buddhist idea had been tried by Asoka and had not worked. The post-Mauryan brāhmanic upsurge in India also needed a counterpoise and it could be provided most naturally by the ruling elements of foreign origin. To indicate their preference in favor of a non-brāhmanic ideology, Kujula Kadphises had already adopted the epithet of sachadhramathida (steadfast in the true 'dharma') which was more in keeping with the Buddhist and Aśokan definitions than the brāhmanic.

But the Kushāṇa state succeeded in pursuing their ideology with éclat because of the eclecticism of the kings so well-known from their coin devices and from their practice of toleration confirmed by the epigraphs and monuments of the period. The motifs on their coins were truly representative of the universality of the state indicating wide areas of contact and acceptability. It is interesting to note that in addition to having the Buddha they used various other gods and goddesses of the Indian, as well as of Iranian and Greco-Roman origins, on their coins. The Kushāṇa kings lived with their bold ideology, although personally some of

them were Buddhists and some śaivas, probably because they did not want to give much importance to the brāhmanic priesthood, or the Buddhist monkhood, in their decision-making process; and perhaps for that reason they not only maintained a balance in their religious polity but even set up a parallel cult of royal worship.

7. CONCLUSION

This preliminary study of the Kushāṇa state leaves many important aspects of the subject state, particularly in terms of various relationships, unattended. This is not only because of the scarcity of material but also because whatever is available is most inadequate to answer our questions. The matter becomes more complicated as the literary sources, already almost entirely of circumstantial nature, are non-Kushāṇa products and incorporate mixed traditions and backgrounds from which it is not easy to discriminate the Kushāṇa from the non-Kushāṇa. Much of the available discussion on the subject therefore does not lead to the specificity desirable in a case study. Its linkage with ancient Indian polity and social organization produces more ambiguity than clarity. Nonetheless some limited generalizations may be made.

The Kushāṇa state started from the substructure of a 'chiefdom' (yabgu) as part of the structure of the early state of the Great Yüeh-chih. It arose out of conquest and so it was a 'conquest' state. It became a 'successor' state because it incorporated into its own state system what it inherited from the earlier state systems of various origins in the territories of the empire. It was thus gradually transformed.

The role of war and the influence of a previously existing state, or states, are evident. Population growth and/or pressure do not seem to have been impelling factors to statehood. It was not a nation-state. Ethnically and linguistically it was, or it soon became, pluralistic. The existence of a plurality of traditions produced antagonisms as well as accommodations. Class differentiations took new forms and dimensions. There was a markedly increased social mobility throughout the process of development of the Kushāṇa state. A setback took place in the status and

authority of the priestly class and in their regulating power. In the economic area, there is evidence to indicate a growing tendency towards private ownership and enterprise. The merchant class was very well organized. Although the state minted coins, the banking and distributive power was effectively controlled by the guilds. The Kushāṇa state definitely displays traits superseding the characteristics of the so-called Asiatic mode of production. The ideology of the Kushāṇa state provides a complex syncretic model. For legitimation of its authority it sought independently a divine source in its own right which transcended the existing religious boundaries. The evidence indicates that the Kushāṇa state probably belonged to a 'posttransitional' type; it certainly belongs to a stage when the early state ceases to be early.

NOTES

- The Kushāṇa chronology is still unsettled. The last international discussion specifically on the problem of the date of Kanishka, the best known Kushāṇa king, was held in London in 1960 (Basham 1968). In my view the date of Kanishka should fall between c. A.D. 100 and 130 (Narain 1968). I rule out such proposed dates as 58 B.C., A.D. 78, A.D. 144, A.D. 248 or A.D. 278.
- Since the London conference of 1960 there has been an enhanced interest in Kushāṇa studies and much new material has become available as a result of archeological excavations in Soviet Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. While my own comprehensive work on the Kushāṇas is still incomplete and unpublished, the material in the section here is based in general on Chattopadhyaya (1967, 1975), Mukherjee (1967) Narain (1962, 1968, 1977), Stavisky (1977).
- 3. This is based on a paper (Narain 1976) in which I have taken into account the linguistic association of the Tocharian language with the Yüeh-chih, the continuity of material culture showing no signs of foreign intrusion in the Kansu and Ordos region from Neolithic times to the first millennium B.C., and the early historical and geographical literature of the Chinese with regard to the Yüeh-chih.
- I am grateful to M. Frankfort of the French Archeological Delegation in Afghanistan at Kabul for showing me in 1976 the material recovered from Shoturgai and nearby sites. But now see Lyonnet (1977).
- For numismatic studies of the Greeks of Bactria and India, see Gardner (1966), Lahiri (1965), Narain (1962), Tarn (1951), and Whitehead (1914).
- In the light of the excavations now being done by the French and against the background of the findings of the Soviet archeologists in

Turkmenistan and elsewhere this seems to be the case in my opinion. Certainly these findings add a new dimension, that of the central Asian links, to the whole problem of the Harappan culture and to the history of urban civilization in the Indus valley which were hitherto discussed in the context of western Asia and the Indo-Iranian borderlands only. See S.P. Gupta (1979).

- Various suggestions have been made about it but the general consensus seems to locate it in Badakshan.
- See for example such patronymic names as Urumujaputra (in the Panjtar Inscription) Kamagulyaputra (Wardak Vase Inscription) and such patrilocal names as Poshapuriaputrana (in the Ara Inscription), Imtavhriaputrana (Taxila silver scroll). See Konow (1929).
- See for their names Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka (Oxford 1883) and The Taisho (Tokyo, repr. 1977).
- Recent discovery of the trilingual Dasht-i-Nawur inscription confirms the use of a variety of dialects. See Fussman (1974) and Bivar (1976).
- Pliny XII, 41:19. Roman gold to the value of one hundred million sesterces a year was paid for such luxury products as spices and silk, muslin and gems.
- 12. Attempts have been made linguistically to derive the origin of the word yabgu from various sources. While the linguists have failed to come to a decision, the fact remains that the word was used in one form or another by the Saka and Kushana kings in their epigraphs and coins. In Chien Han-shu this is used only in the accounts which dealt with the Yüeh-chih, the Wu-sun and the K'ang-chu. We are not sure if all three were of the same ethnic background or if they adopted the usage from one another. Be that as it may, the Great Yüeh-chih did pass through the territories governed by the Wu-sun and the K'ang-chu, and we have no evidence to indicate that the Yüeh-chih were familiar with the institution in their original habitat before, or after, some of them had moved out. It seems from the description of the roles and relationships that in central Asia the yabgu was a title of nobility of the higher order. For example, the infant Wu-sun prince, whose father was killed by the Yüeh-chih, was protected by a yabgu named Pu-chiu (Chien Han-shu, Bk. 96 B); one of the daughters of the Wu-sun king, Weng-kuei-mi, married Jo-hu, a yabgu; a K'ang-chu king consulted with all his yabgus on matters relating to an alliance with Chih-chih, the Hsiung-nu chief (Chien Han-shu, Bk. 96 B). The yabgus took an active part even in the selection or rejection of a Wu-sun king (Chien Hanshu, Bk. 96 B). No doubt they had an important role in the social polity and government of these peoples. This was most probably an institution of the Wu-sun and the K'ang-chu adopted by the Great Yüeh-chih and later borrowed by the Hephthalites and the Turks. The word yabgu denoted first an office of high authority but later, with the transformation of a tribal or nomadic/seminomadic polity into a territorial one, it also implied the territorial jurisdiction of that authority.

- 13. There is clear evidence for this practice among the Saka and the Pahlava predecessors and contemporaries of the Kushanas. In the case of the latter too, it has been used to explain some of the successions, e.g., if the Ara Inscription of Yr. 41 refers to a Kanishka II he could be a brother of Huvishka.
- The Chinese reference does not indicate that Hsieh was a 'lesser king' or a 'shāhi'.
- For the story see H. Jacobi (1880). 'Das Kālakācārya-Kathānakam'. Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft 34, 247-318.

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14 The Precolonial Indian State in History and Epistemology. A Reconstruction of Societal Formation in the Western Deccan from the Fifteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century* FRANK PERLIN

In sum, in his [Thucydides'] view, "Agamemnon's Mycenae and fifth-century Mycenae could be thought of as one city, repaired and casually rebuilt but essentially the same."

(Finley 1964: 290; quoting Cook 1955)

1. THE ARGUMENT

This study concerns what has conveniently, but misleadingly, been termed a successor state. After three to four centuries of Mughal and Sultanate rule a new and powerful polity was established by conquest in the western Deccan. Reconstruction of the evolution of this seventeenth/eighteenth-century polity has entailed critical requestioning of the epistemological status of the precolonial state in India. At its simplest the latter is reducible to two basic axioms: (a) the millenia-long continuity of civilizational level and state forms between ancient times and the eve of absorption into the European world market (and thus their basic unresponsiveness to change in precolonial times); and (b) an equally fundamental

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hiatus in relationships and institutions mediating between state and countryside, court and peasantry, town and village. These two axioms imply that Asia has been subject to laws of history and societal organization of a different order from those characterizing European history. The corollary is a view of the state as subject to a continual kaleidoscopic reorientation of a given political and social content. Despite increasing disquiet in recent years the idiom has continued to assert itself, preventing a systematic attempt to work out appropriate means for reassessing the histories which it continues to dominate.

In contrast, the state of the seventeenth and eighteenth century shows upon close examination a complexity of social structure and responsiveness to change that has escaped the historiography. The evidence demonstrates: (a) the probability of significant discontinuities between ancient civilizations, on the one hand, and those of the epoch immediately prior to colonial occupation, on the other; (b) the long-term evolution of social and economic forms underlying the emergence of the sophisticated institutional nexus of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and (c) a structure of social relationships transcending the peasantry and including the village as the productive locus of the larger order.

Beginning in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a whole bundle of simultaneous developments may be identified: the political transition from extensive hegemonies based upon the articulation of isolated nuclei of settlement, to intensive forms of rule based upon widespread arable peasant agriculture; the emergence of semipatrimonial bureaucratic organizations, and of ruling groups characterized by increased rootedness in the institutional substructure of the countryside; the very emergence of this institutional basis of a settled society (one that includes private possession); the experimental elaboration of an increasingly sophisticated administrative 'technology' of appropriation; monetization and the development of financial organization.

This simultaneous, widespread extension of agrarian settlement and emergence of state structure can be observed elsewhere in India, for example in Bengal, Gujerat, and Tamil Nadu. Further research seems likely to demonstrate that the movement was even more generalized (for example, Rajastan, central India, and large parts of the north Indian plains). Further, administrative developments and a progressive process of monetization may be observed

on a wide front from the Mughal empire's territories in northern India to the Bijapur sultanate and Vijayanagar kingdom in the south. The sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were crucial.

The implications are as follows. The state we are examining belongs to a particular epoch of settlement, the long-term development of which transcends, (a) the typological distinctions between different regimes, established in the area at one time or another, and, (b) the severe crises that occasionally punctuated the course of political rule in the region and devastated its socioeconomy. The cyclical theories of Fox and others lack empirical substance. Secondly, the state is integrated in social organization; the disarticulated state hallowed in the historiography and reformulated recently by M.N. Pearson also lacks substance in the evidence (Fox 1971; Pearson 1976). Thirdly, the old regime state in India is the product of the same historical laws of change and systematic social articulation as Europe - we observe no metaphysical distinctions. Finally, therefore, a major reinterpretation of South Asian history is required in order to reassess the comparative significance of the states of the old regime. This in turn requires a serious research effort to add to a body of knowledge that, despite presumptions to the contrary, has never been sufficient for the task of understanding the nature of the precolonial state.

Such reconstruction must take account of the simultaneous expansion of Europe into Asia. The latter implies caution before too hasty a comparison between the feudal-like societies of seventeenth to eighteenth-century India and the feudal systems of medieval Europe. What is clearly a casualty, however, is the whole nexus of thought, common right across the nineteenth and twentieth-century ideological spectrum, of which the Asiatic mode of production has been merely representative.

2. AN INITIAL DILEMMA

Let us begin with the dilemma that faced this researcher. In the eighteenth century there is abundant evidence of a powerful complex articulating social relationships in the Deccan countryside, and which clearly evolved over a much longer period than the life of the Maratha polity alone. Further evidence shows that this system of rights and class organization was the product of an evolu-

tion that had by no means come to a halt. Thus the sense of relative antiquity and legalism, and simultaneously, a sense of dynamism and recent origins: the first, in opposition to the convention that each polity established its own organizational laws upon a tabula rasa, continuously wiped clean by conquest and despotism; the second, in opposition to the apparently unchanging permanence of precolonial India since classical times.

Of the first, cyclic theories - theories in which cyclic forces are assumed as dominant, or as the only forces acting on society are currently representative. However, the cycle merely displaces 'despotism', as a source of explanation, from human agency to the more abstract realm of a 'social force' (which has all the Cartesian immunity from human interference possessed by a natural, or deific force). A recent example is Fox's interpretation of the history of areas of Rajput settlement in northern India in terms of developmental cycles. Conceptually, every cycle, and every locus of the cycle, is autonomous. Its too-narrow factual base is in fact the condition that permits the cycle (as a movement excluding other forms of process) to be formulated, as do all formulations of Indian history built upon the axiom of its unchangingness. This is equally the case, therefore, in views that place the emphasis on the kaleidoscopic, nondevelopmental, random character of Indian history. Van Leur's views of Asian history are representative: 'Almost every time one reads one of Moreland's sound, excellent chapters (Moreland 1974 [1920]), the questions arise: How did such technological and organizational forms come into existence?...If one considers the circumstances of the 'historical milieu' then it becomes apparent that they for the most part remained almost the same down through the centuries' (Van Leur 1967: 23; also Baden-Powell 1913: 76). Ashin Das Gupta's comment on this is exemplary: 'This...hypothesis...in one form or another has come to be widely accepted. But from what we know of Indian developments, the hypothesis is not yet testable' (Das Gupta 1977: 2). It is important to note that these views were not only axiomatic to Third World historiography in general, but continue to be so among a substantial body of sociologists concerned with Europe's own internal Third World, its peasantries. Their deep cultural (and popular) basis (possibly integral to the positivistic philosophy of the nineteenth century) is the reason we accord them an epistemological status. Recent

works by Dirks (1978) and Pearsan (1976) demonstrate the current persistence of this epistemology (Perlin 1980, section 2 (b) for more extensive discussion).

3. AGRARIAN SETTLEMENT AND A STRUCTURE OF DOMINANCE

Fragmentary but conclusive evidence suggests that settlement in the Deccan expanded progressively between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries – a long-term perspective transcending the severe crises which occasionally emptied the countryside. From the time when the Bahmani sultanate fragmented into a series of smaller sultanates ruling the Deccan, agrarian settlement spread and established its institutional basis (Sontheimer 1975: 147ff.; Robertson 1820: 409ff.; and the following discussion).³ Bound up with this growth, there occurred the construction of a class society and ever more elaborate mechanisms of rule. By implication the massive and transitory territorial dominions of the Delhi and Bahmani sultanates in the Deccan were at best foundedaround nucleated arable settlements of the type discussed by Stein, isolated amidst immense pastoral and even unutilized tracts (Stein 1969: 179-188). Thus the ease with which conquest and dominion were accomplished, and fragmentation followed. The process of growth and spread of population — the virtual colonization of the subcontinent by peasant-based social orders – and the parallel fragmentation of political authority into viable territorially organized structures of rule can also be seen in Bengal from the fifteenth century and elsewhere (e.g., for Bengal: Inden, 1976: 2, 151; Mukherjee 1938; Sanyal 1977, 1978. For Gujerat: Hardiman 1979: 20, 26-27; Breman 1974: 26, 28. Central India: Chambard, 1975. Kahndesh: Paranzape 1979: 2. Northern India: Habib 1974: 299; Moreland 1974: 20-22; Moosvi 1977. Oudh and Nepal frontier region: Gazetteer Oudh: 176ff. Tamil Nadu: Stein 1969. But see note 7). In south India the process is registered by the formation of the Vijayanagar empire in the fourteenth century (Stein 1969: 188ff.). Stein explains this in terms of a migrant aristocracy's political ambitions for hegemony, but this neglects the basic prerequisite underlying such political expansion, that of long term societal growth. We reject a purely 'Malthusian' explanation for such population growth and coloniza-

tion. Nor does its cause lie in one or another factor, but rather in the holistic character of state formation, especially in the coterminous development and elaboration of taxation and other obligations serving to stimulate a need for increased production (thus land to produce on) and larger labor input (thus increased family size and more complex social organization).⁴

The development of systems of obligation was formatively corrected with the emerging private interests of ruling groups and their entrepreneurial attitudes to rural colonization (compare with well researched medieval Europe: Duby 1968, bk. 2, ch. I; Duby 1974, pt. IV; Hilton 1973: 43; Hilton 1978: 6). The development of state bureaucracy and private lordly organization were neither mutually exclusive nor confined to two different stages of a In this agrarian society private and state interests developed simultaneously and in terms of one another. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries many of the major families, who would eventually dominate the Maratha state, developed their power base. At first, this base was narrow and itinerant (correlating with the little-settled character of the region) but over time they accumulated hereditary properties and offices while serving the various Deccan courts as administrative officers and military Thus the Bhosles, who assumed the Maratha kingship in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, shifted residence from Patas tarf, in what is now Pune District, to Verul (Ellora) in Aurangabad District, to Bangalore several hundred miles to the south, to Supe, also in the Pune region. This trail was littered with accumulated properties of different kinds. The Nimbkars (ancestors of a member of the small ruling elite of the eighteenth century) showed a similar pattern of mobility, accumulation, and service to different political orders (Rajvade, no. 266). Ziegler (1978) provides evidence of similar tendencies among Rajputs.

By the eighteenth century the establishment of villages in the heartlands of the Maratha polity was complete, colonization having become a largely internal matter. As population and village life spread, so the interests of these powerful families extended through the territories held by the courts they served and intensified in those regions where they settled. When in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Maratha regimes are constituted, it is at the behest of a small class whose particular interests have come sufficiently to coincide. It is important to

emphasize that the emerging structure of properties — peasant-held and lordly — was of a widespread precapitalist kind. Major holders of rights in the eighteenth century possessed dispersed fractional properties intermingled in the same territories, even in the same villages or fields. Relative (but fragile) coincidence of interests on the macrolevel of state consolidation is understandable, therefore, even if a good deal of social conflict occurred at the local level. 'Clan territories' are not in evidence.

But this generalization requires qualification. While state formation is indeed strictly dependent upon the emergence of such social networks of rural dominance, the members of families concerned frequently shifted their loyalties from one political center to another, while in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many Marathas continued to serve the Mughal and sultanate courts, in conflict with the breakaway Maratha kingdom. Frequently, members of the same family are found in battle against one another.⁵ What is remarkable is that the properties so accumulated - both assigned and hereditary - were likely to remain with them, despite shifting loyalties and places of settlement. Ziegler's evidence confirms similar tendencies in Rajastan (Ziegler 1978: 217-223). The implication is that the evolution of these social groupings, like that of the structure of rights itself, transcended the momentary maps of particular political configurations in the Deccan. More generally, the organizational structures of society thereby set in motion by such larger-order configurations, occupied a space inclusive of a plurality of individual polities (contiguous and successive), as also of competing realms of local polity and empire.

These long-term features of class development, together with a remarkable general development in the apparatus of state rule and of the administrative 'technology' of appropriation, can be observed in much of the subcontinent between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Habib, however, captures a less obvious but especially significant dimension of the process: the general emergence of a highly variegated rural class structure, which we have just seen in the particular instance of the Deccan. It is from the later fifteenth century that the terms zamindar and rajput begin to assume their characteristically ubiquitous reference for the dominant rural classes over so much of India (Habib 1974: 297, 309). In our view, the emergence of the zamindar (and its

ideological derivative, rajput) – lord over landed rights – can only be conceived of in terms of the equally ubiquitous emergence of a zamin or land to be lorded over; we mean of course the artificial fabric of a populated, peasant-based society referred to above. In the Deccan, close study reveals a long-term unfolding of the layers of institutional complexity which came to characterize the state: most interesting is the essentially dualistic character of the emerging system of properties, directly reflecting the equally dualistic development of an institutional base for production relations among the peasantry and of a system of rule whereby that production might best be tapped. On the one hand, there developed a complex body of hereditary, private properties, associated with a contingent ideology of dispersed, hereditary, inherent 'sovereignties' (a collectivist theory of 'sovereignty', therefore); on the other hand, there also developed a body of nonhereditary revertible rights, held by grace of the court and thus part of a household-ordered descending pattern of rule and authority (and 'sovereignty'). Both bodies possessed their own specific organizational characteristics and both focused on the same fields, villages, and It is not a case of one property form emerging to replace the other but of both developing as related products of an holistic development, bound together in an embrace fraught with contradiction. The transformation of the territorial fiscal domain of the court (as contrasted with territorial rights assigned to its chief retainers) from a tight band centered around the capital (as under the Delhi and Gujerat sultanates, for example), into the Mughal/Maratha type in which the courtly lands were distributed fractionally through the length and breadth of the polity, interspersed with alienated rights in office, land, and taxation, may also have registered crucial moments of this longterm process of progressive agrarian colonization of waste (Habib 1974: 291, for Delhi Sultanate and Mughals; Forbes 1856, II: 272, for Gujerat Sultanate; Perlin 1978 for Marathas; Moosvi 1977, map 104-105 for the focusing of densest settlement around Agra in 1595). By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when severe crisis once more hit the Deccan, this process of institutional, class, and state development had proceeded so far that subsequent recovery merely witnessed the repeopling of an older construction.

To make a further qualification, Hilton describes the polarized

structure of class dominance characteristic of medieval England: a tiny elite of powerful men with interests dispersed all over the territories of the Anglo-Norman kingdom – a truly centralized ruling class although with clearly defined local properties (lands and administrations); secondly, a more locally confined lordly class, relatively less powerful, less wealthy, partly subordinated to the former, but nevertheless having a relation of dominance over the peasantry (Hilton 1973: 44-45; for seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, Blum 1978: 24; for the Mughal elite, Habib 1974: 304-305). In Maharashtra, a similar differentiation of the ruling class can be discerned, but in this case political order appears to be characterized by an uneasy and unstable compromise between these two elements, and a tendency for the grandees further to subordinate their lesser peers, and exacerbate their progressive decline. In short, the emergence of a ruling class able to rule involved subtle social developments and conflicts, processes of rise and decline amongst various groups attempting in their various ways to root themselves in the countryside.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE 'TECHNOLOGY', SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT, AND A QUESTION OF THE WORLD MARKET

We spoke of the development of a sophisticated administrative 'technology' after the sixteenth century. The various land surveys and tax reforms instituted by the great administrators are well known features of medieval political economy, but when studied in the confines of a particular region we find them to be simply important moments in an almost irrepressible surge of experimentation and reform in the means of administering the countryside during these centuries. Early evidence of such 'survey assessments' take us back to a crucial phase in the development of the Delhi sultanate in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries when internal construction and imperial expansion ran hand in hand (Habib 1974: 288; Hardy 1978: 195). A partly monetized taxation system also existed in this early period and given the sparse settlement of the dominions of the sultanate, money may perhaps be seen as possessing a special function in the articulation of imperial revenues and resources between nuclear areas and provincial capitals. But it is from the late

fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries, when agrarian settlement becomes more extensive and generates new and comparatively advanced forms of economic activity, that the process of experimentation becomes relatively frequent and ubiquitous. In the Deccan a steady process of survey and resurvey (as villages expanded their internal control, and increased in number), of modification in the composition of taxation, and increase in the scale of demand, is discernible. Robertson's splendid reconstruction of the process gives evidence of the slow increase in the role of money in the composition of the tax demand, of the carefully structured development of the demand to include a small but important element of cash cropping, and of increase in the tax weight both per unit of production and per unit of territory (Robertson 1820). In the late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries this process is accompanied in the southern half of the subcontinent by the transformation of a largely gold-based monetary system into one based predominantly on silver - a process that occurred stage by stage through the Deccan and in much of the south, and which, while stimulated (even organized) by Mughal conquest, was by no means merely a function of it; thus more complex causes are discernible, as we shall see below (Brennig 1977: 13-18, for the transition in Kandesh and north Deccan; Richards 1975: 135-137 for Golconda; abundant and varied documentation in Pune Archives for Marathas, e.g., village documents).

Two important observations should be made concerning this: (1) that such developments effectively transcended regime-based divisions: (a) in the western Deccan this series of rational changes is produced at the behest of a progression of succeeding regimens; (b) the most important of them occur almost simultaneously (relatively speaking) in the widely dispersed territories of different states. While large-scale borrowing of precedents and ideas was clearly involved, it is the generally felt need for them and their general application that is most significant. Thus reforms supposedly pioneered by the Mughal administrator, Todar Mal, in the 1590s, in widely dispersed parts of the Mughal Empire (parts of Bihar and Gujerat, for example) were not only further extended (thus Khandesh), but in the early seventeenth century also formed the basis for innovations instituted in the territories of at least one Deccan sultanate, and later under the Marathas (Grover 1961

for Bihar; Robertson 1820: 409 for Ahmednagar; Paranzape 1979: 2 for Kandesh; Sen 1925: 77 for Marathas.⁶

(2) These were but items in a long process of governmental adaptation to changing agrarian and economic conditions throughout much of the subcontinent. We argue that increased rates and intensity of taxation were not simply a result of despotic will and efficiency of control, but were rather a response to more impersonal forces connected with the development of society and with the particular history of the times, mediated, for example, through such institutional phenomena as price movements. The course of prices in late medieval India is disputed but the evidence does seem to lie on the side of a general process of inflation overriding fluctuational elasticities in the old agrarian and military political economy. We shall see the reason for focusing on this question in the course of the section.

The implications of such developments go beyond merely administrative aspects. The form and intensity of peasant obligations affected the social organization of agrarian life as much as its quality. Equally, the content and kinds of economic activity characterizing life in the polity at large were also powerfully influenced by the manner in which rural production was tapped and the product monetized.

Looked at from a larger perspective, however, there is reason to view the development and functioning of governmental organization, forms of political and military rule, lordly household establishments, types of obligation and the modes of their appropriation, and finally, even predatory raiding, as being in turn crucially dependent upon the simultaneous evolution of a sophisticated financial and monetary organization, operating on a much more widespread basis than that of any one particular polity. Thus by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries credit institutions were operating in town and countryside, financing not only the chronic indebtedness of nobility and peasantry in the long-term but also their daily economic functioning, providing both with the means to ride out seasonal, annual and other fluctuations in local conditions. Urban finance firms fueled the expenses of administration and warfare while at the same time involving themselves in the mechanisms of grain extraction and its subsequent monetization (e.g., Perlin 1978: 191 and Kulkarni 1973 for Marathas; Habib 1969 and Grover 1962 for

Mughals; van Santen 1979 for V.O.C. use of indigenous institutions; evidence for Marathas is much more abundant than the references suggest). Payment forms may even have provided the permissive medium in which predatory raiding could function on a wide scale. Thus when the Marathas fell upon the villages of Gujerat, far from extracting ready money or kind (which would have immobilized them) they obtained bonds from local bankers 'payable in any part of India' (by implication honored even when the Marathas had retreated) (Forbes 1856, II: 49-50).

By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this organization was sufficiently elaborate to link up the purely local movements of grain-laden bullocks in the backward Maharashtran countryside, Mughal finance at Agra for making war at Kandahar, and the credit needed by the Dutch East India Company to purchase goods for export from Surat, in any particular year. It is difficult to believe, moreover, that the particular kinds of political, military, social, fiscal, and administrative organization witnessed in the subcontinent at this time, could have functioned without this provision of money and credit, thus of the institutional bases of finance and trade underlying it. Such a hypothesis requires intensive research, yet it flows from close familiarity with the organization of one particular polity, and from numerous casual, but unsynthesized references in primary and secondary sources.

Given these arguments, the fundamental implications of the transition to a silver economy, and of long-term inflation, become manifest. For in precisely this period, we witness the increasing import into India of substantial amounts of silver and copper from Europe and East Asia. Vilar sees the import of silver as having provided a new stability to late sixteenth-century political order in India, while Robertson viewed it as having indirectly stimulated a new eighteenth-century phase of important adjustments in relations between the state and its exploitable medium the countryside (Vilar 1976: 96; Robertson 1820: 426). These are simply two of a handful of provocative hypotheses — not all in agreement with one another, and essentially unsynthesized — but which suggest the importance of a domain of interaction, the study of which has been remarkably neglected.⁷

The role of European expansion and the complex set of relationships developed between trade in Asia, specie production in South America and Japan, and the holistic transformation of society in Europe, are thus, arguably, intimately bound up — to a certain and relative extent — with the process of experimentation and development of administrative technology in the hinterland polities of India. What is thus hypothetically possible is that this process of internal bureaucratic development expresses changes taking place on a world scale. The question of these relationships promises to become one of the great historical debates of the future, in which much blood will surely be let. Suffice it to say for the present that monetization and its composition (the changeover to silver) is only one of a whole series of powerful general affects which European activities on the coastal littoral of India (despite their apparent modesty and their highly particularistic appearance) may have had within the subcontinent between the sixteenth century and the eve of conquest.

These problems require a new kind of intensive research. European expansion may have affected levels of accumulation of wealth, political stability, and even the development of certain institutions, long before the world market can be said to have 'absorbed' the territories involved. Certainly, by the eighteenth century we can see it as having stimulated a similar process of political federalization (fragmentation of central authority) to that which Wilks has described in the case of Asante in the late nineteenth century: far from the permanent condition of African or Indian political life – observed on the eve of conquest and since developed into an orthodoxy - it is likely to have been an accumulative consequence of European penetration (Terray 1977: 317). If so we would no longer be able to avoid viewing such shifts as powerfully influenced by developments in the structure of the growing world market of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.8

5. THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE AND A FEUDALISTIC ORDER

This long term development in the administrative physiognomy of the Indian state was accompanied by the emergence of the feudalistic (not feudal — we cannot presume so much at this stage) political sociology of power and private interest which underlay the articulation of state, social class, and property. The administrative process, identified above in terms of larger state

organizations, also occurred on the level of the lordly household, the rise of which we again closely identified with the very emergence of the state. It is evidenced by the abundant production of private documentation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries dealing with the exploitation of lordly properties. In this respect there is, between the lords of courts and kings, a similitude only broken by differences of scale, the rule of a king resulting from the greater success of one among the conquering lordly households of the time (although growth in scale could ultimately involve additions of bureaucratic attributes).

Once again we emphasize the interconnections: a settled territory is an object of rule; an administrative technology is a means to rule; the growth of a ruling class and its private interests is inseparable from the process of rule. It is this firm administrative basis that makes territorial rule by successful conquerors so frequently and easily accomplished. The stock of tools out of which administrations and power systems could be constructed was sufficiently a part of the collective mentality of the age, and sufficiently flexible, for every unit of political power to develop its own characteristics and for rulers to indulge in virtual orgies of creative construction during the course of their rule. Shivaji, the first Maratha king, indulged himself twice in this way, and the differences in administrative organization between the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Maratha polities are clearly significant in this respect. Looked at differently, in terms of the effects on the agrarian base of such different developments, regional differences characterizing the system of rights and found throughout Maratha territories evinced not only the subtleties of a complex and differential local history - of a multitude of neighborly and overlayered local developments – but also that the Maratha regime had emerged and grown at the expense of a plurality of major political orders whose shifting but common frontier lay precisely and facilitatively in this very region – a fact which we have already seen to be the basis of the long-term emergence of the Maratha ruling class (Fukazawa 1963).

Here it is worth making a brief comparison with Ziegler's excellent analysis of Rajput political developments. His material is exemplary and his interpretation of great interest, but it is weakened by neglect of the agrarian base, and thus — as in the case of Stein — of the underlying social dimension of the changes

he describes (a society to be ruled). Given this addition, his analysis strikingly confirms and supplements our general thesis of an epoch of long-term holistic developments, transcending crises and changes of rule, and together composing a distinctive set of subcontinentwide, societal developments to be carefully set apart from that which had gone before.

Thus it is in the late fifteenth century that so many of the genealogical 'founders' of Rajput houses are located, and in the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries that lord-client relationships begin rapidly to replace those of kinship as the basis of social organization, causing simultaneously a shift in the structural character of landed rights. 'By the early 17th century... we see the first true Rajput "states"...in the sense that there was a defined and institutionalized locus of power...', while the 'process of transforming relationships on the land also included the increasing bureaucratization of these relationships as administrative procedures became more sophisticated in these local kingdoms' (Ziegler 1978: 223ff.). What we detect beneath all this — which Ziegler sees as fostered by delegations of Mughal authority to local rulers — is the peasantization of extensive tracts beyond the old nuclear-settled areas.

The simultaneity of these developments with those which occurred independently to the south is particularly significant. In the mid-seventeenth century Shivaji's kingdom slowly takes form, and it is significant, in the light of Habib's theory (Section 3 above), that Shivaji and other powerful warrior families claimed raiput ancestry. While grants of ostensibly temporary, fiscal rights over assigned territories, issued by the Mughal and sultanate courts, served as a means to absorb and stabilize these local princelings, they were simultaneously the instrument whereby more localized political orders evolved. What Ziegler sees as a shift towards localization of political power and of extended control over access to land, must also be seen as the development of that social infrastructure of economy and society in terms of which local exercise of power and control of land became meaningful. In Maharashtra we find abundant evidence of the simultaneous development of sophisticated ideologies of property, in respect of which 'earlier' kin- and clan-based idioms of social organization, such as are described by Ziegler for the Rajputs, were not so much replaced as absorbed into quite new uses

appropriate to a property system in which relationships of blood kinship were secondary, and which thus completely transcended the actual operations of kin (thus Perlin 1979). As this egalitarian property ideology of social bonding evolved so also did the inegalitarian welter of lordship and clientship.⁹

Given a general absence of serfdom in the Deccan, there is much at this level comparable at first sight with the medieval West: the fluid character of political frontiers and of the territories they included, in a similarly embryonic context of social and political formation (see, for example, Le Patourel 1965, 1971); the parcelization and distribution of authorities that permitted large territories with poorly developed communications to be managed and defended. The tendency for delegated rights of authority to develop into princely autonomies on the distant peripheries; the general military basis of society; the growth of a special administrative personnel, constituting an alternative mode of upward social mobility, and common to regimes varying in cultural predisposition.

Territorial relationships between different polities possessed the characteristic forms of the property system, but on the largest of possible scales. Thus at their edges territorial jurisdictions began to intermingle, while the revenues of some regions — sometimes of whole polities — might' well be shared, both parties more than likely organizing their own administrations in the regions concerned. This closely mirrored the tendency of military leaders in the Deccan to hold properties under the jurisdiction of more than one power, and of each holder of fiscal rights in a particular locus to have his own collectorate, a plurality of such collectors descending on the countryside at harvest time. A further point is that political order was obtained by pushing out the frontier of crisis, thus the Maratha polity emerged on just such a frontier, shifting crisis outwards into Khandesh and elsewhere, husbandmen thence migrating into the 'charmed circle'.

Turning to the military basis of these polities, it is the 'service' of clients, employees and retainers that provided the lordly household with its special political organization and courtly character, setting it in portentous conflict with other more egalitarian forms of organization simultaneously operating in the societies concerned. Ziegler also testified to this formative characteristic in the case of Rajastan. Speaking generally, this was

organized around provision of personal loyalties and troops (and administrative service) in exchange for assigned properties. Such armies were privately recruited and maintained, assignations providing the costs of service and a personal maintenance of an expected standard. Given this principle of organization there was wide variation in the manner in which it was actually realized. That of the Mughals is particularly famous, and the rich literature dealing with it is responsible for much misunderstanding concerning the articulation of political order in the Indian state. It is Habib again who has cleared away a good deal of the dross surrounding this discussion (Habib 1963: 136-138; see Ali 1968 on the assignments system). Ideally, the Mughal imperial system maintained rapid mobility between service holders and assigned properties, in order to inhibit the formation of local roots and loyalties. In fact things were more complex, with rooted hereditary systems of reward coexisting tightly with temporary grants, and with a more complex sociology of dominance articulating relationships between courts and territories (operating side by side with peripatetic members of the Mughal nobility). The uneasy absorption of Rajput loyalties into the Mughal empire is merely a particularly strong manifestation of a process widely distributed throughout Mughal territories which greatly complicates the once simple historiographic juxtapositions of peripatetic noble (jagirdar) against peasantry (Ali 1968; Richards 1975; Ziegler 1978; also Forbes 1856, vol. I). In Maratha territories temporary service alienations were equally important, but they were more overtly accepted as heritable – a practice also discernible among Raiputs (Ziegler 1978). Moreover, they were always combined with properly heritable properties (Perlin 1978).

Finally, this consideration of ruling class and state formation must take account of an additional, important, and widespread development: that of the growth of a specialized and highly differentiated, 'indigenous' administrative personnel found increasingly to people the administrative departments of household and court from the late fifteenth century on. These administrators often rose to high positions in the state, competing with the military elites, even taking upon themselves the prestigious warrior roles characterizing the latter, and assuming their own positions among the developing ruling classes of the polity. They were ubiquitous: in the Bahmani and subsequent Deccan sultanates; in

the Gujerat sultanate; in the court administration of the Maratha polity; in all the greater and lesser administrations of lordly and princely control among the Marathas. Certainly, the financial accounts of these lordly households demonstrate the abundant secondary activities performed by these men — managers, accountants, heads of department — who in their private capacity are frequently seen to have established their own more or less complex property relationships in the countryside.

In general, however, they were heavily dependent upon the organizing factor of the military household, except where they managed to set up similar households themselves, with an independent rural base, or to shift laterally into other but interdependent types of activity such as finance. Of course, it was generally the case that such different kinds of activity were severally found in the hands of such families.

These specialists are singular indications of the development we are chronicling. The rapid spread of administrative ideas must surely have been stimulated by their extraordinary mobility, since like their military peers they seemed little concerned with the cultural or religious affiliations of the regimes they served. The emergence of the Maratha state and its peculiar brand of bureaucratic innovation is likely to have been heavily dependent upon the nexus of experience and skills already accumulated by these different segments of the ruling class.

The corollary of this feudalistic power structure is that patrimonial styles of administration coexisted beside, inhabited, and even drove the bureaucratic systems of state control. While there were severe problems of order among members of this dominant class (so much so that Heesterman (1978) has aptly formulated the problem in terms of an inner frontier of conflict), some of these bureaucratic systems were nevertheless designed to manage both the limited domains of court-held (thus unalienated) territories, and to run parallel systems of check and control within temporarily assigned service territories. This was characteristic of both the Mughal system and the Maratha, and yet the initial point concerning the realities of power (and a large body of evidence for the western Deccan) shows this to have been a relative ideal, much less likely to have affected the powerful princely elite of the state than the minor military chiefs and administrators (if even them). In sum we might describe the system as semipatrimonial: a term emphasizing the interdependence of dispersed household authorities with the elaborate bureaucratic organizations considered above.

Finally, as we have seen, military activity and personal power were founded on an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure providing systems of credit and finance; local networks of trade maintaining grain distribution in an unstable preindustrial economy; long-distance trade to fuel the increasingly widespread centers of conspicuous lordly consumption as well as to fuel the economy with metals for use as currency; an eruption of greater and lesser urban conglomerations; an increasingly complex network of intermediaries. Habib has brilliantly analyzed the structural characteristics of this kind of economy for the case of the Mughal empire and we shall not give details here (Habib 1969). Suffice it to say that economic development, the development of the feudalistic power structure, that of the bureaucratic propensities of the state, and the fundamental processes of monetization of the economic base, should not be broken down into factors which are modern and corrosive, on the one hand, and archaic on the other (factors doomed to be corroded). Rather they may be viewed as interdependent developments of a holistic process (which even includes population growth as one of its integral factors: caused, as well as causing), inclusive of profound contradictions within the emerging system. We do not find harmonious structures in which function and need slot neatly together. 10

6. CULTURAL CORRELATIONS

We have referred to ideologies of property and sovereignty connected with the social and political aspects of state formation. Also from the late fifteenth century, fine schools of painting emerged in many parts of India associated with Deccan, Mughal, Rajput, and other major and minor royal courts. What we wish to stress is the extraordinary simultaneity of these processes in spite of the political fragmentation of the subcontinent. In addition, movements against religious orthodoxy (bhakti, sufism, etc.) arose, which despite early roots in some regions, assumed particularly widespread forms only from the sixteenth century on.

These movements had a populist base and were contemporaneous (even associated) with new religious cults, vernacular literatures, and new and extensive temple building in the countryside. Most interesting is the support given to bhakti and sufi 'saints' (in some cases a close collaboration) by emerging lordships, most notably by Akbar in the late sixteenth century and Shivaji in the seventeenth century. In addition, urban traders and financiers seem to have been particularly susceptible to bhakti (at least to certain currents covered by this useful but catch-all term). If then the nature of its populist character requires social definition there remains good reason to ask questions concerning its relationship with the powerful movements of state formation and growth occurring simultaneously (Richards 1978: 256-257; Zelliott 1976; Mukhia 1978: 448-449, 451; Hardiman 1979: 41ff.).

So far as an indisputably popular religious worship is concerned, it can be shown in the Deccan to have had a distinctly pastoralist character before the fifteenth century, connected with temples now in relative disuse in the countryside (Sontheimer 1975). Similarly, Sanyal's excellent essays on long trends in Bengali temple building suggest that only from the late fifteenth century was temple building taken up again on a relatively large scale, and that peasantish influences began markedly to affect temple architecture and decoration (Sanyal 1977, 1978). Scattered but abundant data suggests similar architectural developments in Gujerat; it is reflected not only in village temple building but in reconstructions and additions to older temple complexes (as also the case in Maharashtra, for example at Jejuri and Kolhapur) (Mate 1962; Sontheimer 1975: 147-148). Finally, in the Deccan, the emerging character of dominant relationships and the stabilization of political rule is reflected in the still extant remains of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century secular architecture, distributed widely in the towns and villages of the countryside and evidence of an availability of skilled and unskilled labor inconceivable on such a general scale before the seventeenth century.

Even when turning to such apparently unchanging and pervasive institutions as caste, evidence appears in at least one region, Bengal, of serious structural modification and development, correlating with political, demographic, and other changes affecting society at the same time. Ziegler implies similarly structural modifications in the case of Rajastan, while in medieval Ma-

harashtra contemporary forms of social organization developed which cut right across those characteristic of caste and varna (Inden 1976; Ziegler 1978; Perlin 1979; Gune 1953: 54, n. 15; evidence in Chambard 1975). This popular dimension of medieval life has yet to be recognized, let alone researched.

Finally, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (depending on region) a widespread documentation of private and state interests emerged, the products of all manner of wealth-accumulating households; of the administrative establishments of kingly and imperial courts; and of legal institutions regulating the property system on which the whole nexus of social relationships had come to be based (Ziegler 1978: 227; Gune 1953).

7. CONCLUSION

In all this, however, we require great sensitivity to the ever present danger that 'Clever Hans' may have prompted our answers (Sebeok 1978: 1041). But in our view the evidence is too dense and too varied to escape the view that the political economy existing on the eve of European occupation was the product of a long process of evolution, in which even the expanding world market — long cut off by a secondary epistemological cordon sanitaire — may have played a not insignificant part.

Moreover, evidence of change does not lie merely in circumstantial associations of different events arranged chronologically. An empirical and comparative study of rural institutions and of their actual (rather than definitional) use by contemporaries, permits the reconstruction of sequential runs of cause and effect (provisionally in Perlin 1979). A case study of property change in the western Deccan has shown that properties were being accumulated in the hands of precisely that class of increasingly powerful men who had taken hold of the helm of government during this period, subtle institutional modifications being introduced in order to accommodate them. The implications of such individual instances of change lay in a slow, partial, but profound mutation in the hallowed structure of hereditary rights, secondly in an alteration in the ordering of the countryside in favor of new kinds of lordly relationships of dominance. Most important, these changes transcended the great crisis of the late seventeenth, early

eighteenth century in the Deccan - they were even accelerated by it.

For us the implication is that the state is inherently transitional. There is no stage, as such, when processes of transformation cease and a particular structure finally takes root until the next 'demonic' undoing. Further, state formation in late medieval India is one that transcends substitutions in political rule - in the Deccan the emergence of the eighteenth-century state begins in the fifteenth century at the latest, and includes a whole series of different phases of rule each of which had a formative role in its construction. The sophisticated kingdoms of the Marathas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the historical realizations of these processes. This is not to argue a theory of inevitability but of the essential character of historical process in understanding any social organization perceived synchronically. In my own case this long-term interpretation of events in the Deccan provided contextualization for structures and processes observable in evidence from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, introducing order and an otherwise absent source of comprehension to the latter.

Nor does this imply that such transitional systems must escape classification. The task of correctly formulating the comparative relationships between state systems in different parts of the world is important, but we need sufficient evidence and sensitivity to the problems involved in order to escape the traps of our own epistemological predispositions. Thus the observation of a changing and holistically structured agrarian order implies reversal of the old terms of comparison and contrast; secondly, the possible role of European expansion and of the developed monetary systems of medieval India (operating on a scale clearly transcending the frontiers of particular polities) implies a level of connection that must on final assessment supersede any temptation to identify the feudalistic regimes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century India with the feudal societies of medieval Europe. In the case of India, moreover, we still lack sufficient evidence; the traps are full of victims. The despotic rulers of precolonial India are not the rajas, sultans or the Grand Mughal, who despite ambitions contended with a refractory population, lordly and peasant; rather they are the representatives of an increasingly discredited epistemological idiom.

8. POSTSCRIPT

What does this argument claim for the position of the peasantry during these several centuries? Firstly, that whatever autonomy they are seen to possess was formed in relationship to a larger order - they are interpreted as a class and not as a society or economy, constituting a varied sociological medium which evolved as one pole of a complex and changing set of relationships of production. Land – or, rather, the institutional definition of the means of access to land - is a dimension of state formation seen in the long term. As a class, the peasantry generated institutional forms in contradiction with others developing simultaneously in the same society: popular collective sovereignties as against lordly descending sovereignties; the two forms of property related to this dual development, inherent and dependent; the penetration of the two, whereby the former provided access to lordly ambitions and to a renewed development of lordly forms of power, possessing significant structural implications. contradictory relationships, emerging from a holistic phase of epochal development, comprise a substantial dimension of the motive forces driving society into new forms. This is no stable state: state (political, social) is not state (physical).

Finally, we were tempted to compare political development and societal growth, and certain important institutional developments, with events in Europe in medieval times. But what makes it different is precisely the question of chronology (the fact that in the task of synthesis one eventually reaches a moment at which comparison and connection are no longer isolable problems). In India we are referring to a phase of growth coterminous with the epoch of European transformation and expansion: the growth of the world market. The implications of this relationship — especially with respect to the highly developed mercantile economy of medieval India — have yet to be examined, let alone understood.

NOTES

'Successor state' refers to the various polities emerging from the ruins
of the Mughal empire; briefly, we argue that the state is a long-term
development transcending different regimes in time and space. 'Feuda-

listic' is used to describe societies in which militaristic, patrimonial, and parcelized authorities, based on fractional property forms, have a crucial role in their organization; 'feudal' defines the nature of a society, mode of production, the fianl synthesis. It is time to reinstate European history as an appropriate basis for comparison and contrast with precolonial Asia, not merely because of descriptive similarities and the realm of connection, but because it is the only densely worked, extensively debated history of preindustrial societies available. 'Empire' and 'imperial' are used according to the convention of Indianist historiography, and generally refer to broad, expansive hegemonies subsuming smaller once independent polities. Here, I distinguish between earlier extensive empire, and a later intensive phase. Finally, I use current regional names to facilitate comprehension by non-Indianists (thus Rajastan instead of Mewar).

- 2. The two seminal essays on the subject are Habib (1974), a remarkable work of synthesis, unique in the historiography, and Ziegler (1978), a brilliant reconstruction of lordship and kingship in one particular case. Stein (1969) is important for tracing the chronology of expansion. I reject the explanatory utility of Fox and Stein's 'segmentary state' as too tolerant of difference (Alur and Rajputs in a single category!), too neutral with regard to social and economic organization, and too insensitive to history (e.g., Fox 1971).
- Data from my research will appear in my thesis; seventeenth-and eighteenth-century documentation is abundant on property, administration, and finance, and suggestive concerning the long-term movement to arable.
- The missing (and crucial) dimension in Blum (1978) and the Past & Present Symposium debate, but surely less a question of one or another preeminent factor as of locating an appropriate level of synthesis.
- Notable examples in the Maratha-Adil Shahi wars being the Bhosles, Ghorpades, and Karad Yadavs. See Ziegler (1978) for comparison and discussion.
- 6. The problem here, and more generally concerning the whole wastearable movement is that a multitude of significant facts are scattered in works that take continuity for granted. These have to be acquired piecemeal from gazetteers, settlement reports, and other secondary works. Thus Saletore's extensively documented chapter on Vijayanagar's revenue administration frustrates all attempts to construct a chronology (Saletore 1934, vol. I, ch. 4). Some of the above references are thus merely inferential.
- See Perlin (1980) for discussion of the problem of Western interaction and for earlier historiography; also for the wider Asian context.
- 8. The reverse hypothesis is also valid: that the persistent demand for bullion by the growing socioeconomies of Asia provided a facilitative medium for Western trade and expansion in Asia, suggesting portentous links between developments in different parts of the world. For the importance of copper, see Perlin 1980.

- Ziegler's material does not, however, enable us to decide whether clan
 loyalties are in process of substitution by dyadic lord-client relationships or whether instead they are simultaneous developments of a
 single holistic set of processes (notwithstanding their contradictory
 character), as seems to be the case in Maharashtra.
- Discussion of implications of Mughal decline is omitted here. The chronology, extent, depth, and causation of 'decline' is uncertain and the historiography unhelpful. But see Grover 1962: 137-140.
- 11. '...the Clever Hans Fallacy (after the performing horse of that name) the semiotic phenomenon whereby the destination of a message decisively but unwittingly influences the behaviour of the source...I have seldom come across a more transparent case of unconscious sensory cueing.'

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15 Ways of State Formation in Africa: A Demonstration of Typical Possibilities

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1. INTRODUCTION

It is astonishing and seems at first sight to be a contradiction that Africa, on the one hand, is the continent where in Egypt one of the earliest state formations in the world took place, but where on the other hand, this decisive progress was not repeated in other areas until more than 3000 years later. The explanation for this lies in the following facts:

- Egypt was a place with very favorable conditions. The Nile flood secured the irrigation of the fields and prevented salinization. Having worked out irrigation techniques, man was able to produce a large surplus from agriculture. Besides this, Egypt could benefit by progress made in the Near East from which it received grains for cultivation and animals for cattle breeding. Equally favorable conditions were to be found in no other African area.
- The plants cultivated in Egypt (wheat and barley) could be distributed to very few other places in Africa, such as the north and northeast Africa. In the Sudan zone agriculture could only be invented after the domestication of such African plants as millet and sorghum (cf. Oliver and Fagan 1975: 4). The result was a comparatively late neolithic period in sub-Saharan Africa (cf. Oliver and Fagan 1975: 4, 14 ff.).
- A further decisive factor was the drying up of the Sahara. Since the third millennium B.C. this area became more and more

unfavorable and was only sparsely inhabited by gatherers and hunters. Therefore, the connections between Africa outside the Nile valley and the most progressive areas of the world grew more and more difficult.

- Another very decisive factor was the impossibility of cattle breeding in vast parts of the African continent because of the tsetse fly or (in northern Africa) because of the drying up of the Sahara. Under African conditions without cattle breeding food production was less abundant.
- The transition from Stone Age to Iron Age took place in most African areas without an intermediary Bronze Age. The birth of the Iron Age did not occur until about 500 B.C. (cf. Willett 1971: 14; Mauny 1971: 82; Shinnie 1971: 94), so the distribution of more effective tools and implements took place relatively late.

Since the production of a stable surplus is necessary for the process of state formation (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978: 627 f.), the conditions for the rise of classes and states began to develop outside the Nile valley only during the first millennium B.C.

In the history of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa several stages can be distinguished, each of which was characterized by specific conditions and different grades of maturity in respect to social and political development.

2. FIRST PERIOD (FIRST MILLENNIUM B.C. UNTIL A.D. 500)

During this time the development of class societies and states took place in sub-Saharan Africa independently in two areas: in Axum and Ghana. The transition from ancient society to class society ended in the third century A.D. in Axum and at the beginning of the fourth century A.D. in Ghana. Both processes of state formation were comparable though not identical. Both in Axum and Ghana state formation was prepared by a quick development of the productive forces. In both areas in the first millennium B.C. decisive improvements in agriculture, i.e., in the economically most important sector, took place. In West Africa the improvements concerned terraced agriculture on the hillsides and/or protection against erosion by stone enclosures. At the same time, cattle breeding was extended considerably and contributed to the productivity of agriculture (Berzina 1970: 66). In

northeast Africa these improvements included the introduction of the plough, which made it possible to use draught animals and to cultivate larger areas, and irrigation and water-raising wheels, which increased the productivity of agriculture considerably. These innovations were perhaps introduced by the Sabaeans, who had come in greater numbers into this area since the fifth century B.C. (Kobishchanov 1966: 126; 1978: 153 f.).

The development of the productive forces was also assisted in both areas by the invention of metalworking, first in bronze (which, as we stated, was exceptional in Africa outside the Nile Valley) and since the fifth century B.C. in iron (Davidson 1959: 67; Mauny 1971: 68; Oliver and Fagan 1975: 42). In Axum knowledge of ironworking was disseminated from Meroe (Mauny 1971: 68; Oliver and Fagan 1975: 38), and in West; Africa probably from North Africa (Mauny 1971: 68). As elsewhere in the world, metalworking had to be done by specialists and was therefore connected with the development of a social division of labor. Archeologically, this was reflected by a clear demarcation of the dwelling places of smiths within villages and towns.

The most important consequence of the social division of labor was that the position of men in the process of production began to change. As long as everybody did — with perhaps a few exceptions – the same work, no differences between the members of a society could arise. But now the producers held different positions in the process of production which could be associated with privileges, and therefore with a preferred position for the artisans. However, sometimes the artisans lost their independent position and became attached to the households of the clan This happened if they could not afford to buy expensive raw materials. In such a case they were provided with everything they needed, but everything they produced belonged We have no information about the social to their masters. position of artisans in Ghana and Axum. We only know from other sources what could have happened during this transitional period. In any case, the development of a social division of labor through different ways contributed to fundamental changes in social relations and helped to undermine the egalitarian character of ancient society (cf. Kobishchanov 1978: 155).

A very important factor in the process of state formation in Axum as well as in Ghana was the inclusion in long-distance trading relations. In Axum this was prepared by the Sabaeans, who opened up the area for the trade in ivory, gold, rhinoceros horn, and slaves across the Red Sea. When the Ptolemies gained political power, they became especially interested in this area after the discovery of the direct sea route to India by Eudoxos (115 B.C.). The port of Adulis, a Ptolemaean foundation, became the economically most important place on the shores of the Red Sea (Oliver and Fagan 1975 f; Kobishchanov 1978: 152).

In West Africa the trade in gold was practiced since Carthaginian times (Oliver and Fagan 1975: 48) and more extensively since Roman days (Berzina 1970: 67; Suret-Canale 1966: 154), and remained of vital importance during the whole history of Ghana (cf. Bovill 1958: 68, 82 f.; Mauny 1971: 85; Fage 1959: 20 f.).

If we summarize the previous statements, we find that by improvement of the material productive forces, social divisions of labor, extension of trade relations, and contacts with regions of historical progress, the situation in certain parts of sub-Saharan Africa was fundamentally changed at the beginning of our era. At that time the most important presupposition for the transition to class society and the state gradually came into being: the possibility of producing a stable surplus. At first, this surplus product was commonly consumed, but it soon came to be distributed unequally. Persons bearing a greater responsibility got a preferred position and a greater share of the social wealth. A social upper class was the result of this development.

Just as in other parts of the world, the rise of the upper class was also a very important event in the history of African peoples. It had already taken place in the upper stage of ancient society and contributed decisively to its decline. This upper class developed for several reasons:

- The members of the upper class fulfilled important social tasks: organization of production (especially in irrigation agriculture); organization of trade (securing trade routes, markets, life and personal property of foreign traders; building of trade routes); organization of war (from which they derived the right to a greater or lesser share of the booty); maintenance of public order; fulfilment of religious duties (Kobishchanov 1966: 207, 252 ff.; 1978: 157 f., 160 ff.).
- Their responsibilities demanded their exemption from the necessity of producing their own livelihood. Starting with

presents, every adult member of the community was subsequently forced to contribute to the subsistence of the upper class, either by revenues and/or duties or by labor (Kobishchanov 1966: 147 ff.; Delafosse 1912: 44; Bovill 1958: 62 f.; Suret-Canale 1968: 172, 174).

- Step by step, the members of the upper class accumulated more or less the whole surplus product of the society in their hands. As long as tribal institutions remained intact, the upper class had responsibilities toward their fellow tribesmen. Therefore, in the beginning of this development they were in charge of this social wealth but were not its proprietors. However, when they rendered themselves independent from the public and developed their specific interests, which were more and more opposed to those of their tribesmen, they could use their position to gain complete control over the accumulated social wealth.
- The decisive factor in the whole process was the gaining of political power by members of the upper class. To this fundamental change the following facts contributed: economic necessities, especially with respect to the direction and organization of public works (cf. Kobishchanov 1966: 148 ff.); the growing complexity of social organization because of the formation of larger ethnic units (for instance tribal unions and peoples; cf. Niane and Suret-Canale 1961: 31), which necessitated administrative institutions to which power was delegated (cf. Kobishchanov 1966: 205 ff.; Trimingham 1962: 53); the organization of war (Paulme 1957: 562; Mauny 1971: 85; Delafosse 1912: 41; Kobishchanov 1966: 207), which gave them command over the armed power and promoted their transformation into the ruling class.

The result of this process was the formation of a class society in Axum and Ghana with the character of ancient oriental class society. Its main characteristics are discussed below:

- The most fundamental contradiction existed between the collectively organized ruling class and the producers, who kept direct access to the means of production and who were also collectively organized in village communities (sometimes even tribal structures remained intact, as for instance in Ghana).
- The property relations were characterized by the absence of private property in land.
- The surplus product was extracted from the immediate producers by revenues and duties with the help of extraeconomic

power. Besides this, the peasants were forced to perform public works.

- The monopolization of important branches of the economy was carried on by the head of the state, as for instance the monopoly of all nuggets (cf. Trimingham 1962: 54; Delafosse 1912: 44), which were the most important equivalents of money in the trans-Sahara trade, or a kind of general trading monopoly (Kobishchanov 1978: 157 f.). In societies with irrigation agriculture the control of water was a very important additional monopoly. In Ghana, where shifting cultivation was practiced, the supervision of land distribution in connection with the possibility of enslaving prisoners of war had enabled the head of the state to bring large areas under cultivation (Suret-Canale 1968: 172).
- The concentration of social wealth was in the hands of the head of the state, who redistributed it among the other members of the ruling class according to his own decision (= despotism).

Since the second half of the first millennium, states of this character also came into being in other African regions, for example in Tekur and Kanem. At the end of the millennium, states with the character of ancient oriental class societies were well established in West and northeast Africa.

3. SECOND PERIOD (BEGINNING OF THE SECOND MILLENNIUM A.D.)

3.1. At this time a new category of state, the city-state, developed in Africa. It was to be found among the Yoruba and Hausa peoples (concerning the city-states on the coast of East Africa, see below). In Africa the conditions for the existence of city-states differed in some respects from those in the Near East. Whereas in Mesopotamia urbanization was very closely connected with the organization of irrigation agriculture, and therefore each town formed the economic and administrative center of an irrigation province (Sellnow 1977: 144), in West Africa other reasons must have been decisive. A very important presupposition was the development of a social division of labor. Among the Yoruba as well as among the Hausa, trade and special branches of handicrafts gained strong importance. As elsewhere, these economic activities were concentrated in urbanlike

settlements.

Among the Yoruba the most important crafts were metalworking and glass production (Oliver and Fagan 1975: 187). As early as the first millennium B.C. in this area it can be proved that bronze casting existed. The artisans were highly respected and worked mainly at the courts of the kings, from whom they got the expensive raw material and to whom they owed their products (cf. Westermann 1952: 273). As old as bronze casting, was the tradition of glass production among the Yoruba. Both metalworking and glass production were possible because of the surrounding forests, which were also the prerequisite for the development of wood carving, another important handicraft among the Yoruba. With the beginning of the Iron Age, the population had already become very dense. Iron tools enabled man to extend the cultivated areas. The quality of the work of Yoruban craftsmen was the finest in West Africa and therefore strongly stimulated the development of trade.

Because of these economic activities, which had no parallel in the region, it became necessary to protect the places where people lived, kept their accumulated wealth, and where the artisans created. Therefore, the settlements became walled and were defended by an army. Thus, among the Yoruba urbanization was developed.

At the same time a social differentiation took place. who were responsible for the administration reserved themselves certain privileges, for instance with respect to trade (Westermann 1952: 273), and attached to their households a great number of skilled artisans (ibid., 273). Finally, the heads of the communities began to collect taxes from their citizens and on all merchandise brought to the markets (Forde 1951: 21; Lloyd 1959: 10; Meek 1957: 162). In the city-states of the Yoruba the heads of the communities could never gain despotic political power. In each of these states, of which about twenty existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the nobility had a great influence (cf. Suret-Canale 1966: 190; Forde 1951: 21) and had often been able to dispose of the head of state. Each city-state was surrounded by several villages which had to pay duties and taxes, and the inhabitants of which were protected in the event of war by the walled towns. The towns of the Yoruba were separated from one another by densely wooded areas. As every city-state

was self-sustaining and as intercourse between them was so difficult, none of them could over a longer period succeed in subduing all the others. For that reason, the city-state remained the form of state organization among the Yoruba.

A similar development had taken place among the Hausa (cf. Sellnow 1968: 185 ff.). In this case the development of city-states was the result of three interacting factors: first, the steadily growing production in agriculture and handicrafts (especially weaving and dying, but also metal- and leather-working); second, a high degree of political separation because of the equal strength of the competing city-states; and third, interference from outside which prevented the concentration of political power in a territorial state.

According to the Kano Chronicle the city-state must have developed among the Hausa about A.D. 1100. At this time Gijimasu started to build the city wall (Palmer 1908: 66). The process of state formation was at the latest completed in the thirteenth century, when Naguji demanded one eighth of their harvests from all peasants as duties (ibid.: 67).

Because of the increase in production, the Hausa were able to get a steadily growing share of the trans-Sahara trade, until they possessed a kind of monopoly in the kola-nut and salt trade. Their textiles were distributed over vast areas of the western Sudan, and after having displaced the Egyptian imports, they fulfilled the function of a general monetary equivalent (Urvoy 1934: 155).

Owing to the economic importance of this area, Mali and Songhai as well as Bornu tried to subjugate the city-states of the Hausa, and succeeded temporarily. These subjugations, in addition to a struggle for predominance between Kano and Katsina which lasted about 150 years — and in which both of them proved to be of equal strength — contributed very much to the fact that no political center developed among the Hausa. Therefore, until the conquest by the Fulani the form of political organization among the Hausa was the city-state. In its socioeconomic character these city-states of the Hausa were comparable to ancient oriental class society (at least in pre-Fulani times).

3.2. Whereas in West Africa societies with the character of an ancient oriental class society continued to exist, and in northeast

Africa (Ethiopia) the transition from this stage of development to feudal society took place, in the coastal areas of East Africa feudal elements penetrated African societies from outside.

Between Mogadishu and Sofala several important commercial towns had been founded since the eighth century A.D. (cf. Freeman-Grenville 1962; Oliver and Mathew 1967). These towns developed into city-states, a process which ended at the beginning of the second millennium A.D. The analysis of the socioeconomic character of these East African city-states offers some difficulties. During the process of their formation several elements worked together. The African component was the decline of the ancient society, and the formation of the state in a manner comparable to other areas of the continent. The Arabian component was of quite another quality. The Arabian immigrants brought with them the knowledge of private property in land, of differentiated forms of dependency, of exploitation by disposition of land on loan, and of a money economy. Feudal elements were, therefore, integrated into Arab-African society and became more and more decisive. But since in East Africa no territorial state could be founded, and since in the city-states agricultural production unlike in feudal states in other areas of the world - was always of secondary importance, specific socioeconomic relations came into being there. The public revenues came mostly from tolls or trading profits whereas the exploitation of dependent peasants was either of minor importance or wholly absent. African city-states with their concentration on entrepot trade and an origin partly based on African and partly on Arabian elements developed a feudal society with a particular character.

3.3. But the development of city-states was not the only change during this second period in the history of state formation in Africa. Beginning in the early second millennium A.D., the territorial states — especially in West Africa — also underwent modifications. The most fundamental one was the beginning of a regional division of labor. Pottery, carving, glass production, metalworking, and salt production were concentrated at those places where the best conditions for their development existed. Now production aimed at the provisioning of greater areas, and therefore became market production for inner-African purposes. Towns were multiplying, and exchange between towns and village

communities grew. This development promoted regional specialization as well as an economic interweaving of the different regions.

A second important factor in this period was the beginning of state formation among the Bantu tribes. Originating somewhere in West Africa (Nigeria, Cameroons), the Bantu had spread steadily across the central, eastern, and a great deal of the southern continent, thereby diffusing agriculture, cattle breeding and ironworking (cf. Posnansky 1968; 11-22). In certain regions all the preconditions of state formation were developed by them; as for instance in Zimbabwe (cf. Caton-Thompson 1931; Lobato 1954-1960) or in the interlacustrine area, where the kingdom of Buganda is one of the best investigated (cf. Rusch 1975; for other Interlacustrine States, see Bäck on Rwanda and Steinhart on Bunvoro in this volume). In South Africa the preconditions for the development of class society and the state existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when for instance among the Zulu (cf. Bryant 1929, 1949; Krige 1937), the southern Sotho (cf. Casalis 1860), the Xhosa (cf. Soga 1930, 1931; Kropf 1889), and the Swazi (cf. Kuper 1963) this process began.

Finally, it has to be added that the process of state formation was also continued in the western Sudan. After the beginning of the second millennium A.D. the Mossi states (cf. Tauxier 1917), Mali (cf. Monteil 1968; Niane 1960), and Songhai (cf. Kubbel' 1974; Rouch 1953, 1954) came into being.

4. THIRD PERIOD: STATE FORMATION UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM

The third period of state formation in Africa began in the eighteenth century and continued until the early nineteenth century, when several jihads took place, resulting in the formation of states. The main role in this process was played by the Fulani, a group of partly nomadic and partly sedentary tribes. Whereas the latter professed Islam, the former in general did not. Because of their learning, the Moslems succeeded in getting the leadership of these movements, and the rebellions of the Fulani therefore took the form and character of holy wars.

These movements were of a complex nature. Political, ethnical, social, and religious reasons all played a part. Especially the events of the eighteenth century, which brought about the creation of theocratic empires in Futa Diallon and Futa Toro, should be considered when examining the after effects of the invasion of the Moroccans in the late sixteenth century. In Songhai (and in other communities in West Africa), Islam was at this time on its way to becoming popular because of its universal character (Hunwick 1966: 303). But this changed fundamentally after the destruction of the Songhai empire. At that point, this religion was evaluated as the religion of invaders, and its influence diminished considerably. During the seventeenth century the situation changed again. The Moroccans had destroyed the Songhai empire but did not succeed in building up a stable political power. Therefore, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries new political constellations could develop in the western Sudan. An important role in this process was played by the Fulani, who relied on Islam in their propaganda. Under the motto of holy wars, they were able to conquer large areas and to build up military-theocratic states or to reform the existing states in Futa Djallon (1725), Futa Toro (1776), among the Hausa (1804) and in Massina (1810).

Islam was of great importance because of its attitude toward ethnic differences: it considered these irrelevant. The formation of states of multiethnic character was supported by this religion and their stability improved. After having overcome the consequences of the Moroccan invasion, and with the renewed attempt to form larger states, the influence of Islam further increased. Whereas in former times Islam was spread gradually and was introduced by the ruling class into the wholly developed state society, under the specific circumstances of the eighteenth century Islam became an important factor in the process of state formation itself as well as in the process of state reform.

5. STATE FORMATION AND COLONIAL POWERS

A special problem in the history of state formation in Africa arose with the beginning of the complete distribution of the African continent among the colonial powers. Then two quite different factors interacted: factors of inner-African socioeconomic

dynamism, and influences from the colonial powers, which primarily affected economics and politics. States which should be studied under these conditions were those of the Ashanti, Dahomey, Luba, and Lunda. Some of them – especially Dahomey and Lunda - played an important role in the slave trade. In each of them the influences of the colonial powers were different. For instance, in Ashanti the process of state formation was dominated by the African component and the influence of the colonial power aimed from the beginning at the splitting up of this community. In Dahomey and in the Luba and Lunda kingdoms, the colonial power organized trade and slave trade with the help of the indigenous ruling class in general which was very much to the latter's benefit. The result was the deepening and acceleration of the process of social differentiation. But the cooperation between colonial powers and independent African states was of short duration. With the beginning of the formation of colonies in the whole continent, the former allies were also conquered and subdued. At that point economics and politics in Africa were subordinated to the interests of the colonial powers.

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16 Kalinga and Andhra: The Process of Secondary State Formation in Early India¹

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1. INTRODUCTION

To distinguish between pristine and secondary types of early states (Fried 1967: 231-242; Khazanov 1978: 78ff.) is a useful division in understanding the process of state formation (Service 1975: 19-20; Claessen and Skalník 1978: 620). It has been pointed out that pristine as well as secondary states 'enjoyed a gradual development and many institutions of the pre-state period continued their existence within them' (Claessen and Skalník, ibid.). This situation has more specifically been described as the 'dualistic' character where tribal relations are in a process of disintegration while the process of class formation had not been totally completed (Kochakova 1978: 499).

The present study deals with the process of secondary state formation in the post-third-century, B.C. period. In this study the prestate situation conforms to the 'chiefdoms' belonging to an intermediate form growing out of egalitarian societies preceding the primitive state (Service 1975: 15-16; Fried 1967; Sahlins 1968: 20-27). The process of secondary state formation in Kalinga (modern Orissa, or Udisha) and Andhra resulted when autochthonous forces combined with consequences resulting from a period of political subordination to the 'metropolitan states' of the Mauryas and the Sātavāhanas. The process of secondary state formation in Kalinga and Andhra rapidly accomplished the task of transforming the 'rank' society of the prestate

into a 'stratified' class society, with the consolidation of the ruling classes and their gaining direct access to the surplus product and its distribution. Therefore, it is important to take note of the dynamics of internal transformation in the socioeconomic structure of Kalinga and Andhra and the impetus given by the metropolitan states in evolving 'transitional types of early states' (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 23) through a process of secondary state formation.

Kalinga and Andhra are located along the eastern coast of India, in the fertile alluvial deltaic plains of the Mahanadi and Krishna-Godavari rivers respectively. The hills of the Eastern Ghats that surround these fertile pockets contain rich mineral resources. The dispersed character of such fertile pockets resulted in diverse centers of political authority in the southern Deccan. The proximity of location to the eastern coast linked these areas ultimately with the Gangetic delta in the north and with the extreme south, including Sri Lanka. This in turn resulted in an intensive commercial network and the formation of an important avenue of cultural diffusion from the north to the south in the post-fifth-century B.C. period.

Kalinga was originally subjugated by the Nandas of Magadha (Hatigumpha inscription of Kharavela, c.50 B.C., cf. Sircar 1965: 213-221). It was reconquered and brought under Magadha by the Mauryas during the reign of Asoka, who conducted a destructive campaign for this purpose (Major Rock Edict XIII of Aśoka, cf. Hultzsch 1922; Thapar 1961: 35-36). With the decline of the Mauryas, Kalinga emerged as an independent state by the end of the second century B.C. under a local ruling house named the Mahāmeghavāhana. The southern Deccan and Andhra came under the sway of the Mauryas prior to Aśoka's reign. These areas. however, contain Aśokan inscriptions. In the post Mauryan period, after a short time lag, Andhra underwent a second period of occupation with the expansion of the Satavahana state from the western Deccan to the east. The Satavahana power declined by the second century A.D. and subsequently Andhra came under the control of the Ikshvakus, who emerged locally and ruled from Vijayapuri (present Nagarjunkonda).

2. THE PRESTATE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

The emergence of an agrarian base, a demographic expansion, rudimentary craft specialization, a developing exchange network, a degree of social differentation, and the emergence of spheres of political influence could be outlined as the basic internal developments that occurred prior to the subordination of these areas by the metropolitan states.

The profusion of the Iron Age megalithic Black and Red Ware culture sites³ over the Neolithic-Chalcolithic sites suggests a demographic expansion in Andhra and in south India during the post-fifth-century B.C. period. There is sufficient evidence archeologically to establish the presence of rather extensive permanent settlements housing these village-based agrarian communities. The demographic expansion not only coincided with the spread of settlements from the highland peripheral areas to the fertile deltaic plains of the nuclear areas, but also with the transformation from a pastoral-cum-subsistence economy to a primarily agrarian one. The change in the technique of food production (from swidden to plough cultivation) and the increased frequency of land use capable of cultivating a higher surplusyielding crop such as paddy was a natural outcome of the demands resulting from demographic expansion (Boserup 1965).

In Kalinga there is evidence for the existence of a relatively large population in the nuclear area during the time of Aśoka. The figures quoted in the XIII Major Rock Edict⁴ (even if considered exaggerated) suggest: a relatively large population that thrived mainly in the agrarian tracts of the fertile plain; and readily available manpower that could form a sizable army to engage the more powerful forces of the Mauryas, even after the massacre and the deportation — the latter perhaps for the purpose of expanding agriculture in other areas of the Mauryan state (Thapar 1961: 62). Still, Kalinga contained a provincial head-quarters of the Mauryas at Tosali and slightly later possessed the capacity to establish an independent state soon after the decline of the Mauryas.

The close association between the segmentary tribe and the territorial unit, i.e., the primary area of occupation, is evident even among the present day pastoralists, such as the Todas of south India (Rivers 1906: 540) and the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard

1940: 203), where 'man and herd live in a symbiotic community' (Krader 1968: 453). This association is based upon the primary subsistence pattern and its immediate social group. In protohistoric south India too, the term *kudi* seems to have been associated with the primary economic base, i.e. the herd, and its affiliated social group, i.e., the extended family. The form of agriculture practiced in the peripheral hilly and pastoral areas according to the Tamil Sangam texts⁵ was swidden cultivation (Narrinai. 259: 3; Sivathamby 1966: 325), which could sustain only 'simple segmentary tribes living as decentralized autonomous communities in small dispersed settlements' (Harris 1972: 256; also Netting 1972: 220; Sahlins 1968). Thus the restricted geographical area they occupied conformed to the level of production and consumption.

By the end phase of the protohistoric period or at least by the early historic period, the term kudi seems to have acquired extended meanings. It not only implied the household and the cowherd colony, but also the clan, subjects of a ruler, and even the territory (Subrahmanian 1966: 285). The dispersal of the original tribe into extended units was inevitable when an expanding population required greater resources for subsistence. The acts of 'confrontation' in the hilly and in the pastoral areas, according to the Sangam texts, were the capture and recapture of cattle and encroachments made upon pastoral land (Arunachalam 1968; Sivathamby 1966, 1974). The high frequency of iron implements of war and of the chase associated with megalithic burials. especially in the peripheral areas, may reflect such attempts at accumulating social wealth (in the form of cattle) and other incidents of tribal warfare for the purpose of territorial expansion. A similar situation apparently prevailed in the pastoral society of early Greece (Thomson 1973: 29).

The leadership among such pastoral tribes of the peripheral areas was associated with the *perumakan* (great herdsman) (*Purananuru*. 157; *Ahnanuru*. 115: 5; 61; 242: 5-6). The qualitative and the quantitative nature of his authority cannot be determined in precise terms, though certain aspects of the *perumakan* described in the *Sangam* texts could possibly be equated with the 'big-man' status (Sahlins 1963: 289; 1968: 21-22; Netting 1972: 220). It has been suggested that the Tamil words for king and queen may have derived from the terms $k\bar{o}n$ (herdsman) and

āycci (herdswoman) respectively (Sirinivasan Iyengar 1929: 10). This may indicate the trend of institutional development by the end phase of the protohistoric period in relation to the economic situation. The correlation between demographic expansion and warfare consequently leading to territorial and community insulation (Fried 1967; Carneiro 1970; 1972: 64-65; Lewis, this volume), may have witnessed a simultaneous extension of perumakan's sphere of control.

The consequences of territorial and community insulation was a feature that became far more significant in the fertile areas. The end phase of the protohistoric period witnessed a demographic expansion, a shift to the fertile plains and the establishment of an agrarian economy based on paddy cultivation (see above). Such developments not only result in a sharper bounding of the area with the residential group exploiting concentrated or localized resources, but also lead to greater structural differentiation (Fried 1967: 109-116, 175).

The territorial unit in the fertile tracts of south India was known as the *nādu* (Subrahmanian 1966: 488). A nādu at times contained well over three hundred villages (Purananuru. 110). A territory possessing the resources to provide a regular means of subsistence to its inhabitants and a rich income to its chief was considered a 'worthy' nadu (Singaravelu 1966: 171-173; Purananuru. 29: 16; 7: 12-13; 200: 17). This situation clearly indicates the integration of the earlier dispersed segmentary units at one level, and also the gradual integration of 'several specialized local economies' at another level within the newly evolving territorial unit of the nadu. The economic 'surplus' resulting from such a sociopolitical integration - leading to an exemption of the chieftain from the process of production - provided a strong basis for the emergence of prestate chiefdoms in the agrarian tracts (cf. Singh 1971: 171-172; Claessen and Skalník 1978: 545).

The prevalence of luxury items such as gold ornaments in certain megalithic burials in Andhra (Subrahmanyam 1975: 179, 194, 208-209), including the arrangement and the construction of 'specialized burials' in the southern Deccan and Andhra (Wheeler 1948: 197; Gururaja Rao 1972: 184), may suggest the emerging traits of social differentiation and affluence.

The Sangam texts often associate the political leadership in the fertile tracts with a group known as the vēlir chieftains. Archeolo-

gical evidence corroborated by literary texts suggests a coincidence between the locational areas of the $v\bar{e}lir$ chieftains and fertile tracts that emerged with a relatively larger surplus in agricultural production.⁶ It is not incorrect to term the $v\bar{e}lirs$ as the earliest agrarian elite in south India. The Sangam sources often refer to such chieftains controlling $n\bar{a}dus$ possessing fertile land with villages⁷ and of chieftains possessing wealth in the form of gold and other precious items.⁸ It is therefore not surprising that the $v\bar{e}lir$ chiefs are often located in fertile and raw-material-producing areas or along routes of communication, or at coastal points that developed into relatively large exchange centers. Thus, by the early historic period a conscious attempt was being made by certain chieftains exercising political authority to bring under 'control' communities and localized resources.

The beginning of a rudimentary craft specialization and an exchange vortex in the southern Deccan and in Andhra had been established as early as the first millennium by the Neolithic-Chalcolithic communities. This process was further intensified by the iron-using megalithic communities. The prestate societies often tend to make more rapid advances in handicraft production than in agriculture or animal husbandry (Khazanov 1978: 80). There is unmistakable evidence by the fifth century B.C. for the existence of craft specialists such as lapidaries, potters, and metal smiths functioning at the village level along with the full-time agriculturists.

Though full-time specialization had come into vogue, the Sangam texts indicate that the extended family still remained the unit of production, where the division of labor had an age and sex basis. Evidence is lacking for a division of labor where a controlling authority allots specific productive tasks to individuals or groups. Within the territorial unit of the chieftains, on the one hand the family as the unit of production was in control not only of its labor power, but also of the means of production. On the other hand, the Sangam texts speak of different 'production techniques' (farming, herding, and other forms of subsistence) that existed side by side within the nāḍu. This 'complex combination of several modes of production' (see Terray 1972: 96 ff.) creates a primary difficulty in defining the nature of the economy through division of labor (see Hopkins 1957: 277) at this developmental juncture for the society under study.

There is little evidence to determine the form of exchange relationships between the producer and the society at large, and the degree of control over the producer by a primary nonproducing strata. The most significant consequence of the demographic expansion was a substantial increase in the agricultural output and craft production (mainly metal objects and pottery) well above the level of domestic consumption. It was precisely this 'surplus' that was acquired by the chiefs rather than a direct control over the means of production and labor. The internal dynamics of the segmentary groups now insulated within the territorial unit had established a 'circulation of goods flowing towards the top of the social pyramid and down again' (Sahlins 1968: 87; Fried 1967: 117). In fact, the chieftains controlling the nadus have been lauded by the Sangam poets as 'great distributors of wealth' (Kailasapathy 1968: 219-221). In the above situation, viz. the existence of several modes of production and the nonsubordination of the primary producer to a controlling authority, 'what counts more in the formation of chiefdoms is less the nature of techniques of production than the importance of the "surplus" they produce (Godelier 1977: 88).

In these areas, therefore, a 'stratified society' resulting from the private ownership of the means of production subsequently leading to the formation of the state was yet to crystallize in its proper form. What developed was a 'rank society' (Fried 1967: 185, 191) reflecting a 'dualistic character' (as in Yoruba), where there was an emergence of a special ruling stratum, while the tribal relations had yet not totally disintegrated (Kochakova 1978: 497-499). The establishment of a class society where the primary producer was subordinated by a ruling elite which also extended considerable control over the means of production was a development especially after the impact of the metropolitan states on these areas and when the process of secondary state formation gathered greater momentum.

3. THE EXTERNAL IMPETUS

The formative period of the metropolitan states depended upon the agrarian base, which sustained not only the ruling classes and other nonproducing urban groups, but also maintained the functional apparatus of authority of the state, i.e., the bureaucracy and the armed forces. The primary locus of the metropolitan states often did not possess sufficient internal resources to meet the ever increasing demands for services and the material requirements of the ruling classes as well as of their subjects. The pressing need for territorial annexation was therefore geared towards the objective of acquiring additional sources of income so as to supplement the agrarian base. Such major sources were: the raw-material-producing areas, the trade routes and exchange centers, and areas with a relatively high population concentration including fertile tracts. The 'routes of expansion' of the Nanda, Maurya, and later the Sātavāhana states by and large reflect such economic considerations (Seneviratne 1978: 383-384).

In Kalinga, the western hills which possessed rich deposits of iron ore may have been an important consideration favoring an annexation of this territory. If coastal Kalinga could be controlled, it gave access to the eastern trade route that linked Tamralipti (the major port in the Gangetic delta) with southern India (Thapar 1961: 82). The agrarian states of the Nandas and the Mauryas could also have used the fertile plains of Kalinga and its large population to procure a greater production in food as well surplus labor for services. The importance of Kalinga for the metropolitan states is seen by the location of a provincial administrative center at Tosali, which has in its vicinity the Major Rock Edicts of Aśoka (Lal 1949: 64-65).

The southern Deccan and Andhra were equally attractive to the Mauryas. According to the ancient treatise on political economics, the Arthaśāstra (7.12: 24-25), the southern trade route leading to areas producing an abundance of conch shells, diamonds, rubies, pearls, and gold had been recommended as the more profitable one (Kangle 1972, II: 360). This route traversed areas possessing The provincial capital of the Mauryas was at mines (ibid.). Suvarnagiri ('gold mountain') located in the gold-rich Mysore area. There are six Asokan Rock Edicts in the vicinity of ancient gold mines (Malony 1968: 225; 1976: 25). In the deltaic area of Andhra, the location of Asokan Edicts addressed to provincial officers (Sircar 1965: 50-52) indicates the importance of this region. Andhra also possessed a well-populated area and a highly fertile agrarian tract. It also controlled the eastern coast linking south India and Sri Lanka. Thus, the Mauryas encroached upon

the two most fertile pockets on the eastern coast as well as certain other areas of the subcontinent possessing a high potential for development, which were already undergoing certain structural changes by the end phase of the protohistoric period.

The provincial headquarters with viceroys were installed to 'control' such areas and extract their resources. In the Mauryan state, princes of royal blood, i.e., the kumāras and the āryaputras, generally functioned as viceroys. Such kumāras ruled at Tosali in Kalinga (Sircar 1965: 44) and in Andhra (Ghosh 1969: no. 2). It is also known that a section of the Mauryan bureaucracy, i.e., mahāmattas, rājukas, prādeśikas, and later the dhamma-mahāmattas, were expected to conduct periodic tours within the state (for details on the provincial administration, see Thapar 1961: 100-123).

This expansion, covering a large geographical area with a relatively low intensity of communication with far-flung areas of the state, suffered from basic inherent contradictions. The massive investment of resources for annexations e.g., Aśoka's Kalinga campaign, the subsequent expansion of the bureaucracy and the armed forces which in turn necessitated more resources, and the fact that the expansion was 'horizontal' in character undermined the stability of the Mauryan state in the long run (Seneviratne 1978: 400).

The expansion as well as the functioning of the Mauryan state in the provinces was horizontal in character. This was conditioned by the uneven socioeconomic development of communities within the subcontinent. The authority of the Mauryan state over its sphere of influence could be characterized as 'power to homage and tribute' and not 'power to organize all the political affairs of a large and in principle precisely delimitable area' (Mabbett 1964: 166), a situation more clearly seen during the Sātavāhana (Sharma 1968: 216-234) and the Kushāṇa states (Sharma 1968: 201-215; Chattopadhyaya 1978; also Narain this volume), that emerged slightly later. This aspect in turn questions the validity of the 'centralized-empire' status attributed to the Mauryan state (see Thapar in this volume).

It is to the credit of Asoka that he assessed such contradictions and resorted to other measures to ensure peace on which the productivity of the region depended. The following may be listed as such measures: the propagation of the *dhamma* (code of social

ethics) emphasizing the duties, obligations, and other moral aspects (Thapar 1961: 137-181), the royal tours, the erection of edicts inscribed in a uniform script and language, the expansion of the bureaucracy and the creation of the dhamma-mahāmattas who were later assigned greater powers, and the extension of patronage to north Indian religious sects that had already begun to penetrate into fertile areas of the subcontinent. In order to establish a facade of centralization, larger states of the preindustrial world often resorted to such measures (Eisenstadt 1963).

The quantitative degree of state authority can be gauged by its power to 'control' labor and extract natural resources in the most direct manner, as well as its 'power' to regulate production and distribution at all levels within the territory. Though the existence of the southern provincial headquarters of the Mauryas, located in the vicinity of the gold mines of Mysore, may suggest direct supervision over the production of gold, this cannot be considered as the general pattern of operation. It is doubtful whether the provincial administration ever possessed sufficient resources to penetrate to the primary producer at the village level, where the extended family functioned as the unit of production. instances compel the conquering power to establish a 'chain of command' (Fried 1967: 241), in which the local chieftains play a crucial role. In this case, too, it was such chieftains who formed the vital link in directing the surplus from the local units to the metropolis via the provincial governments and along commercial avenues.

The Aśokan Edicts record the existence of several tribal groups within the territory of the Mauryas (Hultzsch 1922: 46-48). They seem to have retained semiautonomous status in return for 'homage and tribute' to the Mauryas. Elsewhere, in western India, Pushyagupta and yavana-rāja Tushāspa¹¹ were appointed by Chandragupta Maurya and Aśoka respectively as district governors (Sircar 1965: 177). Neither of them belonged to the royal house and in all probability may have been powerful commercial magnates. Aśoka himself married a daughter of a merchant during his tenure as viceroy at Vidisa (in central India), and his father-inlaw may have been a person of some status at this important commercial center. The pattern may not have been different in Kalinga and Andhra, where chieftains controlling local units came to be associated with the provincial government of the Mauryas.

The Kośar tribe of southwestern Andhra went to the extent of assisting the Mauryas in their southern campaign (Ahnanuru. 251). It is possible that sēnagōpa (general) Muḍukunṭala (Luders 1973: no. 1266) and a member of the Pakōṭaka clan who held the title senāpati (army commander) (Ghosh 1969: no. 7 a) may have been local chiefs serving the Mauryas.

Therefore, the territorial expansion of the Mauryas in the short run resulted in a horizontal rather than a vertical extension of authority, as the 'control' exercised by the provincial administration was primarily a supervisory one at the upper level. As a consequence, in the long run the very establishment of provincial headquarters and the association of the local chieftains in a subordinate position saw the emergence of a better-defined ruling elite soon after the retreat of the metropolitan state authority from the provinces.

4. THE PROCESS

Given the above situation, the local elite made use of the opportunity to stabilize and consolidate itself at a level of the hierarchy below that of the provincial rulers. More evidence given below indicates that it was precisely such chieftains or local elite groups that ascended to power, establishing ruling houses (after the retreat of the metropolitan states), taking over the paraphenalia (which ranged from high-sounding titles to the style of living) required for a more sophisticated ruling elite. The very process of acculturation (to the Indo-Ārvan culture) to which the local elite subjected itself when it was assimilated into the power structure of the overlord, gave an added advantage to the former in the long run. This process of acculturation resulted in establishing a social distinction especially vis-à-vis the agricultural and craft groups. An essential political advantage accrued to the local elite in establishing a differentiation in social identity or status, at a stage when it was attempting to stabilize itself within a society undergoing a process of transformation to a primarily agrarian-based economy. The fact that provincial governments of the metropolitan states were based in areas with potential for development in turn resulted in regional concentration of resources to some extent, and also an inward turn of the sphere of interest with the first cracks of the Mauryan and Sātavāhana states. It was not surprising, therefore, that the very seats of the provincial governments emerged as centers of political power under local ruling houses.

The economic factor combined with the political factor in creating greater structural differentiation resulting in a class society. The evidence indicates that social stratification with a functional hierarchy - operating within the political and economic structure – gradually emerged in the post Mauryan period. There is substantial evidence at this stage for an increased subordination of the primary producer by a nonproducing class, which also came to extend a more efficient control over the means of production. This development, however, does not permit a simple overview identifying social classes determined by their 'economic place' in the 'production process', but an essential identification of social classes by their situation within the totality of social practices or the 'ensemble of the division of labor which includes political and ideological relations' (Poulantzas 1973: 27-28). The emergence of social classes also saw ideological and production relations between the ruling classes and the common folk develop outside kinship relations (Godelier 1977: 87).

In the Hatigumpha inscription, Kharavela (who ruled around 50 B.C.) identifies himself as a descendant of the Mahāmeghavāhana family of Kalinga, and also claims to be the third in that lineage (Sircar 1965: 213), thus establishing the legitimacy of his political authority. This family may have possibly acquired preeminence around the second century B.C. or the latter half of the Mauryan hegemony. The titles and epithets such as Kalingadhipati ('the lord of Kalinga') and Chakradhara ('the holder of the wheel of sovereignty') attributed to Kharavela, and the references to his standing army in the inscription, clearly establish his political authority which prevailed over the geographical area of Kalinga. In his youth Kharavela was yuva-rāja (crown prince) and later mahārāja (great king). The inscriptions also mention titles such as agamahisi (chief queen), kumāra (prince), and nagarakhadamsa (town judge) (Luders 1973: nos. 1346, 1348, 1351). Such titles, taken together with references in the consecration ceremony, indicate the existence of an institutionalized ruling hierarchy, as well as the adaptation of Sanskritized Indo-Aryan titles and ceremonies by the newly emerging local ruling groups.

Similarly, in Andhra soon after the retreat of the Mauryas, local chieftains emerged as heads of local political units. The casket inscriptions of Bhattiprolu, dated to c.100 B.C., refer to a rāja (king) Kubira (Buhler 1894: 328; Sircar 1965: 224-225, n. 1). The Pakotaka clan (see above) flourished in the Guntur district of Andhra, and one of its members held the title senāpati, possibly under the Mauryas. Pithuda, the 'kingdom founded by a former ruler' located in coastal Andhra, was later destroyed by Kharavela (Sircar 1965: 217). The references made to a rāja-kumāri (princess) and her retinue (parivesaka), and also to a bhānḍāgārika (treasurer) in other pre-Christian inscriptions of Andhra (Chatterjee 1976: 212-214), indicate not only the graded social hierarchy and administrative functions, but also the imitation of north Indian titles by the ruling classes as in Kalinga.

In Andhra the political hegemony of the local ruling groups developed further during the post-Satavahana period. Sātavāhana rule in Andhra 'left behind a legacy of organized administration', and they evolved a 'decentralized system of government by assigning vice-regal functions to many conquered local chieftains side by side with appointed officials' (Chatterjee 1976: 224-225). Such chieftains were given titles within the administration. Titles such as mahāsenapati (chief commander), mahātalavara (general/chief/governor), mahārathi (rāstra means an administrative unit), mahābhoja (bhoja, the produce of an area to be enjoyed) indicate the degree to which the chieftains controlling local areas were assimilated in the larger state system. The very use of the term mahā (great/chief) as a prefix, which began under the Satavahanas, firmly introduced 'graded and unequal relationship' (Sharma 1968: 210) within the power structure. The administrative units of the Satavahanas - which were under the supervision of the above-mentioned subordinate officers belonging to the local elite families - emerged during the post-Satavahana period as seats of political power, a situation quite apparent in the case of the Ikshvakus.

The assimilation or the integration and the consolidation of the ruling class in Andhra seems to have further intensified during the period of the Ikshvākus. The titles such as mahāsenāpati, mahātalavara, mahādandanāyaka (chief justice) were not the prerogative of the royal family, and were also held by persons belonging to other local elite families. Often these titles have been

mentioned in association with clan names in the inscriptions (Sircar 1961-1962: 198) and were also adopted even by female members of such families (Sharma 1968: 209). Under the Iksvākus matrimonial alliances were concluded between the local elite families and the royal house. Thus, the total political mechanism was structured upon a kinship base where there was a 'network of alliances controlling various subordinate semi-tribal families controlling different localities' (Chatterjee 1976: 245). The state often existed through an insulation of chiefdoms and dominated tribes rather than being incompatible with the existence of tribal societies (Godelier 1977: 89). The fact that titles turned out to be hereditary under the Ikshvākus, further confirms the establishment of a permanent ruling class. Interestingly, during their period of political consolidation, traits of matriarchy and cross-cousin marriage diminished to a great extent among the Ikshvākus.

Archeological evidence confirms that fortified citadels came into vogue in Kalinga during the Mauryan period (Lal 1949: 74) and in Andhra during the Sātavāhana period (Ghosh 1958-1959: 8; Khan 1963). Fortified citadels, such as Sisupalgarh and Nagarjunakonda, were better planned and also developed greater sophistication with the establishment of local ruling houses.

The role of an ideology in the consolidation of the ruling class can be seen within the process of 'āryanization' and the patronage extended by the ruling houses to the north Indian religious sects that were well entrenched in these areas by now. In the cultural sphere the process of aryanization perpetuated social differentiation, and the religious ideologies played a crucial role in legitimizing the existence of the ruling classes and their hegemony over the subordinate groups.

The adaptation of the high-sounding titles, dynastic names (such as Ikṣvāku, which was a revival of a name which existed in north India during the sixth century B.C.), was largely due to the attempt made by the local ruling houses to imitate the norms of the north Indian rulers and their former overlords. This was also evident in the cultural and religious spheres. The Vedic and Brahmanical sacrifices practiced by the Sātavāhanas were later performed by the Ikshvākus. Their inscriptions also mention other north Indian deities, including the local deities who had been assimilated into the Indo-Āryan pantheon. A large number of inscriptions further indicate the patronage extended to Buddhism

by the royalty and nobility of Andhra. In Kalinga the inscriptions of Kharavela refer to endowments made by him to the Brahmins and also to the Jain establishment.

Such developments within the sociopolitical framework were largely augmented by the economic factor in creating greater structural changes leading to a class society. The assimilation of these areas into the Mauryan, and later to the Sātavāhana state, also resulted in the linking of the resources of such areas to a larger exchange vortex. While the Arthaśāstra clearly states the nature of the items demanded in the north from the south during the period under discussion, numismatic evidence (Gupta 1961) confirms that more organized commercial groups from the north arrived in these areas during the Mauryan period. Trade and commerce in fact became the additional means by which the resources of the provinces were channeled to the metropolis.

In operating this exchange process, the northern merchants may have obtained the cooperation of chieftains located in areas producing raw materials or along important routes and those at coastal points. This cooperation would have been easily obtained during the period of political hegemony over these areas by the metropolitan state. The close association of certain chieftains with local craft/commercial guilds in the post-Mauryan period may indicate their familiarity with such groups even during the Mauryan period. This may also have provided the earliest opportunity for the local elite to establish some form of direct control over the primary producer (beginning with the Mauryan period), consequently leading to a greater concentration of wealth and regulating power in the hands of the former, as well as creating greater social differentiation based on an unequal distribution of the surplus. Under such circumstances, the beginnings of a period of economic efflorescence in Kalinga and Andhra occurred in the post-second-century B.C. period. By the beginning of the Christian era, there was a greater development of urbanization, a more regular use of script, a more intensive circulation of north Indian, Roman, and other local coins, better organized craft/ commerical guilds and a well-established and affluent local merchant class. The most significant development, however, was the direct control established during this period over land and labor by the ruling classes.

Within the power structure dominated by the ruling classes,

the merchants and the landowning agrarian elite came to occupy a significant place in the post-Mauryan period. The need to establish a broad-based ruling stratum by absorbing these two elements was essential, because the very survival of the power structure depended upon the productivity of agriculture and commerce through a domination exercised upon the primary producer. This either had to be done directly by the ruling political elite or through the landowning groups and the merchants controlling craft/commercial guilds. Therefore, it was not surprising that all these groups were linked vertically within the power structure, forming a composite ruling class with a common identity vis-à-vis the primary producer as those who 'regulated' labor, production, and distribution.

The development of a dependent peasantry whose surplus was 'transferred to a dominant group of rulers' (Wolf 1966: 3-4) also implies the emergence of private ownership in land. The original clan/communal ownership apparently gave way to individuals claiming direct ownership of land, including the subordination of the primary producer in the agrarian sector. Similar dynamics of class formation in relation to an extension of the agrarian base occurred elsewhere in India in an earlier period (Sharma 1975: 1-13). In the Sangam texts, while the term velālar is attributed to the small peasant (Tolkappiyam. Porul. 635: 1) as well as the big landholder (Champakalakshmi 1975-76: 120), ulavar is a term that specifically denotes the agricultural laborer (Perumpanattrupadai, 197). The large number of gahapati/kutumbika (householder) group mentioned in the pre-Christian inscriptions of Andhra (Luders 1973: nos. 1206, 1209, 1211, 1216 etc.) derived their wealth primarily from land like the vēlālar landholders of south India. 12 The right to alienate land was naturally associated with private ownership. A first-century A.D. inscription from the western Deccan records a cash payment made by a ruler to purchase some land from a Brahmin (Sircar 1965: 169). The increased references during this period to direct land and village donations made by the ruling houses indicate the extent of command exercised over land and labor by the ruling class. In their inscriptions the Ikshvakus are often called the givers of 'one hundred thousand cows and one hundred thousand plough land' (ibid. 238-239). The Ikshvaku nobility even financed the construction of water tanks (Sircar 1961-1962: 200).

The development of a marketable surplus in certain commodities, especially luxury items, necessitated the regulation of production and distribution, which is evident from the emergence of organized craft and commercial guilds. In a sense, the formation of the early guilds in these areas seems to have developed through a process of subordination of the earlier village-based independent craft specialists, who functioned within the extended family, the unit of production. Pre-Christian inscriptions from Andhra refer to instances where the clan is being identified with the guild: the recording of the residential localities of craftsmen and of guild members and the local chieftain/king functioning as the head of the guild (Buhler 1894: 327-329; Luders 1973: no. 1202).

The Sātavāhanas and their successors realized the importance of commerce as a crucial factor sustaining their economic as well as their political base. They issued coins with their names inscribed, a practice which differed totally from early north India where currencies were mainly issued by commercial guilds. The Hatigumpha inscription states that Kharavela mastered the knowledge of minting coins. Some of the symbols found in the inscriptions of the Sātavāhanas and those of Kharavela are also to be found on certain coins. In order to accumulate more wealth, the new ruling houses did not hesitate to resort to plunder or attempts at controlling certain commercially lucrative areas and routes. Such expeditions conducted in the south by Kharavela clearly followed the trade route linking the major commercial centers of the Sātavāhana state.

Where there was no direct control over the guilds, the ruling houses seem to have in any case maintained a close link with the merchant class and their guilds. An inscription from the western Deccan records cash investments made by a member of the ruling house in two weaving guilds (Sircar 1965: 164-165). A female officer attached to the Ikshvaku harem invested a sum of money in four different guilds (Sircar 1963-1964: 4-7). On the other hand, there are references to members of merchant families holding administrative posts under the ruling houses (Luders 1973: nos. 1239, 1247; Sharma 1968: 205-206).

In conclusion, it may be stated that the process of secondary state formation in the subcontinent was largely conditioned by a fusion between the internal and the external developments. The external impetus under the metropolitan state occupation became so effective primarily because these areas had already undergone certain structural changes, which enabled these societies to incorporate as well as be receptive to the new elements inducted by the external source. Therefore, during the period of metropolitan state hegemony the prestate social elites acquired cultural sophistication, legitimization of political status, and a familiarity with the state apparatus required for a more efficient control over subjects and resources. Secondly, the amalgamation of these areas in the sphere of influence of the metropolitan states, resulted in more intensive economic activities by local groups, especially in trade and commodity production. Each of these developments resulted in a greater disparity in the distribution of social wealth, and an integration of the polity and the economy within the power structure now operated by a better defined composite ruling class which finally gave rise to a real crystallization of the state in Kalinga and Andhra.

NOTES

- An earlier draft of this article was presented at the (Xth ICAES) postconference on 'The Study of the State', held at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 18-20 December 1978. Thanks are due to Prof. Romila Thapar (J.N.U.), Prof. Henri Claessen (Leiden), and Dr. Shereen Ratnagar (J.N.U.) for their useful comments.
- 2. The term metropolitan state was used by Prof. Romila Thapar (during the postconference session), specifically to denote the Mauryan state that emerged in the fertile middle Ganga valley, which was also the most developed socioeconomic region in its period. The metropolitan state, through its bureaucracy and standing army, maintained areas peripheral to the primary locus as a vast repository of wealth for the center, i.e. the metropolis at Pataliputra. See Thapar, this volume.
- 3. The emergence of the iron-using megalithic culture in the southern Deccan can be dated to c.1000 B.C., and apparently spread east and southward by around the fifth century B.C. The megalithic burials and the associated distinct pottery type, Black and Red Ware, gradually went out of vogue around the first century B.C. in the primary nuclear areas. (For an integrated study see Gururaja Rao 1972.)
- 4. 'When King Devanampiya Priyadarsin had been anointed eight years, (the country of) the Kalingas was conquered by (him). One hundred and fifty thousand in number were the men who were deported thence, one hundred thousand in number were those who were slain there, and many times as many those who died...' (Hultzsch 1922: 47).
- 5. These are the most ancient Tamil literary works, and are divided as

the Eight Anthologies and the Ten Idylls. There are also eighteen minor works and the twin epics (Silappadikaram and Manimekalai). The themes of the literature could be divided into those dealing with love and war, and are related to the five ecological regions viz. hills, arid land, pastures, the littoral, and the agricultural tracts. In all probability the Sangam literature could be dated between the third century B.C. and the early Christian era. These works also represent certain evidence related to the terminal megalithic culture in south India (Sirinivasan 1946: 9-16; Champakalakshmi 1975-1976: 119; for details on literature see Kailasapathy 1968; Zvelebil 1975).

- 6. A recent study indicates a coincidence between the areas occupied by the vēļir groups and megalithic sites (Champakalakshmi 1975-1976: 110-122). We have further observed a prevalence of the vēļir groups in areas earlier dominated by a pastoral-cum-agrarian economy in the hilly and arid regions.
- 7. A similar development seems to have taken place in early Sri Lanka. The earliest stone inscriptions (third to second century B.C.) mentioning the parumaka (the foremost one/leader) group often coincide with the megalithic Black and Red Ware sites, with areas conducive for agriculture, and those along river routes leading to the mineral-rich hill country. A similar pattern seems to have been followed by the inscriptions of the rajha (literally: king) group in pre-Christian Sri Lanka. (for details on these groups, see Gunawardana in this volume).
- Nānnan, the chief of the Kośar tribe, extended his control over the gold-producing southern Mysore (Narrinai. 391: 6; Ahnanuru. 199: 19).
- 9. Rudimentary craft specialization is evident from the occurrence of a considerable range in the ceramic industry, beads (of stone, steatite, carnelian, shell), ornaments of copper/bronze and of gold. Archeological evidence of remains such as certain lithifacts, shell objects, and gold ornaments indicates the establishment of routes of transportation from the sources of raw materials to distant and nearby sites, and also the establishment of some form of an exchange process.
- 10. The Black and Red Ware and associated pottery types, the iron implements of a homogenous character that spread out in a wide geographical area, along with the high quality of production, speak for a considerable degree of full-time specialization and a network of relatively intensive communication.
- Originally, the Ionians, who conducted commercial activities in western India, were known as the Yavana, a term later extended to other west Asian groups as well. Rāja in this context would imply leader or chief.
- 12. The household group is termed grahata in the inscriptions of Aśoka (XIII Major Rock Edict, Shahbazgarhi version, cf. Hultzsch 1922: 66-67). From the sixth century B.C. in north India, this group was primarily associated with land and agriculture. A section of this affluent group, the setthigahapati (merchant-householder), resided at urban centers and ventured into trade and guild activities.

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17 Some Additional Thoughts on the Concept of the Early State

PETER SKALNÍK

1. INTRODUCTION

In the concluding chapters of the collection on *The Early State*, Claessen and I wrote that the aim of this venture was 'to refine the existing theoretical tools through confrontation with generalized data on actual early states' (1978: 650). At the same time, these chapters (531-650) were 'not to set forth unshakable truths, but to provide a basis for further research on, and discussion of, the early state' (531). The Delhi postconference and especially the proceedings to which this is a contribution will no doubt present another step in research and discussion. In this paper I shall limit myself to discussing the concept of the early state alone and relate it briefly to the theory of the state in general. My approach derives from the materialist conception of history as developed originally by Marx and recently by Krader.

In Chapter 1 of *The Early State*, the state was characterized as a transient, 'historically limited type of human organization', the product of a divided society', or 'a specific kind of social organization' (4). In the concluding chapter, Claessen and I offered an extensive definition according to which the early state regulates relations between *emergent social classes* (640):

The early state is a centralized socio-political organization for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided into at least two

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basic strata, or emergent social classes - viz. the rulers and the ruled-, whose relations are characterized by political dominance of the former and tributary obligations of the latter, legitimized by a common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle.

These relations were mainly those of political dominance and tributary obligations, legitimized by a common (state-generated) ideology of reciprocity. Referring to the society of the Asiatic mode of production as characterized by 'a basic dichotomy between the state organization...and the agricultural or pastoral (village) communities' (643) we implicitly identified the early state with the ruling class. I shall return to the relation between state and society in Section 3.

A number of contributors to *The Early State* put forth evidence for the class character of the state. The 'general benefit' hypothesis of the state (Service 1975) was refuted (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 642-644) although not in all of its aspects. Krader, in his contribution to the volume, pointed out the dualism of the state: the latter, according to him (following Marx), is the organization of society for the regulation of the relations both within and between the social classes and is formed by and out of the relations of the classes in society to one another and to the social whole (1978: 93-94, my emphasis). Krader continues by asserting that the state is the principle of organization of a classdivided society, more concretely 'the organization itself', or 'the formal organization of the society of political economy' (96, my emphasis). In his recent book Krader adds that 'the state is the fiction of society...the reification of society' (1976a: 230, my emphasis).

I suggest that this brings us to an important point. Although some authors in *The Early State* (e.g., Khazanov 1978a: 80-87) implicitly considered the state a superstructural phenomenon, the analysis of the determining substructure — without which the rise of the state organization would be unthinkable — is less emphasized by a number of contributors. It seems to me that this is due not only to scarcity of data, but especially to the tendency towards seeing the state as a more self-generating phenomenon than it really is.

In his Ethnological Notebooks, Marx pointed out very clearly that 'the apparent supreme independence of the state is itself merely show, and in all its forms it is an excrescence of society' (1972: 329). In the light of this, the potential of the early state as a theoretical concept for determining the nature of the society is not as high as contributors to *The Early State* suppose. One notes the difference when Marx's and Krader's statements are compared with Cohen's assertion that

the state is the most powerful, continuously authoritative, and most inclusive organization in the history of the species, [which] has the universally acknowledged right, if it wishes, to expropriate holdings of the largest and most powerful multinational in the world' (1978: 31).

While Marx and Krader indicate the existence of the forces from which the state derives, in Cohen's formulation, the state wishes, expropriates, and behaves like the moving power in history.

2. HUMAN LABOR

What, if any, are the social forces of which the early state is an 'excrescence', 'outgrowth', 'derivate', 'reification' or 'fiction'? I hold that the essence of the materialist conception of history is the process of human labor. No amount of controversy concerning the modes of production, periodization and stages of history, social (and economic) formations, forms of property, or relations of dependence can substitute for the analysis of the central problem of labor. Human labor is the primary condition for production and reproduction of social life. The question about the meaning of the state in general and the early state in particular can be tackled successfully only when the analysis of the concrete and abstract dialectic of social labor is carried out.

According to Marx and Krader, the qualitative change in history occurred when the original production and consumption units—the communities of immediate producers¹—began to produce commodities for exchange. Prior to this historical landmark, work and life in communities were collective, and opposition of private and public activities existed only to a negligible degree (Krader 1976a: 223).² The labor of all able-bodied members of each community was concrete, its product was consumed by the producing group. In this sense the community was a natural (naturwüchsig), undivided unit of social relations, free from economic exploitation and alienation of people among themselves.

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Consequently, there was no large society above the community level; the community was synonymous with the primeval society. Economy in the communities was based on communal labor, thus existing in the original, unalienated sense of the term. Clans and lineages were the organizing principles, or charters, in other words, the superstructure of the primeval society. They did not fulfill economic functions, even if they might have appeared to do so. This confused Morgan, Engels, and many scholars after them (cf. Krader 1975: 295). The clan was a primary juridical body, an association or corporation of the primeval society, an analogy of the corporation of the divided society.

Exchange of commodities was probably called into existence by an increasing dependence among communities. More productive and at the same time less self-sufficient communities developed exchange and thus brought about the transition from the primitive, or communal, to the political, or class, economy. Labor became social through exchange of commodities. An ever-increasing amount of the community's production was designed for the consumption of other than the immediate producers. This did not necessarily mean that the consumers no longer participated in the process of production. Analytically, the process of social production became separated from the process of social reproduction. We can speak about social economy which is not yet class or political economy. Eventual increase in production, enhanced by the benefits of exchange of commodities, was expressed in the social value of production which brought with it the exchange More and more products were being valued by the value. producers and the consumers involved in exchange.

In historical terms this development could have taken long periods of time. Exchange of commodities probably existed long before a part of the social product was unequally redistributed and appropriated by those who did not participate in social production and tended to separate themselves from the community (Marx's term *Losreissung*; see Marx 1972: 329; Krader 1976b: 113). Categories of *surplus* as the 'unearned appropriated product' (Krader), and *surplus value*, introduce the exploitation and division of the society into emergent social classes. Just as the rise of social classes extended over a long period of time, so also did the establishment of the state as the superstructural organization above them. The contributors to *The Early State*

showed in a multitude of examples that social stratification and class formation preceded the formation of the state.

It is the dialectic of transition from social life in primeval communities to various forms of at once united and divided society which stands in the center of investigation. It is not the mere distinguishing of stages, nor discussion on the number of historical stages which suggest the convenience of evolutionist organicism. The state is often falsely taken as a stage of evolution which would supersede the plurality of small communities. However, the state is an organization within a larger system of civil society.

3. CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society, an expression which Marx borrowed from Hegel, constitutes the key concept for understanding the place and significance of the early state in history. It is civil society and not the state which stands in a dialectical opposition to the primeval communities. Civil society, as analyzed by Krader (1976a), comprises all epochs of the economic formation of society, i.e., all forms of class society. Etymologically as well as factually, the societies of the precapitalist modes of production — such as the Asiatic, classical, or feudal — would appear as less developed forms of modern bourgeois society.

Civil society is based on the production of surplus value, on private property, and on the relations of political economy. The state, according to Krader, is 'the product of relations between political economy and [civil] society. Its agencies usurp the organization of production' (1976a: 50, bracketed word inserted by me). Korsch considered civil society as 'the sum and aggregate of the material conditions prevailing in the new commodity producing society' (1963: 138). 'Civil society...is the society with the state, or political society' (Krader 1978: 94-95, my emphasis). Thus civil society is not to be confounded with the state, although it must be kept in mind that it is the society with the state. This was already pointed out by Marx:

...legal relations as well as forms of State cannot be understood out of themselves nor out of the so-called general development of the human mind

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but, on the contrary, are rooted in the material conditions of life, the aggregate of which Hegel, following the precedent of the English and French of the 18th century, grouped together under the name of 'civil society', and that the anatomy of civil society is to be sought for in political economy (Mss 1843, MEGA I, 1, i: 401-553, quoted from Korsch 1963: 20).

To sum up the point under discussion, I would once again stress that the state, including the early state, appears as a superstructural social phenomenon, a product derived from the relations between civil society and political economy. Civil society forms a link between the substructure of political economy and the superstructure of the state.³

4. CLASS FORMATION

What is essential for understanding the relations among political economy, civil society, and the state? In my opinion, it is the process of class formation. When observing and analyzing this process, we see various communities of immediate producers existing continuously in juxtaposed epochs of human history. Within them the emergence of first individuals — class subjects of history — took place. They formed the sovereign's retinue, nobility, and first rich people of the societies with an early state (cf. Krader 1976a: 153). I suggest that in order to explain concrete social processes adequately, one has to grasp the dialectic of community and civil society historically as an unfolding of class differentiation, corroborated eventually, but not always, by the development of the state. In fact, data show that class formation both preceded and succeeded the period of existence of the early state.

Class formation is a nearly universal process, directly connected with substructural processes of labor, production, and creation of exchange and surplus value. It is superordinate to the state. The state, which is a formal public expression of class opposition, is distinguished by its agencies of centralization, formalization, and legitimation of power of one class in the society. There is no automatism between the existence or rise of social classes and state formation. Khazanov's statement that the early-class society is the social equivalent of the early state is not precise (Khazanov

1978a: 77). Nor is it mere usurpation of power that necessarily leads to the state. What is needed is legitimation or *Anerkennung* in the eyes of all or most members of a class-divided society (see Kurtz 1978 and this volume, and Skalník 1978b).

In the light of the above discussion the decisive criteria of the concept of the early state may be other than the absence of political fission over time or reciprocity relations as means for legitimation. Even the characteristics according to which the early state 'represented a rather unsteady kind of polity...with a complex and unstable social structure and different relations of dependence' (Khazanov 1978a: 78) are hardly satisfactory for distinguishing the early state as a specific category.

I contend that if the early state is to be a useful concept, we have first to examine the question of the relation of the early state in particular and the state in general. My position with regard to this point is unambiguous: the early state is a concept denoting one typical development form of the state. To be sure, the state, as a concept and as a social phenomenon, remains in principle and substance always the same: it is based on the cleavage of society into social classes. However, concrete historical forms of it differ; they change from one period of human history to another, from one place to another. The state rises above the thus created and cleft society as its ideological, superstructural organizational principle only when there is objective necessity for it.

5. TRIBUTE

To grasp the character of the early state means to carry out the analysis of the role it plays as the product of the relation between political economy and civil society. Let us discuss in some detail the point where the triangle of political economy-civil society-early state makes clear sense: the extraction of surplus value. In The Early State the existence of tribute and its various derivates was considered one of fundamental distinguishing characteristics of the early state. However, interpretation of what tribute means differs with various authors.

For example Cohen sees tribute as an interstate payment or payment of nonstate polities to the state in recognition of relations of dependence or friendship (Cohen 1978: 50). Khazanov writes 346 Peter Skalnik

on tribute in a similar manner and distinguishes between tribute (outside the early state) and taxes (inside of it) (1978b: 427-435). But Steinhart, in his chapter on Ankole, mentions interchangeably gift, rent, taxation, and tribute (1978: 142, 143, 145, 147) as contributions of farming communities to the Ankole state and the pastoral ruling class. He concludes that

...the overarching political authority of the pastoral ruling class supported by *tribute* from both economies gives rise to that sub-type of the tributary modes of production found in the lacustrine area and represented by such lacustrine states as the pre-colonial kingdom of Ankole and its neighbours (ibid.: 147, my emphasis).

My own chapter on Voltaic states in West Africa introduces the term tributary gift as the most rudimentary form of state revenue, and tribute and tributary relations are mentioned as distinguishing features characterizing the appropriation of surplus value in these early states (1978a: passim). Kobishchanov first alludes to a synonymity between the terms of tribute and rent (1978: 155). but then in the analysis of the early state of Axum, he refers to tribute as the main source of income of the king (ibid.: 156). He writes that the king of Axum and his vassals 'collected tribute from subordinate communities by touring around the country', which, he adds, is a custom common in the early feudal type of states in Europe, Africa and Oceania'. Vassal kings of Axum, in their turn, 'paid a yearly tribute to their suzerain' (ibid.: 160). Kochakova, in her chapter on the Yoruba state of Oyo, writes about levies (a neutral term), taxes, gifts, duties, and tributes. The latter are 'yearly presents from dependent cities and territories' (1978: 502). The armies of Oyo went on 'plundering raids and to instill awe in tributaries by the king every few years' (ibid.: 507, my emphasis).

Claessen, in Chapter 25, characterizes Jimma's 'heavy percentage' payment from trade revenues to Ethiopia (cf. Lewis 1978: 233) as a tax (Claessen 1978: 549 ff.), while that of Dagbong to Asante as tribute. Then he tries to summarize in Table IV (ibid.: 550-551) the sorts of sources of income of those who have indirect connections with food production. Mentioning taxes, land rent, booty, barter, remuneration, gifts, services, and having put them carefully in Table IV, he claims to have found that 'in all early states the obligation to pay taxes existed' (ibid.: 553,

structural characteristic no. 17). At the same time tribute or tributary gifts were found by Claessen to have been the *principal* source of income of sovereigns and aristocracy in the sample of twenty-one early states analyzed in the volume (ibid.: 554, structural characteristic no. 19).

In my chapter on the early state as a process, which follows the chapter by Claessen just mentioned, I view social inequality in early states as a development from irregular, inchoate forms of appropriation of surplus value — such as tributary gifts, occasional labor, service or so-called booty production — to a regular and sophisticated tribute in kind and labor, various levies and a taxation system. I concluded that

Tributary relations emerged as the most characteristic form of relation of dependence in the early state. They define the unequal relationship between the rulers and ruled as one between two basic emergent classes in the early state (Skalník 1978b: 604).

Finally in the last chapter of the volume, Claessen and I have included tributary relations in the definition of the early state itself (see above), where we wrote that the relations of the emergent social classes of rulers and ruled are 'characterized by political dominance of the former and tributary obligations of the latter...' (1978: 640).

I think that this extensive documentation of the usages of the term tribute in *The Early State* (I could also have quoted from other chapters in the volume) indicates that at least two meanings are associated with this term. The first, more specific, means a payment in kind or money by the dependent tribe or vassal state to the stronger state and its sovereign (suzerain). The second meaning occurs along with tax, gift, tributary gift, rent, and services. It was provided by communities of immediate producers or by lower members of the ruling class. The second usage can also be found in Krader (1975: passim) and Marx. Krader, however, avoids usage of tribute in the second sense and uses consequently the term tax (in kind, services, or money) in his later book (1976a).

Samir Amin (1973, 1977) is the most ardent propagator of tributary relations as being most characteristic and epoch making in what he calls the tributary stage or tributary mode of production. This stage in human history is characterized by such a level 348 Peter Skalník

of development of productive forces that it 'makes possible and at the same time requires, the existence of the state'. The forms of ownership 'allow the ruling class to control access to agricultural land and thereby to exact tribute from the peasant producers' (1977: 25). I do not think such an automatism of development could really exist. Moreover, at least in the societies of the Asiatic mode of production (see Krader 1975 and other literature on the AMP), the land was not really controlled by the sovereign or other members of the ruling class but by the communities of immediate producers. Only a small part of land was privately The public ownership of land in the person of the owned. sovereign seems to be a fiction misused by European colonialists for establishment of their control over natural resources, including agricultural land in the non-European countries. It was political and ideological power which moved communities to pay tax or tribute.

Today I view the usage of the term 'tribute' and thus also concepts like 'tributary relations' or 'tributary mode of producton' with little enthusiasm. Such usage is, at the least, debatable. I think that we first have to pay respect to the usage of the Latin term tributum by the Romans. It seems it was originally the payment of three component tribes of the Roman nation. Later the meaning changed to the payment by those tribes conquered by Rome. The term tribute, as we have seen, often overlaps in literature with the terms tax and rent. I feel that deeper analysis of modes of production, modes of exploitation (Ruyle 1975), and forms of dependence in the early civil societies would profit more from the analytical strength of the terms tax and rent.

It seems to me that the data brought together in *The Early State* clearly hint at the early state as the only supracommunity organization in early civil society which expresses at once both the public and private contents of the relations between opposed social classes. Why is this so? The existence of the agencies of the early state and individual representatives of the state was possible thanks to a specific mode of exploitation of immediate producers by which the state received the surplus value at once as tax and rent. Only if one views the tribute as an amalgam of tax and rent may the term tribute be somewhat justified.

The tax is that part of surplus value in early civil society which is presented to the state agencies as the public acknowledgement of and payment for political hegemony, protection, etc. The rent is connected with the right to private property of individuals or corporations and consequently occurs in more developed forms of civil society. In the period of existence of the early state it is usually found as the monopoly of some individuals who form the top of the state hierarchy. Analytically, it is that part of surplus value received by the ruling class via the state apparatus on the assumption that the state individuals also have private rights to people and land. The early state may perhaps be seen in this respect as a unique supercorporation, which under the public guise gradually makes private its power over the originally natural communities of free humans.

The early state is according to this viewpoint a dialectical unity of public and private principles of civil society. The state cannot be substituted for the latter, but was capable in its early forms of covering with its imaginary wings both the public and private civil condition of society and political economy. I propose that it is in this duality that the specificity and reason of the early state reside as a distinct scientific concept and historical social reality.⁶

NOTES

- By community is understood a group of people who in a stable way share
 the same residential unit, work activities, and everyday face-to-face
 contacts. Communities of immediate producers can be village communities, house or compound communities (Hauskommunion), extended
 family communities, clan communities, etc.
- 2. We distinguish between concrete labor or work, and abstract labor. The latter is labor of all kinds taken as an abstraction. The distinction exists only in social and political economy, not in primitive economy. In primitive economy even use value does not exist because working time is not measured. Products are simply consumed without valuing them. Social labor and production of exchange and surplus value are associated with the social character of labor and unequal distribution of value produced.
- 3. The separation between civil society and the state is also an historical process. For example, the Inca system was a case of syncretic unity of instances. The civil society was not yet developed there and seems to have been formally the same as the community. Likewise, the community and the state were not distinguished. The land was possessed by 'the community as the state' (Krader 1976a: 147). Marx also discusses at

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length the relation between civil society and the state in his critique of 'Philosophy of Right' by Hegel (1970). He compares the situation in the medieval era and modern times, pointing out that 'the abstraction of the state as such belongs to modern times...In the Middle Ages popular life and state /i.e., political/ life were identical. Man was the actual principle of the state, but he was unfree man' (1970: 32).

- 4. In 1978 when studying data on the early state of Nanun in Northern Ghana (Voltaic area), I came across the article by the late A.A. Iliasu entitled 'Asante's Relations with Dagomba, c. 1740-1984' published in Ghana Social Science Journal 1 (2), 54-62 for 1971, where the author argues that the kingdom of Dagbon (northern neighbor of Nanun) paid to the Asante kingdom not tribute of dependence but a sort of yearly installment of a ransom for a Dagomba sovereign captured and later released by the Ashanti.
- The question of the tributum in Roman history is not simple at all. Such an authoritative compendium as Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (1976), vol. 17: 1077 seems not to distinguish between tribute and tax:

In Rome, along with consumption taxes and custom duties, there were certain 'direct' taxes. The principal of these was the *tributum* paid by citizens and usually as a head tax.

French usage of the term *tribut* also often overlaps with that of *impôt*. Pershits, a Soviet specialist, distinguishes between the usage of the term tribute by historians who mean by it 'requisition from the conquered, as well as any primitive form of direct tax' and by ethnographers who think that tribute denotes 'occasional or regular requisitions from conquered tribes' (1979: 149). He continues (ibid.) by writing that

There is furthermore no generally accepted understanding of the term tribute relations which can mean either dependence of one ethnic group upon another (tribal slavery, or what is known as the Asiatic mode of production), or a system of protofeudal taxation which has not yet developed into a regularized feudal treasury.

Pershits calls for unification of usage of the term. He shows variations of tribute throughout history and concludes, at variance with Amin, that 'tribute relations represent no specific mode of production' (ibid.: 154) but admits at the same time that 'tribute relations represent a specific method of exploitation' (ibid.).

6. This contribution cannot take up all important points concerning the concept of the early state. Ideological moments such as legitimation, symbolic or sacred power, 'antieconomic' parameters of the early civil society and the state have to be studied with no less intensity (cf. Godelier 1978).

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18 From 'Empire' to State: The Emergence of the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara: c. 1350-1890

EDWARD I. STEINHART

1. INTRODUCTION

From the earliest descriptions by explorers, missionaries and administrators, the societies of the interlacustrine region of Uganda have been described as kingdoms and enjoyed a high regard for the organization, dignity, and grandeur of their states seldom granted by Victorian gentlemen to 'savage races'. If the granting of feudal titles of nobility and designations of royalty were conceded by these early accounts, the modern and scientific students of the area have been no less willing to apply feudal terminology, granting title of nobility to the pastoral aristocrats and landholders as well as the dignity of sovereign rulers to those who held supreme power and ritual-bound authority among the peoples of the region (eg., Beattie 1960). I do not intend to demean these societies or their attainments by calling in question these, in any case, dubious honors bestowed by men whose regard for order and authority often exceeded that which they held for justice and independence. However, damage is done to our understanding of precolonial lacustrine societies by the uncritical award of feudal title and the unthinking application of European notions of royalty, statecraft and political order to these diverse cultures and societies. What is needed is a reexamination and critical assessment of the evolution of the economic and social bases of these societies with a view to better understanding their historical and political dynamics rather than encapsulating them

in a fixed and changeless category of state, be it feudal or bureaucratic, primitive, rudimentary, or inchoate. The emphasis in this essay then is on process and transition; on the lacustrine societies as social formations continually making themselves, coming into being, creating and recreating their unique political order.

Among the lacustrine societies, the empire and kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara² is believed to be the oldest, largest, and grandest of them all. The rise of the neighboring kingdom of Buganda in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has tended to eclipse the achievements of Kitara, even giving the name Uganda to the modern colony and republic which includes the Kitaran districts. Now only the small district of Bunyoro, pinioned between Buganda's expansive territories and the eastern shores of Lake Albert, retains the claim to the heritage of the once extensive Even if we deflate the excessive claims of territorial extent (cf. Kiwanuka 1968) made by Kitara's champions (Nyakatura 1973: 1), we still must recognize the claim of Kitara to a wide expanse of western Uganda from the Victoria Nile to the Kagera River and from Ruwenzori to the lakeside plains of Lake The transformation of Kitara from an extensive and loose-knit 'empire' to a smaller and more compact 'state' by the second half of the nineteenth century is pictured in the literature as a classical decline and fall of a powerful imperial tradition (Nyakatura 1973; Uzoigwe 1970). There is an alternative view that focuses on the growth of state power and institutions rather than the decline of 'imperial' power. This process of emergence goes on within and counter to the tendency to disintegration and decay of 'imperial' power which is the more familiar theme. By examining the growth of 'state' power and its social basis, I hope to come closer to understanding the nature of state formation in Bunyoro-Kitara during its five centuries of autonomous existence.3

2. A QUESTION OF ORIGINS

The history of the Kitaran empire begins with a period of migration and settlement of the region by Iron Age pastoral and agricultural peoples. It has been customary to treat this period as

the country's contemporary inhabitants have understood it: in terms of heroes, demigods and legendary giants (cf. Beattie 1971: 33-61; Dunbar 1965; 10-30). Only recently has this mythic past been plumbed with a view to establishing sequence, veracity, and the role of social and economic relations in the development of early states in the region (Buchanan 1975; Webster 1979). This mythic period in Kitaran history has been subdivided into two dynastic eras: the Age of the Gods or Batembuzi and that of the Demigods or Bacwezi. The first group, the Batembuzi, carry the names of primal forces and are generally agreed to be personifications of natural phenomena. I believe only one modern author argues that the Batembuzi represented real men who once lived and ruled Kitara as its first kings (Webster 1979). On the other hand, the Bacwezi have the names of people and have almost universally been identified with a real group of men and women who once lived in and probably ruled a vast territory of what is now western Uganda and possibly extending into northern Tanzania and eastern Zaire. Only one author contends that they too are merely mythic beings personified as kings (Wrigley 1958; cf. De Heusch 1972). That the Bacwezi of history were neither the supermen nor demigods of legend has generally been assumed by modern writers, who see them as something between invading militaristic conquerors and impoverished wandering herdsmen.

There is less agreement on the question of whether or not the Bacwezi were real kings as well as real men. At one end of the spectrum, we find that 'the Bachwezi were a ruling clan a tiny minority who were held in awe by the local people because of their apparent super-human knowledge and skill'. This 'superhuman knowledge', which led to such supposed introductions as regalia, palaces and court officials, administrative hierarchies and a regular army, has caused the Bacwezi to be 'remembered throughout western Uganda as the originators of a pattern of social organization and religion which were imitated by successor dynasties' (Dunbar 1965: 24). There is at least one East African scholar who contends that prior to the Bacwezi era of pastoral intrusion, the Bantu-speaking cultivators had established their own traditions of statecraft and centralized political control (Katoke 1971). Most authorities reject this notion in favor of a picture of agricultural society composed of autonomous villages and village clusters based on what might be termed a 'lineage mode of

production' (Rey 1975). For these authorities it was the 'conquest' of the (Bairu) farmers by 'invading' (Bahuma) herders, with superior culture and/or military organization which precipitated the subordination of the agricultural group, the emergence of class society and the origins of kingship and statehood.

We must first dismiss the 'conquest theory' of Kitaran origins as being totally unsupported by evidence and based merely on the speculative projection of European notions of pastoral nomadic militarism and the 'well known' propensity of cattle keepers and mobile herdsmen to dominate sedentary agriculturalists (contrast Claessen and Skalník 1978: 45-49, 425-439). Lacustrine traditions⁴ record no battles, victories, or subjugations. The invasion appears to be nothing more militant than the (forced?) migration of herding groups, rich in cattle but poor in material and political culture, and their settlement in the drier and less arable areas of the highland corridor between the western Rift Valley and Lake Victoria. The herders appear to have been too small in number to have left any linguistic impact on the Bantu farmers. They appear to have established only scattered and isolated communities of pastoral clans in the drier uplands of western Uganda during the era of migration and settlement prior to c. 1400.

Indeed, there are only two sources of evidence for the existence of a state at all in the Bacwezi era (c. 1350-c. 1400). The first is the testimony of royal tradition which systematically refers to the Bacwezi as kings and to Kitara in terms of a monarchical system. This can be interpreted as a projection backward of later development, a 'mythical charter' for subsequent political organization.⁵ Such an interpretation is compelling in the absence of independent supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in this case of archeology, is harder to discredit. The great earthworks at Bigo and the smaller cognate sites which 'stretch southward from the Bugoma Forest in Bunyoro to the south bank of the Katonga River in Masaka District, Buganda' (Lanning 1960: 184) have been firmly linked by tradition and archeology to the Bacwezi era and pastoral culture (Posnansky 1966; Lanning 1970). These earthworks and ditches have been used to posit a high level of political centralization on the grounds that such extensive labors required the direction of a highly organized and hierarchical system of political control. And what but a 'state', monarchical and authoritarian, could accomplish such organization?

The question is meant to be more than rhetorical. I believe that ritual control or extensive kin-based labor recruitment may have accomplished the same objective without either state apparatus or class-hegemonic labor control. In any case, the archeological evidence gives conclusive proof of the establishment of a pastoral economy with Iron Age technology and considerable attainments in manpower management, but no firm proof of state organization.

In the absence of such evidence, I would advance the hypothesis that the existence of even a rudimentary or inchoate early state is incompatible with what we know of the economic and social situation of fifteenth-century western Uganda. Rather it would seem that the intrusion of a sparse population of itinerant herders organized around a dominant lineage or clan group (the Bacwezi) had little dynamic impact on a similarly sparse agricultural population during the pre-1400 Bacwezi era. Pastoral tradition exaggerated the cultural gifts of the Bacwezi describing them as bringers of fire, iron, coffee, cotton, and cattle. Only the last item deserves serious attention. It does appear that a new larger variety of cattle, long-horned and humped, called sanga, were the gift of the pastoral intruders.

Both tradition and archeology attest to the extensive cattle herds of the Bahuma migrants (Nyakatura 1973: 47; Lanning, 1970: 52). The construction of earthworks for the penning of cattle is not, however, proof of statecraft or the subjugation of the agricultural population as a labor force. Indeed, the Huma tendency to exclude nonpastoralists from even the menial tasks of the kraal does not accord well with the image of a class-based political system based on the extraction of labor tribute from farming communities subordinated to a pastoral state. The pre-1400 era saw the establishment of two autonomous communities of herders and farmers with a limited interaction based on exchange and not political dominion.

Politically, leadership within the agricultural community was on a village/lineage basis with little specialization or economic differentiation of leader (headman) from followers. Among the herders, a lineage group of the Bacwezi seems to have asserted claims to primacy and possibly to some labor services from other Huma herding clans. But this was at most an embryonic dynasty whose claims to authority constituted neither control over a state

apparatus of coercion and territorial administration nor ideological hegemony. At best this stratified society might be described as organized by a prestate, a *dynastate*, the only statelike institution being a dynasty, or dominant lineage differentiated from the 'subject' population of related herders and autonomous farmers of the area (cf. Steinhart 1978b).

3. THE EARLY BITO PERIOD C. 1400-C. 1550

If no state existed in c. 1400 when the Bacwezi mysteriously departed from western Uganda, then there can be no question that the Bito dynasty which replaced (or supplanted) them did not inherit the mantle of state power from a former sovereign dynasty. The Babito have been firmly identified with a southward migration of Lwoo-speaking Nilotes who settled along the northern bank of the Nile, later called Acholi, and across northern Uganda into western Kenya, known as Luo or Japadhola, etc., (Ogot 1967). It is possible that the state institutions which came to be established by the nineteenth century were of purely Luo invention and were introduced into Kitara in a developed condition, but it is most unlikely and contrary to what little evidence we have of the culture of the Luo migrants and of the traditional history of the Kitaran empire (cf. Atkinson 1978).

According to tradition, despite a fanciful claim to genetic relationship to the previous dynasty of Bacwezi, the Bito rulers had to be trained ab initio in the techniques and customs of Kitaran government. No claim is made for them to cultural ascendancy among the pastoralists. What then did the Luo bring to the Kataran area which made them the undisputed rulers of the dynastate?

The first Lwo immigrants known as Palwo established themselves south of the Nile by the early fifteenth century, but it appears that the Bito dynasty was part of a later group of immigrants who arrived after the Cwezi 'disappearance' (Adefuye 1973: 1-11, Webster 1972: 10).

A period of one generation is allowed between the end of Cwezi hegemony, perhaps tied to a time of troubles which Webster calls Wamara's Famine, and the arrival of the Bito under Rukidi, which Webster associates with another famine called Rukidi's, (Webster 1974: 8-9). Rukidi is universally accepted as the founder of the

Bito dynasty of Kitara, an arrangement which tradition associates with famine and the consequent exchange of Cwezi regalia (especially a 'royal drum') for Lwo foodstuffs, named with clear biblical resonance, 'a mess of porridge'. The idea is attractive as it implies a certain complementarity of Lwo grain production and Huma pastoralism being used to political advantage by one group. But I think we must see the exchange as both symbolic of a transfer of power to a new dynasty and of the shifting political economy in northern Kitara.

The first four Bito dynasts were buried (and lived) in Palwo country far from the Mubende heartland of the Kitaran empire. This has been used by Adefuye to argue for Palwo domination of Kitara (1973: 30-34). I would suggest that the Bito at this stage (c. 1400-c. 1544) controlled only the Palwo area and the one generation interregnum accepted by Webster must be extended to three or four generations. During this period which included at least one major drought and famine, Lwo political dominance was aided by their steady production of grains, especially highly regarded millet, which came to supplement the milk and meat regimen of the herders. By the reign of Olimi I (c. 1517-1544), the Bito leaders of Palwo had parlayed their mess of millet into a solution to the prolonged crisis in Kitara by placing their own dynasty as heirs to Cwezi power in the Mubende heartland of pastoral hegemony.

Another aspect of the notion of Bito succession to Cwezi power should be borne in mind. Once the Cwezi are deified and portrayed as rulers of a great empire, the burden of tradition is to explain the loss of the golden age and the decline of Kitaran power over the centuries. Thus, the loss of Buganda during Rukidi's generation; of Ankole and the southern marches in the time of Winyi II (c. 1571-1598) and of Toro and the western fringe under Nyamutukura (c. 1783-c. 1830) are cast in tradition as part of a long process of decay and dissolution. If we recognize the Cwezi as wandering herdsmen, primus inter pares, and not the founders of a vast empire and the wielders of great authority, our burden is to draw from the recesses of that tradition of decline, the scattered evidences for the opposite: the progressive if intermittent accumulation of power, centralization of control and institutionalization of leadership and authority which is the evolution of the state.

4. THE MATURE BITO PERIOD C. 1550-C. 1760

From Olimi I (c. 1517-1544) to Olimi III (c. 1733-1760) we can witness the consolidation of the Bito dynasty as rulers of Kitara. A new political economy developed, based not on a strict cultural division of labor between pastoral exclusivism and subsistence rainfall grain agriculture, but rather on a ruling class whose forebears practiced mixed farming and who mediated the differences between herders and farmers and emerged as leaders of a hegemonic state as a result of this role of mediation.

Under Olimi I the Bito dynasty not only moves its 'capital' to the southern pastoral zone, but begins the centuries' long policy of military expansion against its southern neighbors running in an arc from Buganda and Buddu on the east to Nkore and Rwanda to the southwest. Olimi I, particularly, campaigns in Buganda and Buddu and is buried in Ssingo county of what becomes the colonial Buganda kingdom and district. His successor, Nyabongo (c. 1544-1571), born of a Palwo mother, turns his expansive attentions northward against the central Sudanic-speaking Madi (an indication of his 'Palwo' or northern orientation?). By the reign of Chwa I (c. 1626-1652) Kitaran aggressiveness against its pastoral rivals to the south reached a fevered pitch in major wars against Nkore and Rwanda where Chwa was defeated, killed, and buried (Nyakatura 1973: 67-74; Adefuye 1973: 30-31, 226).

The southern expansions of Kitara under Chwa I ties in with a major famine which produced important migrations in northern Uganda (Webster 1974: 15). The Great Famine (c. 1620s) and the previous Nyarubanga Famine (1580s) seem to have led to a major crisis and setback in the northern (agricultural) areas of Kitara but stimulated a pastoral expansion. The search for water resources and cattle to replenish herds decimated by extended drought periods shifted the balance of economic power in the kingdom away from the stricken and helpless farmers and towards the still viable and aggressive herders (cf. Webster 1974: 20; Atkinson, 1978: 398-404).

The next important drought/famine cycle in the lacustrine tradition comes in the 1720s and is called Nyamdere (Webster 1974: 24). In the century-long interim, Kitaran dynastic politics reflect the shift of focus to the south. The Bito rulers, who had taken wives from both Huma (Bantu) pastoral families and Palwo

farmers, allow the children of Huma women to ascend the throne for the first time in the reign of Nyaika (c. 1706-1733) and Olimi III (c. 1733-1760). The increasing Bantuization of the court, the growth of pastoral custom and influence caused by successive shifts in the locus of economic power, culminated in the period from c. 1680 to c. 1760 in the massive emigration of the Palwo element from northern Kitara triggered by drought/famine and the aggressive anti-Palwo 'persecutions' of the 'Bantu' king, Olimi III (Adefuye 1973: 64-69).

One other factor in the consolidation of the Bito dynasty over their dual kingdom should be mentioned. A.R. Dunbar (1965: 34) records the tradition that Rukidi 'developed the salt and iron industries'. Certainly both production and distribution of these items was an important feature of Bito political economy. This is especially true as both items were produced outside the dual farming and herding economy and were vital to the material life of both. While there is no evidence of a 'state monopoly' of iron or salt production or distribution, there is some evidence that the rich production centers, especially the salt of Kibiro on Lake Albert, were closely regulated by the dynasty. Local and longdistance trade in iron hoe blades was also affected by royal regulation of markets (Tosh 1970: 104-106; Uzoigwe 1972: 431-433, 445-446, 449-452). However, there was clearly no state monopoly of production or exchange; nothing approaching the degree of regulation of trade found in West African coastal kingdoms such as Dahomey or Asante and no reason to conclude that control of trade or specialized production (except that of ivory hunting and trade by the late nineteenth century) was an important ingredient of royal power in Kitara.

During the seventeenth century, Kitara came close to resembling the far flung 'empire' of the legendary Bacwezi. Based on a growing pastoral hegemony of the economy and the loose territorial spread of members of the royal dynasty and pastoral nobility for political structure, Kitara remained an imperial protostate which lacked the essential elements of state power such as a territorial administration or coercive monopoly. What Kitara under the Bito kings did have was first a rudimentary system of tribute collection using the local pastoral aristocrats and Bito clansmen as tax collectors. Second, they used a pervasive symbolism of authority inherited from the now deified Bacwezi

and manifested in the regalia of drums and spears. These symbols were distributed to tributaries as a sign of the Bito claim to suzerainty and the recipient's loyalty to the growing dynastic empire (Beattie 1971: 95-122; cf. Atkinson 1978: 157-174).

5. THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE C. 1760-1890

To understand the emergence of a true state among the people of Kitara after 1700, we must first retreat to the previous period of protostate development. The transfer of dynastic leadership from the Cwezi to the Bito clan or to a patrilineage within that clan as we have seen did not in itself 'form' a state. The power of the ruler was still effectively limited by the absence of coercive authority and a governmental apparatus in the hands of a figure of little more than ritual importance. What it did was initiate a process of social class formation which would lead, in turn, to the concentration of power in the hands of the Bito dynasts, the Bito clan, and those who associated themselves with the central role of the dynasty in the Kitaran empire. The social and political processes which contributed to the emergence of a rudimentary state between the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be summarized as, first: the naturalization of the Bito dynasty, second, the tenantization of the agricultural population and the emergence of a land-controlling class collecting tribute/rent and third, the magnification of the role of the court and dynasty as mediator of class conflict and locus of 'national' values.

The first aspect of this complex process of state formation in Bunyoro-Kitara concerns the naturalization of the Bito royal clan. This was a double-edged process. The dynasty accommodated to local conditions, on the one hand by local intermarriage especially with the Huma aristocracy, and on the other hand by the association of both Huma and Iru clans in the courtly and political life of the kingdom by the distribution of honors, privileges, and territorial duties to a large number of individuals on the basis of personal service and/or clan membership. Both these processes tended to increase the network of kinship and political association at the top of the hierarchy creating of the Bito dynasts and their close supporters a real ruling class of hereditary honor, privilege, and duty. The culmination of this process was the distribution

of 'crowns' and the formation of a corporate group known as the crown-wearers or bajwara kondo (Beattie 1971: 119 ff.). What is certain is that the ruling class of territorial chiefs, courtiers, and customary officials called banyamirwa (Beattie 1971: 124-125) was neither the exclusive preserve of the pastoral herdsmen, the Bahuma, nor the Bito clan. On the contrary, political authority came to be identified in 'the Nyoro way of thinking...with rights over land and over people who live on that land, and everyone who possesses such rights is *ipso facto* a chief' (Beattie 1954b: The association of land ownership and political power meant that the power of the Bito monarch as ultimate, if titular, 'owner' of all the land in the country was confirmed by distributing chieftaincies and 'fiefs', e.g., parcels of land with their occupants to Bito, Huma, and Iru, thus creating a class of landlords who were distinct from the cattle aristocracy of the older 'imperial' tradition. This new ruling class would become the basis of a new form and organization of power, state power.

A further effect of the process of naturalization was also a consequence of the wide intermarriage and growing prestige of the dynasty. Over time the Bito clan had become the largest kin group in Kitara as a result of the ability of the Bito 'princes' to marry well and often and to acquire and support large families. As collateral branches of the royal family ramified, many members of the clan fell from the exalted status of royalty and became 'commoners' whose only distinction was neither wealth nor power, but simply a nominal kinship with the rulers. Being a Mubito was no guarantee of high economic status or class, merely of respect and social regard. Babito were represented at all economic levels and in various social divisions of Nyoro society creating for the Bito dynasty itself the illusion of being a truly 'national' institution which by virtue of kinship ties reached from the apex to the base of Nyoro society. Thus, the dynasty was naturalized within Nyoro society while simultaneously assuring its position as the politically dominant group at the center of an increasingly elaborate and powerful hierarchy of court and territorial officials. One consequence of increasing power was increasing conflict over who exercised that power. The frequency of succession wars and usurper kings from the mid-seventeenth-century reign of Kyebambe I (c. 1652-1679) through to Kyebambe IV Kamurasi (c. 1851-1878) is chronicled in the traditions and analyzed by

Bunyoro's historians (Dunbar 1965: 35; Uzoigwe 1973).

While the Bito rulers accumulated the trappings of state power at the top of the Nyoro political hierarchy, at the other end of the social scale a process of tenantization of the peasantry was lending substance to those trappings. Here we may be permitted a highly speculative suggestion as to the remote causes of this process of tenant/landlord differentiation. The probability of expanding agricultural population and the likely extension of cultivation into drier areas previously controlled by the pastoralists put new pressures on both resources and social relations. A larger population, above the level supportable by the dry zones affected by the periodic drought cycles experienced throughout the western lacustrine zone may have brought the agriculturalists into direct competition for water and land which were previously the undisputed preserve of the herdsman and their mobile cattle resources, already adapted to the dry lands and their drought conditions. In the absence of a pattern of clientage relationships which prevailed in the marcher areas of the southern lacustrine zone (cf. Steinhart 1979) and lacking the protection of the privileges of the pastoral group by a dynasty of its own, the rulers of Kitara attempted to work out a new solution to this stress. That solution appears to have been the development of a new class of landowner chiefs called Banyoro (Roscoe 1923: 10-11) and the reciprocal emergence of a class of tenants whose right to cultivable land was dependent on the payment of rent/ tribute to the new landlord/chiefs. The identity 'to the Nyoro way of thinking' of landownership and political authority can now be understood as the result of the emergence of this class of landlords composed of some Babito appointees, some Huma prepared to abandon their seminomadic wanderings in exchange for rights in land, and principally those Bairu who were elevated to free status and called Banyoro. Roscoe (1923: 10-12, 56) identifies this process of emancipation and ennoblement as resulting from the act of a particular unnamed king taking place 'some generations ago'. While we may doubt if such fundamental changes are the result of legislative enactment, I think it is safe to assert that the growth in social power of a landlord class from among the Iru peasantry came to be reflected in the political sphere by the grant of chiefly status and honors to the 'Banyoro' and their incorporation in the emergent ruling class 'some generations ago'. It is impossible to date this transformation with any precision, but I would suggest that the great droughts and famines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which precipitated an analogous concentration of power in the southern zone (Steinhart 1978a, 1979) offer an acceptable time period consonant with the available, although often circumstantial, evidence.

The emergence of landlords and tenants had profound impact on the emergence of a Nyoro state. The Banyoro owed their elevated status to their ability to control land and labor. First, this control devolved on the heads of important households and families with rights in clan lands (emigongo), but increasingly rights over territories were granted or confirmed to individuals and their heirs by the crown as 'official estates' (obwesengeze) whose tenure was associated with chiefly office. On the obwesengeze estates, chiefs were entitled to collect tribute, part of which was remitted to the court directly or indirectly through a rough hierarchy of territorial officials. Tenant cultivators on both official and clan lands paid this tribute in agricultural produce, especially beer, at regular intervals. The power to collect and redistribute this tribute by the local representatives of the dynasty provided the center with the resources necessary for the accumulation of dependants and followers and the concentration of power. The court was transformed from an elaborate and temporary cattle kraal to a center of redistribution and magnet for the politically ambitious of all the status groups. became the center of a commercial monopoly in strategic and prestige goods including iron, slaves, ivory, and guns when these emerged as important trade goods in the nineteenth century (Uzoigwe 1972; Tosh 1970; Beachey 1962, 1967).

Although the centralization of trade at the capital was not in itself the founding 'moment' in the formation of the Nyoro state, it was an important indicator of that transformation. The creation of a real capital in the place of the 'imperial' court was only one of the more visible signs of the abstract process of state formation. Simultaneous with the centralization of trade went a concentration of the powers of coercion in the hands of the royal court and its territorial administration of chiefs. This culminated in the emergence of the royal bodyguard or barusura as a standing army under Mukama Chwa II Kabarega (1879-1899). The fierce reputation of this military force indicates that it was as often

used to enforce the payment of tribute internally as it was to defend the country from external enemies (Beattie 1971: 128; Uzoigwe 1970). The use of tribute and the claim to tribute collection to support both a 'national' army and territorial administration seems to me to mark the emergence of a full-blown state within what had been the domain of the Kitaran 'empire'. It is perhaps poetic justice that this state came to be characterized by its neighbors as 'Bunyoro', the land of the Banyoro freedmen. Elements of the once lowly agricultural peasantry, ennobled as Banyoro, built this kingdom of Bunyoro. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century under the populist and militant 'nationalist' monarch, Kabarega, Bunyoro revived its claim to the imperial tradition of Kitara and began to enforce that claim by using the power inherent in the new Bunyoro state (Uzoigwe 1970).

NOTES

- The literature of travel, exploration, and missionary ethnography on Bunyoro-Kitara includes accounts of exploration by Speke (1864), Baker (1883), Emin Pasha (Schweinfurth et al., 1888), and Chaillé-Long (1877). Chief among the missionary accounts are Roscoe (1923), Fisher (1905), and Gorju (1920). The earliest administrators were drawn from military service which is heavily reflected in their Caesarian accounts (cf. Colvile 1895, Ternan 1930, and most valuably Thruston 1900).
- 2. The hyphenated title has come into use only in this century to emphasize the continuity and heritage of the political system from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries. I will use it to refer to the entire historical span, preferring Kitara for the early 'empire' and Bunyoro for the much smaller kingdom and colonial district of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
- 3. I have tried here to advance that study first by eliminating the explicit feudal analogy and the implicit functionalist equilibrium model of much of the ethnographic literature from my discussion of state formation. Second, I have attempted to utilize the notions of political economy based on specific social relations of production and forces of production (modes of production) in analyzing the emergence of a precapitalist state within the Kitaran social formation (Steinhart in Claessen and Skalník 1978; Amin 1976: 13-58).
- 4. By tradition, I refer to Kitaran royal traditions first recorded in this century and collected in three convenient locations. Two of these, the essays of 'K.W.', identified as the late mukama Tito Winyi IV, published in the Uganda Journal (K.W. 1935: 193) and the volume by the court

historian, John Nyakatura, published in Runyoro in 1947 and in English translation in 1973 (Nyakatura 1973) are sufficiently similar to be treated as one tradition. The third, Twilight Tales of the Black Baganda (1970), was originally published in 1911 by the C.M.S. missionary, Ruth Fisher. The value of these sources has undergone much scrutiny, some cynical (Henige 1974; Buchanan 1975), but along with other recorded traditions (Bikunya 1927; Karubanga 1949: Gorju 1920) they represent a vital historical source available to students of the culture of the lacustrine region.

- 5. We should note the tendency of traditions maintained by a dynasty which only later came to control a significant state apparatus to read back into their past the same kind of dignity and authority which they had come to enjoy as rulers of a state. The tendency to legitimize authority by giving it longevity and ancestral sanction serves also to provide a familiar frame of reference for past events (cf. Atkinson 1978: 102). Similarly, in treating the traditions of antiquity of royal and state institutions we should bear in mind that royal traditions themselves carry the political purpose of adding the weight of years to the claims to authority of the rulers.
- The use of fire and of iron implements were clear pre-Cwezi developments.
 Coffee and cotton were at best marginal crops in precolonial Uganda and were unlikely to have been associated with the exclusive pastoralism of the Huma culture.
- 7. This period which I see as one of concentration of power is remembered in royal tradition (Nyakatura 1973: 91-99; K.W. 1937: 53-84) as one of a succession of weak rulers from Nyakamatura (c. 1786-1835) to Kamurasi (1852-1878) who witnessed the decline and dissolution of the 'empire', signaled by the secession of the heavily Huma pastoral regions around Toro in the south and west, endemic Luo rebellion and secession in the Nilotic northern marches, and the loss to Bugandan expansion of the moister areas to the south and east. I believe this reflects both the reality of the shift from an extensive pastoral 'empire' to an intensive agricultural state and the ideology of neotraditional claims to former glories in the twentieth century (cf. Kiwanuka 1968).

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19 Terrestrial Deities and Celestial Bureaucrats: Transformation of the State and Local Communities in the Asiatic Mode of Production in Japan

KURUMI SUGITA

This paper aims at contributing to the discourse on the concept of the Asiatic mode of production. Specifically, I wish to examine the nature of the evolution of this mode of production. For this purpose Japan presents a privileged case, for contrary to what is generally suggested in other historical cases, the evolution of the Asiatic mode of production took place quite rapidly without any direct intervention from outside conquest. We shall consider the period between the third century B.C. and the seventh century A.D. ¹

The essence of the Asiatic mode of production consists in the simultaneous existence of (1) a local community which appears as the presupposition of the appropriation of the objective conditions of the life of individuals: here property is communal and the access of the individual-as-possessor is mediated through membership in the community; and (2) a superior community which expresses the paradigm of communal property. In this capacity, the superior community appropriates part of the surplus of local communities.

Neither the superior community nor the local community can be treated as given. Local communities are constituted as units of production on a basis distinct from that of the preceding period. The superior community as a 'unity' assembling local communities does not constitute itself immediately as such either. The historical process of their constitution must be studied carefully.

Before proceeding to the problem of their constitution, I shall

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clarify my understanding of the nature of the superior community. By superior community I do not mean a specific political organization, but rather a function which can be assumed by political organizations of different levels. In other words, a superior community cannot be merely identified as the state. Although the state and the superior community may eventually assume overlapping political functions, there is a fundamental historical distinction between the two. For example, in the period of the archaic state in Japan, some of the functions of the superior community were exercised by an aristocracy outside the realm of the state. My viewpoint therefore allows us to formulate the problem of the relation between the constitution of a state on the one hand and the establishment of class relations on the other.

Having clarified my standpoint about the nature of the superior community, I shall proceed to the problem of its constitution: what are the conditions responsible for the appearance of the superior community? The realization of construction works on a large scale which cannot be carried out by small, isolated, local communities as a necessary condition of this appearance, as has been often suggested, seems dubious. In fact large construction works appear more as a function of the superior community than as a condition of its appearance. At this point we face an important theoretical problem: what is the status of the superior community at the moment of its appearance? My hypothesis is that at the beginning of its existence, the superior community presents itself as an 'imaginary' condition of the production and reproduction of small, more or less independent local units of production. The existence 'in imagination' is, however, the basis for real social relations which prescribe the extraction of part of the surplus of the local unit of production by the superior community. On the other hand, as soon as the superior community intervenes as a condition of production (the control of the knowledge and means of production, the organization of a largescale construction work, etc.), it acquires another mode of existence; it becomes one of the material conditions in the reproduction of local communities. The process of the transformation of the superior community from an 'imaginary' condition to a 'real', material condition is, in my opinion, accompanied by the constitution of village communities.

The Yamato state, the first archaic state for which we have

sufficient data, appeared in Kinai (the region which contains the basin of Kyoto, the basin of Nara, and the plain of Osaka) in the third century A.D. My first examination therefore concerns the Yayoi epoch which preceded the formation of this state.

One of the elements which distinguish this epoch from the preceding one was the introduction of wet rice cultivation. The worldwide tendency to a milder climate which started some centuries before permitted the introduction of wet rice cultivation into Japan. Also Japan lies in the monsoon zone where high temperature and high humidity favor wet rice cultivation in comparison with North Korea or North China, where the climate favors cultivation of cereals such as millet and wheat on unirrigated land. Another important factor is that alluvial plains were in the process of formation, and there existed many swamps which guaranteed the supply of water which is an indispensable condition of wet rice cultivation. In the early period, use was made of these Wet rice can be cultivated in successive crops at the same spot without a fallow period and, thanks to the nourishing water, the land produces a relatively reliable harvest, even without fertilizer. The use of iron was still not generalized, and most tools were still of wood or stone. However, wet rice cultivation in swamps was practicable with wooden tools, though productivity was quite low. Transplantation was not known, and the process of threshing was absent. At harvest, only the ears of the rice plants were harvested. They were dried and ground by individual producers. Thus in the agricultural production cycle any processes which might have required a large scale mobilization of labor were absent.

The introduction of rice cultivation produced small, uniform production units replacing hunting and gathering or fishing groups related to each other organically. Rice cultivation, which was first diffused to west Japan, spread to east Japan in the middle period of the *Yayoi* epoch. In many areas production was carried out by small units with a developing relative economic autonomy. However, in advanced areas of west Japan, introduction of irrigation systems began in this period.

From the middle to the last period of the Yayoi epoch, settlements increased in number and expanded geographically at a high rate. By this time most of the Japanese population depended on agriculture. In the alluvial plains, large settlements

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with systems of irrigation and drainage appeared. However, in many areas, cultivation in swamps or in valleys was still common. The general introduction of irrigation and drainage systems with the diffusion of iron instruments was realized only in the *Kofun* epoch which succeeded the *Yayoi* epoch.

I shall now turn to the ritual and political relations which may have existed between small local production units. For this purpose, I shall examine ritual objects and myths of ancient Japan.

Japan in the middle period of the Yayoi epoch can be divided in two zones according to the distribution of bronze objects: (1) the zone centered around North Kyûshû characterized by a distribution of bronze weapons; and (2) the zone centered around Kinai, characterized by the distribution of bronze bells (dôtaku). It is the dôtaku which will be treated here.

The dôtaku circulated in the middle and the last period of the Yayoi epoch and disappeared completely by the end of the Yayoi epoch. In its early form we can see clearly that it served as a bell whereas later it became much larger, lost its character as a musical instrument, and obtained more character as a ritual object. Dôtaku are almost always found buried on the slope near the top of a hill overlooking a plain. Their state of discovery suggests that they were buried carefully and were not simply abandoned. It is thought that they were used in agricultural rites. Mishina (1973a) suggests that the very act of burying was one of the essential procedures of this ritual, that it was used to agitate the creative power of land and to increase the fertility. The place where the dôtaku is found reminds us of the rite of kunimi and utagaki (kagai) recorded in many historical documents of a later epoch. To describe these rites, it is necessary to review the ancient Japanese concept of the supernatural power, tama. The tama is the source of life, which is found in all sorts of objects. It is often represented by things which move constantly. As the tama is considered homogeneous, it can be transmitted from one object to another, for example from plants to human beings and vice versa. The transmission of the tama power is the aim of the rites concerning tama. The transmission is realized either by contact, or by the simple act of seeing, or by the imitation of movement of the tama, that is to say, by the agitation of objects.

The rite of the kunimi-utagaki is one of the typical rites concerning the tama. The kunimi means 'looking over the

country'. It consists of going to the mountain near the village in the springtime. The subject, gazing over the countryside, is thus in a position to absorb the *tama* power as it rises from the reawakening earth. It was accompanied by consumption of food and drink, singing and dancing, and licentiousness, which served in their turn, to give *tama* power to the world. This sequence of the ritual is known as *utagaki*.

The place where these rites took place (on a hill overlooking a plain) suggests that the *dôtaku* may have been employed for this rite. Sometimes several *dôtaku* are found on the same site, which may indicate the expansion of the ritual unity. I consider this ritual unity as one of the expressions of the relations which existed between small local production units in this period.

Basing himself on a comparison between the dôtaku and the bronze mirrors $(d\hat{o}kv\hat{o})$ of the middle period of the Han, Mishina (1973a), like many other historians, concludes that the dôtaku were objects used in a terrestrial cult. From historical documents of a later period, we are certain that the mirror was a magicoritual object. However, whereas the dôtaku is found outside the settlement and does not present any relation with a particular individual, the $d\hat{o}ky\hat{o}$ is found in the kofun (tumuli of aristocrats appeared towards the end of the third century A.D.): they were buried inside the coffin, often placed on the body of the deceased. Kobayashi (1961) has suggested that they were the mirrors introduced from China in the Yayoi epoch which had been transmitted from generation to generation until they were finally buried in tumuli with aristocrats. Recently, Kawanishi (1975) demonstrated that this was actually the case, by studying the distribution pattern of bronze bells and bronze mirrors. They both appeared towards the beginning of the middle period of the Yayoi epoch and whereas bronze bells were abandoned before the Kofun epoch, the bronze mirrors were transmitted until the Kofun epoch. Moreover, by analyzing the type of bronze bells, Kawanishi learned that in the regions where mirrors were introduced, bells ceased to circulate, whereas in the regions where mirrors were not known, new types of bronze bells continued to circulate. This division into the 'zone of bronze mirrors' and the 'zone of bronze bells' was established in the middle period and was not modified in the course of the last period. suggests a certain incompatibility between these two ritual objects.

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By analyzing the distribution of bronze mirrors made with the same mold, Kobayashi (1961) suggested that they were distributed by an aristocrat related to the Yamato state. According to Kawanishi (1975), these mirrors were found in the 'zone of bronze mirrors' and not in the 'zone of bronze bells'. This may suggest the existence of some kind of political organization in the former zone with which the Yamato state attempted to establish relations by sending their mirrors. To conclude, the existence of $d\hat{o}taku$ (bronze bells) may be related to an egalitarian society where rituals were performed collectively without any intervention of a specialist (priest). On the other hand, the existence of the $d\hat{o}ky\hat{o}$ (bronze mirrors) may indicate some kind of political organization centered around the person who possessed the mirrors, and who was likely to have been the specialist in rituals using these mirrors.

I shall now analyze the character of this specialist, priest-chief, from a different aspect. For this purpose, I will examine the ritual of *niiname*. This is a ritual at harvest performed by women. It consists of eating newly harvested rice. It seems that the original aim of this ritual was to enable the women to absorb the tama power of the newly harvested rice and infuse this power into the next year's rice. By metaphorical extension we see that the women 'conceive' each rice crop just as they give life to human The *niiname* is also an important imperial rite. It is performed every year at the harvest. The first rite of niiname after the enthronement of the emperor is called daijô or ônie (great niiname). To extract the essential points which concern us here, newly harvested rice was sent to the capital from selected paddy fields and was presented to the new emperor. In the most important stage, the emperor finds himself alone and eats the rice. There are bedclothes in the room where the rite is performed. It is generally accepted by historians and mythologists that originally it was Hononinigi, ancestor of the imperial family, who was the main character in this rite. According to the ancient variant of the myth concerning Hononinigi, he descended from the sky 'wrapped in a sac', 'spreading paddies around'. The name Hononinigi signifies the person who 'ripens the rice' (Mishina, 1973a, 1973b). The figure 'wrapped in a sac', may be a sign of an infant. In an other variant, he was born in the sky. At the same time it may also symbolize the grain in hull. Thus it seems that Hononinigi was conceived as an infant-new born rice.

Many emperors and princes of ancient Japan had names referring to rice. On the other hand, empresses and princesses sometimes carried names signifying 'sacred paddy field'. Looking through the mythology about the birth of the prince, we find a constant theme: a princess 'sacred paddy field' is preparing the rite of *niiname* when the father emperor 'spirit of rice' married her and she gives birth to a prince. The birth of a prince is thus conceived as a birth of new rice. In the rite of ônie as in the rite of *niiname* performed by the emperor, it is the emperor himself who eats newly harvested rice. Since this rite is still secret, we do not know exactly the function of the bedclothes in this rite. Origuchi (1957) suggested that the emperor actually enters the bedclothes and symbolically reproduces the scene of the descent of Hononinigi ("in a sac") and acquires himself the quality of a 'rice-baby'. Thus the emperor was a rice-baby par excellence and it was by this quality that he governed the country. The country he governed was called osu-kuni, the country he 'eats', for it was by eating the newly harvested rice in his country that the emperor renewed the spirit of rice and assured a good agricultural production for the next year. Tax was called tachikara, 'the power of the field', and the act of paying tax was called mitsuki, 'putting to the body'. Thus paying tax (part of the harvest) was conceived as 'putting the power of the field to the body of the emperor' who, in his turn, gives his power to the rice of the next year.

The rite of the *niiname* was not, however, the monopoly of the emperor. Of course, this continued to be practiced by women in villages. But at the same time, the *niiname* was performed by aristocrats. In any case, before attaining the absolute supremacy vis-a-vis other aristocrats, the emperor was only the most powerful The mythology and legend suggest to us that the aristocrat. niiname was practiced in ancient times. I would suppose that at origin it was performed only by women. However, later, hand in hand with this ritual consumption of newly harvested rice by women, an offering of the harvest was made to a person who was considered to have strong tama in order to give stronger power to the rice of the next year. This can be deduced by the characteristics surrounding the emperor who was the most powerful priest and who appears as the person of the strongest tama.

To sum up the preceding discussion, in the early and the middle

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periods of the Yayoi epoch, small local production units were carrying out rice cultivation in swamps, in valleys and so on, with relative economic autonomy. Between these units, there seem to have existed close relations. We do not know the details of these relations. However, relations on the religious level seem to be quite important. Together with archeological evidence from settlement sites, we can assume that no important social differentiation existed among the members of local units and that everybody participated in the rite on an equal basis. The first differentiation occurred when a priest, the person of a stronger tama, appeared. The bronze mirrors are likely to have been in the possession of the priest, who was now considered as a specialist of a new cult and who, on this basis, appropriated a part of the harvest. The priest represented a ritual community encompassing local production units, which was conceived as a necessary condition of their reproduction. Existence of this ritual community is highly important. Although it presents only an ideological character (material conditions of production being contained in each of the small units), it represents a possibility of further development into a cooperative unit; the cooperative unit being mobilized by the priest's potential influence over the population. This is the stage I called the existence of a superior community in 'imagination'.

In the last period of the Yayoi epoch (in the middle period in advanced areas), the formation of big villages on small plains by the river started. Canalization was essential for the utilization of these plains. Although canalization involves a less complicated work process than other forms of irrigation, for example construction of irrigation ponds, it definitely presupposes the existence of an 'organizer' of work who can mobilize the members of small, dispersed, local settlements. This is the first step of the 'real existence' of the superior community. On the other hand, we know that personal titles in this period were not It is likely that the title of the priest-chief was transmitted along with ritual objects (expecially bronze mirrors) to the next person who was considered to be capable of carrying out his role. The transformation of priests into an hereditary aristocracy seems to have occurred in the course of the third century in advanced areas. This corresponds roughly to the period

when the relation between Yamato and the provinces was intensified. This is reflected in the appearance of the kofun in the area centered around Kinai towards the end of the third century. Its size (about 100m long) and location mark a radical distinction in the status of aristocrats from that of all others buried in the communal graveyard. The ancient priest-chief had achieved this remarkable development by the Kofun epoch. The striking uniformity of the kofun shows the direct relation between Yamato and the areas where they appeared. The diffusion of the kofun signifies, moreover, the diffusion of a certain knowledge of production, for the nature of forces of production represented in their construction is the same nature as those necessary for the construction of systems of irrigation and drainage.

The kofun expanded rapidly in the course of the fourth and the fifth centuries. This indicates the formation of the stratum of aristocracy almost all over Japan. It shows also the capacity of accumulation of this social stratum. Until the end of the fourth century funeral goods consisted of prestige goods of magicoritual character (mirrors, beads, jasper bracelets, etc.) and weapons (especially of iron). Towards the end of the fourth century we observe a radical change in funeral goods: we find a vast accumulation of iron. The most striking accumulation is found from the kofun of the last half of the fifth century in Kinai. Most of the iron is likely to have come from the continent. Thus the Yamato state, situated in Kinai, seems to have been controlling the exchange relations with the continent. Through the Yamato state, aristocrats monopolized iron (finished goods, materials as well as technology) and other prestige goods.

Local communities were founded upon these principles (knowledge) and means (irrigation systems) of production. Thus the local communities developed as the place of exploitation by the aristocracy. It is in these terms that we can really begin a discussion of village communities. In the development of this community there were contradictions within the aristocracy which become clear in the struggle for control of water. The Yamato state which expanded in the course of the fourth and the fifth centuries had the character of an apparatus to regulate these contradictions. Thus this state apparatus helped the aristocracy to supersede their conflicting interests and consolidate their interests as a class. The Yamato state was, at its origin, above all 380 Kurumi Sugita

a confederation of aristocrats. Many political, juridical, economic, and ideological functions were exercised outside the state by the aristocracy. It articulated itself over the relation of exploitation between aristocracy and village communities. The apogee of this archaic state was attained in the fifth century.

With the development of the Yamato state, tributary relations were reorganized. This took the form of the system of uji which appeared in the fifth century. Uji is a political organization consisting of a chief of uji, his kinsmen and tributaries dispersed in various regions. Since the members of *uji* bear the name of the chief of *uji*, *uji* has been confused with clan. However, it belongs to a political order and is by no means a spontaneous social organization. In the beginning it was organized around aristocrats who were in charge of various works in the imperial court. In principle, their tributaries were granted to them for the necessary expenses to carry out their duties. Tributaries seem to have been conscripted either from the still unorganized population or from the mass of Korean immigrants. Thereafter the system of uji expanded among other aristocrats. Lesser local chiefs became integrated into the uii of more powerful aristocrats. This political and economic submission passed through the form of the dominant social relations, i.e., kinship relations. That is to say, this submission is realized through the integration of the genealogy of powerful aristocrats by local aristocrats. Thus we observe the development of fictitious kinship relations between the central aristocrats and local aristocrats. In the course of this development, tributaries in general came to bear the character of the tributaries of the state, that is to say, a population which pays tribute to the aristocracy for its functions in the state. This was the general tendency in the fifth century. In this process the aristocrats who were subjects of the imperial family who were carrying out various works of the court obtained power, replacing the hegemony of the aristocrats who had matrimonial relations with the imperial family.

The second reorganization of tributary relations occurred towards the end of the fifth century or the beginning of the sixth century. There was a big wave of immigration of a population with skill in trading from Paekche in Korea at the end of the fifth century. They were divided according to their trade and were subordinated to various offices led by functionaries. This

type of organization spread to other sections of the state structure in the sixth century. Instead of receiving tributes through aristocracy, tributaries became subordinated to state offices directly. This reorganization of tributary relations penetrated into the village community which had been left intact by the state so far. Census, though partial, was carried out by an agent sent by the state, and village communities were divided into groups of houses which were subordinated to state offices. It is also in the sixth century that many state granaries were established, making it possible to extort surplus directly from village communities. In this process aristocrats came to have the character of appointed administrators. Local minor functionaries were related to central aristocrats, responsible to the offices, not through fictitious kinship relations but through simple relations of administration.

Let us now look at the same process from the side of the village community. The generalization of village communities is a process in the development of the fourth and the fifth centuries. Village communities were brought into being by an introduction of complex systems of irrigation and drainage. Formation of village communities was also accompanied by the appearance of labor processes which demanded large-scale mobilization of labor. According to Kondô (1962), immense paddy fields were made possible only with the introduction of the technology of transplantation. For while the paddy is young, it is necessary to keep it in water to avoid a decline in the temperature of the earth. This was nearly impossible in big artificial paddy fields with the existing level of technology. As for the harvest, cutting only the ears of the rice plant and leaving the rest in the field still seems to have been predominant. This signifies that the mobilization of labor on a large scale was not necessary at harvest. However, the construction and maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems together with transplantation presupposed a large number of workers. In the early state, it is probable that groups of extended families constituted the unit of agricultural work except for work which demanded a larger mobilization of labor. Judging from historical records of a later period which refer to ancient times, private property in land was absent and only usufruct was known. Land seems to have been redistributed annually at the occasion of agricultural rites in spring. Thus community relations appear as a presupposition of the appropriation of the nature by each

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member of the community. The generalization of village communities was accompanied by the reorganization of work processes and brought a general increase of forces of production and the realization and intensification of community relations which mark a clear distinction from the nature of the forces of production and the relations of production in the preceding epoch.

The fourth and the fifth centuries when generalization of village communities took place were also the periods of development of the aristocracy. This epoch was almost immediately followed by the period when numerous small kofun were constructed. Small kofun appeared towards the end of the fifth century and increased enormously in the sixth and the seventh centuries. Small as they were for kofun, they demanded a considerable amount of labor. To build a sepulcher, dozens of stones weighing hundreds of kilos had to be brought and set in proper form. People buried in these kofun must have been able to control a great amount of labor. Moreover, usually, differentiation is observed among the small kofun. This indicates that internal differentiation advanced quite rapidly once village communities were brought into being. Thus the formation of village communities seems to have brought about immediately the conditions of internal differentiation. Iron tools as well as tools for metalworking which were monopolized by the aristocracy are also found in small kofun as well as in village This indicates that the intensifying differentiation inside the village community was related to the change in the distribution of means of production. The fact that certain families were able to possess iron tools signifies an important modification in forces of production, which led to an increasing autonomy of each family as a unit of agricultural work, and encouraged quicker fission of families. This tendency, in turn, made it possible to reorganize the tributary relations.

On the other hand, the change in the distribution of means of production and the process of reorganization of tributary relations suggest that the state played an important role in this development of the village communities.

In the process of differentiation there seem to have appeared certain families with dependents around them. The constitution of the centralized state presupposed the existence of local, wealthy families who functioned as tax farmers. This indicates that in the period preceding the constitution of the centralized state, certain families were intervening in the determination of the conditions of production and reproduction of village communities side by side with the dominant community relations. Judging from the historical documents and archeological evidence, it is possible that these families were loaning out rice and controlling transport and local industries. This does not involve the development of private property in land. Private appropriation of objective conditions of production can be realized without the private control of land, by unequal access to land and by control of agricultural products, for instance.

Thus before the constitution of the centralized state, four types of relations of production coexisted; tributary, community, relations of dependency and slave relations. Slaves belonged to individual family members, were objects of purchase and domestic slaves rather than productive slaves. We do not know their population in the period preceding the constitution of the centralized state, but in the Nara epoch they constituted ten to fifteen percent of the population. This includes the descendants of immigrants from Korea who were subordinated to state offices as artisans. It is important to indicate, however, that there were aristocrats who freed quite a large number of slaves at the constitution of the centralized state.

The expansion of the state was thus accompanied by the distribution of means and knowledge of production in the village communities, the introduction of reclamation work of a very large scale, covering territories of different aristocrats (realized after the establishment of the centralized state), and the introduction of complex systems of irrigation and drainage, which were accompanied by reorganization of work processes. As we have seen, this reorganization brought about the modification of social relations of production through which the reproduction of the aristocracy as a distinct class was realized. It is unfortunate that the theme of the relation between irrigation and the state has fallen into obscurity as a consequence of the general condemnation of Wittfogel and his work. In fact, it seems that, in the case of Japan, it is through irrigation that the state reorganized the work processes, developed control over the population, and assured the reproduction of class relations. The expansion of the state appeared, however, as an encroachment on the old privilege of

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aristocracy, for it was realized at the expense of the tributary relationships which were part of the aristocratic hegemony: witness the revolts of local aristocrats which raged in the first half of the sixth century. Thus the realization of the interest of the aristocracy as a class passed through the elimination of a number of aristocrats.

I cannot go into detail about the centralized state whose framework was established in the second half of the seventh century, but its guiding principle was to cut the tributary relations between the aristocracy and local communities. All the individuals and the land were subsumed under the control of the state. Aristocrats, local, minor chiefs, and powerful families were transformed into functionaries.

In the preceding discussion I have tried to describe the evolution of the archaic state in Japan in an analytical way. I have especially attempted to clarify the theoretical ambiguity in the analysis of the Asiatic mode of production which was set on the conception of a linear process: the Asiatic centralized state is based on the village communities which represent the development of the most archaic communal form of production. On the contrary, it seems to me that the centralized state is constituted on the basis of a profound transformation of village communities in the heart of which unequal accumulation develops. In this sense the Asiatic state proper as related directly to village communities existed only in the early phase of the development of the Yamato state. At the end of the Yamato period, it is transformed into a centralized state which presents different characteristics. Here, the nature of the state is transformed. Economic, political, and ideological functions exercised outside the state in the first phase now become proper functions of the state. It is in this stage that the state identifies totally with the superior community, and that it intervenes exclusively to regulate the reproduction of local communities and that of the class structure which was constituted parallel to the state under its first form.

In my opinion, one of the most important problems concerning the state is the relation between the establishment of class relations and the formation of the state. We can certainly say that the state functions to regulate the conflict between classes once it is established. The condition of appearance of the state is, however, a different matter. For this extremely difficult problem, I have presented the case of Japan as material for discussion, in which the simultaneous existence of the superior community appears as a mode of realization of class relations. Here, the state appears as an apparatus which regulates the conflict inside the dominant class (political and economic). However, once brought into being, the state evolves rapidly, the outcome of this evolution being the appearance of a state as a class in itself.

I hope that this case study will shed some light on the problem of the appearance of the state, of the nonappearance of the state, and finally of the disappearance of the state.

NOTE

1. Due to the limitation of the space, I regret that I cannot treat some of the important problems. Yamatai, a political entity that preceded the Yamato state, is one of such cases. Another important problem that has to be put aside is that of the existence or not of swidden agriculture before the introduction of wet rice cultivation. Important as it may be, this case does not concern us here. For even if this type of agriculture had existed, it must have disappeared or have become completely marginal, as we have very little evidence of its existence after the introduction of wet rice cultivation.

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The State as a Problem of Jurisprudence¹

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Purposes

This paper is an essay in anthropological jurisprudence, for it is concerned with the general problem of how the state—its power, authority, organization, and the like—comes into being. It may also be regarded as an essay in analytical jurisprudence or general anthropology, for it is concerned with clarifying both legal and anthropological thought. The central thesis asserts that the existence of a system of social rules, that is legal rules, laid down by a centralized (legal) authority is a sufficient condition of the state.

Several disciplines are concerned with the problem of the state in their everyday task. For some disciplines it is enough to accept a more or less plausible hypothesis and go forward. But in the field of law, jurists and lawyers must face the state from a position which is far from the one of an observer. For example, they can act as the state, they can plead against the state, they can act before the state acts. Thus the problem of the state increases in dimension and complexity.

During more than two millenia, the state has provided subject matter and a key concept of jurisprudence. It is not a recent discovery of cultural anthropology.

Men have also expressed through language the conception that

functions designated by the word state are primarily legal functions. Consider, for example, expressions such as 'controversies between a state and citizens', 'Sei Fujii vs the state', 'state trials', 'The state powers are three', 'state law', 'equality of states', 'state practice', 'federal state', 'constitutional state', 'unitary state', and so forth.

A jurisprudential approach thus is required in any study of the state. Further, legal concepts are necessary elements in any elucidation of the state.

I approach the problem by focusing first on the meaning of state. I raise the problem of meaning because in searching for and finding such meaning we 'are looking not merely at words but also to realities we use words to talk about' (Austin 1956-1957:8). In the field of social sciences it is particularly true that a clear awareness of the use and meaning of words sharpens our perception of the phenomena (Hart 1972:vii; also Austin 1956-1957). Once the problem of the meaning of state is resolved, I attempt to analyze some persistent issues involving the problem of the state in order to show that all of them are primarily legal issues.

2. THE MEANING OF 'STATE'

2.1. Difficulties

The word state is neither a complex morpheme nor an onomatopoeic; it means something. Words, in their function of communicating, are symbols that impute meaning. When we ask for the
meaning of a word we are asking for the object that the word
names. But to find out the object that the word names is often
not an easy task. This happens, generally, when we are not able
to refer to a tangible object; that is, when we cannot determine
precisely what object the word designates. This is the problem
with the word state. Since we cannot precisely define it, in order
to find its meaning it is necessary to resort to other words and
phrases.

Another difficulty in finding out the object that the word names is that the same word may name different objects in different situations. We shall use the term context to refer to the situation in which words exist. The meaning of such words is shown precisely by their context. Thus it is proper to observe that the meaning of words is, in large measure, determined by the context. If, on the one hand, the meaning of words may be found, in large measure, in their context, and if, on the other hand, it is not possible to determine ostensibly the meaning of state, then it seems reasonable to resort to the context in which the word state generally shows up in order to know what the term state designates.

2.2. Habitual Context of 'State'

Where, when, how is the term state used or said? With some exceptions, the word state does not usually appear by itself. Usually it is accompanied by other words. I shall call the most persistent relationship between the term state and other words which accompany it 'the habitual context of state' (HCS). A significant question is how are we to recognize the words that comprise the HCS?

A first test might be to resort to the frequency or persistence in which such words appear in the books, articles, and periodicals which deal with traditionally recognized problems pertaining to the theory of the state. A second test might consist in establishing the common expressions in the vernacular in which these words and the word state actually occur.

Let us contemplate the following list of words: government, constitution, administration, expropriation, execution, indult, war, alliance, treaty, adjudication, process, sentence, invasion, arbitration, coercion, conciliation, among others. With respect to this list (with primary legal connotation) we may point out that many books that pretend to deal with problems of the state contain analysis or descriptions of things, events, or activities which are named by the words above. These words satisfy, in this way, the first of the two tests.

The second test is also satisfied, because each one of the words in conjunction with the term state form established expressions. For example, relating the word constitution to the word state enables us to form expressions such as 'the constitution of the state', 'the state enforces the constitution', and so forth. These statements are not odd or artificial; they are easily found and understood. Similarly by relating the word legislation to the word state, we might create expressions such as 'the legislation of the state', or 'the state passes legislation'. Again neither expression is odd or strange in ordinary language. The same relationship holds for the words administration, enactment, treaties, jurisdiction, expropriation, and the like when used in conjunction with the word state.

2.3. The Common Element of the HCS

Since we cannot analyze these words one by one, we have to resort to a procedure that allows us to analyze, if not all, at least a high percentage of them. For this purpose, it is necessary to find certain *common* elements upon which the analysis may be based.

Most of the words (such as government, adjudication, legislation, constitution, sentence, execution, administration, treaties, war) designate a human activity or the result of such activity. For example, the word legislation implies an activity through which an act is passed; constitution implies an activity through which a special statute is established; sentence assumes an activity through which an adjudication is pronounced. In summary, these words indicate most often activities or situations where human action plays a decisive role.

2.4. Human Behavior (of the State)

This is why our problem is constituted by human behavior. But why do we have to analyze human behavior? We may answer with the following argument: If at a language level (L_1) the word state is found intimately related with words which constitute the context in which it is habitually incorporated, then it is reasonable to think at the level of things (L_0) of a close relationship (likeness, similitude, implication, or identity) between the objects that the word state names (marked with an 'x') and those which the words of its HCS name. This may be easily appreciated in the following

graphic:

If the words of HCS name human behavior, then it seems reasonable to assume that the object (or objects) that the word state denotes is either human behavior or something related or associated with it. This provides an orientation for our intention to determine which things or events the term state designates: human behavior.

However we will not make a general analysis of human behavior; we will treat only those aspects related with the object state. Behaviors which are not named (described, referred to) by the words of HCS are not relevant to our study. Given the fact that behaviors which we will study ought to be named, described, or implied by the words which form the HCS, such behavior will be referred to as state acts. From this it follows that the state seems to be an order of human behavior.

STATE ACTS

3.1. Interaction and Directives

If we consider the HCS we will find that such words imply the existence of a close link between individuals. Even more, those words name interactions, or rather, human relation. For example, the words legislation and sentence assume that someone (some body of persons) addresses others using a discourse reflecting that someone or body acts on others (see Ross 1968: 34 ff.).

According to this argument, state acts (the human behaviors named by the HCS) are established imperative social relations in the sense that certain behaviors are no longer optional but result from orders, commands, customs, and the like. The specific social relations that constitute the typical characteristics of a group of individuals are the data which allow us to determine how a group functions and how it is structured. Through social relation

individuals communicate what they want and what they plan to do. Thus it follows that the words that form the HCS name the basic behaviors of the *social code* of the group. But what is the foundation of this social code?

3.2. The Basic Rule of State Acts

Among the products of human cultural behavior we find habits, traditions, and customs; in brief, certain social instructions. How are they brought about?

Individuals choose, through an endless process of trial and error, the habitat—place, climate, neighborhood—in which they can best survive. They choose among alternatives elements within the environment which provides conditions for survival. I shall call this segment of the environment the vital imperative (VI). It includes possession of territory, food, women, domination, control, and so forth.

The behavior of someone (or something) which may interfere, damage, diminish, or harm, in any way, the VI shall stimulate as response an aversive behavior (aggression, threat, attack). By using an expression of Tiger and Fox we can say: "This has been the response that has paid off in the struggle for survival" (1971: 22 ff.). When men have to give an account of their behavior, they have at their disposal only the repertoire of responses to be given to specific behavior. Men have a single pattern of evaluation. This pattern of behaviors rests on one basic rule which may be formulated as follows:

R₁: any behavior which is followed by an aversive conduct is a damage, a prejudice or injury.

Disputes, or if it is desired, prejudices, are due to the struggle for the possession or control of a VI which secures survival both for the individual and the group. Once a dispute is established it has to be resolved.

Let us imagine a typical group of primates of the savannah, for example the baboons. Such a group is organized on the basis of peculiar arrangements of space. In the center of the group are the individuals (males) who are dominant (who control the VI of the group). Around them females and young are grouped. Scattered around this central nucleus are the *cadets* (males) who aspire to the central nucleus. At the edge of the group we find the individuals of the *periphery*; individuals who either could not attain or had lost position in the central hierarchy (Tiger and Fox 1971: 47). A group of this kind had to be disciplined in order to survive; this discipline was guaranteed by the way the disputes were settled and by the structure of the hierarchy.

3.3. Disputes

Let us see now the more significant ways of settling disputes in human groups.



Figure 1.

In (1) in Figure 1 the aversive behavior of B repels the injury or prejudice (assault or invasion) of A by forcing him to flee (when the VI controlled by B is only sufficient for his survival) or to establish himself in the periphery, thus relegating A to a second rank in the community. This situation is very important in the understanding of social power, because if it has any significance for human society it must be conceived as a complex interaction that may be described by the following form: an individual has power over another if and only if the former can make the latter behave as he wishes or desires. If A stays in the group this condition is fulfilled in (1) because B has power over A and can make A behave as he wishes or desires.

In (2) we find the injury, prejudice, or attack resolved by the elimination of A (for example, by the death of A). In (3) we contemplate the case in which the aversive behavior of B (threat, aggression) is not sufficient to resist the conduct of A and gives way to the control of the VI. In these cases the conduct of A may

not be interpreted as an intromission or invasion. If there was a prejudice it was committed by B, which gave origin to the aversive conduct of A. Of course if B stays in the group A will have power over B. The conduct of A could well be interpreted as a conquest, or as a reorganization of the hierarchy.

3.4. The Resolution of Disputes and its Effects

These systems of settling disputes engender a rapid selection of the characteristics that lead to social domination (Thorpe 1963:82) and which rise to the establishment of certain patterns of stratification, for example, *la couche dominante*, the *retinue favorite*, the individual on the periphery, and the like. This stratification also induces a certain characteristic attitude which produces stability and limits the use of force. Consider the following statements:

- The individuals of low status because of fear or respect seem to be obliged to pay a lot of attention to the individuals of the couche dominante, becoming subjects.
- (2) The individual of high status himself behaves most like being dominant and convinces the others that he is dominant, using coercion (Tiger and Fox 1971: 49).

Isn't this the first stage of institutionalization of power, or even of legitimation?

The settlement of disputes takes place because of coercion (the resolution of disputes had its origin in the use of coercion). Agencies of coercion are usually centralized and their actions ritualized because of the attitudes acquired by the individuals which comprise the group. It is not necessary for the social structure to be maintained through constant coercion; it is sufficient for members of the population to recognize that certain individuals are empowered to use coercion. This ritualization plays an essential role in the structure of the group; it stabilizes the group and, in certain respects, it legitimates the use of power.

Thus a group is stable while the attitudes—actual behavior—of the dominant members of the group find their correlates in the attitudes of actual behavior of dominated individuals. These attitudes and behaviors are learned by the individual through a protracted process. But once internalized, the individual possesses a culture, tradition, customs, that is a repertoire of prejudices, as well as their corresponding responses, the punishments, and the authorities empowered to enforce them. The agents of domination of a social group will be legitimate when the repertoire of prejudice and punishment are the same for them, the authorities, as for the subjects. It is in this way that the representation of the prejudice-punishment relationship becomes "a reason for individuals to act" (Hart 1972: 542 ff., 86 ff.). When the individual has learned that certain behavior produces an aversive response to him or his group, he will either avoid or try to avoid such behavior. Thus, for example, if stealing food is generally followed by banishment of the thief then the thief (perhaps A in (1) by recognizing that his action will compel the aversive behavior by B (1) will try to avoid stealing food.

Men, besides their instincts, have social instructions, namely law. Law, or social rules or instructions, tends to increase and become more sophisticated in the course of social evolution. Social rules substitute for primordial instincts. But in order to be effective rules must be obeyed, at least with the same regularity that we obey our instincts. Obedience to social rules is extremely important. Men not only have to do things, but—and even more important socially—have to avoid doing certain things. Rules, directives and, in general, all social instructions, have changed men and environment. There is no doubt that laws were determining factors for the cohesion of former human communities.

3.5. State Acts and the Social Rules

From everything said it follows that the specific relations that differentiate social groups are constituted primarily by what we called rules or instructions which are endorsed by recognition (acceptation, social pressure) and coercion (punishment, sanction). We dare say that human relations that are designated by the words of the HCS (legislation, enforcement, execution), that we called state acts, are human acts which lay down, apply, enforce, follow, social (legal) rules. Thus all state acts, that is any behavior upon which is predicated the existence of statehood, exist only in terms of social rules that are endorsed by acts of coercion. These acts and the rules endorsed by the state may be referred to by the

term law.

Now, whatever else the word state may designate, it is a complex of social (legal) rules that constitutes the institutions of the community and the unity of the community itself. This will be appreciated by analyzing some persistent issues involving the problem of the state.

4. PERSISTENT PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE CONCEPT 'STATE'

The view that the state is either a predictable response to certain specific conditions, or a natural consequence of human evolution, or a correlate, or even an 'excrescence', of human interaction, even if true, sheds little light on the problems of how the political community reaches unity and identity, and actually functions over time. The state needs to be understood not only in terms of its natural or necessary conditions, but also in terms of its function: organizing communities, small and large, by forcing men to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain behaviors by means of institutionalized coercion.

4.1. The 'Unity of the State'

It has been said that the state constitutes a political unity of one or more ethnic communities. But if the concept of state implies unity, exactly what unity is one talking about? How is this unity constituted? Against the view that the unity of the state constitutes a natural reality, developed or evolved from natural conditions, we assert that it is an artificial unity established by orders, rules, commands, coercion, and the like. Briefly, the unity the state constitutes consists of nothing but the normative, thus artificial, order or system regulating the mutual behavior of the individuals who comprise that order. Further, the assertion that individuals are members of a state's community is only a metaphor for the specific relations (or state acts) that are constituted, determined, ensured, and enforced by a normative order.

The assertion that the state exists independently of its legal system can be substantiated only by showing that individuals belonging to the same state form a unity which is not constituted

by the legal system, its commands, orders, statutes, adjudications, customs, and so forth, but rather by an element which has nothing to do with law (see Kelsen 1961: 183). It is said that interaction of some kind is the essential element by which the 'unity' of the state is constituted. But when the state is considered as a social unity the criterion of unity is undoubtedly quite different from social interaction (economic activities, warfare, exploitation, or Individuals of different states can have an cultural trends). economic or cultural exchange involving a more intense interaction than individuals of the same state. Interaction does not offer by itself a satisfactory explanation for the unity of the state. It would seem that any positive solution to this problem supposes the idea of a legal or political artifice. I would dare to assert that all social interactions are established and imposed through acts of coercion and by the threats and evils that exist in legal rules.

It also is an erroneous view that the unity of the state rests only on the existence of common interests, common traditions, common beliefs, common ideology, and the like. Although common beliefs or common ideology are often present, they are not a necessary nor a sufficient condition of statehood. In fact, if something is 'common' to a number of individuals who may or may not be linked to each other by social interaction it is because of the binding force that law (the set of coercive rules) has upon the individuals whose behavior it prescribes. Common interest, common beliefs, and common traditions in society generally are imposed. The sole element the individuals share in common is the legal order to which they are subjected, even if they do not share interest, beliefs, ideologies, or traditions.

4.2. Domination

The most successful attempt to explain the nature of the state derives from the view of domination. The state is defined as a relationship where some command and some are ruled (see Kelsen 1961: 186). But if the concept of domination (or power) has some sense in social relations they must be understood in terms of human behavior. We can formulate the scheme of social domination as follows: X has power over Y, if and only if X can make Y

do or refrain from doing something.

The relations of domination are nothing but the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of others (see Weber 1954: 323 ff.). In actual social life there exists an infinity of such relations. An individual is especially likely to give his will this form when he is, or thinks he is, in a position to claim obedience. Nevertheless, not every domination is a state domination, that is, a domination by virtue of authority, the 'power to command and the duty to obey' (Weber 1954: 324). What is then the criterion by which the relations of domination that constitute the state are distinguished from those which do not? The decisive criterion may be stated in the following way: An individual exercises a state domination if he commands in the name of the state.

How then do we distinguish these commands from others? There is no other means than the legal order which constitutes the state. As Kelsen points out, 'A command is binding, not because the individual commanding has an actual superiority in physical strength but because he is authorized to issue commands of a binding nature' (1961: 31). An individual is empowered to issue commands of a binding nature, only if the set of rules (enacted or customary) which is presupposed to be binding confers this capacity (competence) on him; that is, if he is the legitimate authority of a state community (see Kelsen 1961: 31).

Factual powers of command usually are a superadditium to a normative order claiming to exist by virtue of law (Weber 1954: 329-330). Insofar as such a domination relation (state domination) exists, we can assert that it is nothing but the fact that the law (orders, statutes, adjudication, etc.) itself is effective and that legal norms providing for sanctions (punishment or pain) actually exercise a specific compulsion upon individuals (see Kelsen 1961: 190). State power is the efficacy of the coercive order recognized as 'law'.

4.3. Legitimacy

Power is *legitimate* only if it rests on a legal order, that is presupposed to be valid. Legitimate power can change only if the legal order in which this power has been established is replaced by another. Are individuals who are brought to power by

illegitimate replacement, such as revolution or substitution of dynasties, the legitimate authority? Only if the order they establish is *largely effective*; that is, if the legal order they establish is generally *observed*. If the new order acquires effectiveness it is presupposed to be a 'valid' order and the individuals commanding to be the 'legitimate' authorities. The legitimate authority is then the one commanding in accordance with the legal order in force—that is, *in accordance with the law that exists*.

It is the phenomenon of substitution of authorities which clearly shows the normative significance of legitimacy. The old order ceases and the new order begins to be efficacious because the individuals whom the new order regulates actually behave, by and large, in conformity with it. But if the revolutionaries fall, that is if the order they try to establish remains inefficacious, then their acts are interpreted not as legitimate law-creating acts but as an illegal act, a crime, according to the legal order still in force (see Kelsen 1961:118). Authorities are devoid of legitimacy when the legal order on which they have been relying loses its validity either because it is no longer efficacious or because the actual behavior of men no longer conforms to this order but to another. Actual behavior could be the result of common beliefs. common ideology, fear, submission, indolence, acquiescence, and so forth. But the behavior that actually conforms with a specific order is a necessary condition of its validity. Only if this corresponding behavior is present is the order to which this behavior conforms presupposed or accepted as a valid legal order.

In summary, an actual established authority is the legitimate authority of the state and its coercive apparatus is its legal order insofar as this order is, on the whole, efficacious. The set of legal rules then is essential to the concept of domination as applied to the state; only a domination considered to be 'legitimate' can be conceived of as a state. 'No usable concept of domination can be defined in any way other than by reference to power of command' (Weber 1954: 329). But a domination is 'legitimate' if and only if it takes place in accordance with a legal order, that is a set of legal rules, whose validity is presupposed by the actions and behavior of individuals (see Kelsen 1961: 187-188). It is not just ideology or beliefs but the actual behavior of individuals that make this system either remain or come into being. The decisive criterion is not shared beliefs or ideology but

the actual complementary behaviors that make domination possible.

4.4. Sovereignty, Authority, and Centralization

It is said that the state is an autonomous political entity, and that it possesses a specific characteristic without which it is deprived of the character of a state: sovereignty. This autonomy has nothing to do with economic or ideological activities. This autonomy has a normative character and can be described as follows: A political community is autonomous if and only if the authority empowered to issue commands is not in a habit of obedience to any determinate human superior, while it is itself the determinate and common superior to which the bulk of a subject society is in a habit of obedience (Holland 1906: 47-48).

Commanding is a characteristic feature of domination and the command is easily distinguished from a simple desire by 'the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded' (Austin 1970: 5). It is not strange, then, to assert that 'law or rule...is a command. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly so called, are species of commands' (Austin 1970: 5). Rules bring about a domination relation.

Forcing others to behave in conformity to one's will amounts to having power over them. It is easy to understand that the concept of domination implies the concepts of authority and of supraordination or stratification (see Kelsen 1961: 190). All commands—including laws and rules—are said to proceed from superiors and to bind inferiors. Thus, the term superiority, taken within this context, 'signifies legal might because we cannot overlook the fact that the meaning of the command is accepted as a valid norm' (Weber 1954: 328, emphasis added). The term authority is implied by the term command, for authority is the power of enforcing compliance with a wish; a command is binding only when it is issued by an authority.

A given society, therefore is not a state unless the generality of its members are in the habit of obedience to a determinate and common superior (see Austin 1970: 173). Individuals whose action are considered to be acts of the state are the superiors, the

organs of the state, the 'legitimate' rulers.

The idea of authority has sense only in a more or less centralized community. We can think of authority, superior, ruler, and the like in a community where the apparatus of commanding has reached a certain degree of centralization. Social power of command does not exist unless the authority which is claimed by someone is actually heeded to a significant degree. The development of legal order from primitive times to the present condition within the contemporary state shows the constant tendency toward reducing the use of force and to carrying out socially organized sanctions. Therefore, there is the tendency, which increases gradually, of prohibiting the use of force by one individual against another member of the community (see Kelsen 1970: 36).

In determining the conditions under which and the individuals by whom force is to be used, the order introduces a collective security since it protects individuals against illegal use of force by other individuals. This minimum protection may exist even though the monopoly of force is decentralized, that is, when self-defense prevails. It is possible to consider such a stage as the lowest grade of collective security. However, we speak of collective security in a more limited sense; when the monopoly of the use of force in the community has reached a minimum of centralization.

This happens when, at least, the power to settle a dispute is taken away from the parties involved (cf. above) and transferred to a specialized organ (see Kelsen 1970: 37) such as the pontifex or judex. The order is centralized if the individuals authorized to use force are invested with the characteristics of special organs of the community to whom the bulk of individuals is in the habit of obedience; that is when there exists a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Thus, in accordance with its development, the order, through the establishment of a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, introduces peace into the community (see Duroselle 1972: 9-21; also Tamayo y Salmorán 1975: 713-724). In summary, a more or less centralized domination relation is a characteristic feature of the state. Only in a sufficiently centralized domination do we find a superior class of rulers or authorities.

4.5. Organization

Law as an organizing factor Practically nobody can deny that the state is either an organization or an organized community (see Claessen and Skalník 1978: 4). But an immediate question arises: how is this organization constituted? On what foundation does the state organization rest? The immediate answer is, this organization rests on a system of rules, legal rules endorsed by coercion. That constitutes the state.

In fact, the state is deemed an organization just because it is an order regulating human behavior (what else can we organize or regulate?). 'No aggregation of people could long exist without some form of association, of communication and, of more or less, cooperation.... Thus, arose the crude beginnings of law and government, for the purpose of maintaining a semblance of order...[as] social life advanced, more definitive and authoritative regulation was demanded' (Gettel 1910: 46).

Early states arose and maintained themselves only by perfecting their discipline, by making sanction of custom more inviolable (Gettel 1910: 49). Ancestor worship, for instance, strengthened the kinship organization. Tribal unity and customs were secured by acts of coercion determining common beliefs and organization for all kinsmen, tribesmen, or citizens. Primitive man must have learned obedience (cf. above).

In the process of change from a mere aggregation of people into an *organized* community, law and authority accomplished an extraordinary role in a human organization. It is why 'for many centuries, law was looked (on)...as (a) basic requirement of human survival and coexistence...giving structure and form to the social edifice' (Bodenheimer 1973: 1).

To provoke human behavior is not an easy task. Human behavior is a phenomenon resulting from numerous motives, so persistent that it becomes extremely difficult even to diminish their motivating function. In order to make certain that individuals behave according to the will of another, it is necessary to posses an instrument that allows the alteration of the habitual motivations of individuals.

The problem of motivation becomes more acute because it is no longer a question of provoking the behavior of certain individuals, or of a small group of people, but of communities made up of different groups of individuals having different behavioral patterns. The persuasive element must necessarily be a standard element, the representation of which would motivate the members of a more or less large community in an equal, or at least, similar manner. Only one persuasive element as such has ever been known by men: coercion (Tamayo y Salmorán 1975: 713 ff.). 'A close examination of history indicates that only a coercive theory can account for the rise of the state. Force...is the mechanism by which political evolution has led...to the state' (Carneiro 1974: 419). Indeed, 'as far as the organization of the group is concerned, essentially only one method of bringing about socially desirable behavior is taken into account: the threat and application of an evil in cases of contrary behavior—the technique of punishment' (Kelsen 1961: 18), that is, coercion.

Law: coercive apparatus If there exists a widespread view according to which the state is an organization, there also exists considerable agreement considering law or legal order as an order of human behavior (see Kelsen 1970: 31-33; idem 1961: 15-28), and as a set of rules designed to guide or prescribe human behavior (see Hart 1972: 8-13; Kelsen 1961: 1; idem 1970: 47). This function of law can be explained as that which consists of making people behave in a certain foreseen manner.

It is the function of every social organization to provoke a certain behavior of individuals making them refrain from doing certain things that for some reason are considered detrimental for the community, and making them do other things that again, for some reason, are thought to be of value for the same (see Kelsen 1970: 24 ff.; idem 1961: 15 ff.). Is there by some chance another way of organizing a community? From this it follows that the state, inasmuch as it is an organization, causes individuals to do or refrain from doing certain things. And it does so through the only method it has: law, a coercive apparatus.

Thus the state is nothing but the legal order organizing a community. Law, as far as it may be considered a specific method of organizing society, is a system motivating human behavior. And the motivating function of law results from the manner law orders or forbids behavior through coercion. Coercion is, then, that enormously persuasive element that nullifies, or rather, that

changes the frame of the motivations of the social behavior of individuals. It is a fact that coercion (penalty, punishment, and the like) has played an extremely important role in social organization. This is observed in a particularly clear manner amidst early states that retain a religious character. If primitive peoples respect social order, it is because they fear the terrible sanctions of their gods in punishment of the violation of the social order. In comparison with the deep fear that these primitive people feel for the punishment and death imposed by their divinities, the hope of reward takes a subordinate role (see Kelsen 1970: 30). That the method of coercion has had and still has a major importance in institutional history is further revealed by the fact that the most important social order (understood as a system of rules or norms), law, makes use of this method of motivation (Kelsen 1970: 33).

The penalty with which the law reacts against those actions considered detrimental is called sanction, and through this coercive act a damage or harm is inflicted on the affected individual even against his will, by the employment of physical force, if needed. While the sanction prescribed is always the behavior of an individual, it is interpreted as an action of the law of the community; that means that sanctions are attributed or imputed to the state or community (see Kelsen 1970: 33 ff.). By establishing sanctions, such as deprivation of life, health, or freedom, the legal order of the state induces individuals to act according to the wish or wishes of those who establish the rules, the class of rulers. It is in this manner that terms such as subject, governed, as well as power, dominium, and auctoritas acquire Someone submits to another-a subject-when the former has the power-practically irresistible-of making the latter do, or refrain from doing, something. This application of force is the *power* of the state (of its legal order).

Every organization, that is every state, needs domination, because it is always necessary that some powers of command be in the hands of somebody (Weber 1954: 330). The motivating power of the actions and omissions that organize society reside, in large measure, in the coercive power of law.

Organization and composite The state is not a thing but a composite whose components are nothing other than individual

actions. One can say that there is no state unless it is a sum of individuals' acts. But if the state is nothing but a composite of individuals' actions, organization is just the function each individual accomplishes in the community; organization is the manner in which their functions are arranged. The identity of a state depends on what the components, the individuals, actually do. These acts determine the structure and form of the state.

It is the legal order that assigns the function of individuals and by this fact organizes community. By determining the function of the body of individuals, the legal order becomes the scheme of the state, its plan, according to which the community is arranged in terms of such roles as judges, arbitrators, priests, soldiers, subjects, and others. Legal order assigns competence to individuals and determines the social roles of the individuals that belong to the community. These actions, roles, and functions of individuals will be interpreted as acts of the state. That is why the state is considered a legal entity: it is the common concept into which various human actions are united, a common unity of different legal acts.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The meaning of the word state revealed that such a term designated human acts which were named by words HCS having primary legal connotation. The uses of the word state related with its HCS evoked considerable evidence regarding what men have thought of the state: generally it is a phenomenon that is either inseparable from law or constitutes only one of its aspects. While the word state designated human acts, we analyzed those that were named by the HCS and found that those acts implied interactions (some act on others) and the use of imperative discourse (commands, directives) which have the characteristics of legal rules (statutes, bylaws, adjudication). When we considered the persistent problems of the state, we observed that they were nothing other than problems involving creation, derogation, enforcement, execution, and legitimation of social rules endorsed by coercion, namely, legal rules.

We have considerable evidence that shows that the state is nothing other than a complex of legal acts, a set of legal rules sufficiently centralized and having the monopoly of the use of force. Now, if the state is only a specific legal system, the problem of how the state comes into being, how it functions, how it changes, turns into the problem of how legal rules come into being, how they function, and how they change.

NOTE

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ROMILA THAPAR

The question of state formation and the typology of states, with reference both to contemporary evidence and data from early periods, has been a major interest among historians and political anthropologists. One aspect of existing formulations which needs fundamental reexamination relates to the typology of early empires: the first experience of the state enveloping a series of differentiated political and economic systems under a form which has been designated as 'empire'. The emergence of such empires is ascribed to the monopoly of force acquired through kingship, the establishment of a state which emerges from conquest, the appropriation of the surplus from agriculture and trade, control of the hydraulic machinery, the bureaucratic structure and religion functioning as an expression of state authority (Eisenstadt 1969; Wittfogel 1957; Polanyi 1957). The definition of an empire has been arbitrarily related to size which has led to some ambiguity as to where a kingdom ends and an empire begins; hence the frequent interchangeability of kingdom and empire in the labeling of states in early periods of history.

The description of empires has obsessively hovered around the model of oriental despotism or its more refined version in the Asiatic mode of production. In spite of overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary the model of this system has frequently been thrust upon all Asian kingdoms of a sizeable area. Implicit in this concept of early empires is the notion of uniform structures striding the territory like a colossus. Each individual village

community is identical with, but isolated from, its neighbor and is bound tightly in the meshes of an administrative network the control of which lay in the hands of a single ruler or at best a small ruling class clustered at the capital. The latter articulated its legitimacy through a link with divinity generally based on a despotic political authoritarianism which was permitted because of the absence of either landed intermediaries or commercial groups which might have broken the isolation of the village community or diluted the control of political authority. This control is strengthened by the absence of private ownership of land. The refining and redefining of this model has been a major effort in investigating the formation and structure of empires of the ancient world.

The formation and structure of empires can be examined more meaningfully if the empire is seen as a further and more evolved form of the state. The formation relates to the nucleus of a highly developed state, which might perhaps be termed the metropolitan state and which seeks to spread its political hegemony over adjoining areas, gradually spreading out to more distant parts. The territory over which hegemony is sought to be imposed may be described as the peripheral territory in contradistinction to the metropolitan state. The relationship to be analyzed is that between the metropolitan state and a series of political systems, some prior to state formation and others having already acquired identities as states. The extension of power is established through conquest. But conquest is not necessarily indiscriminate for it implies motives and controls. It is generally taken to be the mopping up of existing but weak states which easily tend to become what has often been described as areas of political However, conquest is rarely so arbitrary and is more often tied to the acquisition of areas of economic potential, either agricultural or commercial, which potential would flow back to the metropolitan state seeking hegemony and provide the foundation for hegemony (Seneviratne, this volume).

The political economy of the expansion would determine the structure of relations between the metropolitan state and the areas sought to be controlled. The extension of an agricultural base would require primarily a revenue assessing and revenue collecting administration or the reorganizing of a potentially rich agricultural area to provide revenue to the metropolitan state; in areas newly

introduced to agriculture a system of settlements would be necessary. Control over trade would require a somewhat different administration with a military control over trade routes by the metropolitan state and an administrative control over the agencies of production and exchange. Areas with a minimum economic potential would be left relatively untouched provided they recognized the sovereignty of the metropolitan state. Administrative and economic restructuring, which is assumed to be part of the function of imperial systems, would therefore be correlated to the ultimate aim of hegemony and the ability of the imperial system to derive benefits from the restructuring.

The ancient empires may therefore be examined more usefully in terms of a metropolitan state in juxtaposition with other territories in varying stages of state formation and over which the metropolitan state seeks to establish its hegemony; that the structure of the control would differ in accordance with the economy and the ecology of the area and the existing sociopolitical forms; that the metropolitan state need not reproduce itself on a massive, centralized scale but should be seen as maintaining a variety of flexible relationships. The nucleus of the empire then becomes the metropolitan state to which revenue is directed and from which control emanates, but it need not act as the agency for a complete redistribution since some of the revenue would be consumed in maintaining the local structures. This could well result not in a uniformity encompassing the empire but even at some point, in an imbalance between the metropolitan state and other areas, which imbalance is sometimes reflected in the emergence of divergent political systems on the breakup of the empire.

A further refinement of such a definition would require the analysis of the relations between two types of systems — the metropolitan area which is the nucleus of the empire and the peripheral areas which are acquired through conquest and which may register a range of differentiated systems. This sometimes leads to the emergence of new submetropolitan areas with the same characteristics as the metropolitan area. The distinction between the two is that the surplus revenue goes towards the development of the metropolitan area although the amount would depend on the relationship between the two areas.

In the typology of early empires the nature of the relationship between the metropolitan and the peripheral areas is crucial. It may be possible to suggest at least two different categories. The earliest empires were those which permitted a wide range of politicoeconomic systems to subsist within their boundaries and the metropolitan-peripheral relationship varied with each system. The range included hunters and gatherers and forest tribes, chiefships, a variety of peasant tenures and exchange relationships extending from barter to incipient market systems. The metropolitan area encouraged the economic intensification of the more developed regions acting often as the direct agent and this enterprise became the agency of change in the peripheral region. The initiative towards empire would be explained as an attempt to control new resources, as for example, agriculture and technology, in an effort by the metropolitan area to extend its power, and where the extension of power could only be based on the control of new resources. The acceptability of empire occurs at a time when traditional ties of similar social formations across an area break down and an attempt is made to replace the old ties by a new socioeconomic formation using the new resources. This attempt is backed by resort to new ideologies which play a significant role in cohering the segments. The success of the enterprise depends on the balancing of the income from the new resources with the cost of developing these resources.

The second category in the typology of empires, often later in time, is distinguished by a smaller range of differentiated systems or alternatively a condition where the more primitive systems of gathering and hunting, pastoralism, barter and primitive argiculture are marginal to a larger component of complex agrarian structures and commercial networks. In such a situation the metropolitan area tends to invest in the more complex systems, often by encouraging their expansion, not directly, but through intermediaries. Marginal economies tend to get absorbed if they stand in the way of such expansion. The pace of expansion moves faster because of demographic pressures, encroachment on arable land and a higher level of conspicuous consumption, there being many more submetropolitan centers. There is a repetition of the pattern of exploiting new resources but the nature of the relationship is different from the first category. Control is exerted by the metropolitan state largely through an attempt to create a series of similar subsystems. Traces of the tendencies towards uniformity are more easily recognizable in this category. Similarities in the peripheral areas become more important for maintaining the cohesion of the empire than any overarching ideology.

Such a typology would suggest less emphasis on the monolithic character of the empire and a greater concern with the integration of differentiated systems. This is particularly so with regard to analyzing the first category. One may suggest the analogy of a gearing mechanism in which there are a series of vertical wheels of various size and over which is superimposed a horizontal wheel which attempts to link the vertical and regulate the pace.

Specific to the Indian context is the evidence of the empire of the Mauryas with which this paper is concerned and which has in the past been described as a recognizable form of oriental despotism in India (Wittfogel 1957). The trend towards the building of an empire dates to the fourth century B.C. with the rise of the Nanda dynasty controlling a major part of the Ganges valley and probably including the delta of the Mahanadi with its maritime route going south. The political establishment of empire dates to the reign of Chandragupta Maurya in the last quarter of the fourth century B.C. and the peak period of the empire was the third century during the reign of Aśoka. The decline of the empire appears to have been fairly rapid after the death of Aśoka and the early half of the second century sees a number of successor states.

The nucleus of the Mauryan empire was the state of Magadha in modern south Bihar. By the mid-first millennium B.C. it is listed as one of the sixteen major states of northern India and gradually in the course of a century it came to acquire increasing control over the Ganges valley, until with the rise of the Nanda dynasty, it became the most powerful state in northern India (K.A. Nilakantha Sastri 1952). It was the hegemony of the state of Magadha which was sought to be extended by the Mauryas and Magadha can therefore be seen as the metropolitan state in the Mauryan empire. The ascendancy of Magadha was due to a large number of factors: its agricultural richness, the control of the river trade on the Ganges which is in part indicated by the shifting of its capital from inland Rajagriha to the river port of Pataliputra, the proximity of iron ore in south Bihar which becomes significant in an age of transition to iron technology, additional wealth in the form of timber and elephants from its forests and a high population density.

The first of the Mauryan rulers, Chandragupta usurped the throne of the Nandas and proceeded to conquer central India and northwestern India extending the frontiers into Afghanistan and the borders of eastern Iran (Thapar 1961). Within the next half a century the empire included the peninsula as far south as present day Karnataka as well as the rich Mahanadi and Godavari deltas in the east. The area under Mauryan control is indicated by the location of royal inscriptions, substantially edicts, of the Mauryan king, Aśoka. The capital remained at Pataliputra and, as if to emphasize the importance of Magadha, the emperor Aśoka refers to himself in one of the edicts by the unassuming but significant title of, 'king of Magadha' (Bhabra Inscription). There is a striking absence of grandiloquent titles such as, 'king of kings', used by the near contemporaries and neighbors of the Mauryan kings, the Achaemenid emperors of Persia.

The Mauryan empire covered an area of more than threequarters of the Indian subcontinent (Schwartzberg 1977) and is estimated to have had a population of probably less than a hundred million. Clearly this was an area of diverse political and economic systems. The differentiated system included forest people, chieftaincies and erstwhile oligarchic and monarchical states. The first groups were located both in the interior of the empire and along the borders and were threatened if they failed to abide by the laws of the administration (Separate Edict II). Those included under the category of the gana-sangha system ranged from chieftaincies recently evolved into states, in which clan ties were predominant, to well-defined agrarian based states described by historians as oligarchies. These as well as the states which were monarchies prior to their inclusion in the empire, registered a variety of tenancies including independent cultivators paying revenue to the state, tenant farmers and sharecroppers working for private landowners as well as on state-owned land. In addition to this there is evidence of a range of commercial and trade activities.

Two points are worth noting. These differentiated systems are to be found in juxtaposition all over the subcontinent and are not confined to particular areas. The constraints remained largely ecological. Secondly, the Mauryan state did not attempt to reduce them to a single uniform pattern, but on the contrary, maintained the differentiation and merely attempted to control

the revenue which these differing systems provided. The first major work on statecraft is associated with the Mauryan period. This is the Arthaśāstra, a text on political economy attributed to Kautilya who is generally identified as the minister to the first Maurvan king. The text is essentially a discussion on the theoretical and ideal plane rather than the actual, nevertheless its assumptions are significant for the period. This text does not advise the termination of the gana-sangha system but provides suggestions for weakening their power through political cunning (Artha. XI). The emphasis therefore is not on destroying the communal tenure and replacing it by the state ownership of all land, but the attempt to introduce a mechanism by which communal tenures could continue yet permit the metropolitan state to appropriate the surplus. The continuation of the gana-sanghas is evident not only from their persistence into post-Mauryan times, but also from Megasthenes' reference to the magistrates of the self-governing peoples and cities (Arrian XII). Megasthenes writes as a contemporary of Chandragupta Maurya having been the ambassador from Seleucus Nicator to the Mauryan court and having left in the *Indica*, an account of his observations on India. The reference to the cities is important since the gana-sanghas were each generally associated with at least one major urban center.

The maintenance of the forest tribes has a further interest, since they could have been viewed as forming buffer zones. In periods when there were no lineal boundaries, sanctified through cartography, the frontier would be essentially a no-man's-land with strategic points guarded by garrisons and forts. Forests may have been regarded as natural frontiers separating well-defined ecological zones. Curiously, in the chapter in which Kautilya discusses the work of the officer in charge of the frontier checking the bona fides of those coming into the state, he also discusses the use and the control of the pasture lands (II. 34). The forest tribes could well have been potential predators on agricultural settlements or trading caravans, as those in central India continued to be for many centuries.

The Mauryan state attempted both to control the revenue provided by these differentiated systems and to act as the entrepreneur in extending agricultural and commercial activity. The first was largely a reorganization of existing trends and potentialities; the second was actively undertaken in new settlements. New settlements are recommended either in areas once cultivated and later deserted or on waste land (Artha. II. 1). The former suggests peasant migrations but the reason for migration is not clear. Possibly it refers to the large floodplains of the rivers where a shift of settlement would be required with a change in the course of the river. Migrating peasants are also referred to in the context of oppressive regimes (Jatakas, nos. 432, 520) and peasants discontent where migration and not revolt was regarded as the solution. The settlers were not necessarily local cultivators but include cultivators brought in from elsewhere. One of the edicts refers to the deportation of prisoners of war (Rock Edict XIII) after the campaign in Kalinga and is suggestive of such persons being settled on wasteland.

On the land owned by the state both in the metropolitan and peripheral areas, the boundaries of the settlement were carefully fixed. This was obviously for revenue purposes. It may also be suggested that there was a high demographic pressure on prime agricultural land with a premium on full cultivation. That this was prime agricultural land would be apparent from the fact of state investment in such land through state assistance with seed, livestock, revenue adjustments, and on occasion, irrigation facilities (Artha, II. 1). The revenue was collected both on the area of land under cultivation and on the amount of the produce (Megasthenes, quoted in Diodorus II. 40). The amount of wasteland brought under cultivation through state-organized settlements is difficult to ascertain. It was in any case restricted to the potentially most fertile areas, since the more widespread extension of agriculture comes in a later period. Arable land allotted to cultivators is only for a lifetime and reverts to the state at death. Such allotments are therefore different from the land grants of later periods which were revenue free and granted in perpetuity. Those peasants who worked on state lands appear to have been tied to the land whereas others were evidently free. Megasthenes writes that the Mauryan state kept the peasants unarmed (Arrian XI).

The extension of cultivation is linked to the authority of the state. Conquest meant the incorporation of new areas into the state system. But unless the state restructured the economy of these areas they would remain segments under the overarching control of the state, where the state would remain an alien agency. Environmental circumscription (Carneiro 1970) could here be relevant to assessing the degree of restructuring required. peasants are tied to the land then they would be willing to accept the authority of the stronger force. If alternative land is available then the choice of migration is possible. The reference to deserted lands may indicate a shift in cultivating populations. Optimum lands would be areas in the Ganges valley which by all accounts were fertile and well-populated. These lands would be ecologically more conducive to agriculture than those in central India, the Vindhyas, parts of northwestern India and Rajasthan. Furthermore, in each area there were ecological differences, resulting in varied types of land use and the degree of imperial control over the activities in these areas would also vary. Within the peripheral states a further distinction would have to be made between core and marginal areas.

The state is advised to settle new agricultural areas with shudra families (Artha. II. 1). These were the lowest in rank among the four castes, but not as low as the outcasts. Slaves are not mentioned in this context. Such shudra families had a tenurial arrangement with the state and therefore had legal rights and an income which precludes their being called either slaves or serfs. The extension of agriculture therefore was not through the intensification of cultivation by slave labor but through the increase of the amount of land brought under cultivation. Sources of a less precisely defined period which may be applicable to Mauryan times do refer to some use of slaves in the cultivation of land. The question of the percentage of slaves employed remains indeterminate since the references are often in the form of the compound phrase, dasa-bhritaka, slaves and hired laborers.

The control of the hydraulic machinery has been suggested as a major casual factor in the rise of large states and empires. The information on irrigation in the Mauryan period does not support this argument. There is only a single irrigation work on a large enough scale built by the Mauryan state and this was the dam on the Sudarshan lake in Junagadh (Saurashtra), even though the Arthaśāstra speaks of it as an area where the gana-sangha system prevailed and other sources indicate a fairly localized administration under Mauryan supervision. The Nanda dynasty is said to have built a canal in Kalinga (Sircar 1947), yet the Nanda control

over the area did not survive, since, in spite of the Mauryas having inherited the Nanda kingdom, the state of Kalinga had to be reconquered by the Mauryas (see Seneviratne, this volume).

The information on irrigation suggests considerable decentralization (Artha, II. 24; III. 9; III. 34; VI. 1). Irrigation works are frequently small-scale systems such as the drawing of water from rivers, pools, tanks, wells, and springs. None of these required state help and appear to have been constructed through local enterprise. Where more elaborate construction was required as in reservoirs and embankments, resources are said to have been pooled by the local cultivators, some providing labor and others bullocks and finance. State assistance with irrigation works is more common in the newly settled lands and in arid regions. Where it provided irrigation the state collected a higher water The latter was paid by all those who used some form of irrigation whether private or provided by the state. The concern of the state is that there should be irrigation works and these should be maintained by the cultivators, irrespective of whether they were privately owned or provided by the state. The paucity of reference to state-built irrigation works could suggest that the majority were privately owned (cf. Gunawardana, this volume).

Irrigation is in turn related to crop patterns. There is evidence, both from archeology (Chowdhury 1977) and from the account of Megasthenes that double cropping was the norm, with rice in summer and wheat and barley in winter, in those areas where both rice and wheat could be grown (Megasthenes, quoted in Strabo XV. 1. 20). Double cropping according to Megasthenes was possible owing to the natural fertility of the land and the regularity of rainfall. The Arthaśāstra maintains that a second crop is necessary only in times of economic emergency (V. 2). That there was some degree of state-assisted irrigation agriculture is apparent from Megasthenes' reference to the agoranomoi, the market commissioners who among other things, regulated the supply of water (Strabo XV. 1. 50). Possibly this was with reference to state-owned lands and new settlements. Crop patterns varied according to region. Northwestern India grew barley and wheat for which intensive irrigation was not as necessary as for rice which was preponderant in the Ganges valley. The peninsula was again a millet producing area with some rice and the former did not require intensive irrigation. The extension of rice cultivation may have introduced a concern for irrigation.

Conquest helped the state to acquire new areas for extending agriculture; an equally imperative reason for conquest was the need to control trade routes. This is demonstrated by the discovery of the edicts of Aśoka along nodal points on important trade routes and areas of raw materials, (other than those edicts specifically associated with religious purposes and found at places important to Buddhism). The nodal points beyond the Ganges valley were Kandahar, Taxila, Ujjain, the northern Konkan, the Raichur and Bellary districts, and Kalinga all of which have provided evidence of inscriptions. It is not surprising that the king took pride in having had roads constructed with amenities for travelers (Pillar Edict VII). These would serve the double purpose of quick administrative communication as well as accelerating trade.

Another input into the growth of trade was the use of coined money which introduced a qualitative change in exchange and commercial relationships. The punch-marked coins used in the Mauryan period preceded the empire by a couple of centuries (Thapar 1961). They were evidently issued by some of the smaller states of the previous period and continued to be issued even after the decline of the Mauryan empire. Some may have been traders' tokens issued by the more important guilds. It is questionable whether any of the series were dynastic issues since it is curious that such issues made no change in the format of the coins. Although reference is made to the minting of coins of various denominations by the mint master, he is also required to determine the value of coins already in circulation. It would seem therefore that there was no state monopoly over coined money.

The state did, however, maintain a careful control over individual traders and guilds, inspecting their identity, their merchandise, and their profits (Artha, II. 1, 4, 13.). The sale of goods at the place of production was not permitted, presumably because sale in markets was more accessible to revenue collectors. The state collected a series of taxes at various points in the production of goods from raw materials to commodities. Special officers were appointed to ensure standards and prevent fraud as well as to intercept trade in those items on which the state had a monopoly such as, weapons, armor, metals, and gems. Commodity

production was therefore an independent enterprise geared to a market and trade was a major revenue resource for the state. Craft production was not restricted to autonomous village economies. Trade also provided a substantial interregional link.

That the chief concern of the state was the collection of revenue arose out of the need for the metropolitan state to maintain two structures crucial to the functioning of an empire: its military strength and its administrative network. accounts the Mauryan army was vast. The figures given by Plutarch and Pliny were almost certainly exaggerated, probably to maximize the Indian strength which faced Alexander during his campaign in northern India. Pliny for example, refers to six hundred thousand infantry (Nat. His. VI. 22), a figure which is also quoted for the increase in the Roman army during the period of Diocletian and which is seen as a pressure on the Roman economy. The Mauryan economy had fewer resources to draw upon, to sustain such an army. The Arthaśāstra indirectly seems to support a smaller figure since it legitimizes the use of a variety of what might be called paramilitary forces during a campaign (II. 33). Megasthenes writes that the soldiers were well-paid (Arrian XII) and the financial demands of the army were evidently high. This may in part account for the emphasis on nonviolence and the avoidance of war in the policies of Aśoka.

The administrative network consisted of an upper bureaucracy recruited from the upper castes and receiving handsome salaries. There was no central method of recruitment and local persons appear to have been appointed in areas distant from the metropolitan state, such as the Iranian Tushaspa, and in Saurashtra (Thapar 1961). The lower bureaucracy, it can be assumed, was also recruited from the locality. At the peak period of the empire mention is made of a group of officers, basically concerned with revenue administration, who appear to have been centrally appointed and who were required to tour the areas under their jurisdiction and enquire into the wellbeing of the subjects (Rock Edict III, Pillar Edict IV). With the decline of the Mauryan state we hear no more of them as specific groups with specific functions. The bureaucracy was not required to restructure conquered areas to conform to a uniform pattern but to ensure the free flow of revenue. The separation of local administration from central administration is obliquely indicated in the reference to a revolt

in the city of Taxila where the objection was to the oppressive actions of the officials and not to the Mauryan ruling family (Divyavadana 1959: 234, 262). The upper bureaucracy had a largely managerial function. When revenue collecting preceded the Mauryan conquest, the existing system was in all likelihood continued particularly at the lower levels of the bureaucracy through local appointments. Units of villages were grouped together for tax purposes. The main change would have been in the flow of revenue being directed substantially towards the metropolitan state.

The concept of citizenship seems absent in the Mauryan state. Aśoka maintains in one of his edicts (Separate Edict I) that all men are his subjects/children (the word being identical for both), and further, compares his officers to nurses looking after the welfare of children (Pillar Edict IV). Loyalty was directed less to the state and more to the immediately recognizable social identity of caste or lineage. Caste norms did have some uniformity, but this was again limited to areas where caste society was established, which tended to be in the core regions. Upper castes, observing more closely a code of behavior which established their claim to high caste, would be more easily recognizable, whereas lower castes doubtless displayed less uniformity. Megasthenes's description of caste follows economic categories rather than socioreligious distinctions, although he correctly emphasizes practices relating to marriage and occupation as being primary characteristics of caste society (Strabo XV. 1. 39-49).

A more visible manifestation of uniformity in empires is often seen in the erection of monumental buildings – palaces, temples, and tombs – focusing on the ruling groups and as expressions of the culture of the metropolitan state. There is in the Mauryan empire a striking absence of such monuments except in the capital. Elsewhere, as for example at Taxila, there are few monumental structures (Marshall 1951). The absence of tombs and mausoleums may be accounted for by the prevalence of cremation as a funerary rite. Nevertheless, the sacred enclosures and relic mounds, often funerary, were tumuli of heaped earth and bricks and remained largely unadorned during this period. The conspicuous consumption associated with 'oriental empires' is not borne out by the monumental buildings. The wealth of the court in the personal adornments of those attending has been described

by Megasthenes (Strabo XV. 1. 53-56). That the metropolitan culture did reach out into the peripheral states is evident from the use of Prakrit in the royal inscriptions, although even in this sphere, concessions were made to areas with a strong regional linguistic identity, such as the Greek and Aramaic speaking parts of the northwest. Another aspect of uniformity, the use of a uniform legal code, remains ambiguous during this period. A controversial statement in one of the edicts hints at this (Pillar Edict IV), but there is no mention of such a code in any other source. The caste structure of society tended to encourage a caste differentiated code, where the aim was less to equalize everyone in the eyes of the law than to interrelate the differences into the totality of social functioning.

That a uniform, imperial system did not reach down into every part of the empire is evident from the successor states on the decline of Mauryan power. The conquest of areas which had not experienced state formation resulted in the imposition of the state through Mauryan control and this may well have accelerated the emergence of the state in these areas in the post-Mauryan period. The post-Mauryan period sees distinct patterns in successor states. Lineage based societies of the gana-sangha type either used the imperial state to strengthen the power of the ruling lineage or else were incorporated into the Mauryan system and failed to survive as separate entities. The former were located in the ecologically more differentiated regions and the latter in the more fertile edges of the Ganges valley. The degree of change in the Ganges valley was qualitatively more intensive and the ganasangha system could not survive. Here the dynastic, monarchical system was fully established and the successors to the Mauryas are not lineage-based ruling families, but new dynasties with no kinship ties with earlier ruling families.

The origins of the Mauryan family according to later Buddhist sources can be traced to a lineage-based society in that they are said to be kshatriyas related to the Shakyas, the kingroup of the Buddhai (Vamsatthapakasini, I.V: 179-180). According to the more orthodox brahmanical traditional their social status was ambiguous if not low (Pargiter 1931), and later literature gives them the epithet of vrishala, low or of the heterodoxy. The controversy over origins may have required a legitimization of the family. It is significant that the Mauryas aspire to this

legitimization not through claims to divinity but through patronizing the socioreligious movements such as Jainism and Buddhism, which arose in the middle Ganges valley and Magadha and which were regarded as heterodox by brahmanical orthodoxy. patronage was also motivated by other reasons. Traditional kin and clan ties were weakening and a new social framework was becoming necessary. One attempt at this was the working out of the varna model of caste society, incorporating various social groups based on status and economic activity into a hierarchy of ranking and interrelationships enveloped in ritual sanction. This was gradually to become the major force, being by now established even in the core areas of the periphery. Another attempt was that of the universalistic ethic of the heterodox sects which, while it did not root out lineage or caste ties, nevertheless attempted to cut across them. It was this ethic which was brought in as an ideological support to its political counterpart in the formulation of what has been called the policy of dhamma/dharma as expounded by Asoka in his edicts.

The endorsing of a universalistic ethic was implicit in this policy and provided an ideological parallel to imperial policy. The initial motivation may well have been the personal predilection of the emperor for Buddhism but its propagation by the emperor inevitably introduced a political dimension (Thapar 1961). Patronage to the heterodox sects subsumed much else which, although not primarily political, nevertheless assisted in the change which the metropolitan state was anxious to encourage. provided access to the parallel society of the Buddhist order as articulated in the monastery and this was parallel both to the state and to the caste ordering of society. The spheres of the king and the monk were theoretically distinct and even though on occasion they overlapped, as when the king was permitted to interfere in sectarian conflicts, patronage was generally to the benefit of both. The monk could act as the mediator between the king and his subjects, often as a center of loyalty and support. As carriers of ideology, monasteries were based in areas where agriculture and trade had developed and they became the points of contact in a network which ran alongside the administrative The universalistic ethic was also a connecting link in forging new ties across the empire (Thapar 1978).

That the dhamma of Aśoka was more than merely patronage

to a particular religious sect would seem evident from the constant plea for harmony in intersect relations (Rock Edicts VII, XII). Up to a point the religious sect functioned as a sociopolitical faction competing for political patronage and status. The breaking and weakening of older ties would inevitably result in the emergence of fresh alignments and these were being articulated in the activities of the socioreligious movements of the time. Their heterodoxy lay (among other things) in the fact that, even though they did not oppose the caste structure of society, they did break caste obligations in creating monastic orders and regarded caste as irrelevant to the concerns of individual salvation.

The sanction of the heterodox sects became an additional level of control for the Mauryan rulers eliminating the need for an appeal to divinity in kingship. It could be argued that the title adopted by Aśoka, Devanampiya (the beloved of the gods), or the claim that during his reign the gods had come to mingle with the people (Rock Edict IV), was more a concession to earlier notions of kingship than the requirement of an imperial system. Religious sanction served a different purpose from divine kingship. This perhaps spurred Aśoka on to speak in terms verging on a royal cult in the later Pillar Edicts, a tone noticeably different from the earlier Rock Edicts. In the earlier edicts it is the dhamma which as an ideology is efficacious, in the later texts the king takes the credit as the primary agent of dhamma. Religious sanction was woven into administrative functions as is clear from the special cadre of officials, the dhamma-mahamattas, whose concern for specific aspects of the welfare of the populace was tied into persuading people to act in accordance with the dhamma (Rock Edict V).

The distinction between the divinity of the king and religious sanction is further seen in the interlocking of the state and the Buddhist order in Buddhist historiography. There are no historical chronicles of the Mauryan empire. In the brahmanical sources the dynasty is listed merely as one among many others. Buddhist sources chronicle its activities in greater detail and these lead up to the central event of the king and the Buddhist Order becoming so interdependent as to function in unison (Mahavamsa 1964). This then becomes the model for all rulers in the Buddhist tradition and the concept of the universal monarch, the emperor par excellence, draws heavily on this idealization.

It might be argued that much of what has been said about the metropolitan state echoes earlier views on the functions of a centralized government in an imperial system. However there is more than a marginal difference between a model which emphasizes a simplistic centralization subsuming uniformity and one which takes into consideration the relations between categories of states and political structures within an imperial system. That there was the consciousness of empire, articulated in the conquest of territories and of the attempt to bring under a single administration a large variety of political structures encompassing an area whose dimensions were vast by any standards, cannot be doubted. What needs to be examined is the assumption that such empires were invariably seeking to impose a uniformity which became a necessary prerequisite to their functioning.

The insistence on uniformity and the nature of centralization in early empires therefore requires redefinition. It need not mean the imposition of a uniform, monolithic administration, evenly in every part of the empire, but can be limited to the controlling of revenue through a series of apparently flexible relationships between the metropolitan state and the periphery. Both the revenue and the degree of control would be conditioned by the degree of restructuring, but given the demands of the imperial system this may not have amounted to dramatic changes in all the peripheral areas. The interlinking of differentiated systems within a peripheral area would also have modified the impact of the metropolitan state. It is also likely to have influenced the nature of the submetropolitan system emerging in the core areas of the periphery, such as the provincial capitals of the empire. The life-style of the metropolitan state was evidently not repeated mechanically in innumerable local centers. This would again relate to the availability of resources as well as the authority of the metropolitan state to impose its life-style in such areas, not to mention the draining of revenue towards the metropolitan state rather than its expenditure in conspicuous consumption in the local center. Possibly the degree of restructuring by the Mauryan imperial system and its consequent exploitation of local resources for the benefit of the metropolitan state was not sufficient to sustain the imperial system over a long period and this may account for the short duration of the empire.

NOTE

 The references to the Arthaśāstra are to the text and not to the volumes. Part I contains the text, Part II a translation of the text by Kangle, and Part III consists of a discussion on the text. The references in this chapter are to the books and chapters into which the text is divided.

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The Army and the Formation of the States of West Africa in the Nineteenth Century: The Cases of Kenedugu and Samori State

MICHAŁ TYMOWSKI

In the present paper I propose to consider the role of the army in the formation of two West African states: Samori's state and Kenedugu.

Samori's state occupied an area in the upper Niger and Milo valleys, inhabited by Mande peoples — chiefly the Malinke and the Dyula. The Malinke farmers had been the creators of the large state of Mali, which was formed in the thirteenth and disintegrated about the middle of the seventeenth century; following this the Malinke formed a large number of small territorial units known as kafu, headed by rulers (mansa) and councils made up of village heads (dugutigi) and chiefs of prominent families (lu-tigi). Social differentiation was negligible because of the system of joint ownership prevailing in the big families (lu). Chiefs of families, villages, and kafu had the right to levy tribute in farm produce, which gave them a degree of economic advantage over the rest of the community, though on the other hand they were under an obligation to use the tribute for the needs of the community (Person 1968: 64-73; Meillassoux 1963).

The main social division was that between free men and captives. Age groups called kari, comprising men who underwent initiation together, played a major role in social and cultural life. The kari system was the foundation of the community's military organization: in case of war, men from specified age groups were called up into the army. The Malinke comprised many such kafu. After the final collapse of Mali and until as late as the eighteenth

century, they displayed no tendency to create a state organization. The state of balance among the *kafu* and lack of political dynamism came to an end in the nineteenth century.

In addition to the territorial organization, ties of kinship between members of not only the families (*lu*), but also totemic clans, were very important among the Malinke and the Dyula (Person 1963; idem 1968: 54-64).

As regards the Senufo, who accounted for the bulk of the population of the future state of Kenedugu, their organization did not go beyond the basic kinship and territorial ties either. Their main unit was the family (narigba) and the territorial unit was the village, often composed of a few settlements (vogu). At the higher level of organization there were totemic clans (fele) and complexes of villages called 'cantons' in French literature (Holas 1957: 19-33; Quiquandon 1892: 371-387).

Families and villages were headed by chiefs and their councils. The whole free population was divided into age groups connected to initiation (*lo, poro*). The Wattara clan from Kong imposed their rule on this segmentary political system in the early eighteenth century, but its hegemony was of a merely transitional nature and collapsed in the second half of the eighteenth century (Bernus 1960; Kodjo 1975; Person 1974: 276-281).

The question is why did Samori's state and Kenedugu emerge only in the second half of the nineteenth century? What factors accelerated, and which ones held back the process of their formation? In both cases, we have to do with communities which began producing an economic surplus capable of maintaining a ruling group much earlier than the states actually developed. In both cases, too, the communities had knowledge of state organization. It proved, however, neither to be the economic surplus nor the readily available organizational models that automatically caused states to emerge. Thus, there must have been factors hampering this process.

These factors included the economic stagnation during preceding centuries (Cissoko 1969; Tymowski 1974) and the lack of a dramatic external threat which would force the Malinke or the Senufo to organize in self-defense. There was also no social group determined to take on the job of creating the state. The necessity of such a group with this aim and attitude is stressed by others,

too (Lewis in this volume).

The stable economic, social, and political system described above was shaken in various parts of West Africa at different times. The Wattara clan's attempt to create the Kong state was an early, but in the long run unsuccessful, drive to break through the old system. The nineteenth century, when the two states under consideration here were formed, was decisive for dismantling the old economic and political structures (Deschamps 1970-1971; Coquery-Vidrovitch and Moniot 1974; Ajayi and Crowder 1971-1974).

Among the factors which contributed to this, pride of place gave way to population growth. In the nineteenth century, the outflow of slaves to America gradually declined. That did not stop slave trading in Africa itself, however. Though people were abducted, turned into slaves, and sold, they remained in Africa and were forced to work the land and pay tribute to their owners (Meillassoux 1975; on population growth see also Lewis in this volume).

Another factor which spurred political processes was the development of trade. The Dyula traders created a particularly wide-ranging and complex system of trade in modern West Africa, and in the nineteenth century this system of trade run by the Dyula showed especially lively development (Nowak 1974; Person 1963; Meillassoux 1971). The need to ensure security on trading routes was one of the stimuli for the development of the state (Person 1967; idem 1968: 216-219, 1975: 2044-2047).

Trade led to growing social differentiation. With the growth of the internal African market and its ties to external trade, new ways of utilizing the economic surplus appeared. Chiefs of the kafu, cantons, villages, or families could place on the market the goods they collected as tribute. Thus, they were interested in increasing the fiscal pressure on their subjects. The interests of the trading and ruling groups began to merge.

However, the existing system of organization made it impossible to intensify the exploitation of the people. The family, village, kafu, or canton were not suited to this function. Therefore, from the point of view of groups ruling these sociopolitical organizations, it became necessary to break through the old system of organization and to create a new one to (1) impose greater tribute on the people, (2) protect trading routes and trade, and (3) ensure

rising social position and protection for the ruling group.

It was in fact a difficult and stormy process, due to resistance put up by the population and to the appearance of many pretenders to state authority. Both conflicts created a situation in which victory in the power struggle went to those who more quickly and efficiently created an army (on the role of the army in state formation see: Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940: xvii-xx; Claessen and Skalník 1978c: 626-627; Lewis, this volume).

The formation of the state did not mean total rejection or abolition of the old sociopolitical institutions. In the new political structure of the state, the family, village, kafu, and canton found their place simply as lower levels of organization. They were modified only as much as was necessary to enable them to perform their new functions (Person 1970: 1015-1020; Collieaux 1924; Quiquandon 1891a; AS, 1G 146). But the organization of the army underwent a far-reaching and complete change. The egalitarian system of calling entire age groups – kari, lo, poro – up into the army proved to be useless now. Chiefs grouped around themselves troops of warriors made up either of members of their own clans or people of widely differing origins, volunteers or their own slaves. The goal was to create an army outside and independent of existing social structures.

The state of Kenedugu was formed by the Traore clan. This clan produced a ruling dynasty. Polygamy, the large number of children of each ruler, and the system of succession, providing for brothers and not sons of rulers to succeed to power, made the clan very extensive. In the first half of the eighteenth century the Traore represented in Kenedugu the authority of Wattara of Kong, but in the second half they became independent (Person 1974: 276-280, 301-303).

The origins of Kenedugu reach further back in time than is described in the existing literature. Most of those writings follow Collieaux (1924: 130-139), who considered Tieba as the sixth ruler of Kenedugu. Although a report by Captain Quiquandon containing fragments of oral tradition about the origins of Kenedugu has been known since 1892, this publication is still disregarded by students of the problem (Quiquandon 1892; AS, 1G 146; Person 1970: 745-758, 783-784).

Oral tradition quoted in the report lists over twenty predecessors

of Tieba and Babemba and indicates that the war conducted by the Traore lasted for over a century. It began in the second half of the eighteenth century at the time of Kacina Traore, who settled in Follona, and Doula-Ba, whose headquarters was on Kenedugu territory. Hostilities went on with changing luck and intensity, and until as late as the 1840s they could be interpreted as nothing more than events attending the emergence of one of many local powers which apeared after the disintegration of Kong (Quiquandon 1892: 370-376).

The process of state formation picked up momentum during Daula's rule (approx. 1840-1865). He fought against chiefs of Gwiriko and Makuma, backed by the Wattara of Kong. Traore's final victory over them owed much to their alliances with local chiefs of villages and cantons. Having fought back the invading Gwiriko and Makuma, Daula embarked on conquests of his own, taking advantage of local conflicts and allying with some villages against others (Quiquandon 1892: 378-387, 401-403; AS, 1G 322). Let me point out several characteristic features. The Traore had to use institutions existing in given areas. They entered into alliances with local chiefs. Thanks to this, in case of defeat (and there were plenty of those) it was relatively easy to re-form the army or establish entirely new armed units. But in order to gain allies, successes - or at least the promise of success - were That is why the small but permanent group of warriors (sofa) that the Traore rulers maintained were so important for their position. At first, the warriors were recruited from among Traore clan members, but as the powers of Traore chiefs grew, their clients and slaves were also included (AS, 1G 322; Quiquandon 1892: 401).

Secondly, in the early stages of the war, when the Traore were dependent on alliances with local chiefs, their political position was very shaky. That was reflected in the many defeats they suffered, in the need to make alliances, dependence on effective assistance from allies, rebellions in already conquered territories, and the territorial instability of the state they were building (Quiquandon 1892: 373-374, 409).

And thirdly, as they developed their own regular army, the Traore became successively more independent of external support and went on to impose their own authority on their allies by force; they began to levy tributes and tithes and deprived the allies of the right to try more serious crimes, reserving this for the ruler (AS, 1G 322; Quiquandon 1892: 376). Social structure was modified by the emergence of a group interested in wielding power – the army (Quiquandon 1891a: 4650, 4694; AS, 1G 164; 1G 206a, b; 1G 322).

The process of state formation, after a period of unrest following Daula's death, ended during Tieba's reign in the 1870s (Quiquandon 1891a; AS, 15G 72; AN, Missions 4). At the same time, the country's territory was stablilized, as shown by the establishment of the permanent capital in Sikasso and the expansion of fortifications around it (AS, 1G 146; 1G 164; 1G 206b; AN, Missions 4; Quiquandon 1891a: 4637-4640; Meniaud 1935: 102).

Samori's state arose in the 1860s and 1870s. Around the middle of the century there existed among the Malinke a number of budding centers of power concentrated around the Berete, Sise, and Kaba clans. Samori (Person 1968, 1970, 1975) in his youth was a Dyula trader from the Ture clan, in the 1850s he was a warrior (sofa) in the service of Sise and then began his career as a military and political leader in the 1860s. He began by announcing that every young man willing to fight under his command would be given his upkeep. He got a small unit together, imposed tributes on a few villages, mounted expeditions for spoils, but was soon defeated by two strong clans, the Sise and the Berete; his unit was scattered and Samori himself had to go into hiding (Kouroubari 1959; Peroz 1889: 388-398; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 144-150, Fofana 1963).

It was clear that it was impossible to form an army and win control of territory wholly outside the existing organizational structures of the Malinke. So Samori decided to get in touch with the head of the village Dala, thanks to the influence of his mother's clan, the Kamara. In 1861, Samori became Dala's war leader (keletigi). He formed a small regular army, originally numbering less than twenty warriors, and was also given the right of mobilization of the age groups (kari). His successful war attracted to his army more volunteers interested in spoils of war. To encourage them Samori took for himself only one-third of the booty, distributing the remaining two-thirds among his warriors, even though it was customary to give the army only half. Moreover,

Samori established contact with Dyula traders and began using his part of the spoils to buy ever more firearms (Person 1968: 257, 275, 293-294).

In 1862 Samori became the keletigi of Sanankoro, a large village ruled by members of the Kamara clan and serving as the center of an extensive kafu. The rules of his service were the same; he was the war leader, accountable to the head (mansa) of Sanankoro and his council. But the continued expansion of the regular army loosened these ties of dependence. To reflect the new situation, Samori adopted the new title of murutigi (Master of the Sword) in 1863, and after successful struggles against the Sise, that of the highest war leader and ruler, faama, in 1867 (Person 1968: 268, 286; Kouroubari 1959: 546). His subordination to Sanankoro was already largely titular and anyway did not extend to the kafu, which Samori conquered thanks to his regular army. In order to win full independence, Samori in 1873 shifted his headquarters to Bissandugu, which remained his capital until 1892, that is until the fall of the first Samorian state during a war against the French (Peroz 1889: 363-369; AN Sénégal, III/II; Cartothéque HS 162; Archinard 1891; Humbert 1893).

The formation of both states was possible due to the creation of a regular army owing its loyalty to the person of the war leader, armed by him, sharing in the spoils and creating a new and separate social group unknown to societies predating the formation of the state (Peroz 1889: 398; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 103-105; Legassick 1966; AN Sénégal, IV/85; AS, 1G 322; Quiquandon 1891a: 4650, 4694). In both cases, war leaders originally based their activities on alliances with local chiefs, used existing institutions for their purposes, especially the mobilization of age groups into provisionally formed armies. Thus, the state emerged within the existing political structures. In both cases the leaders broke through the structures at convenient moments or created their organizations beyond them.

In both areas there were a number of pretenders to power, and struggle among them hampered the process of state emergence. The success of one of the pretenders was determined by his personal qualities in using the existing situation, showing greater organizational abilities and attracting to his person the warriors of his army. This is in agreement with general conclusions about

the role of the 'Great Man' and the influence of evolution on his activity (Claessen and Skalník 1978c: 621; Lewis, this volume). It is especially evident in Samori's case.

The two processes also differ in some respects. Kenedugu arose around representatives of the Traore clan who arrived on Senufo territory from outside and retained a consciousness of their separate identity. That situation lent special importance to bonds of solidarity linking the Traore, and that clan was the foundation of emerging statehood. On the other hand, Samori, who himself belonged to the Ture clan, based his career for a time on ties with the Kamara clan; still, neither the clan nor his own family — but he himself — became the center of the rising state. In Kenedugu, a dynasty emerged as the central state institution; Samori never had time to establish a dynasty, as he survived the fall of his own state after its conquest by the French. In both cases, however, the unifying force was the personal ties based on loyalty between the war leader/ruler and his warriors (AN Soudan, V/4a, b; Missions 4; Peroz 1889: 385-386; Monteil 1896: 52).

Kenedugu took longer to emerge, partly because the process started earlier, when firearms were insufficiently widespread in the interior of West Africa. Once the firearms had been introduced (since about the middle of the nineteenth century) the process of state formation was accelerated (Quiquandon 1892: 385, 387; White 1971). Samori began his activity when firearms were already available. As a former Dyula trader he was able to obtain the guns faster than other war leaders. That was the basis for his successes and the reason why the process of creating his state was exceptionally stormy and violent. In both cases, highly centralized organizations emerged, based on the role of the war leader/ruler, and on the ruling group's military superiority over the population.

Centralization of power resulted also from the need to buy guns. Their price was high and means to buy them could be amassed only by rulers, on condition that they imposed high tributes on their subjects or conducted a continuous war for spoils. In either case, a strong army was necessary, whether as a means of coercion, and sometimes also internal repression, or as a force with which to conquer or plunder areas outside the state. In fact, the army combined both those functions (AS, 1G 164; 1G 206a, b; 1G 230; 1G 322; AN Sénégal, IV/73 bis; IV/81, 85, 87, 88; Soudan, III/1b; Quiquandon 1891a: 4639, 4653, 4693;

Peroz 1889: 331, 381; Binger 1892, Vol. 1: 71-74).

Thus, we have to do here with a significant relationship of interdependence: a strong army could arise when it was supplied with firearms, and the purchase of firearms was possible only if one had a strong army to amass the necessary means. There was a similar interrelationship between the ruler and his army. The ruler (or a dynasty) and the army were wholly dependent on each other, and one could not exist without the other. This interdependence was reflected in the care the ruler took of his army and in the army's loyalty to him, and it was the foundation of the cohesion of the whole state system.

The army became the chief institution of the state it helped create (apart from the dynasty or the ruler). It would take too long to describe other institutions — the court, the fiscal, judicial, administrative systems, etc. It has to be stressed, however, that the functioning of all these institutions depended upon the army. The court consisted above all of top military commanders. There were also direct relationships between the ruler and his bodyguard (AN Sénégal, III/11; IV/85; AS, 1G 164; 1G 206b; 1G 322; Peroz 1889: 357, 409; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 97). The treasury operated primarily for the army, and thanks to the army.

The army provided more than war booty. The sofa also supervised the collection of tribute from the population of the ruler's own country. When a given village refused to deliver a prescribed part of the harvest or manpower, it was subject to a punitive expedition (AS, 1G 322; AN Soudan, I/6a; III/1a; Monteil 1896: 52-53; Peroz 1889: 413; Binger 1892, Vol. 1: 74, 99). In turn, the landed estates of the ruler and his top officials bloomed because of the work of slaves captured in successful military operations (AN, Missions 4; Soudan III/1b; Quiquandon 1891a: 4694; Peroz 1889: 352-354). Forced labor played a major part in the economic organization of the state. In the more territorially extensive Samorian state, this took the form chiefly of transporting tribute to state granaries or to places where the army was stationed (Binger 1892, vol. 1: 66, 71, 87). In Kenedugu, forced labor involved building the fortress of Sikasso and other, smaller forts (tata) (AS, 1G 164; 1G 206b; AN Soudan, I/9; Monteil 1896: 53). All forced labor participants were supervised by the sofa warriors. Export trade was dependent on

the supply of slaves in exchange for whom most goods were bought, and on the army's protection of trading routes (AS, 1G 206c; AN Sénégal, IV/87; Soudan, I/6b; Binger 1892, vol. 1:71, 83). The *sofa* also executed court verdicts (AS, 1G 322, Peroz 1889: 406-407).

The administrative division of both states was closely interlinked with the organization of the army. Governors (chiefs) of provinces or cantons doubled as commanders of local military units and in fact held all types of authority: administrative, judicial, fiscal, etc. (AS, 1G 322; Quiquandon 1891a: 4694; Peroz 1889: 348-405). In villages which accepted the authority of Samori or Kenedugu rulers voluntarily, the old chiefs were allowed to remain but were given sofa as second in command (AS, 1G 164; 1G 206b, c; AN Sénégal, IV/85; Soudan, III/1b). As for villages which put up resistance, they were given new chiefs, also from among the sofa. In addition, warriors ran the estates of rulers and the villages of slaves. In Samori's state there also existed the post of the overseer of a kafu (dugukunasigi) who was placed alongside the mansa (Peroz 1889: 406; Person 1970: 1018-1020).

In both states, the armies were maintained with the aid of the work of the rest of society as well as the spoils of war. The intensity of exploitation of the people is hard to estimate, and in any case it differed, depending, for example, on the army's luck in wars outside the country. However, since the level of agricultural production and the surplus achieved in both states were similar, a cue to the intensity of exploitation is provided by a comparison of the size of the population and the numerical strength of the army.

When Samori's state was at the height of its success, its population was an estimated 1,100,000, and the regular army numbered 28,000, that is 2.5 percent of the total (AN Sénégal, IV/85; Frey 1888: 106; Humbert 1893; Person 1970: 896-900). In Kenedugu there were about 250,000 people, while the army numbered an estimated 15,000 warriors, that is no less than 6 percent of the total (AS, 1G 322; AN Soudan, I/2; V/4b; Sénégal, IV/95; Quiquandon 1891a: 4681, 4692; 1891b: 454). These estimated figures indicate that the population of Kenedugu was more heavily exploited. This concerns above all tribute from the people for feeding and the general upkeep of the army. Expenditure for firearms and horses is more difficult to estimate in

this way since they were bought chiefly in return for slaves, and moreover, the two armies differed in their equipment: Samori's army had more firearms, while in Kenedugu a more important role was played by fortifications (Meniaud 1935: 106-108, Bah 1971: 205-216; Legassick 1966; Person 1970: 910).

In any case, there is no doubt that in both states the armies enjoyed a privileged position. Free volunteers served in them as well as slaves caught during wars and incorporated into army units (Quiquandon 1891a: 4650; Peroz 1889: 407; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 103). Samori's most loyal commanders came from among the bilakoro — boys caught during a war and given to the ruler as part of his booty (AS, 1D 169; AN Soudan, IV/2). Among the volunteers there were escapees from French forces or from neighboring countries (AS, 1G 206a; 1D 169; Meniaud 1935: 188), but naturally local people made up the bulk of the army. Thus, the army was a social group which developed and grew regardless of social groups and divisions which predated its emergence. And its growth relegated the rest of society to a subordinate position.

Another aspect of social change connected with the army was differentiation among the warriors themselves. It grew as the state itself grew and its organizational structure became more complicated. Samori's brothers served as commanders, and so did members of the Traore clan. However, as the armies grew in number and various levels of command were created, people from outside the ruling family were also appointed to commanding posts. They reached the highest level of the military hierarchy: the rank of *keletigi* in Samori's state and that of *kuntigi* in Kenedugu, and took over most of the lower levels of command: the ranks of *bolokuntigi* and *sofakun* in Samori's army, and of *sofakong, soniebla* and *simaniebla* in that of Kenedugu (AS, 1D 120b; 1D 169; 1G 206a; 1G 322; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 103; Quiquandon 1891a: 4694; Person 1970: 951-957).

The commanders formed a particularly privileged, powerful and prosperous group. Rank-and-file sofa were of course much more prosperous and secure than the rest of the population, but they did not enjoy the privileges of the small group of commanders who ruled the country. After the war season, the sofa spent the rainy season like ordinary farmers — tilling the land (AS, 1G 164; Peroz 1889: 408). They did not have to pay tribute and during

time of war were maintained from the state treasury, but their families had to work to support themselves. The bodyguard formed a separate group within the army; a rank-and-file sofa serving in it enjoyed special privileges and was maintained by the state even during peacetime. Thus, while the whole army was a privileged group, it was by no means uniform. The scope of privileges enjoyed by a warrior and his affluence and authority were determined by his rank in the army and in the state.

The organizations created by Samori and by the Traore clan show all the characteristics of the early state, except a longer period of existence (Claessen and Skalník 1978b: 21-23: 1978c: 625-629; Cohen 1978: 32-37). In Kenedugu, where development lasted longer, we can observe in the first period of conquests constant change in the political situation. It was stabilized only under the rule of Tieba and Babemba. Samori's state existed for too short a period to assess its stability. We know that the revolt of his subjects in the years 1888-1890 was efficiently suppressed by Samori's army (Person 1970: 1060-1067, 1089-1103). The internal cohesion of both organizations is shown by the fact that they could successfully fight against the attacks of the French. Samori resisted for nearly twenty years. The rulers of Kenedugu treated with France, but when the attack came, Babemba defended his country with great force and determination (AN Soudan, V/4b; Meniaud 1935). The force of this resistance reflects good organization and unity of both the states under examination, especially exhibited in moments of danger.

In any case, the evolution of both states was terminated abruptly by colonial conquest. It is impossible to determine how they would have changed and how the political and social role performed in them by the army would have evolved. All we can say is that when both states flourished, there were already indications that social groups and institutions other than the army began to grow in importance. Alongside military commanders, also griots and marabouts began to play a certain role at the court and in diplomatic negotiations; they were also involved in running the country at lower levels of the administration (AS, 1D 120b; 1D 169; Binger 1892, vol. 1: 71; Quiquandon 1891a: 4678). Apart from the state's central treasury, there also appeared the treasuries of governors of provinces (AS, 1G 322; Person 1970:

1023), the ruler's relatives and top state officials began to receive villages or complexes of villages (AS, 1D 120b; Quiquandon 1891a: 4694; Collieaux 1924: 169; Peroz 1889: 363). Those were the beginnings of a process a decentralization, and of reducing the role of the army in favor of other institutions of government. But the process was impeded by the enormous outside threat of French expansion, and was subsequently interrupted by colonial conquest.

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Marx and Weber on the Primary State¹

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In this paper two conceptions of the primary state which seriously influenced the formation of the modern views on the subject are (briefly) discussed: those of Karl Marx and Max Weber. While aiming to reproduce the logic of construction of both conceptions, it is at the same time important to call attention to one of their aspects. Without critical analysis of the fact of social-cultural pluralism in the world it is impossible to determine the significance of these conceptions for modern knowledge of society. The temptations of Eurocentric monism, the forms of its cognition and attempts to overcome it are considered. As will be seen from the text, these attempts for Marx took the character of a reconstruction of the content of his theory towards the end of his life, while Weber preferred formal, methodological clarifications of the nature, limitations, and capabilities of social-historical knowledge.

The essential assumption of the concept of the primary state in both Marx and Weber is the thesis of the inferiority of its political form compared with the forms of new European states. Both authors include the primary state in their schemes of rationalization of world history as a more or less irrational starting point — from whose negation the whole process of rationalization of the sphere of dominance and rulership results — and hold that this rationalization approaches its culmination in contemporary Europe. At the same time, however, they understand rationalization quite differently.

Marx is always preoccupied with the rationalization of collecti-

vity. The point of departure is the whole, not individuals, nor their 'actions' or 'social actions'. The free subjective cognition and will of individuals is the decisive precondition of the rationalization of human society, but is possible only in and through society. Without individualization there is no rationalization, but individualization itself is a property of collectivity, its historical property. Collectivity precedes individualization and is its enveloping whole. This collectivity can take the following successive historical forms.

At first, there is an isolated primordial collectivity, members of which are bound to each other by rigid ties of 'flesh and blood'. Primitive people possess' physiological distinctions, but are devoid of individuality ('herd-consciousness', 'sheeplike or tribal consciousness'). There then comes a social whole in the form of interaction of isolated individuals who have broken the umbilical cord of primitive bonds and aim at universal relations as practical, object-active individuals ('world market'). Social relations here have a pseudorational character, since even though they are relations between individuals pursuing their own goals, the content of these interests is manipulated by the alienated sphere of products of object activity ('fetishistic' consciousness). Finally, there comes the future 'human society' (the human species which has inherited the universality of relations from the previous epoch and overthrown the dominance of the alienated world of fetishes). In this society of universally developed individuals, 'free cognition and will' pervade the relations between people and the relation of people to nature, by which a complete rational transparency of both types of relations is attained. Here there is no contradiction between the individual and society, since society itself exists in the form of interaction of universally developed individuals. Because of the absence of the contradiction between the general and the particular, the general does not have to assume the form of a political institution divorced from both the general interests and the particular interests of people. If the development of the historical forms of collectivity is crowned with the triumph of the rationality of 'human society', then the concentrated expression of this rationality is the statelessness of this society.

In striking contrast to the statelessness of 'human society', in Marx's writings appear those historical forms of primitive communist collectivity which owe their existence to the early state. These forms are examined by Marx in the framework of his conception of 'the Asiatic mode of production'. According to this conception, the primitive collectives are self-contained, isolated, and have identical, but not mutual interests. Their way of life does not create any connections between them, they are indifferent or, as neighbors, inimical to one another. A connection between them is possible only through a mediator, through a 'linking unity' (Zusammenfassende Einheit) which is inserted among them — a function which the archaic state assumes (Marx 1973: 375-377). Such is the nature of systems of primitive collectivities. The conditions of existence for such a system are the following: stability, unchangeability of its elements, i.e., reproduction, in an invariable form if possible, of the 'herd' character of the primitive collectivities. The whole historical movement away from local isolation, ethnic, natural-religious and similar conditioning is not realized here through the development of individuality, its needs, abilities, productive forces, forms of relations. It is located in the transcendental sphere of politics, in the 'residences of the rulers', growths on the economic order. Mass 'tribal consciousness' on one side, the freedom of despotic arbitrariness on another; such is the situation. As an attempt to overcome local limitations, not through development of individuality, but through the utmost widening of its functions and power (by despotism and the 'complete slavery' of its subjects), the primary state in Marx's historical schemelies in general beyond the point where processes of modernization achieve development.

Marx, of course, quite fully realized the wide geographical distribution of primary state formations and their amazing level of resistance to historical time. But even in the 1860s he did not see in the ability of 'the Asiatic mode of production' to surpass local boundaries a real opponent of his hypothetical model of the universality of 'human society'. Marx explained the appearance of the early state formations by specific geographic (irrigation, etc.) or historical (defense, etc.) circumstances, i.e., ultimately by local, particular conditions. On the other hand, he insisted that universal historical necessity naturally leads to the appearance of 'human society'. This necessity, though it had paved its way at first in the favorable *European* geographic and historical circumstances, would in time subordinate the whole world, supporting itself on its successes in Europe.

Marx knew that his conception was developed from the 'European point of view'. But he wanted to look from the 'point of view of human society', i.e., the all-human point of view. And he maintained that his Eurocentrism was not an obstacle to universalism but rather the only possible way to it. Some quite radical assumptions of his conception are connected with the above. He assumes that the human species has not yet been formed and is still in the phase of natural evolution. And he insists that the completion of this evolution will be expressed in the formation of a 'human society'. Further, he acknowledges as 'social' only European social experience, and events similar to it in other regions and in different epochs. Hence, he classifies all the rest of the gigantic body of history as belonging to the world of nature, to the various phases of natural evolution of the human species (Marx 1973: 107). One of these phases is represented by the formation of early states (Vitkin 1972). As a result Marx perceives history as a natural-historical process of formation of the human species, decisive ('social') phases of which were proceeding in contemporary Europe. In the framework of assumptions introduced by Marx into his doctrine, cosmopolitanism presupposes Eurocentrism. Closer to the end of his life (in the 1870s or the beginning of the 1880s), however, Marx developed ideas which deviate substantially from the scheme described above, and we will briefly touch upon them after we consider Weber's conception of 'patrimonial offices' and 'patrimonial bureaucracy'.

Like Marx, though with a terminological rigorism that Marx did not possess, Weber discusses rationalization. However, he chooses as point of departure not the superindividual level, but the level of an individual actor whose actions are meaningfully oriented toward actions of other individuals. In Weber, social relations are logically derivative, secondary with respect to actions and social actions; they get rationalized because the working-out of the norms of behavior gets easier the more individual actions get rationalized. Social relations are determined to a decisive extent politically, hence rationalization finds its concentrated expression in rationalization of the sphere of dominance and control. In Weber's sociology, as distinct from Marx's, rationalization leads not to the universal development of individuals, but to their stereotyping, and not to individual freedom and the withering away of the state, but to the as yet unknown streng-

thening and omnipotence of the state. Since for Marx rationalization aims at statelessness, he interprets the irrationality of the primary state as the source of the never-surpassed omnipotence of the state. For Weber, on the contrary, the irrationality of the primary state ('patrimonial office') is viewed as the source of its weakness compared to developed state rationalism (bureaucracy). In Marx's 'collectivistic' conception of the primary state attention is devoted, first of all, to the problem of 'linking unity', which insures the wholeness of the primary state formations; in Weber's 'individualistic' conception special significance is attributed to the problems of dominance and management.

As long as the sphere of dominance, according to Weber, was limited by the narrow boundaries of the simplest primitive communes, the problems of management were solved collectively. With the emergence of patriarchal power beyond its primary boundary lines (in this way the often vast empires of the East were created) old methods of control became obsolete and ineffective. Control in the new conditions had to be exercised by means of a special office. Formed, as a rule, from those people who were personally involved with or dependent upon the patriarchal chief — relatives, servants, clients, slaves, emancipated slaves, etc.

The creation of such an office means that in the relations of dominance and subordination, the weight of arbitrariness, not limited by tradition, increases. Without it the dominance over regions with different traditions or types of dominance is impossible to achieve. Instead of the primitive traditional order (patriarchalism and gerontocracy) which did without an office of dominance and management, patrimonial dominance and despotic sultanism appear. Weber calls 'patrimonial' such a primitive linked-by-tradition dominance, which as a result of the creation of the office of dominance is oriented by the law established by the master. He calls 'sultanism' a patrimonial dominance, achieved from the very beginning through an unlimited arbitrariness. The sultanist form of patrimonialism is sometimes only limited in appearance by tradition.

Created with the goal of controlling, the office of dominance is the more suitable to its purpose the more rationally the actions of its members are organized. Ideally, it must be an organization of people working as reliably and precisely as a machine. But to do that it must be 'dehumanized', to exclude the influence on its workings of any personal, noncalculable moments, i.e., to formalize. This means that the constructing principle of such an organization must be a special knowledge, a science of control, and its inner order must be determined by formal regulations. And with that, all its characteristic features are connected: hiring for a position according to professional requirements, special education and division of labor, firm competence, hierarchical subordination and control, salaries paid in money, promotions on the basis of common rules. In other words, to rationalize control means to bureaucratize it.

However, such an ideal is unattainable in reality or attainable only as an exception. It exists as a logical notion in a scientist's mind. Only contemporary European states and large capitalist enterprises approach quite closely, according to Weber, such a formal bureaucratic machine. As for the traditional state, the appearance there of the office of dominance at first presents a direct contrast to the rationally organized office of control. Weber writes (1968: 229):

In the pure type of traditional rule, the following features of a bureaucratic administrative staff are absent:

- a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules,
- b) a rationally established hierarchy,
- a regular system of appointment on the basis of free contract, and orderly promotion.
- d) technical training as a regular requirement,
- e) (frequently) fixed salaries, in the type case paid in money.

If, therefore, one starts with the goal which predominated in the creation of the patrimonial office of control and confronts it with its means, i.e., in this case with the principle of the organization of the actions of people who are solving the problems of control, then we have an irrational way of solving such problems.

Indeed, instead of a strict (on the basis of written regulations) division of rights and obligations, there prevail the tasks and proxies established by the will of a sovereign in each separate case. Such absence of the notion 'competence' in the modern sense of the word can easily be verified by looking at the lists of office employees of the ancient East. With rare exceptions they do not demonstrate a rational division of spheres of activity on the basis

of competence in the modern meaning of the word. If, however, tasks and proxies become long or even constant with time, so that one can notice the existence of departments, then it turns out to be a result of competition for positions, looked at as a source of material income.

Instead of a strictly established hierarchy of subordination, the whimsical will of a sovereign decides under whose command one or another matter will end up.

Instead of hiring for positions and promotion regulated on a basis of free agreement, there takes place a patrimonial recruiting of personnel, where career depends in full on the sovereign's favor or disfavor. A transfer to extrapatrimonial recruiting on the basis of the personal trust of a sovereign means the advent of a whole new epoch. Bureaucracy, as a bearer of the 'spirit' of rationalization, appears at first in the patrimonial states as extrapatrimonially recruited officials. But even those officials are personal servants of the sovereign in the beginning.

Instead of special competence for the business of management, all that is needed is a certain degree of empirical experience. Included here is first of all the art of reading and writing. According to Weber (1971: 337).

Der alte chinesische Mandarin war kein Fachbeamter, sondern im Gegenteil ein literarische-humanistisch gebildeter Gentleman. Der ägyptische, spätrömische, byzantinische Beamte war wesentlich mehr Bürokrat in unserem Sinne. Aber die Staatsaufgaben, welche in seiner Hand lagen, waren gegenüber den modernen unendlich einfach und bescheiden, sein Verhalten teils traditionalistisch gebunden teils patriarchal, also irrational, orientiert. Er war ein reiner Empiriker, wie der Gewerbetreibende der Vergangenheit.

Finally, persons who hold the patrimonial office of dominance eat from the sovereign's table and dress from his warehouses, instead of receiving an established income, in particular a monetary income. Monetary income, together with the opportunity of freedom from arbitrariness and a chance for a career, serves as a quite reliable means of establishing a strict work discipline.

All this taken together characterizes the patrimonial office of dominance and management as an ideal type. The relations of personal dependence on the master make the patrimonial office an informally organized group of persons, generally irrationally oriented in their actions. In reality, however, such a means of solving problems of control occurs only as an exception. As a rule, there is a rationalization of the office of dominance to some degree. This is how the 'patrimonial bureaucracies', i.e., patrimonial office of dominance with a more or less advanced process of rationalization (bureaucratization), arise.

In some historical cases bureaucratization turns out to be quite significant. Weber writes (1968: 964):

Historical examples of relatively clearly developed and quantitatively large bureaucracies are: (a) Egypt, during the period of the New Kingdom, although with strong patrimonial elements; (b) the later Roman Principate, and especially Diocletian monarchy and the Byzantine polity which developed out of it; these, too, contained strong feudal and patrimonial admixtures; (c) the Roman Catholic Church, increasingly so since the end of thirteenth century; (d) China, from the time of Shi Hwangti until the present, but with strong patrimonial and prebendal elements; (e) in ever pure forms, the modern European states and, increasingly, all public bodies since the time of princely absolutism; (f) the large modern capitalist enterprise, proportional to its size and complexity.

What, then, are historical (economic and social) preconditions of rationalization of the traditional type of dominance and management?

First of all, extensive and quantitative broadening of the sphere of control. For example, in the political sphere an excellent soil for bureaucratization is created by the formation of great empires.

Even more than extensive and quantitative broadening of the sphere of control, its intensive and qualitative growth serves as a stimulus to bureaucratization. These problems can be of different sorts. For example, in the most ancient country exhibiting bureaucratic state control, Egypt, the reason for bureaucratization was, first of all, the technical-economic necessity of the overall regulation of hydrotechnical relations, to which were added in quite an early period the problems of controlling extensive construction work. There exist quite a number of historical examples where bureaucratization accompanied the attempts to solve military, transportation, and other problems effectively.

Further, a certain degree of development of a monetary economy is, according to Weber, a premise—if not for creation, then for the stability—of purely bureaucratic power. This is so because the monetary income of office holders frees the sovereign from the necessity of allotting them land, together with,

corresponding economic rights and rights of dominance. If, however, the position of office holders grows stronger nonetheless, then breaches in the hierarchic structure of dominance occur, working discipline weakens, and in the end the degeneration of bureaucratic relations can take place, even if they were already significantly developed.

However, the determining reason for the bureaucratization of dominance from early times on was its purely technical superiority over any other form, including the patrimonial. Weber writes, that 'The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production' (1968: 973). In his opinion, the experience of mankind has not created any other means of solution of problems of control as effective as bureaucratic organizations.

But even despite its technical superiority, bureaucracy is everywhere a relatively late and mainly European product of development. However, Weber's scheme has the form of a world, and not just European, history. Like Marx, Weber looks at the world from 'the European point of view'. He does it, however, on the basis of motives distinct from Marx's. He does not identify the European point of view with the point of view of all mankind, in spite of the far-reaching processes of westernization of the Monistic pictures of the world claiming an exclusive truth belong, in Weber's opinion, to the past of science. The content of any conception is conditioned by the affiliation of the researcher to his culture. Such is the destiny of a European scientist as well. However, similar to any other point of view, the 'European point of view' is endowed with 'objectivity' if research is being performed in accordance with the laws of logic and norms of methodology of research work. Logicomethodological rules are universal; they are necessary to every researcher, whatever culture he belongs to. Making concessions to relativism in the question of content, Weber at the same time tries to build up a methodological obstacle to relativism (Schelting 1934). The point of view of the whole of mankind is not only inaccessible, it is not at all necessary for acquiring valid knowledge. scheme: 'patrimonial office - patrimonial bureaucracy - contemporary bureaucracy' was a creation of a European scientist. But it tells us about processes that have occurred, are occurring or could occur when any attempt at dominance and control,

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wherever and whenever it takes place, is made. Of course, the intensity and cultural context in which these processes occur are quite different in Europe and outside it. Europe is the closest to the ideally typical intensity of this process. But a certain cognitive validity of this scheme is retained outside Europe; its usefulness in any given circumstances can be determined only by the results of research.

However, as a methodologist, Weber is not occupied with searching for means and ways of presenting a researcher's position as a solitary cultural fact in the background of primary cultural and social pluralism of the human world. In the end result, the acceptance by his methodology of the diversity of forms of cognitive experience does not guarantee the content of his conception against monistic reductionism. (In general form, a convincing critique of monistic reductionism has recently been introduced by Zilberman 1978.)

Marx decided differently on this. When in the seventies of the last century the rapproachment of universal and European points of view ceased to satisfy him, he chose not the path of rejection of the former and of methodological determination of the limitations and abilities of the latter, but the path of retaining the universal position by way of content reconstruction of his theory. From then on the theory had to spring out of the significance of not only European but also non-European experience. The old division into the natural (non-European) and social (mainly European) phases of history, which legitimated Eurocentrism, was thrown away and supplanted by the scheme of two 'big' social formations - 'primary', or 'archaic', and 'secondary' (Marx and Engels, Werke 1959: 384-406). The concept of 'primary formation' is introduced into classical Marxism for such content reconstruction, instead of the idea of the natural character of non-European history, thus allowing a monistic picture of the world to be worked out, which overcomes the Eurocentrism of the previous constructions (Vitkin 1978). 'Primary formation' with its characteristic collectivism and prolonged absence of individuality of the European type was accepted into classical Marxism as an initial empirical equivalent of the collectivistic general approach to social reality which has always been characteristic of Marxism. European individualism, and its corresponding social experience ('secondary formation'), was rethought and now considered as a

deviation from the most massive 'primary' social experience, caused by the peculiarities of European historical surroundings. As a result, the theoretical substantiation of communism as a future society of universal social relations became more and more dependent on the idea of a return by contemporary societies to archaic communist relations with, however, the adoption of the achievements of European peoples.

Such innovations could not help but bring a number of problems, that so far had remained on the peripheries of the theory, to its center. This includes the problem of the primary state. The immediacy of the problem was caused by an obvious question, namely, whether the predicted dialectical return to primary relations will simply turn into a regeneration of the modernized form of primary state formations - this extremely balanced, developed and tremendously viable and changeable historical form. Do we not get an epoch of 'state socialism' instead of the interaction of universally developed individuals, which makes any state system superfluous? To answer these questions a careful study of primary states and their historical transformations was needed. This was included in Marx's plans, but despite his many years of work, those plans were not realized. After Marx's death, Engels had to call upon Marx's students to 'disclose the state socialism, which spreads like a contagion' (Marx and Engels 1956: 441).

Both concepts of the primary state considered here are determined quite strictly by the strategic plans of their creators. Along with the great differences between the two concepts, the common desire of both Marx and Weber to overcome the hypertrophy of the 'European point of view' attracts our attention. In our multicultural world this common desire is not devoid of significance.

NOTE

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24 The Study of the Southeast Asian State

ROBERT L. WINZELER

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I shall be concerned with certain facets of the development of the state in Southeast Asia, in particular with the technological and ecological factors which Goody (1971) has sought to show were crucial influences in the development of traditional African political systems. My analysis rests on the premise—which itself will, for want of space, have to remain unexamined—that there were important differences in the formation and nature of states between Southeast Asia and other major regions of Asia (see Winzeler 1976 for a discussion). It is useful to approach these points by way of a discussion of some of the problems which confront the scholar who seeks to understand Southeast Asian states in comparative terms. Finally, by Southeast Asia I shall mean both the mainland and insular realms which were both a part of the same general pattern of development over the past two thousand years.

2. THE STUDY OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATE

There is a rich body of historical and ethnological literature on Southeast Asian politics. However this literature is uneven and difficult in various ways. For a number of possible reasons there has not developed a coherent or focused tradition of anthropological study of states or political systems generally in this area. There have been some notable, even brilliant particular studies, above all perhaps Leach's (1965) Political Systems of Highland Burma, a work which has been of wide importance in post World War Two social anthropology generally. However, both this and other individual studies which could be mentioned have remained largely isolated accounts—influential no doubt but not followed by other studies of comparable (which is not to say identical) instances. Beyond the handful of relevant ethnographic and ethnological accounts for the entire vast realm of Southeast Asia the anthropologist interested in traditional states or political systems must make use of a variety of disciplinary sources in several languages concerned with such topics as ancient civilization and trade, customary law and kinship systems.

Not that this is entirely bad. Nor, perhaps, is another difficulty, which is that the range of Southeast Asia forms of traditional political organization and economic adaptation is not easily ordered in terms of commonly used anthropological concepts such as 'band', 'tribe', 'chiefdom' (Service 1962) or 'egalitarian', 'ranked', 'stratified', and 'state-level' societies (Fried 1967). Most notably it is not always easy to determine which traditional Southeast Asian polities are to be considered 'states' and which are not or, alternatively, what this term should exactly mean as it has been sometimes used in regard to Southeast Asian cases. Among the sources of confusion is the fact that cultural notions relating to the state, such as terms for 'king', or 'ruler', or 'state' itself, were diffused much more readily and widely than were the social, economic, administrative, and military institutions of state organization. This difficulty can be grasped easily enough by perusing the three Human Relations Area Files ethnological gazeteers (Lebar et. al. 1964, 1972, 1975) on mainland and insular Southeast Asian ethnic groups and trying to relate the various terms used for political leadership and organization to appropriate conventional comparative notions; or by taking more detailed analyses of particular cases. Leach (1960: 61), for example, describes '...a typical Burma state', as follows:

It had from certain points of view a very real existence ... Yet in another sense it was a fiction. Its Shan inhabitants were widely scattered and by no means numerous. The Prince could only undertake effective political action

with the aid and consent of the Hill 'subjects' who were not subjects at all. His claims regarding suzerainty were optimistic in the extreme...I believe that the Indian style states of 'Burma' history have been of this general type.

Indeed other accounts suggest that such a general type of political organization was widespread throughout much of both mainland and insular Southeast Asia, as the following remarks on the Balinese 'state' indicate:

When the Dutch entered Bali early in this century, the complex indigenous political system that they found was basically not territorial in nature. The many small competing kingdoms were dependent for their strength on personal ties between lords and their commoner subjects irrespective of their landholdings or place of residence. Nor were their boundary regions between kingdoms clearly defined. Usually they consisted of intermediate areas where villages or even subjects were scattered in among each other, living side by side. (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 23)

Moreover, both the Burmese and the Balinese sorts of state, as well as the larger, more populous, and more fully territoriallyorganized polities of Southeast Asia (such as Siam) have tended to appear to their analysts to require special conceptual notions which define or highlight what are presumed to be their most important characteristics, and which thus distinguish them from other more 'ordinary' types of state. Leach (1960: 56-59) thus labels the states of Burma 'charismatic kingships' and Geertz (1973: 223, 331-337) refers to the Balinese and other earlier Indic polities of Java as 'theater states' in order to draw attention to the difference between their grandiose claims and their limited institutional reality, and to their essentially ceremonial-expressive nature. Finally, Tambiah (1976: 69) has recently proposed the term 'galactic polity' as a label for both the traditional Thai state and for the other Southeast Asia polities of diverse size and cultural type which are organized, he feels, in accord with both certain ecological and certain primordial cosmic notions. The comparative scholar looking at the recent anthropological literature on Southeast Asian states is apt to feel at once stimulated and perplexed by both the cultural and conceptual complexity which are to be encountered, perhaps unable to get a reasonable grasp on the material at all.

A further difficulty is in the nature of the existing sources of

information and the disciplinary perspectives which are associated with them. In some regions of the world archeology has not only been a major source of information on earlier states but, as well, archeologists have taken a lead in the study of their emergence. As Wheatley (1975: 230) has noted this has not been the case in Southeast Asia where, until recently (cf. Hutterer 1977) archeology has mainly been oriented to the recovery of antiquities rather than to the gathering of systematic information about such phenomena as trade and settlement patterns, or other relevant social and economic bases of political organization. Nor has epigraphy, which has been another of the main sources of knowledge about earlier Southeast Asian civilizations, been able to provide much information about these matters, or an always reliable view of the size and integration of earlier Southeast Asian states (Wheatley 1975: 229).

Information on traditional state organization in later periods of the sort which is available in the writings of travelers, military officers, and colonial officials in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is much fuller than that available in the early sources. The picture which tends to emerge from such writings is often one of bloody-minded, tyrannical but ineffectual kings, bandit princes, pirate nobles, endemic warfare, political chaos, and oppression. Such writings have been important for anthropologists who have written about Southeast Asian states with reference to these periods. Gullick (1958) bases his analysis of the nineteenth-century Malay state largely, if judiciously, on these types of accounts, as evidently does Leach (1960: 58) when he speaks of this period; Leach in fact appears to accept such sources without hesitation or qualification:

First hand observers of the Thai and the Burmese monarchs during the 19th Century were all unanimous in emphasizing the complete absolutism of the monarch's authority, and the arbitrariness of the resulting administration.

However detailed, such sources are suspect on several grounds, but in particular it should be noted that they often (as in the Burmese and the Malay cases) had reference to political systems which were in the process of breaking down, or under pressure, as a consequence—ironically—of European colonial expansion and domination. They also, it should be kept in mind, tended to

justify European advancement in the region as a process of liberation and a matter of progress.

A final important source of information, particularly for the anthropologist, is fieldwork involving such activities as the observation of political ceremonies and the use of informants who have knowledge of the precolonial regime. Here Goody's (1967: 179) remarks about such perspectives are worth noting:

...when a state succumbs to conquest by a colonizing power the governmental system immediately undergoes a series of rapid and far reaching changes, in function if not in form. So that fieldwork in a post conquest state, carried out along strictly synchronic functionalist lines will give a picture of a kingdom very different from earlier times.

Modern analysts are not unaware of the inadequacies of these various sources of information on traditional states and can with some reason presume that they are apt to be to some extent complimentary—that their varying biases may cancel one another out. In any event, without their use there can be no study of the traditional Southeast Asian state. Yet there is little basis for assuming that our knowledge of these states of later, any more than earlier, periods will be full or perfect or, in particular, unbiased.

3. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES AND INDICIZATION

Perhaps above all because of the nature of the sources of information available for earlier periods, the study of Southeast Asian states—and of related cultural or historical phenomena—has been preoccupied with Indicization. Earlier historians commonly took the view that the initial formation of states in the region involved either large-scale or selective colonization—rather than selective acculturative influence and economic stimulation—leading outside observers to view the classic Southeast Asian civilizations as a simple and direct derivative from India. The energies of more recent historians have gone to modify such views but the results of their efforts do not appear to have completely altered the views of non-Southeast Asianists (cf. Meggers's 1972 observations).

Both historians and anthropologists presume on the basis of

unquestionable (and often spectacular) evidence, that some type and degree of 'Indianization' occurred in large areas of Southeast Asia, that the classic and derivative states of these zones were in some important ways 'Indic' in nature. However the comparative student of the state may wonder, as may Southeast Asianists themselves, just what this explains—the possibilities ranging from a great deal to very little.

The historical literature on Indicization, the issues involved and the differing views which have been advanced, has been discussed by several writers (Wheatley 1975; and especially Mabbet 1977a, b). Contrary to what Leach suggests, the matter of Indian influence in Southeast Asia—one of the more interesting and significant instances of acculturation in world history—does remain something of a mystery, particularly in regard to the 'how' and 'why' as opposed to the 'what' of the development. There are a number of plausible formulations which seek to answer such questions but little direct evidence in support of them.

Perhaps the most important question that may be raised regarding Indianization is that of whether Southeast Asian states could be better understood without reference to such processes or to their 'Indic' characteristics. Since the process evidently involved neither military conquest nor large-scale, if any, colonization, then it may be assumed that Southeast Asians were subject to Indic influences because these (rather than Chinese) fitted into their own cultural and political systems, however these may also have been affected by them. It would be idle speculation to pursue the question of whether, or when, states would have formed in Southeast Asia without acculturative influence or economic stimulation from India or elsewhere, as it would be to pose the question of what these states might have been like in the absence of such influence. However it can be noted that such characteristics as 'unstable charismatic despotism' occur in non-Indic contexts (e.g., see Evans-Pritchard's 1965 account of central African Azande kingship and polity). Here Leach's (1961) advice about 'rethinking' kinship and marriage in structural as opposed to cultural-particular terms can be applied to the study of Southeast Asian states.

4. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The problems which attend the Indic or Indianization perspectives are somewhat like those which Goody has attributed to the use of notions of feudalism and derivative concepts in regard to African states (Goody 1971: 1-20). He suggests, as have others concerning other non-Western contexts, that while it is quite possible to find feudal features in African political organization, this depends upon how the term 'feudal' is meant, and that different people tend to mean different things by it; so that the result is more often vagueness and obscurity than explanatory clarity. He does not reject comparative approaches to feudalism. At the same time he does suggest that

there are more precise reasons why the overall comparison with medieval Europe seems inappropriate and this has initially less to do with government and politics than with economics and technology. In my opinion, most writers about African social systems, particularly when they are dealing with class and government, have failed to appreciate certain basic differences between the economies of Black Africa and the European continent, and this failure has led to superficial comparisons not only in relation to feudality, but also in relationship to land tenure, property, inheritance, marriage, descent groups, and other important spheres of social action.

These points may have some applicability to the study of the Southeast Asian state. The considerable body of information which has been published concerning Indicization and Indic states in Southeast Asia contains little if any systematic comparison between such states and those of India. The evident fact that states in most of Southeast Asia developed more along the lines of those in India than China does not mean that they were identical or even much like the former. Where scholars have looked beyond the flow of cultural influence relating Hinduism and Buddhism to the formation of institutional arrangements such as caste, they have found differences rather than similarities. This raises the question of whether the kind of technological, economic, and related social bases which Goody suggests underlie the differences in the political development of sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia may also help to explain the Southeast Asian case-as it is presently understood.

Goody argues that the differences between Africa and Europe

involve two basic sets of factors. The first is the productive economic order, the 'means of production'. African modes of subsistence were, and are, he suggests, marked by several important features which set them apart from those of Europe and much of the rest of the Old World. These included poor soils in many areas, the absence of the plough which failed to penetrate south of the Sahara, continued reliance on shifting cultivation and longfallow crop regimes, and light population densities. conditions, in turn, were not conducive to the emergence or perpetuation of true feudal arrangements or large, well integrated states, for a number of reasons—but in particular, he feels, because the necessary base of wealth and population was not present, and because subject populations, which were present, could move easily if and when they chose to do so. Further, land scarcity was hardly present so that control over land was of less importance than control over subjects; and since without the former, or without control over some other facet of production, the latter was also difficult to achieve or sustain.

The second set of factors constitute what Goody labels the 'means of destruction' and concern warfare and conquest and their technological and economic bases. The means of destruction in Africa is set off from that of Europe in terms of two sets of factors, the use of the horse and the technology of mounted combat, and the economic base necessary to sustain a military elite of calvary. Of these the first was present and very important in the savannah regions of West Africa but absent from much of the rest of the sub-Saharan realm; the second, the economic base capable of sustaining the sort of elite military apparatus that was a part of European feudalism, was generally absent even in areas where horses were in military use. The fact that throughout much of Africa horses were absent meant that one of the major forces of political development in the Old World was lacking. Technologically, the horse meant, in open terrain, military superiority over opponents without them, a greatly expanded range of activity, and rapid conquest and communication. In addition however, symbolically, the horse tended to set off horse-using ethnic groups or classes from nonusing ones-a role which cattle keeping also played in some regions as well.

Turning back to Southeast Asia it would be somewhat more difficult (which is not to say impossible) to show that the

differences between the development of the state in this region and in India or, especially, China are rooted in differences in the 'means of production' between these areas. Unlike sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia lacked neither the plough nor intensive crop regimes. Indeed here there were basic continuities with both China and India. It is true that shifting cultivation was practiced widely in most regions of Southeast Asia but in many areas at least this was not for want of more intensive forms of agriculture as suitable alternatives, but rather for the reasons which Boserup (1965) gives for the prevalence of less over more intensive forms where population pressure permitted. If scarcity is, as Goody suggests, a key to understanding the nature of development of the state in Africa, an analysis of the ecological bases of Southeast Asia would be apt to show that abundance was more the key for this region-or at least a complex combination of abundance, scarcity, and difficulty which discouraged the interrelated development of larger and more integrated forms of state organization and of larger and denser population bases.

Goody's analysis of the manner in which the 'means of destruction' affected the development of the state in Africa would appear to more directly be applicable to the Southeast Asia case.

It has been argued that warfare had important causal implications for political evolution (the encouragement of populations to concentrate in or around fortified settlements, the emergence of new modes of authority, etc.). It has also been noted that warfare and conquest have been linked to the development of patterns of social stratification which were of wide importance (if also of varying character) in Old World states, patterns which have been labeled 'ethnic stratification' or 'superstratification' (Eberhard 1965). In both of these respects the importance of conquest by mounted, frequently nomadic or seminomadic, steppe or plain dwellers as a factor in the development of states from the savannahs of Africa, through the Eurasian steppes and deserts to China, constitutes one of the older observations made by geographers and historians (the literature here is very large; cf. McNeill 1964 on Eastern Europe; Goody 1971 on Africa and Eberhard 1965 on China). In historical terms McNeill (1979: 33) has recently written that between 800 B.C. and about A.D. 1650 the frontiers between settled folk and mounted nomads

...constituted the critical borderlands across which all of the principal political-military events of some 2400 years of history took place. Indeed it is no exaggeration to assert that all of the rulers of the civilized world... descended (either directly or through the mediation of a number of generations of sedentarization) from steppe peoples. This means that the shaping conditions of steppe and desert life cast a long shadow over the civilized societies of the agricultural zones that lay adjacent to the grasslands.

It is thus perhaps notable that the civilized and agricultural lands of Southeast Asia were not a part of this zone of interaction; the impact of events within it were certainly felt in Southeast Asia, above all perhaps in the rhythm of long-distance trade (Wolters 1970: 39-48) but far more indirectly than was the case in either China or India which were subject to direct conquest and domination. Further, it appears that long-distance warfare was waged as effectively by one Southeast Asian group on another as was the case in much of the rest of Asia. Nor did the relationship between tribally-organized mountain-dwelling peoples and lowland- or coastal-dwelling ones replicate the general characteristic of much of the Old World. Although in Southeast Asia this relationship was generally also hostile and unstable it was one which was characterized more by a standoff than by periodic conquest and domination of one over the other; both types raided one another but both types were also sufficiently strong in their own environment-or weak in that of the other-so as to make decisive expansion in either direction difficult. Nor, finally, were there economic pressures in the interaction between tribesman and peasant which were as crucial as those which were found in the case of the meat, milk, and horse producing pastoralists and grain producing agriculturalists of the steppe and farmland zones of Asia; exchange in Southeast Asia-though always and everywhere very important was mainly, (though not exclusively) in luxury products rather than in caloric or technological necessities. The consequence of all of this is that, as Leach (1960) notes for Burma, in few other areas of the world has a pattern of tribally organized peoples existing in such close proximity with state-level ones remained so developed into the recent past as has been the case in Southeast Asia.

The comparatively limited nature and extent of conquest and agonistic expansion in Southeast Asia can be attributed in part to environmental factors—the difficulties posed by frequent rivers,

heavy rainfall, dense forests, rugged mountains, and perhaps steep disease gradients—but more reasonably to such environmental factors, plus existing sources and modes of military energy and technology. In particular, conditions generally did not favor the use of the horse as a basis of warfare. Though long present and in military use in some regions, the horse did not have the potential it did elsewhere in drier and more open terrain.

Technoenvironmental impediments to long range conquest and agonistic expansion may also underlie some of the characteristic organizational and spatial limits of Southeast Asian states, as well as certain features of Southeast Asian patterns of social stratification, most importantly but not only, the relative insignificance of the ethnic or of superstratification; there was no important mounted warrior class to achieve a position of superordinate dominance over other segments of society. Fairly rapid and often mutual acculturation and assimilation following conquest seem to have been the general rule. However, it needs to be noted also that the absence of strong tendencies toward superstratification appear to have had a functional relationship with other exigencies of the political economy of the Southeast Asian state; the general availability of land and the underpopulation of much of the region meant that the loyalty of subject populations, the acquisition of which was apparently a significant outcome (and perhaps a motive) of state-level warfare, would have been a significant consideration for rulers; and such loyalty would not have been furthered by assigning them to positions of ethnic inferiority.

In the latter sections of this paper I have noted or discussed in regard to Southeast Asia the role of several ecological and technological factors which Goody argues underlie the nature of the development of the African state. Aside from the fact that one set of factors—'the means of production'—cannot be as simply treated in regard to Southeast Asia as Goody feels it can in Africa, I would argue that there are other factors which need to be taken into consideration as well. Some scholars (e.g., Boserup 1965) would probably hold that population levels should be given more emphasis as a crucial variable. And I have elsewhere suggested that the contrasts between the forms of domestic and local social organization characteristic of Southeast Asia and those of other areas of Asia are a significant consideration for an understanding of the development of the state (Winzeler 1976). Along both

these lines Madge (1974) has sought to interpret the differential development of India, China, and Southeast Asia in terms of the interrelationship of demographic patterns, kinship and family, and the state. Finally, proponents of hypotheses concerning the role of irrigations systems in the evolution of the state could find Southeast Asian cases to be of interest as negative instances which could lend support to their arguments. A discussion of any of these considerations has been beyond the scope of this paper. However the general type of factors which Goody stresses as basic to understanding the development of the state in Africa are ones which also deserve more attention than they have received in regard to Southeast Asia-in part because they lead away from a concern with Indianization as an explanation of political evolution in the region and from the historical and cultural particularism which has tended to have a strong appeal to Southeast Asianist scholars.

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25 Ubi sumus? The Study of the State Conference in Retrospect

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When organizing the New Delhi conference on The Study of the State we had in mind a kind of stocktaking of recent views and theories on such topics as (1) state formation, (2) state structures, and (3) the nature of the state. And now, trying to summarize and evaluate the data presented during the conference and in the papers brought together, we must conclude that on the one hand, the stocktaking was of necessity rather incomplete; but that on the other hand quite a number of new views were presented.

We, therefore, will give in this chapter first an overall view of the ideas put forward in this volume as far as they are directly connected to a number of central theoretical problems, and secondly, add data that seem to have been overlooked. In this way we hope to be able to indicate the progress that has been made in this field of study in recent years, and also draw attention to a number of problems yet unsolved, or only partially explained.

It hardly needs emphasizing that not all the data presented in this book will be discussed here. It is of necessity a selection which is, as all selections, rather arbitrary.

1. FORMATION OF THE STATE

As several of the papers concentrate on the problem of the origin of the state (state formation, emergence of the state), and many others contain data or statements related to this subject, it seems fitting to start there.

Gunawardana discusses the evolution of the state in Sri Lanka. In the course of his analysis he demonstrates clearly that ecological factors played an important role in creating social inequality: the quality of the land and the availability of irrigation water quite naturally favored some village communities more than others. This in the long run created not only social inequality, but also social stratification in the sense of Fried (1967: 186): a society in which not all members of the same sex and equivalent age status have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life; in this case irrigation facilities. However, this situation is not in itself a state. The mechanisms of domination were not well developed, and a constant competition for status took place. Through matrimonial ties the leading families created a close-knit network of political relations, and thus formed an inner circle to which outsiders had but limited access. To this development Gunawardana adds the factor war as an important means of enlarging influence. He then points to the role of religion in contributing to growing unification and to the role of longdistance trade.

In his view, however, the development of private property — the possession of irrigation facilities — must be considered the critical factor. State formation was primarily a response to the needs of a society in which the process of the separation of the producers from one or more elements essential for production had led to the growth of what he terms 'exploitative relationships'. In this context technological innovations played a noteworthy role: the use of the sluice mechanism enabled the owners to regulate strictly the issue of water and thereby promoted the accumulation of the agricultural surplus in their hands.

Thus, we have here a number of factors which seem to contribute to the development of the state in Sri Lanka: ecological differentiation, matrimonial links, war, ideology, long-distance trade, and technological innovations leading to exploitative relationships. It is interesting to analyze other societies to find out whether these factors furthered the development of the state there, too, and can thus be considered of general importance.

1.1. Ecology

Khazanov also takes as departing point the ecological situation, which resulted in a rather one-sided economy for Eurasian nomads compared with the much more diversified economy of the sedentary agriculturalists. He goes on to describe the turbulent history of state formation in the Eurasian steppes: the nomads, in constant need of the products of the agriculturalists, had to develop means of securing a stable flow of these goods. Depending on the local situation, they either subdued the agriculturalists or had to submit to them. In a number of cases the relatively strong position of the sedentary peoples forced the nomads to organize in greater units in order to compete with their antagonists. In this way the germs of future early states developed in several places (cf. Cohen 1978a: 155 on a comparable situation in northeast Nigeria). Seneviratne and Perlin, both writing about developments in India, though in different periods and in different areas, also allude to regional differences stimulating contacts or conquests.

To be sure, none of the above-mentioned scholars makes the ecological situation a kind of prime mover, or decisive cause of state formation. They regard this situation as the broad background, the arena in which state formation took place. It is clear, however, that ecological differentiation can greatly promote social inequality. We agree on this with the ideas of for instance Fried (1967), Carneiro (1970) Kottak (1972), and Service (1975). Other scholars, too, make use of ecological differences in explaining situations of sociopolitical inequality: Kohl (1978), for example, explains at length how differences in resources led to contacts, trade, and domination in early Mesopotamia (cf. Tosi 1976), and Miller (1976: 70, 76) points to the control of salt pans and trade routes as sources of power for the Mbundu rulers of western Angola (cf. Sellnow, above). However, we must keep in mind that ecological differences are by no means the only road to social inequality. Moreover, quite a gulf separates the emergence of social inequality from the development of the state as Bonte clearly demonstrates (see also Fried 1967; Ruyle 1973).

1.2. Kinship and Marriage

The same argument holds for the matrimonial alliances, or linkages, mentioned by Gunawardana. The influence of matrimonial alliances on the development of political systems has been under discussion since Levi-Strauss's analyses (1949). volume, Perlin and Seneviratne point to deliberate activities in this respect in India, and Bäck demonstrates how in Rwanda the political Tutsi kept their group more or less endogamous - a view which corresponds rather well with Steinhart's analysis of the Bunyoro or Bonte's of the Tuareg (both above). It seems that the general pattern of these alliances is the development of an endogamous situation: marriage partners are chosen within a rather narrow circle of prominent families and the opportunities for outsiders to enter this chain of relationships are rather limited (cf. also Terray 1977: 287 ff.; Cohen 1976; and Kuper 1978). That specific matrimonial structures, as for instance the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, play an important role in the development of hierarchization - among other ways by creating endogamous structures - was already demonstrated by Leach (1954) and Friedman (1975) for the Kachin in Burma (cf. Claessen and Kloos 1978); kinship systems such as the ramage or the conical clan also easily led to social inequality (Sahlins, 1968: Claessen 1978a: 442 ff.). Interesting in this respect is the analysis by Miller of the political system of the Mbundu. Here the problem is that the segmentary lineage system apparently prevents the emergence of a more permanent hierarchical formation. Neither the introduction of new religious symbols (the lunga, 1976: 59 ff.: the ngola 1976: 63 ff.), nor the adoption of a new type of social organization (the kilombo, 1976: 161 ff.) was sufficient to break the strong, traditional lineage structure (cf. ibid.: 225 ff.). Bonte, however, found that segmentary lineages were not incompatible with the development of hierarchical institutions (also Salzman 1978a, b; Khazanov, above). The same can be said for the Mamprusi, as described by Drucker-Brown (this volume). Winzeler (1976) points to the fact that in Southeast Asia a general absence of unilineal kin groups may have hindered the emergence of state systems. This may be true, but a recent analysis by Kemp (1978) of nineteenth-century Siam makes clear that in a cognatic type of descent, an endogamous structure could develop: many descendants of the large royal family were excluded on purpose from the higher ranks of the elite — a process that strongly resembles the fate that befell younger sons of younger sons of the European nobility during the Middle Ages (cf. Bloch 1967; Gurevich 1978). We must be aware, however, that Kemp deals with only one of a number of aspects of the matter of bilaterality and the state, and with one case only (also Sugita, this volume).

It seems possible, however, in view of the above data, to consider the emergence of some form of endogamy as an important means of hierarchization. But this development is hardly a direct cause of state formation. Together with the ecological differences mentioned earlier, it belongs to the more general mechanisms operating in the formation of hierarchical political systems.

1.3. War

War was mentioned as another factor. For several contributors to this volume war is the most important single factor in the emergence of the state. Especially Lewis and Tymowski concentrate upon this aspect.

Lewis argues that, while many different combinations of factors may create the preconditions for state formation, the actual establishment of states depends upon coercion, force or the threat of it. Normally, it is only by such means that some men become rulers over others to the extent that they create states which endure for generations. Of course not all wars led to state formation, but normally states arise in connection with military actions, wars won and lost, and the application or threat of force by a superior group. Lewis adds to these observations that military organizations play a role in the development of political differentiation and power differentials, and that this gives an added importance to the development of states.

In his chapter Lewis also discusses at length Carneiro's circumscription theory (Carneiro 1970). This theory, in his opinion, is of key importance in explaining the emergence of the state. According to Lewis, however, Carneiro weakened his case, in limiting his theory by making population pressure the main factor. One does not need the idea of population pressure to explain why warfare increases. Significant political or economic con-

sequences may have the same influence.

Lewis's arguments are convincing, especially in view of the innumerable cases where war played a decisive role. We doubt, however, whether the factor war is the cause that leads to state formation. It tells us how a state arises, not why. Moreover, war is not a sufficient condition. To quote Carneiro (1970: 734): 'Yet, though warfare is surely a prime mover in the origin of the state, it cannot be the only factor. After all, wars have been fought in many parts of the world where the state never emerged'. We should rather look for the causes behind war. In this respect we refer to our conclusion in The Early State (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 626), where we stated that 'state formation is not caused by war, but is greatly promoted by war or the threat of war, and by social stress' (cf. also Cohen's arguments, 1978b: 45-49). Moreover, not every state came into being as the direct consequence of war. For instance, the development of the early state in Japan, as described above by Sugita, seems not to be connected directly with war, and the same holds for several of the Mbundu states discussed by Miller (1976: 68 ff., 74 ff., 126 ff.). The complexity of the phenomenon under discussion also appears in Tymowski's careful analysis of two cases of state formation in nineteenth-century Africa. He first points to the fact that several favorable conditions for the emergence of the state were present there, namely the production of a surplus, and the knowledge of existing state systems elsewhere (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978: 627, 629; Service 1975). These conditions were apparently not sufficient, and as long as other more favorable conditions did not develop, the state did not emerge.

As factors activating state formation, Tymowski considers the general unrest at the end of the eighteenth-century, the growth of population (especially since the termination of the slave trade), and the growth of commercial activities, which required safe trade routes. Under these conditions several local chiefs tried to enlarge their influence by modifying the existent sociopolitical structure. Those who succeeded in building a 'power machine', in the form of an armed following, had the best chance of controlling the flow of people and wealth — but also of establishing a state. Here Tymowski comes very near Lewis's views. The latter also stresses the role of the action of an individual, who decisively influenced the rise of the state organization. In fact several other contributors

to this volume emphasize the prominence of the outstanding individual in the development of the state. Gunawardana points to prince Dutthogamani, Khazanov mentions Gengis Khan and Seneviratne names several leaders who significantly affected the course of history. It would not be realistic to deny the influence of actors in social change (Claessen 1979: 190; Boehm 1978; Miller 1976: 276), but once we try to abstract from the events, and look for structures and processes (Bertels 1973), then the role of the individual seems to be of relatively less importance (see Perlin, this volume, on 'unpersonal forces'). Khazanov, in this respect, very aptly remarks that it was Gengis Khan, indeed, who created the Mongol state, but since the time was ripe, any other competent man could have done it as well. Whenever circumstances permit, alert or ingenious people will group opportunities. Some individuals see these chances in an earlier stage than others. They later become famous as culture heroes or founding fathers – though in fact 'they only made explicit certain already existing trends' (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 621; also Terray 1977: 299; Tymowski, above).

Thus war has played an important part in the emergence of the state, without being a sufficient or necessary condition (cf. Cohen 1978b: 45; Claessen and Skalník 1978: 626; Winzeler, this volume).

1.4. Ideology

Another factor mentioned by Gunawardana was the influence of ideology — in this case religion, which was used in Sri Lanka to bind people together. It seems possible to broaden this term, and use 'ideology' to cover law and legitimation, or the dominant principles in kinship and marriage (cf. Godelier 1978a, b; Claessen 1978b: 566). From this point of view several of the contributors to this volume made ideological aspects the central focus of their paper. Kurtz discusses at length the problem of legitimation of the early state in three cases: the Aztecs, the Incas, and Buganda. He shows within the context of political economy how in the course of time an emerging state organization has to convince its citizens of its legitimacy. This process seems to follow general lines, in which the establishment of patterns of social distance,

authority validation, consolidation of power, and socialization are effected by the state political sphere in order to establish a state economy, the basis for state survival. Cohen points to the development of institutions to prevent fission. Tamayo discusses the legal aspects of the state in a more general way, and concludes that the state is 'nothing other than a complex of legal acts, a set of legal rules, sufficiently centralized and having the monopoly of the use of force'. In his view the central problem in the emergence of the state, therefore, is how legal rules come into being — and how they become accepted.

Since several papers in this volume concentrated on the 'sacral kingship complex' in Africa, it seems appropriate to discuss this feature here at some length. To start with, it must be stressed that Africa is by no means the only area where sacral rulers are found. Claessen established that the sacral status of the ruler is a structural characteristic of the early state (1978b: 557). It seems, however, that there are reasons to consider the African variety a specific type. This at least is one of the conclusions of Claessen's chapter, in which he tries to formulate the specific features of the sub-Saharan African early states. By far the majority of these features are directly connected with the position of the ruler: a direct relationship between his health and the well-being of the country; a ritual killing of the ruler when his virility diminishes; the existence of a royal 'double'; the institution of a coruling royal mother, etc.

Some of these characteristics resemble findings in early states elsewhere. For instance, the possibility of a ritual killing is mentioned for the old Anglo-Saxon kings. It appears, however, that here ritual king slaying was 'a means of meeting tribal calamities when the "luck" of the king and folk had deserted them; to restore the favour of Woden-Othin the king whose responsibility that favour was, was offered to him' (Chanley 1970: 115). The ruler here is killed to appease the wrath of the gods. But in the African cases, the killing of the ruler (whether real or not) seems not to be associated with the appeasement of the gods or the restoration of luck. Rather it is associated with the idea that a decline in his virility necessarily has a bad effect upon the fertility and well-being of the country.

One should be cautious, moreover, in selecting only one of the features of such a complex to compare with those found elsewhere.

The phenomena in question are not easily separable from the intricate whole of which they are a part. The ritual killing of the ruler in Africa is a part of an underlying pattern which connects the various features to a meaningful whole. This underlying pattern is analyzed in more detail in this volume by Muller and Abélès, as well as by Cohen on the Gulani and Shani.

Abélès points out the curious paradox that on the one hand, the ruler is a highly sacral person who guarantees the natural order, but on the other he must be killed for the slightest sexual, intellectual, or physical weakness. The ruler is both part of, and above society. He is controlled by society, but also controls it. This situation, according to Abélès, poses problems that are nearly insolvable. Only the death of the ruler offers way out. Then, in his view, the omnipotence of the ruler returns to society, where it is almost immediately reinvested in a new ruler, to recreate (or restore) the cosmic order. It might, perhaps, be better to state that for one eventful moment monarchical power only exists, as potentiality. There are no rules, no order, no law, because the fleshly embodiment of the body politic does not exist in fact, i.e., there is an interregnum.

Abélès sees the paradox of the sacral ruler in Africa in terms of power — a power society hands over to the ruler, for which they hate and kill him. His analysis produces a psychological justification for the killing of the king which seems correct, though the factual base of the analysis is rather narrow for the broad conclusions drawn.

Muller also notes the ambivalence towards the sacral ruler. He connects this with the idea of a 'royal scapegoat' as developed by Laura Makarius (1970) and Girard (1972) (both cited by Abélès, too). By transgressing a number of social rules (taboos), varying from incest to cannibalism, and from eating forbidden foods to committing heinous crimes, the ruler not only places himself above society, but also endangers it. The ruler is good and bad at the same time. He must be punished, but his beneficial aspect must be preserved. To resolve this problem, the ruler or one or more substitutes are sacrificed.

These kinds of ambivalent feelings toward the ruler are described above by Drucker-Brown for the Mamprusi. There, hostility is a part of the ritual reception in which the new ruler is greeted as a stranger and threatened. The ambivalence also appears in the

idea that a vacant office is dangerous and has to be filled within a year.

In his analysis of the position of the ruler in the 'sacral kingship complex', Muller pays much attention to the 'divine chiefs', as he calls the leaders of small chiefdoms who possess the same sacral characteristics as the rulers of the early states. Here the chief is a scapegoat representing the good and evil that affect society. Muller therefore assumes that the 'divine complex' is older than the state, and that the state might be a more developed chiefdom. This view may provide an explanation for Abélès's problem that some polities are difficult to characterize as states, because they had not developed a class structure. It appears, however, from his analysis that the very institution of the sacral ruler effectively prevents the development of social classes. In connection with this, one may ask whether a class structure is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of the state (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978: 20, 545 ff., 642 ff.; Skalník 1978a: 605).

The findings of Muller seem to corroborate the idea that the sacral rulers in Africa are exponents of a widespread underlying ideological pattern. This contradicts Lemarchand's idea that the African monarchs 'saw the need to maintain or develop "political myths" with which to stabilize and legitimize the incipient distributive patterns set through their entrepreneurial skills' (1977: 12). The ideology seems older than the monarchies.

It is doubtful, however, whether this pattern should be considered the *only* one on which African political systems south of the Sahara are based. This may very well be the reason why Lucy Mair (1977: 39 ff.) limits herself to an inventory of rituals of kingship, without trying to formulate more general patterns. Miller (1976), for instance, describes at length a totally different cultural pattern underlying the Mbundu states in western Angola. In his opinion the problem in these lineage-based societies was not to develop cross-cutting structures, but to make these permanent (1976: 225). The many efforts to replace the segmentary lineage structure all failed in the end, and all political entities which arose collapsed in a short time (ibid.: 251 ff.). Miller associates these failures with the strong matrilineal organization of the Mbundu, and expects comparable problems in other matrilineal societies in Africa (ibid.: 265). However, according to Claessen's

analysis (above) the matrilineal Kuba and Tio fitted rather well in the 'sacral kingship complex' (see Vansina 1973, 1978).

In this respect, mention must be made of the fact that the area of the 'sacral kingship complex' and the area reached by the so-called Bantu expansion are more or less the same (Kuper and Van Leynseele 1978). A connection between the two phenomena, therefore, seems possible.

Summarizing, we can say that the African 'sacral kingship complex' is a specific expression of an underlying ideological pattern, which is not limited to states only.

Though in a less detailed manner, Bonte also points above to the importance of religious forms for political activities and Drucker-Brown describes how in the Mamprusi state in today's northern Ghana the religious concept of *naam* provides the legitimation for the ruler as well as for the chiefs. Muller (this volume) concludes that the ideological institution of divine kingship modeled the economy rather than the contrary.

Even a superficial comparison of the data mentioned gives the impression that in most cases the ideological structure of the early state is closely related to the ideology of the prestate Ideological concepts came to be used to defend the growing social inequality and exploitation, the wars and conquests, and the emerging social structures. Old ideas became-often in a more or less adapted form-mighty tools in the hands of the new leaders, striving for more power and influence (Miller 1976: 52, 61 ff.). However, in some cases it could be demonstrated that the prestate ideology was not a favorable base for the development of stable states. Especially the work of Miller in Angola brought this to the fore (for a comparable role of ideology in the political developments in traditional Polynesia see Hanson 1973). The conclusion can be drawn that a readily adaptable ideological background, be it religious, juridical or kinship, is a necessary condition for the emergence of the state. This formulation gives more weight to the ideological background factor than was the case in The Early State (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 628), where ideology was seen as more passive and only of secondary influence. Yet, there too the necessity of the ideological background was mentioned. Among Marxist anthropologists the interest in the role of ideology has grown enormously in recent years. Muller, Abélès, and notably Godelier (1977, 1978b) are good representatives of this new orientation.

The discussion of ideology must not blind us to the fact that not everybody in the polity always agreed with the dominant ideology (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 19, 566). Counterideologies developed, which either existed side by side with the 'official' ideology or replaced it — gradually or by force. The Dutch sociologist-historian Wertheim (1971) even makes the development of counterideologies the key force in the process of evolution (cf. Claessen 1978c and Godelier 1979). Ideological differences and tensions, therefore, must be considered as important forces in the historical process, as Perlin in his chapter convincingly demonstrates.

1.5. Trade

We now will return to the factors mentioned by Tymowski as promoting the emergence of the state: general unrest, growth of population, and growth of trade. Of these factors, the first two are rather general. It can be said, in fact, that in each evolutionary development these kinds of phenomena will play a role. Their influence is not limited to the development of the state only. This is not to say that in specific cases the role of these factors cannot be pointed out very clearly (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978: 625 ff.; Schapera 1956: 5 ff., 219 ff.). It is only to stress that these types of factors are too broad to be specific for the emergence of the state. Along with ecology, endogamy, and war they belong to a category of general conditions for evolution, whose influence can also be noticed in the formation of the state (cf. Cohen 1978b).

Trade, however, belongs to a different category. Several contributors mention trading activities with respect to the emergence, or further development of the state. Gunawardana demonstrated in his chapter on Sri Lanka, that long-distance trade played a role in an early phase of state formation. In the course of time this importance grew, and rulers tried to participate in trade. Long-distance trade does not appear to have been a royal monopoly since the ruler exacted customs duties at the ports. It is also apparent that long-distance trade brought about the extension of the administrative apparatus.

Bonte, in his analysis of the Kel Gress Tuaregs, describes at length the activities of the aristocratic *imajeghen* in the salt trade. This he considers to have been a major factor in the development of hierarchization, contributing to the polarization between the *imajeghen* and the agricultural *ighawelen*, which characterizes this society. Also, in the Moorish Adrar emirate, according to Bonte, the role of trade and commerce was essential for the establishment of a dominant group.

Khazanov discusses the exchange of goods between nomads and agriculturalists, which-at least in a number of cases - led to complex trading activities. In its more developed form, however, long-distance caravan trade was a consequence, rather than a precondition of state formation (Khazanov, personal communica-Narain points out the role of trading activities in the establishment of the Kushana state. In this example the remains of many cities and the existence of coins are testimony to a prosperous state and a money economy, while the chronicles of the Chinese voyager Chang Ch'ien contain many data on its markets and traders. This trade was not only local or regional, its importance lay especially in its many foreign contacts. Longdistance trade stood at the very center of the Kushana economy. It is not clear from Narain's data, however, whether trade must be considered as a decisive factor in the emergence of the Kushana Sellnow, following Suret-Canale, mentions long-distance trade as an important factor in the process of state formation in Africa. She uses the examples of Axum and Ghana, where this factor can easily be demonstrated, while trade and commerce also played a central role in the Yoruba and Hausa city-states. Though Seneviratne, like Perlin actually discusses secondary state formations, he, too, repeatedly points to the formative influence of trade and markets on the development of the state. Sugita, describing the Japanese development refers to the control the leaders of the Yamato state exercised over exchange relations with the continent, while on the local level the aristocracy monopolized iron and other valuable goods (cf. Miller 1976: 70, 76 on salt pans and trade routes). Another good example of the role of trade in promoting the development of the state is given by Kohl, when describing the complex trading relationships in ancient Mesopotamia (1978).

In spite of these data, we cannot conclude that trade has played

a role in the development of all early states. Neither Bäck nor Steinhart nor Sellnow refer to this factor as having been of decisive influence in the development of the interlacustrine states in East Africa. Trade more likely developed there as a consequence Elsewhere, Claessen (1978a) and Skalník of state formation. (1978b) describe the emergence of the early state in Tahiti and the Voltaic Basin, respectively, without finding trade or commerce playing a role in it. Moreover, we must keep in mind that there are societies which did not reach the state level at all, but where long-distance trade was a characteristic of their culture, as is the case with the Trobriand islanders (Young 1979: 163 ff.; Harris 1968: 526 ff.). Therefore, it is not possible to formulate a general rule in this respect. We can only say that in a number of cases commerce and long-distance trade played a formative role in the emergence of the state (cf. Claessen 1978b: 541-544; Cohen 1978b: 44).

1.6. Technological Innovations

Gunawardana pays a great deal of attention to the development of irrigation techniques in the emergence of the state. He demonstrates how access to irrigation water led very early in the history of Sri Lanka to the existence of more and less 'privileged' villages. The more the irrigation systems developed, the more too did the inequality between the villages. After the emergence of the (inchoate) early state this development continued. The ruler of Anurādhapura promoted the building of temples and irrigation works. Especially when the cistern sluice came into use the size of the irrigation works grew considerably. 'Rulers donated some of these irrigation works to monasteries, and it is possible to detect here the beginning of a trend leading to the alienation of the village communities from a strategic resource basis to their agricultural production'.

In a later phase of state formation a new social group emerged: the owners of irrigation reservoirs — which means the development of private property in the means of production. This development seems to confirm the finding of *The Early State* that private property only arose after the beginning of the early state. In the inchoate period there are no traces of private owners. They only

appear after a long period of development. By then, however, the inchoate early state no longer exists. It is replaced by the typical type, and features of the transitional type are already visible. Indeed, the mature state is close at hand (cf. Claessen 1978b: 589 ff.).

Winzeler compares the development of the state in Southeast Asia with state development in Africa, basing himself for the latter on Goody's analysis of the underlying sets of factors: the means of production and the means of destruction (Goody 1971).

The African means of production, according to Goody, included poor soils, the absence of the plough, reliance on shifting cultivation, and light population densities. Because of this, the necessary base of wealth and population density for large, well-integrated states was not present. Further, land was not scarce so that its control was of less importance than control over people.

The means of destruction concern warfare and conquest. In Africa two sets of factors were different from those in other areas of the Old World: the use of the horse and the technology of mounted combat, as well as the absence of an elite military apparatus.

For Southeast Asia Winzeler points out the fact that this area lacked neither the plough nor intensive crop regimes. Not scarcity, as in Africa, but abundance is more the key for the region, or rather a complex combination of abundance, scarcity, and difficulties seems to have discouraged the development of larger and more integrated forms of state organization.

In Winzeler's opinion the means of destruction aspects would be more applicable to Southeast Asia. This region remained outside the zone of interaction between pastoral nomads and agricultural peoples, which in Asia and Europe so often seems connected with the emergence of social stratification and the state (cf. Khazanov, this volume). The relations between the mountain-dwelling peoples and the lowland or coastal ones, though hostile and unstable, only seldom led to conquest or domination of one over the other. Technoenvironmental impediments to long range conquests and expansion (limited role of the horse, difficult geographical conditions), as well as certain features of the social organization, seem to be the main factors explaining the retarded formation of the state in Southeast Asia. In view of these observations, we wonder whether the developments in Sri Lanka

should be considered as an exception, or that possibly more or different factors were operative there.

To this analysis we would like to add a further comment that, though Goody's views are certainly of great importance, the fact must not be overlooked that Africa experienced a number of well-organized and stable states (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978 for a number of descriptions of African states; cf. also Claessen 1979: 184 ff. on the stability of African states). It seems, however, that Goody had in mind a comparison of some of the more developed European states with African cases. The factors he mentions may very well be sufficient to explain the differences in the respective developments. In how far these factors can be used to explain whether states do develop or not is not clear. In fact Winzeler seems to imply this in weighing the factors mentioned by Goody.

Before turning to the next part we will summarize our conclusions thus far:

Ecological differences, the development of endogamous groups, war and unrest, and population growth or pressure seem to be rather general influences not connected specifically with state formation. They are found to play a role in many other instances of social development as well. It must be stated, however, that in a number of cases a direct influence of one or more of these factors in the process of state formation can be demonstrated. This holds especially for war, which appeared to be responsible for the actual establishment of the state in the great majority of cases.

Ideology — in the sense of religion, kinship principles, or legitimation — seems to be conditional: without a 'favorable' ideology the process of state formation becomes very difficult. It should perhaps be considered a necessary condition.

Commerce, long-distance trade and technological innovations often seem to play a specific role in the emergence of the state. It does not seem possible, however, to regard one of these as a necessary or a sufficient condition.

This analysis also leads to another conclusion. We have stated several times that no single variable or combination of variables can be used to formulate an effective theory of early state origin. It does not seem probable that another case study, or a number of case studies will reveal a combination of particularistic variables

explaining all cases. Therefore, the primary problem appears to be one of theory, not one of more data. This theory must address the question of why states develop.

It is true that all cases of state development represent particular historical processes. It seems probable, however, that behind these particular and specific developments are hidden more general causes, general problems or needs of society which call forth the development of the state. These general problems must most probably be sought at a higher level of abstraction than the one represented by the variables mentioned above. These in fact seem more directed towards answering the question how a state developed – not why. 1

Probably only when the answers to these two different questions are available will it be possible to attack successfully the question of what the early state is, and more generally what is the state?

2. STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

Though not mentioned explicitly, the New Delhi conference on The Study of the State concentrated mainly upon the early state. The comments in this paragraph, therefore, are limited to this specific type of state.

Though for a strictly evolutionary approach the so-called secondary states are less interesting, for a discussion of the structural aspects of the early state they can profitably be included (cf. Cherry 1978: 417). Secondary states, as distinguished from pristine states by Fried (1967, 1978: 37) and others (Lewis 1966; Khazanov 1978: 78 ff., Price 1978: 170 ff.), are posterior in the chronological sense, and by definition arose in a sociopolitical field complicated by the presence of more developed polities in the vicinity. However, the case study presented here by Seneviratne is a good illustration of Cherry's assertion (1978: 415) 'that for many so-called secondary states the development of hierarchy, heterogeneity, and complexity was largely an intrasystemic process in its own right, whatever the initial factor(s) that sparked it off'. Seneviratne investigates in detail the formation of two states, Kalinga (modern Orissa) and Andhra (modern Andra Pradesh) both of which arose under the influence

of the Mauryan state (for Maurya, see Thapar 1975: 70 ff.; Seneviratne 1978). But both regions had already undergone considerable development towards statehood before the long arm of the Maurya reached them. The rather complex stratified societies were incorporated in the empire, and princes of royal blood appointed as viceroys. However, it is doubtful whether the imperial administration ever possessed sufficient resources to cover the village and district levels. The political role of the local elites, therefore, remained considerable. After the decline of their imperial masters they took over the position of the Mauryan administrators. Having adopted Indian political and cultural sophistication, they could easily legitimate their new positions and consolidate themselves as the rulers of early states.

A secondary state, especially when based upon conquest, does not always have a more developed political system than its predecessor. Old structures may be destroyed and replaced by less sophisticated ones. Knowledge and experience may not be assimilated. The process of state formation, therefore, is not necessarily always cumulative (Khazanov, above and 1978; Pershits and Khazanov 1978; see, however, Perlin above).

We must also realize that state systems do not necessarily spread to all societies in the region; Cohen (1978a: 154) mentions several instances of locally autonomous societies of the Borno plain (northeast Nigeria) which remained uncentralized while others developed into states.

How early states developed further and gradually grew out of the limitations proposed for this type of state (Claessen 1978b: 589 ff., Claessen and Skalník 1978: 619 ff.; Skalník, above) can be seen in the chapters by Narain and Perlin in this volume.

The Kushāna state was a secondary state, and the rapid development of its social and economic organization justifies Narain's suggestion that Kushāna in the end belonged to a 'posttransitional' type, and perhaps should no longer be seen as an 'early state' (cf. Section 3 below).

The developments described by Perlin cover nearly the whole Indian subcontinent over a period of some three centuries. With bold strokes he pictures this grandiose panorama, and repeatedly tries to lay bare the evolutionary and structural frame far under the surface of events. In his opinion the political evolution of the state in India by no means ended in classical times. On the

contrary, new sociopolitical structures recurrently came into existence. In fact, each time conquerors founded new states, new ideas and new structures were added to the already existing ones so that the whole process of political development was cumulative. In this process, he thinks, the real force behind the stage was not the influence of individual despotic rulers, but 'rather... a response to more impersonal forces connected with the development of society and with the particular history of the times'.

From this point of view the states discussed by Perlin — and especially the Maratha state — must be considered early states. Based upon the same considerations, we regarded twelfth-century France as an early state (Teunis 1978). But though in both cases the state developed in its own right, it did so in an area where states had previously or still existed. In this respect we feel justified in adding the epithet 'secondary', to 'early state'.

It is interesting to consider how far these findings are of use to archeologists concerned with problems of state formation (cf. Cherry 1978). Their task is to deduce the sociocultural contents from the 'form' of the material remains. In an effort to overcome this difficulty the archeologist Wright defines the state as 'a cultural development with a centralized decision-making process which is both externally specialized with regard to the local processes which it regulates and internally specialized in that the central process is divisible into separate activities which can be performed in different places at different times' (1977: 383).

To illustrate his view Wright gives a lengthy description of the administrative process connected with the construction of an irrigation canal in the state of Larsa (Greater Mesopotamia, 1880 B.C.), based upon a study of a fragmentary cuneiform archive. There is no reason to discuss the analysis, which clearly shows that Larsa had attained state level. It is not clear, however, whether this conclusion could have been reached without the evidence of written documents. Another problem is that the definition developed by Wright can be used for most multinationals, trade unions, and even some universities, too. The principal characteristic which distinguishes the state from other forms of social organization, political dominance, the legitimate power to enforce decisions, is not included. That Wright had to

struggle with this problem is evident from his less than clear statements on the beginning of the state, which he dates as 3700 B.C., while the emergence of state government is placed by him in 2500 B.C. (1977: 386). Does this imply the existence of states without governments for about twelve hundred years? It may be true that in the first case (3700 B.C.) a complex decision-making organization is already present, but whether it qualifies as a state cannot be determined from the rather poor data. A stratified society might have qualified as well, and here the enforcement mechanisms are only slightly developed (cf. Fried 1967).

The question of the implementation of decisions is discussed extensively by Wright's colleague Johnson (1978a: 100 ff.), who also approaches political organization with a decision-making model. He suggests that if status differences are positively related to differences in influence, incorporation of differentially higher status in a decision-making hierarchy should increase the probability of decision implementation. To this he adds that 'the development of regular status inheritance may reduce problems of recruitment, training, and continuity' (ibid.: 100). This may also lead to an increased competition for the throne when the ruler dies (see Kandert 1978). Johnson rightly points to the fact that often 'the ethnographic record fails to distinguish between ostensible administrative role and actual administrative function'. or put in other words, 'a king may reign, but a council of ministers may rule' (ibid.: 104). Yet the reverse of this can exist, too. In Dahomey, for instance, the ruler could by a competent balanceof-power policy outrule the council of ministers (cf. Claessen 1979: 186).

Johnson also mentions the problem of cost/benefit in political organizations (1978a: 105 ff.; cf. also Service 1975 and Fried 1978: 38 ff.). When the costs of organizing and integrating become too high (in the form of stress, or high taxations) the system may collapse (for an example, see Sahlins 1972: 142 ff.).

Another archeological — or rather geographical — approach to forms of social organization, the spatial (or regional) analysis, is also discussed by Johnson (1977, and in press). This approach, too, rests 'on assumptions about the nature of human decision-making' (1977: 479). It is assumed that spatial decisions are made in the context of attempted minimization, maximization, or optimization of certain variables, especially minimization of

energy expended in movement (ibid.: 479). Several models have been developed to explain spatial configurations of which Christ-aller's Central Place Theory is one of the best known. Though most of the models were meant to deal with locational behavior in complex modern societies the theory's basic approach is equally applicable to archeological, or ethnographical cases. (Johnson, 1978b).

To illustrate this, Johnson analyzes at great length data on the Sussiana and Warka areas in the Early Uruk period. In the end he concludes that there was no consistent relationship between form of rank-size distribution and degree of urbanization in these ancient systems. These results make him cautious in assuming a direct relationship between increasing population density and the state (1978b: 44 ff.). This seems to conform with our findings in the present chapter (see also Claessen and Skalník 1978: 625). Also Colin Renfrew (1977) has confidence in the possibilities of spatial analysis. In his opinion social groups will be recognizable in the archeological record, and therefore propositions can be tested with the help of archeological data (for a good example of this method, see Van de Velde 1979a, 1979b). True though this may be, it seems probable, generally speaking, that this kind of research will be possible only under very favorable conditions, for instance in Mesoamerica or Mesopotamia (e.g., Price 1977, 1978; Oates 1977). In other cases, for instance Bunyoro, Ankole, Tahiti, or Tonga, only very poor material remains survived for the archeologist to reconstruct the complex social organization (cf. e.g., Poulsen 1977).

One may conclude that though much is known of the structure of early states, ethnographical data will probably not be of great help to the archeologist.

3. NATURE OF THE (EARLY) STATE

When attempting to summarize some of the views on the nature of the state expressed in this volume, one cannot escape noting two mainstreams of thought. We will follow Cohen (1978c: 16 ff. and also this volume) in stating these two views. The one approaches the state more positivistically, more 'objectively'. For adherents of this view the state is neither bad, nor good — it is a

cultural phenomenon, like hunters and gatherers. Like all cultural activities it must be understood in its own terms. The other view combines scientific analysis with a certain ethic accounting. State systems are associated, once evolved, with an impressive magnification of differences in power and inequality. This feature gives the work of many scholars, theorists as well as field-workers, a tone of nonidentification when discussing the state. For example, Karl Marx in his *Ethnological Notebooks* (Krader 1972: 329) characterizes the state as an 'excrescence of society'. Apart from the question of whether this is only a metaphor or claims to be a scientific characterization, it certainly expresses antipathy towards the state as an historically transient phenomenon. Skalník (this volume) interprets the context of Marx's formulation by saying that the state is always the product of the historically evolved social forces.

When compared with other forms of sociopolitical organization the early state exhibits several specific characteristics (cf. Claessen and Skalnik 1978: 21 ff., 639 ff.), such as: a centralized government, which possesses the power to maintain law and order by means of authority as well as force or threat of force; the power to prevent fission; a *de facto* independence; a basic division of the population into rulers and the ruled; the production of a regular surplus, which is used for the maintenance of the state organization; a common ideology, etc.

Cohen (this volume) makes the capacity to prevent fission the key factor for separating the state from other forms of sociopolitical organization. The development of institutions to prevent fission is, in his words, 'the basic criterion separating states from nonstates', a view that comes very near the discussion of the concept of legitimation by Kurtz (above). Cohen's chapter is an elaboration of his views on the subject presented in earlier works (for example, Cohen 1978a, 1978b) and in The Early State we included this view in our criteria for statehood (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 21, 587, 609, 632, 639, 645). Though the capacity to prevent fission may be seen as only a specific form of the more general capacity of a centralized government to enforce decisions. to consider this criterion separately seems quite defensible. In doing this, however, one has to make clear how long a state has to exist in a nonfission situation before saying it obviously posseses the power to prevent fission? States are known in their history

to have encountered moments when fission became inevitable. We probably have to add specifications to the criterion of antifission, such as for instance a certain period of time during which no fission occurred, or, to state that the development of antifission institutions — apart from their success in prevention — in itself is a sufficient criterion for statehood.

Chiefdoms (as defined by Service 1975: 16), or stratified societies (as defined by Fried 1967: 186) are of a different nature (Claessen and Kloos 1978: 83 ff.). Though both have a more or less central leadership, political leaders in this case have no permanent legitimized power to enforce decisions (see, for example, Drucker-Brown's chapter). Nor is the ability to prevent fission present there. In chiefdoms as well as in stratified societies an emergent division of the population into two categories is found: the rulers and the ruled. The differences between the two groups, however, are not insurmountable and often based upon differences in kinship positions only. A tendency to develop marriage preferences can be found here. Instruments or institutions for systematically extracting a part of the surplus for use in the government of the group do exist, but they are not very well developed, and are often applied only incidentally. Neither tribute nor tributary gifts were the only source of livelihood for the leaders - as is the case in the early state (cf. Skalník, above; Claessen 1978b: 554). There is certainly a common ideology in tribal societies of the chiefdom and stratified type - perhaps even more widespread than in state societies. Here, as Kurtz demonstrated convincingly (this volume), the central authorities have to invest much energy in order to propagate their ideological legitimation, especially when other groups are incorporated into the state.

Unequal access to the means of production was purposely left out of the list of characteristics of the early state. Fried (1967: 185 ff.) already advanced the view that in societies which had not reached the state level, not all members of the same sex and equivalent age status had equal access to the basic resources. Several chapters in this volume confirm this view. For example Bonte convincingly demonstrates how different positions in the production process existed before a state developed, and the same can be said for the chapters by Bäck, Gunawardana, Steinhart, and Sugita (cf. also Cohen, this volume).

The discussion so far confirms the idea that the characteristic according to which the state is distinguished from other forms of sociopolitical organization is the legitimized power to maintain law and order, and to prevent fission (also Claessen and Skalník 1978: 630). Tamayo (this volume) even states in this respect that the existence of a system of social (legal) rules, laid down by a centralized authority, is a sufficient condition for the state. The state, in his opinion, cannot exist independently of its legal system. In fact, the only common institution of the citizens of the state is the legal order. This legal order is binding, not because the ruler has an actual superiority in physical strength, but because he is authorized to issue commands of a binding nature. His analyses in the end lead Tamayo to the conclusion that the essence of the state is the existence of a coercive legal apparatus that organizes society.

With this analysis we are no longer within the confines of the early state. The views of Tamayo are meant for all types of state.

We associated the early state (Claessen and Skalník 1978: 633) with the concepts of reciprocity, and genealogical distance from the sovereign as legitimizing components for social inequality and the power to enforce decisions. The more the early state developed, however, the weaker the role of these ideological components grew (see Vitkin, above).

Managerial and redistributive aspects become even more dominant (see Skalník 1978a p. 614, on the functional principles of redistributional exploitation and centralization). The more efficient governmental apparatus that developed after some time is quite capable of maintaining the state organization without the necessity of resorting to the ruler's supernatural powers, or perpetuating reciprocal obligations.

When the basic ideological concepts lose their meaning, the need for new concepts and new rationalizations becomes apparent. Important in this respect is the increasing orientation toward property. Land as the basic means of production becomes an object of private ownership and the state organization gradually becomes an instrument in the hands of members of that social class which is defined by its control of the means of production. It was in this way that we defined in *The Early State* (1978: 633 ff.) the end of the early state and the transformation to new types of sociopolitical organization, including the mature state. In the

present volume the chapter on Kushāṇa, by Narain, describes a state on the threshold of a new structure (and the same holds for the last part of Gunawardana's chapter on Sri Lanka). Agriculture, pastoral activities, handicrafts and extensive long-distance trade characterize the economy of the 'thousand cities of Bactria', facilitated by the development of a standardized money system. In the commercial enterprises merchant guilds gradually acquired prominence. The existence of groups of unfree laborers (whether serfs or slaves) is well documented.

Influences of the Indian varna, or caste system, are clearly recognizable in the social organization: the ruling group came to be considered as ksatriya and the traders vaisyas. The brahmana and sudra categories, however, did not emerge here. Narain's chapter, unfortunately, does not enable us to formulate a definitive answer to the question whether Kushāṇa already belonged to the posttransitional stage. Data on conditions such as the codification of laws and punishments, the private ownership of land, the existence of salaried officials, etc., are not available at the moment (cf. Claessen and Skalník 1978: 641, for characteristics of the transitional type of early state).

The state formations in India described by Perlin, however, clearly belong to a different type. The development of social classes, the complexity of the apparatus of state rule and the administrative technology are testimony to that fact. Here private property and feudalistic tendencies are found, and the ruling class is internally differentiated. Land surveys, tax reforms, and professionalism of the administration characterize this development. But whether the states of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Deccan and Gujerat should or should not be classified under the heading 'feudal' is a problem we shall not attempt to discuss at the moment.

A last question regarding the nature of the state is discussed by Thapar. She tries to define the often used — and misused concept of *empire*. In her opinion at least two types of empire can be distinguished, an *earlier* and a *later*. In both cases the empire is based upon a highly developed central state, the metropolitan state, and a periphery of conquered or subdued regions. The sociopolitical structures of these regions may differ greatly, varying from the band level to states, while the conquest may have been limited to only a part of these polities, namely those with an attractive economic potential. So far both types of empire are alike. The difference lies in the way in which the government of the metropolitan state organizes the relations with the peripheral regions. The earlier type of empire is characterized by a nonuniform way of dealing with the periphery. The structure of control will vary in accordance with the economy and the ecology of the area and the existing sociopolitical forms. The later type of empire is distinguished by a smaller range of differentiated systems, where the more primitive systems of food gathering, pastoralism, or primitive agricultural are marginal to a larger component of complex agrarian structures and commercial networks. Here the metropolitan state tends to invest in the more complex system, while the marginal economies are absorbed by the expansion.

This way of approaching the difficult concept of empire seems rewarding and lends itself well to application. For instance, the realm of the Incas (Schaedel 1978) or the state of the Carolingians (Ganshof 1971) can be characterized as earlier empires. The state of the Mughal (Perlin, above) may be classified as a later empire.

It seems difficult to apply the concept of the Asiatic mode of production to the rich and colorful patterns of reality that are brought forward in the chapters by Gunawaradana, Narain, Perlin, Seneviratne, Sugita, and Thapar. The conditions in these polities hardly appear to correspond to the picture of a rigid political structure of villages with a collective economy — identical with, but isolated from its neighbors — and bound tightly in the meshes of an administrative network, the control of which lay in the hands of a single ruler or a small ruling group appropriating the (small) surplus and giving in return real or fictive governmental services. (cf. Godelier 1969: 61 ff.; Hindess and Hirst 1975: 184; Krader 1975: 122 ff., 286 ff.; Vitkin 1977).

We agree with Hindess and Hirst when they say that the Asiatic mode of production is a concept, and as such it is general and abstract; the limits of the construction of a concept are not whether a reality corresponding to it exists or not (Hindess and Hirst 1975: 179; cf. Krader 1975: 327 ff.). However, constructing concepts just as an intellectual exercise does not seem to be a very rewarding activity. Concepts, in fact, are developed for better understanding or explaining social reality.

From Krader's monographs (1972: 31-43, 1975), Gunawardana's

compact analysis (1976) of the precolonial Indian social formations in the writings of Marx and Vitkin's analysis (1977), it is evident that Marx based his views upon a wide variety of sources. It also becomes apparent from these works that Marx constantly tested the validity of his views against new material that became available to him (Gunawardana 1976: 371). Marx recognized in the end several forms of land tenure in Asia (communal property, private property, feudal property, developed feudal property), though his interest was focused mainly on the first of these forms (Gunawardana 1976: 377). The characteristics of the village community, or the position and functions of the state and its relations with the village communities were reformulated several times by Marx (idem 1976: 383, 385; Krader 1972, 1975: 306 ff.; Vitkin 1977). Inspired by Marx's scholarly attitude, we think that the many recent and thorough studies of ancient India's history may again bring about a reconsideration of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production - a reconsideration based not only upon new data, which are bountiful, but also upon the development of new interpretations of the nature of organization, as Perlin points out.

An interesting question is how to connect the conception of empire, as stated above, to the concept of the early state. That a metropolitan state requires more than the structure of the inchoate early state is clear, but how much more? The Incas, for instance, were classified as a typical early state (Claessen 1978b: 589-593). Maurya appeared to be of the transitional type (ibid.). The empire of the Carolingians most probably can be classified as being of the transitional type, too. We therefore think that at least a number of early states were at the same time earlier empires. There is no a priori reason, however, to think that all earlier empires fell within the confines of the early state.

4. SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF EARLY STATES

The above exposé of the three main themes discussed by the participants at the New Delhi conference introduces the question of methodology in the study of the early state. What is the nature of the questions various authors interested in the state phenomenon

pose themselves, and what are the ways or approaches for reaching answers to them?

Sometimes it may seem that the questions and approaches differ so much that attempting to bring about constructive cooperation between the representatives of various streams of thought is a waste of time. Social science is in that case compared with a battlefield of irreconcilable ideologies. Instead of addressing the substance, 'Marxist' and 'bourgeois' labels are tacked on scholars and their works. By editing The Early State we wanted to show that communication between 'schools' and methodological approaches is not only possible but highly profitable, at least for We feel that confrontations between ideological persuasions alone, like theological disputes, usually contribute little to the advancement of scientific knowledge. At the same time, we are not blind to the fact that whatever the intensity of striving for objective scientific explanations, every scholar is influenced by traditions, beliefs, and persuasions in his or her societal environment. It is futile to call for totally impartial science when we face social problems. Social science, however, is not identical with ideology unless the latter dissolves into the former.

We must now consider the current positions of the 'schools' in the study of early states. Can we really distinguish constructively between Marxist and non-Marxist? Does it make sense to break down in their turn these broad approaches into separate schools and streams?

In his chapter Lloyd attempts to characterize the Marxist research on West African kingdoms and compare it with his own study of the Yoruba early states. He contrasts two Marxist schools, one 'evolutionary', the other 'structural': the one is more or less limited to eastern Europe, the other to France. This would appear to be a rather schematic division. For example, within French Marxist anthropology or ethnology one observes clear differentiations and even sharp oppositions (cf. *Dialectiques* 21, 1977). There are also great differences among other Marxists. Some are indeed oriented toward evolution seeing the question of the early state as a link in the chain of organically inevitable events. But the 'evolutionary Marxists' are perhaps a minority now, and some of them seriously study qualitative changes too.² There is little reason to believe that the various streams within Marxist thought are limited to one country or one ideologically

defined group of countries (see also Diamond 1979).

What was apparent at the New Delhi conference was that an ever more influential group of scholars exists who are interested in generalizing via the study of the characteristic features of concrete social processes. The origin and early development of the state constitute for them a turning point in history with its own structural characteristics. They claim that it is necessary to learn more about particular cases of social differentiation, formation of hierarchy, production process, etc., before any general conclusion about class formation, exploitation and the formation of the state can be drawn. This is precisely the field where scholars from various scientific traditions can find each other, and where cooperation opens up wide perspectives for scientific progress (cf. a number of contributions to *The Early State*; Danilova 1971).

There is no guarantee that scholars who were able to do intensive field research would reach truer conclusions about early states than those who were not. Historical and comparative analyses seem to be very useful ways, too, to achieve adequate answers to why and how the early state became an historical reality. On the one hand, there are the 'library' researches of Kubbel', Kochakova, Gurevich or Skalník to testify to the usefulness of the works of non-field-workers (see Gellner 1979; Kubbel' 1974; Skalník 1971, 1978b; Kochakova 1978; Gurevich 1978). On the other hand, as Lloyd (above) as well as Godelier (1978a, 1979) pointed out, the application of theoretical concepts such as 'mode of production' or 'social class' sometimes causes problems in the work of Terray (1972; cf. Semenov 1975) or Meillassoux (1964), both distinguished field-workers.

Godelier's (1978a, 1978b) postulation of the dominance of politics, religion, or kinship in precapitalist social structures with the determination of the substructure (or infrastructure) being characterized by functions but not by different institutions seems to be a promising way out of the difficulties in trying to connect findings from non-Western cultures with the more general body of (Marxist) theory (see Claessen 1978c: 769).

Controversy between (some) Marxists and (some of) their opponents often revolves around the concept of class and its applicability to non-European social contexts (cf. Lloyd, above). Marx's ideas are often treated as economic determinism³ and the class concept is thus reduced to an economic one. Sellnow (above)

generalizes from a relatively limited source basis about the typical ways of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa. She enumerates mainly technological and economic factors as causes of social inequality and the state. Her approach exemplifies the attempt to formulate a general periodization for this region (cf. Krader 1976a: Thus only the general stages of African history are outlined in her chapter. However, some of her concepts, such as 'ancient oriental class society' and 'feudal society' would need elaboration, as well as the relation between state and society (on confusion between the two see Skalník's chapter), or between state and nation (see Cohen 1969; Kurtz 1978 and above). Limitations of space unfortunately prevented the analysis of the development of social labor and commodity transactions in communities and societies in Africa, i.e., the dynamics of the dialectical unity of productive forces and production relations. Speaking on a higher level of abstraction, however, the sequences of inventions and events as exposed by Sellnow fit the facts, and the evolutionary process connected by her to the formation of African states gives an impression of reality. However, if one tries to analyze the developments at the grass-roots level, the relations and interdependencies appear to be much more complex than could possibly be shown in this summary.

Does this mean that attempts at using Marx's or Marxist concepts in the analysis of early states are condemned to little success? Danilova (1971: 307-308) warns against the mechanistic usage of Marx's methodological tools:

The discussions revealed with particular clarity the inadequacy of the logical apparatus used by historians in the theoretical analysis of precapitalist societies. This apparatus was developed on the basis of the political economy of capitalism, but the modes of production and the structures derived from them under capitalism and in the precapitalist era are fundamentally different. The meaning of such extremely important notions as those of relationships of production, property, social organism, etc., proves significantly different in the precapitalist epoch and in the capitalist. It is precisely the inadequacy of the logical apparatus, the fact that it did not fit the subject matter, which led to the failure of the model to accommodate social structures transitional between preclass society and the class epoch. Here, too, lies the reason for disputes on the role of the economy in the evolution of the primitive social order. The stumbling block in finding the solution to many questions in the theory of precapitalist social orders was the fact that the mechanism of corresponding processes in capitalist society was projected back upon these orders.

Vitkin above compares Marx with Weber, after showing in earlier works the considerable changes in Marx's understanding in the course of his lifetime of the oriental states (Vitkin 1972, 1977). Vitkin finds that what he calls the primary state as opposed to the modern. European state was understood by both scholars as an inferior political form of the latter. Marx tried to overcome Eurocentric historical reductionism and proposed in the last years of his life the concept of primary (or archaic) and secondary (or civilized) social formation (cf. Skalník 1975). Contrary to Marx, Weber, preferred the way of formal, methodological clarifications of the culturally determined limitations and capabilities of sociohistorical knowledge. Vitkin underlines the importance of the study of 'primary states' for an understanding of the various ways of state formation. He feels that this study can facilitate the methodological revision of traditional forms of monism, still influential in modern social theory. Concepts such as class and state should be given new meaning devoid of Eurocentric bias. Godelier's dialectic of determination and dominance in tackling problems of substructure is, from our point of view, not far from Vitkin's epistemology.

The concept of the early state has been used in anthropological, historical, and archeological literature for some time. In *The Early State* (1978) Claessen and Skalník as well as some of the other contributors to the volume, gave this concept a more exact, empirically verifiable content. The original temporal denomination — early as simply preceding later, full-grown or mature, even modern — was made more precise.

The vision of the state as only a political phenomenon or a concept of political anthropology, political science or political history was refuted in this collection. In the present volume, Skalník tries to develop further the ideas expressed by him in The Early State (1978: 469-494, 597-618) as well as those of Claessen and the joint conclusions in the book (1978: 619-650).

Skalník discusses some Marxist implications of the usage of the term early state itself. He feels that the place of the early state among other categories should be more clearly defined, especially in relation to the concept of society. Referring to Marx and Krader he points out that the early state, as any other state, is an outgrowth or derivate of a divided society. However, the relations

between society and the state have to be studied in their full complexity in each particular case. The development of social and political economy - i.e. social labor, production of commodities and their exchange, etc. - is considered by him as a factor within society (or acting from the outside) which brought about class differentiation and eventually also the early state. Now the question should be whether these factors are the real causes of the state (answer to the why question) or mere dependent variables, respectively methods, of the resolution of problems inherent in the functioning of large social entities. Skalník suggests that the key concept for the study of postprimitive (following primary formation) societies is that of civil society (see Krader 1976a), and sees class formation as a viewpoint from which one can best tackle the relationships between civil society, the state, and political economy. He further discusses the relations between tribute, tax, and rent in the early state. He finds that what is decisive for the specificity of the early state is the character of the extraction of the surplus product: tax and rent in his opinion form an indistinguishable unity, whereas tribute might at best serve as a name for this unity. Otherwise, tribute is a rather vague term with various usages. It must be tested whether the term 'prestation' (proposed by Muller) will prove useful. The early state rests therefore upon the syncretic unity of public and private principles within early civil society. Skalník's usage of what can be called the method of dialectical historism may give the impression of smoothness, which is however, only apparent and may be due to abstractness. The application of this theoretical framework to research on concrete early states (as he is currently doing in northern Ghana) will be the proof of the pudding.

Examples of the application of Marxist methodology were provided in this volume among others by Bonte and Steinhart. While Bonte in his argumentation apparently owes much to French structural and atemporal thinking, Steinhart stresses the historicogenetic technique of investigation. Both use the term class structure (class order) as opposed to class relations. The former is practically synonymous with social stratification, the latter with economic structure. Bonte's analysis uncovers the existence of classes without the state, while in other cases the state may be a condition for class formation (or in fact, 'class structure persists directly in the form of the state'). Bonte, unlike Steinhart or

Katz and Kemnitzer (1979), does not present a clear chronological framework for the early states he studies. This illustrates the contrast between 'structural' and 'historical' Marxists (see Katz and Kemnitzer 1979 and Lloyd, above). A problem here is that the different authors also seem to have slightly different ideas of the concept of class, which makes a thorough evaluation of the matter rather difficult.

There are also contributors to this collection who have implicit or explicit Marxist inclinations but who seem to be less explicit in using Marxist methodology or concepts. This is probably connected with difficulties they have in applying formal Marxist concepts in the analysis of more specific developments in non-Western cultures within the broad theme of the early state. For example, Abélès discusses whether the sociopolitical organizations he describes can be considered as states because the ruling group did not 'operate as a dominant class' (cf. Abélès 1978). Bäck is very careful in using the concept of 'social class' in his otherwise explicit revision of the theories of stratification in precolonial Bonte pleads for a new Marxist Rwanda (cf. Bäck 1976). conceptualization and tries, as shown above, to give an example of new usages (cf. Bonte 1977). Gunawardana, who recently contributed a theoretical article on Marx's analysis of precolonial Asia, mentioned in Section 3 of this chapter (1976), employs but few Marxist tools in his treatment of the historical developments in Sri Lanka. This in spite of the fact that his theme hinges on the interplay of a society based on irrigation economy and the state organization.

Sugita's assertion that the agricultural community in ancient Japan was born out of class formation may have a revolutionary effect on our methodology because it was — for lack of other evidence until now — automatically supposed that there is continuity of the community (at least in form) before and after class society and the state were formed. The same argument against a spontaneous development of village communities can be found in the article by Katz and Kemnitzer (1979). Khazanov (personal communication) points out the fact that no general rule can be formulated with respect to the continuity of the village community. Whether or not there is continuity through the period of class or state formation, the peasant cannot exist without his community. This may explain the fact that in cases

where the village community is disrupted, people try to reestablish it where possible. Sugita's explanation of the Asiatic mode of production in ancient Japan revolves around the transformation of village communities themselves; the whole picture is much more complex than was thought earlier!

Perhaps Lloyd is not far from the truth when he asks in his chapter for clarity in the usage of the concept of class and when he suggests that other concepts can only be applied with difficulty to richly diversified social processes. How complex the relationship between social factors and analytic concepts can be, is seen in some of the more descriptive chapters. Steinhart, for example, compares two coexisting economic systems: a pastoral one, based upon cattle breeding, and an agricultural one, oriented towards the production of millet. The dynasties ruling there successively had different relationships to both systems. Regular periods of drought complicated matters greatly. To this must be added that one of the dynasties, the Bito, eventually acquired an interest though by no means a monopoly – in the long-distance trade in salt and iron. This helped the Bito to strengthen their position. However, several important political aspects of a state were lacking according to Steinhart. Only in the course of the next two centuries did the Bito rulers succeed in founding a real state. In this process, however, not only economic, but to a great extent also social and ideological factors played a role. For Katz and Kemnitzer ideology can even be considered as a kind of production relation (cf. Godelier 1978a, 1978b).

In the light of these complexities there are those scholars who question whether there are any determining factors at all in social and political development. It seems to them that it is rather a combination of various factors, including the capabilities of individual persons, which is responsible for the development of inequality in society (cf. Dahrendorf 1970). Cohen, Kurtz, Lewis, and Claessen try in this volume to apply a comparative approach to the study of early states in which various factors are at the outset supposed to have relatively equal importance. These authors differ in their interest in the historical dimensions but they agree upon a comparative search for the role of various factors in the formation and early development of the state. Cohen uses what is known as the 'method of controlled comparison': his cases are generally similar, but differ in one or two

respects. In this way it is possible to study the consequences of limited differences for the evolution of different political systems (cf. also Cohen 1978a). Claessen and Kurtz added a quantitative technique to their comparative approach. One can ask here what is the comparability of the rather heterogeneous data they try to compare in samples of early states? Should not mutual relations among the factors and phenomena be discussed first before one goes looking for the extent of their diffusion?

The answer to these questions must be that a comparison of only disconnected heterogeneous data merely to establish which one is more widespread than others would be a superfluous, nonscientific activity. However, neither in the chapters in the current volume, nor in *The Early State* is such an approach found. There Claessen, after careful consideration, selected for comparison a number of functionally connected features from the descriptive part, and with the help of that comparison he formulated a number of empirical generalizations concerning the early state. In this volume he proceeds in the reverse way: he gathers data relating to African kingship and after comparison finds a number of features which seem to be relevant for all cases under consideration. Then he demonstrates these features to be the specific expressions of an underlying ideological pattern. Kurtz, for his part, studies the phenomenon of legitimation and compares. for a few selected cases, the features found in this connection. He then succeeds in grouping together his findings in a number of sequences, which form a coherent structural pattern.

NOTES

- For inspiration in reaching this conclusion and on the difference between these two questions, we thank Professor Gregory Johnson, personal communication.
- 2. On the relation between evolution and revolution, and the evolutionist and dialecticohistorical approaches, see Krader 1976b.
- 3. The recent treatment of Marx's theory of history by William Shaw (1978: 81) holds that the essence of Marx's doctrine is the technological determinism of productive forces:

'Marx did see the growth of the productive forces as the prime mover of social development. The linking of this with particular social forms and the struggle between classes constitute what is peculiar to his perspective'.

- Godelier's position, recently summarized once again (1978b), is much more loose on the role of economic relations and production as such, as determinants of society.
- 4. This, of course, is not to deny that differentiation in the process of production can lead to social differentiation. It is, however, to stress that it is by no means the only way to reach social inequality. A good illustration of this can be found in the activities of Kaobawa, the leader of a group of Yanomamö Indians, described by Chagnon (1968). His most important task seemed to be to arbitrate in the never-ending quarrels of his covillagers. Because of his intelligence and courage his influence was great. Moreover, he managed to marry several women with whose help he produced a small surplus of food which he used for entertaining his supporters. His brothers, living in the same village, shared his wives, and in this way were more or less obliged to assist him when problems arose, His brothers-in-law, to whom he had given his sisters in exchange for support, had the same obligation. It is not the different place in the system of production that made Kaobawä the leader, for he did the same work as other men. It was the combination of intellect, courage, energy, and ability in manipulating people and resources which brought him to this position (cf. also Lévi-Strauss 1967).

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